






NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE



TRENT UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY





6ads


k4



E. Stead

2 Hyde Park Gardens

London



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2019 with funding from  
Kahle/Austin Foundation



*B. M. Villain*  
*April 1945.*

# HISTORY

179.

OF THE

## WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

COLONEL 27TH REGIMENT,

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF  
MILITARY SCIENCES.

*NEW EDITION, REVISED BY THE AUTHOR.*

VOL. I.

LONDON:

THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE,

NEW BOND STREET.

MDCCCLXII.

DC 231. N. 223 1862 v. 1



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

DEDICATION . . . . .	xiii
PREFACE . . . . .	xv
NOTICE TO THE READER, OBSERVATIONS ON M. THIERS &c. . . . .	xvi

## BOOK THE FIRST.

### CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
------------------------	---

### CHAPTER II.

Dissensions in the Spanish court—Secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau—Junot's army enters Spain—Dupont's and Moncey's corps enter Spain—Duhesme's corps enters Catalonia—Insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid—Charles the Fourth abdicates—Ferdinand proclaimed king—Murat marches to Madrid—Refuses to recognise Ferdinand as king—The sword of Francis the First delivered to the French general—Savary arrives at Madrid—Ferdinand goes to Bayonne—Charles the Fourth goes to Bayonne—The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, and Barcelona, treacherously seized by the French—Riot at Toledo 23rd of April, Tumult at Madrid 2nd of May, Charles the Fourth abdicates a second time in favour of Napoleon—Assembly of notables at Bayonne—Joseph Buonaparte declared king of Spain—Arrives at Madrid . . . . .	p. 8
--	------

### CHAPTER III.

Council of Castille refuses to take the oath of allegiance—Supreme junta established at Seville—Marquis of Solano murdered at Cadiz, and the conde d'Aguilar at Seville—Intercourse between Castaños and sir Hew Dalrymple—General Spencer and admiral Purvis offer to co-operate with the Spaniards—Admiral Rossily's squadron surrenders to Morla—General insurrection—Massacre at Valencia—Horrible murder of Filanghieri . . . . .	20
--	----

### CHAPTER IV.

New French corps formed in Navarre—Duhesme fixes himself at Barcelona—Importance of that city—Napoleon's military plan and arrangements . . . . .	28
---	----

## CHAPTER V.

First operations of marshal Bessières—Spaniards defeated at Cabeçon, at Segovia, at Logroño, at Torquemada—French take Santander—Lefebvre Desnouettes defeats the Spaniards on the Ebro, on the Huecha, on the Xalon—First siege of Zaragoza—Observations . . . . . p. 39

## CHAPTER VI.

Operations in Catalonia—General Swartz marches against the town of Manresa, and general Chabran against Taragona—French defeated at Bruch—Chabran recalled—Burns Arbos—Marches against Bruch—Retreats—Duhesme assaults Gerona—Is repulsed with loss—Action on the Llobregat—General insurrection of Catalonia—Figueras blockaded—General Reille relieves it—First siege of Gerona—The marquis of Palacios arrives in Catalonia with the Spanish troops from the Balearic isles, declared captain-general under St. Narcissus, re-establishes the line of the Llobregat—The count of Caldagues forces the French lines at Gerona—Duhesme raises the siege and returns to Barcelona—Observations—Moncey marches against Valencia, defeats the Spaniards at Pajaso, at the Siete Aguas, and at Quarte—Attacks Valencia, is repulsed, marches into Murcia—Forces the passage of the Xucar, defeats Serbelloni at San Felipe, arrives at San Clemente—Insurrection at Cuenca, quelled by general Caulaincourt—Observations . . . . . 47

## CHAPTER VII.

Second operations of Bessières—Blake's and Cuesta's armies unite at Benevente—Generals disagree—Battle of Rio Seco—Bessières' endeavour to corrupt the Spanish generals fails—Bessières marches to invade Gallicia, is recalled, and falls back to Burgos—Observations . . . . . 64

## CHAPTER VIII.

Dupont marches against Andalusia, forces the bridge of Alcolea, takes Cordoba—Alarm at Seville—Castaños arrives, forms a new army—Dupont retreats to Andujar, attacks the town of Jaen—Vedel forces the pass of Despenas Perros, arrives at Baylen—Spanish army arrives on the Guadalquivir—General Gobert defeated and killed—Generals Vedel and Dufour retire to Carolina—General Reding takes possession of Baylen—Dupont retires from Andujar—Battle of Baylen—Dupont's capitulation, eighteen thousand French troops lay down their arms—Observations—Joseph holds a council of war, resolves to abandon Madrid—Impolicy of so doing . . . . . 71

## BOOK THE SECOND.

## CHAPTER I.

The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in England—Ministers precipitate—Imprudent choice of agents—Junot marches to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish contingent, enters Portugal, arrives at Abrantes, pushes on to Lisbon—Prince regent emigrates to the Brazils, reflections



on that transaction—Dangerous position of the French army—Portuguese council of regency—Spanish contingent well received—General Taranco dies at Oporto, is succeeded by the French general Quesnel—Solano's troops retire to Badajos—Junot takes possession of the Alentejo and the Algarves; exacts a forced loan; is created duke of Abrantes; suppresses the council of regency; sends the flower of the Portuguese army to France—Napoleon demands a ransom from Portugal—People unable to pay it—Police of Lisbon—Junot's military position; his character; political position—People discontented—Prophetic eggs—Sebastianists—The capture of Rossily's squadron known at Lisbon—Pope's nuncio takes refuge on board the English fleet—Alarm of the French . . . . . p. 85

## CHAPTER II.

The Spanish general Beleta seizes general Quesnel and retires to Galicia—Insurrection at Oporto—Junot disarms and confines the Spanish soldiers near Lisbon—General Avril's column returns to Estremoz—General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is attacked at Mezam Frias; crosses the Duero; attacked at Castro d'Airo; recalled to Lisbon—French driven out of the Algarves—The fort of Figueras taken—Abrantes and Elvas threatened—Setuval in commotion—General Spencer appears off the Tagus—Junot's plan—Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed—Colonel Maransin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots—The insurgents advance from Leiria, fall back—Action at Leiria—Loison arrives at Abrantes—Observations on his march—French army concentrated—The Portuguese general Leite, aided by a Spanish corps, takes post at Evora—Loison crosses the Tagus; defeats Leite's advanced guard at Montemor—Battle of Evora—Town taken and pillaged—Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards—Loison reaches Elvas; collects provisions; is recalled by Junot—Observations . . . . . 98

## CHAPTER III.

Political and military retrospect—Mr. Fox's conduct contrasted with that of his successors—General Spencer sent to the Mediterranean—Sir John Moore withdrawn from thence; arrives in England; sent to Sweden—Spencer arrives at Gibraltar—Ceuta, the object of his expedition—Spanish insurrection diverts his attention to Cadiz; wishes to occupy that city—Spaniards averse to it—Prudent conduct of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Collingwood—Spencer sails to Ayamonte; returns to Cadiz; sails to the mouth of the Tagus; returns to Cadiz—Prince Leopold of Sicily and the duke of Orleans arrive at Gibraltar—Curious intrigue—Army assembled at Cork by the Whig administration, with a view to permanent conquest in South America, the only disposable British force—Sir A. Wellesley takes the command—Contradictory instructions of the ministers—Sir John Moore returns from Sweden; ordered to Portugal—Sir Hew Dalrymple appointed commander of the forces—Confused arrangements made by the ministers . . . . . 106

## CHAPTER IV.

Sir A. Wellesley quits his troops and proceeds to Coruña—Junta refuse assistance in men, but ask for and obtain money—Sir Arthur goes to Oporto; arranges a plan with the bishop; proceeds to the Tagus;

rejoins his troops, joined by Spencer ; disembarks at the Mondego ; has an interview with General Freire d'Andrada ; marches to Leiria—Portuguese insurrection weak—Junot's position and dispositions—Laborde marches to Alcobaça, Loison to Abrantes—General Freire separates from the British—Junot quits Lisbon with the reserve—Laborde takes post at Roriça—Action of Roriça—Laborde retreats to Montachique—Sir A. Wellesley marches to Vimiero—Junot concentrates his army at Torres Vedras . . . . . p. 119

## CHAPTER V.

Portuguese take Abrantes—Generals Acland and Anstruther land and join the British army at Vimiero—Sir Harry Burrard arrives—Battle of Vimiero—Junot defeated—Sir Hew Dalrymple arrives—Armistice—Terms of it—Junot returns to Lisbon—Negotiates for a convention—Sir John Moore's troops land—State of the public mind in Lisbon—The Russian admiral negotiates separately—Convention concluded—The Russian fleet surrenders upon terms—Conduct of the people at Lisbon—The Monteiro Mor requires sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention—Sir John Hope appointed commandant of Lisbon : represses all disorders—Disputes between the French and English commissioners—Reflections thereupon . . . . . 132

## CHAPTER VI.

The bishop and junta of Oporto aim at the supreme power ; wish to establish the seat of government of Oporto ; their intrigues ; strange proceedings of general Decken ; reflections thereupon—Clamour raised against the convention in England and in Portugal ; soon ceases in Portugal—the Spanish general Galluzzo refuses to acknowledge the convention ; invests fort Lalippe ; his proceedings absurd and unjustifiable—Sir John Hope marches against him ; he alters his conduct—Garrison of Lalippe—March to Lisbon—Embarked—Garrison of Almeida ; march to Oporto ; attacked and plundered by the Portuguese—Sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard recalled to England—Vile conduct of the daily press—Violence of public feeling—Convention, improperly called, of Cintra—Observations—On the action of Roriça—On the battle of Vimiero—On the convention . . . . . 152

# BOOK THE THIRD.

## CHAPTER I.

Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people—The general opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, fallacious—Contracted policy of the English cabinet—Account of the civil and military agents employed—Many of them act without judgment—Mischievous effects thereof—Operations of the Spanish armies after the battle of Baylen—Murcian army arrives at Madrid—Valencian army marches to the relief of Zaragoza—General Verdier raises the siege—Castaños enters Madrid—Contumacious conduct of Galluzzo—Disputes



between Blake and Cuesta—Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards—Sagacious observation of Napoleon—Insurrection at Bilbao; quelled by general Merlin—French corps approaches Zaragoza—Palafox alarmed, threatens the council of Castille—Council of war held at Madrid—Plan of operations—Castaños unable to march for want of money—Bad conduct of the junta of Seville—Vigorous conduct of major Cox—Want of arms—Extravagant project to procure them . . . . . p. 174

## CHAPTER II.

Internal political transactions—Factions in Galicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castille—Flagitious conduct of the junta of Seville—Mr. Stuart endeavours to establish a northern cortes—Activity of the council of Castille; proposes a supreme government agreeable to the public—Local juntas become generally odious—Cortes meet at Lugo; declare for a central and supreme government—Deputies appointed—Clamours of the Gallician junta and bishop of Orense—Increasing influence of the council of Castille—Underhand proceedings of the junta of Seville, disconcerted by the quickness of the baily Valdez—Character of Cuesta; he denies the legality of the northern cortes, abandons the line of military operations, returns to Segovia, arrests the baily Valdez and other deputies from Lugo—Central and supreme government established at Aranjuez, Florida Blanca president—Vile intrigues of the local juntas—Cuesta removed from the command of his army; ordered to Aranjuez—Popular feeling in favour of the central junta; vain and interested proceedings of that body: its timidity, inactivity, and folly; refuses to name a generalissimo—Foreign relations—Mr. Canning leaves Mr. Stuart without any instructions for three months—Mr. Frere appointed envoy extraordinary, &c. . . . . 190

## CHAPTER III.

Political position of Napoleon; he resolves to crush the Spaniards; his energy and activity; marches his armies from every part of Europe towards Spain; his oration to his soldiers—Conference at Erfurth—Negotiations for peace—Petulant conduct of Mr. Canning—160,000 conscripts enrolled in France—Power of that country—Napoleon's speech to the senate—He repairs to Bayonne—Remissness of the English cabinet—Sir John Moore appointed to lead an army into Spain; sends his artillery by the Madrid road, and marches himself by Almeida—The central junta impatient for the arrival of the English army—Sir David Baird arrives at Coruña; is refused permission to disembark his troops—Mr. Frere and the marquis of Romana arrive at Coruña; account of the latter's escape from the Danish isles—Central junta resolved not to appoint a generalissimo—Gloomy aspect of affairs . . . . . 205

## CHAPTER IV.

Movements of the Spanish generals on the Ebro; their absurd confidence, their want of system and concert—General opinion that the French are weak—Real strength of the king—Marshal Ney and general Jourdan join the army—Military errors of the king exposed by Napoleon, who instructs him how to make war—Joseph proposes six plans of operation—Observations thereupon . . . . . 223

## CHAPTER V.

Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies—Blake moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro ; sends a division to Bilbao ; French retire from that town—Ney quits his position near Logroño, and retakes Bilbao—The armies of the centre and right approach the Ebro and the Aragon—Various evolutions—Blake attacks and takes Bilbao—Head of the grand French army arrives in Spain—The Castillians join the army of the centre—The Asturians join Blake—Apathy of the central junta—Castaños joins the army ; holds a conference with Palafox ; their dangerous position ; arrange a plan of operations—The Spaniards cross the Ebro—The king orders a general attack—Skirmish at Sanguessa, at Logroño, and Lerim—The Spaniards driven back over the Ebro—Logroña taken—Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish battalion surrenders at Lerim—Francisco Palafox, the military deputy, arrives at Alfaro ; his exceeding folly and presumption ; controls and insults Castaños—Force of the French army increases hourly ; how composed and disposed ; Blake ascends the valley of Durango—Battle of Zornosa—French retake Bilbao—Combat at Valmaceda—Observations, p. 236

## BOOK THE FOURTH.

## CHAPTER I.

Napoleon arrives at Bayonne—Blake advances towards Bilbao—The count Belvedere arrives at Burgos—The first and fourth corps advance—Combat of Guenes—Blake retreats—Napoleon at Vitoria ; his plan—Soult takes the command of the second corps—Battle of Gamonal—Burgos taken—Battle of Espinosa—Flight from Reynosa—Soult overruns the Montagna de Santander, and scours Leon—Napoleon fixes his head-quarters at Burgos, changes his front, lets 10,000 cavalry loose upon Castille and Leon—Marshals Lasnes and Ney directed against Castaños—Folly of the central junta—General St. Juan occupies the pass of the Somosierra—Folly of the generals on the Ebro—Battle of Tudela . . . . . 252

## CHAPTER II.

Napoleon marches against the capital ; forces the pass of the Somosierra—St. Juan murdered by his men—Tumults in Madrid—French army arrives there ; the Retiro stormed—Town capitulates—Remains of Castaños's army driven across the Tagus ; retire to Cuenca—Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles, clergy, and tribunals of Madrid—His vast plans, enormous force—Defenceless state of Spain . . . 266

## CHAPTER III.

Sir John Moore arrives at Salamanca ; hears of the battle of Espinosa—His dangerous position ; discovers the real state of affairs ; contemplates a hardy enterprise ; hears of the defeat of Tudela ; resolves to retreat ; waits for general Hope's division—Danger of that general ; his able conduct—Central junta fly to Badajos—Mr. Frere, incapable of judging rightly, opposes the retreat ; his weakness and levity ; insults the general ; sends colonel Charnilly to Salamanca—Manly conduct of sir John Moore ; his able and bold plan of operations, 279



## CHAPTER IV.

British army advances towards Burgos—French outposts surprised at Rueda—Letter from Berthier to Soult intercepted—Direction of the march changed—Mr. Stuart and a member of the junta arrive at headquarters—Arrogant and insulting letter of Mr. Frere—Noble answer of sir John Moore—British army united at Mayorga; their force and composition—Inconsistent conduct of Romana; his character—Soult's position and forces; concentrates his army at Carrion—Combat of cavalry at Sahagun—The British army retires to Benevente—The emperor moves from Madrid, passes the Guadarama, arrives at Torde-sillas, expects to interrupt the British line of retreat, fails—Bridge of Castro Gonzalo destroyed—Combat of cavalry at Benevente—General Lefebvre taken—Soult forces the bridge of Mansilla; takes Leon—The emperor unites his army at Astorga; hears of the Austrian war; orders marshal Soult to pursue the English army, and returns to France, p. 296

## CHAPTER V.

Sir John Moore retreats towards Vigo; is closely pursued—Miserable scene at Bembibre—Excesses at Villa Franca—Combat at Calcabellos—Death of general Colbert—March to Nogales—Line of retreat changed from Vigo to Coruña—Skilful passage of the bridge of Constantino; skirmish there—The army halts at Lugo—Sir John Moore offers battle; it is not accepted; he makes a forced march to Betanzos; loses many stragglers; rallies the army; reaches Coruna—The army takes a position—Two large stores of powder exploded—Fleet arrives in the harbour; army commences embarking—Battle of Coruña—Death of sir John Moore—His character . . . . . 313

## CHAPTER VI.

Observations—The conduct of Napoleon and that of the English cabinet compared—The emperor's military dispositions examined—Propriety of sir John Moore's operations discussed—Diagram, exposing the relative positions of Spanish, French, and English armies—Propriety of sir John Moore's retreat discussed; and the question, whether he should have fallen back on Portugal or Galicia, investigated—Sir John Moore's judgment defended; his conduct calumniated by interested men for party purposes; eulogized by marshal Soult, by Napoleon, by the duke of Wellington . . . . . 335

## BOOK THE FIFTH.

## CHAPTER I.

Slight effect produced in England by the result of the campaign—Debates in parliament—Treaty with Spain—Napoleon receives addresses at Valladolid—Joseph enters Madrid—Appointed the emperor's lieutenant—Distribution of the French army—The duke of Dantzie forces the bridge of Almaraz—Toledo entered by the first corps—Infantado and Palacios ordered to advance upon Madrid—Cuesta appointed to the command of Galluzzo's troops—Florida Blanca dies at Seville—Succeeded in the presidency by the marquis of Astorga—Moncey arrives

at Cadiz from Mexico—Bad conduct of the central junta—State of the Spanish army—Constancy of the soldiers—Infantado moves on Tarancon—His advanced guard defeated there—French retire towards Toledo—Disputes in the Spanish army—Battle of Ucles—Retreat of Infantado—Cartoajal supersedes him, and advances to Ciudad Real—Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge of Almaraz . . . . . p. 359

## CHAPTER II.

Operations in Aragon—Confusion in Zaragoza—The third and fifth corps invest that city—Fortification described—Monte Torrero taken—Attack on the suburb repulsed—Mortier takes post at Calatayud—The convent of San Joseph taken—The bridge-head carried—Huerba passed—Device of the Spanish leaders to encourage the besieged—Marquis of Lazan takes post on the Sierra de Alcubierre—Lasnes arrives in the French camp—Recals Mortier—Lazan defeated—Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo—The walls of the town taken by assault—General Lacoste and colonel San Genis slain . . . . . 369

## CHAPTER III.

System of terror—The convent of St. Monica taken—Spaniards attempt to retake it, but fail—St. Augustin taken—French change their mode of attack—Spaniards change their mode of defence—Terrible nature of the contest—Convent of Jesus taken on the side of the suburb—Attack of the suburb repulsed—Convent of Francisco taken—Mine exploded under the university fails, and the besieged are repulsed—The Cosso passed—Fresh mines worked under the university, and in six other places—French soldiers dispirited—Lasnes encourages them—The houses leading down to the quay carried by storm—An enormous mine under the university being sprung, that building is carried by assault—The suburb is taken—Baron Versage killed, and two thousand Spaniards surrender—Successful attack on the right bank of the Ebro—Palafox demands terms, which are refused—Fire resumed—Miserable condition of the city—Terrible pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged—Zaragoza surrenders—Observations . . . . . 380.

## CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr commands the seventh corps—Passes the frontier—State of Catalonia—Palacios fixes his head-quarters at Villa Franca—Duhesme forces the line of the Llobregat—Returns to Barcelona—English army from Sicily designed to act in Catalonia—Prevented by Murat—Duhesme forages El Vallés—Action of San Cugat—General Vives supersedes Palacios—Spanish army augments—Blockade of Barcelona—Siege of Rosas—Folly and negligence of the junta—Entrenchments in the town carried by the besiegers—Marquis of Lazan, with six thousand men, reaches Gerona—Lord Cochrane enters the Trinity—Repulses several assaults—Citadel surrenders 5th December—St. Cyr marches on Barcelona—Crosses the Ter—Deceives Lazan—Turns Hostalrich—Defeats Milans at San Celoni—Battle of Cardadeu—Caldagues retires behind the Llobregat—Negligence of Duhesme—Battle of Molino del Rey . . . . . 391

## CHAPTER V.

Tumult in Taragona—Reding proclaimed general—Reinforcements join the Spaniards—Actions at Bruch—Lazan advances, and fights at Castel Ampurias—He quarrels with Reding, and marches towards Zaragoza—Reding's plans—St. Cyr breaks Reding's line at Ilacuna—Actions at Capelades, Igualada, and St. Magi—French general, unable to take the abbey of Creus, turns it, and reaches Villardona—Joined by Souham's division, takes post at Valls and Pla—Reding rallies his centre and left wing—Endeavours to reach Taragona—Battle of Valls—Weak condition of Tortosa—St. Cyr blockades Taragona—Sickness in that city—St. Cyr resolves to retire—Chabran forces the bridge of Molino del Rey—Conspiracy in Barcelona fails—Colonel Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon—St. Cyr retires behind the Llobregat—Pino defeats Wimpfen at Tarrasa—Reding dies—His character—Blake is appointed captain-general of the *Coronilla*—Changes the line of operations to Aragon—Events in that province—Suchet takes the command of the French at Zaragoza—Colonel Perena and Baget oblige eight French companies to surrender—Blake advances—Battle of Alcanitz—Suchet falls back—Disorder in his army—Blake neglects Catalonia—St. Cyr marches by the valley of Congosto upon Vich—Action at the defile of Carriga—Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia—St. Cyr hears of the Austrian war—Barcelona victualled by a French squadron—Observations . . . . . p. 404

Justificatory Pieces . . . . . 425

Notes by general Harispe . . . . . 432

## APPENDIX.

No.

1. Observations on Spanish affairs by Napoleon . . . . . 433
2. Notes ditto ditto . . . . . 436
3. Ditto ditto ditto . . . . . 442
4. Ditto ditto ditto . . . . . 446
5. Ditto ditto ditto . . . . . 450
6. Plan of campaign by king Joseph . . . . . 453
7. Five Sections, containing four letters from Berthier to general Savary—One from marshal Berthier to king Joseph . . . 457
8. Four letters: Mr. Drummond to sir A. Ball—Ditto to sir Hew Dalrymple—Sir Hew Dalrymple to lord Castlereagh—Lord Castlereagh to sir Hew Dalrymple . . . . . 460
9. Two letters from sir Arthur Wellesley to sir Harry Burrard . . 462
10. Articles of the convention for the evacuation of Portugal . . 466
11. Three letters from brigadier-general Von Decken to sir Hew Dalrymple . . . . . 470
12. Two letters; general Leite to sir Hew Dalrymple—Sir H. Dalrymple to lieutenant-general Hope . . . . . 473
13. Nine Sections, containing justificatory extracts from sir John Moore's correspondence: Section I. Want of money—II. Relating to roads—III. Relating to equipments and supplies—IV. Relating to the want of information—V. Relating to the conduct of the local juntas—VI. Central junta—VII. Relating to the passive state of the people—VIII. Miscellaneous . . 475

No.	Page
14. Justificatory extracts from sir John Moore's correspondence . . . . .	489
15. Despatch from the conde de Belvedere relative to the battle of Gamonal . . . . .	491
16. Extract of a letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the author . . . . .	492
17. Letters from Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere . . . . .	492
18. Abstract of the military force of Great Britain, in 1808 . . . . .	497
Return of British troops embarked for Portugal and Spain . . . . .	497
19. Return of killed, &c., sir Arthur Wellesley's army . . . . .	498
20. British order of battle—Roliça . . . . .	498
21. British order of battle—Vimiero . . . . .	499
22. Return of sir Hew Dalrymple's army . . . . .	499
23. Embarkation return of the French under Junot . . . . .	500
24. Detail of troops; extracted from a minute-book made by the duke of York . . . . .	500
25. Order of battle: sir John Moore's army—Return of ditto, December 19th, 1808 . . . . .	501
26. Especial return of loss during sir John Moore's campaign . . . . .	502
27. States of the Spanish armies . . . . .	503
28. Five Sections, containing returns of the French armies in Spain and Portugal . . . . .	505
29. Three letters from lord Collingwood to sir Hew Dalrymple . . . . .	509
30. Extracts from the Imperial muster-rolls . . . . .	514
31. Do. from correspondence on the state of Spain . . . . .	518

---

## LIST OF PLATES.

---

1. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of Baylen . . . . .	<i>to face</i> 77
2. Sketch of the Combat of Roriça . . . . .	127
3. Sketch of the Battle of Vimiero . . . . .	134
4. Explanatory Sketch of the Campaign in Portugal . . . . .	165
5. Explanatory Sketch of the French Positions . . . . .	241
6. Explanatory Sketch of Blake's Position at the Battle of Zornoza . . . . .	247
7. Sketch of the Battle of Coruña . . . . .	327
8. Diagram . . . . .	347
9. Siege of Zaragoza . . . . .	373
10. Operations in Catalonia . . . . .	395



TO  
FIELD-MARSHAL  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

THIS History I dedicate to your Grace, because I have served long enough under your command to know, why the Soldiers of the Tenth Legion were attached to Cæsar.

W. F. P. NAPIER.



## PREFACE.

---

FOR SIX years the Peninsula was devastated by the war of independence. The blood of France, Germany, England, Portugal, and Spain was shed in the contest, and in each of those countries, authors, desirous of recording the sufferings or celebrating the valour of their countrymen, have written largely touching that fierce struggle. It may therefore be demanded, why a thrice-told tale should be renewed?

answer, that two men observing the same object will describe it diversely, according to the point of view from which either beholds it; in the eyes of one it shall be a fair prospect, to the other a barren waste, and neither may see aright! Wherefore, truth being the legitimate object of history, it is better that she should be sought for by many than by few, lest for want of seekers, amongst the mists of prejudice and the false lights of interest, she be lost altogether.

That much injustice has been done, much justice left undone by the authors who have hitherto written concerning this war, I can affirm from a personal knowledge of facts; that similar errors have been avoided in this version is more than may be safely assumed; but an endeavour has been made to render as impartial an account of the Peninsula campaigns as the feelings which must warp the judgment of a contemporary historian will permit. Having witnessed many of the transactions, and from a wide acquaintance with military men been enabled to consult many distinguished officers, French

and English, by whose superior knowledge my own impressions have been corrected, my work is offered to the world with less fear, and it certainly contains original and authentic statements which, without other merit, would suffice to give it interest. Many of those documents I owe to marshal Soult, who disdaining national prejudices placed them with the confidence of a great mind at my disposal without a remark to check the freedom of my judgment, and I take this opportunity to declare a respect, which I believe every British officer who has had the honour to serve against him feels for his military talents. By him the French cause in Spain was long upheld, and after the battle of Salamanca, if his counsel had been followed by the intrusive monarch, the fate of the war might have been changed.

Military operations are so dependent upon accidental circumstances, that, to justify censure, it should always be shown how an unsuccessful general has violated the received maxims and established principles of war. That rule has been my guide, but to preserve the narratives unbroken, the observations are placed after transactions of magnitude, where, their source being known, they will only pass for their worth; and if the logic fails I surrender them to better judgment.

Of the transactions, which commenced with the secret treaty of Fontainebleau, and ended with the Assembly of Notables at Bayonne, little is known, except through the exculpatory and contradictory publications of men interested to conceal the truth. To me it appears, the passions of the present generation must subside and the ultimate fate of Spain be known, before that part of the subject can be justly handled. No more therefore is related of the political affairs than what may suffice to introduce the military events; nor have the disjointed operations of the native armies been always told in detail; for I cared not to swell my work with apocryphal matter, and neglected the thousand narrow babbling currents



of Spanish warfare, to follow that mighty English stream of battle which burst the barriers of the Pyrenees and left deep traces of its fury in the soil of France.

The Spaniards have boldly asserted, and the world has believed, the deliverance of the Peninsula to be the work of their hands. This claim, so untruthful, I combat. It is unjust to the fame of the British general, injurious to the glory of the British arms: military virtue is not the growth of a day, nor is there any nation so rich and populous, that, despising it, can rest secure. The imbecility of Charles IV., the villainess of Ferdinand, the corruption imputed to Godoy, were undoubtedly the proximate causes of the calamities which overwhelmed Spain; but the primary, the historical cause, was the despotism springing from the union of a superstitious court and a sanguinary priesthood, a despotism which suppressed knowledge, contracted the public mind, sapped the foundation of military and civil virtue, and prepared the way for invasion. No foreign potentate would have attempted to steal into the fortresses of a great kingdom, if the prying eyes and clamorous tongues of a free press had been ready to expose his projects, and a disciplined army present to avenge the insult: Spain, destitute of both, was first circumvented by the wiles, and then ravaged by the arms of Napoleon. She was deceived and fettered because the public voice was stifled; she was scourged and torn because her military institutions were decayed. When an English force took the field, the Spaniards ceased to act as principals in a contest carried on in the heart of their country, and involving their existence as an independent nation. They were self-sufficient and their pride was wounded by insult, they were superstitious and their religious feelings were roused to fanatic fury by an all-powerful clergy who feared to lose their own rich endowments, but after the first burst of indignation the cause of independence created little enthusiasm. Horrible barbarities

were exercised on French soldiers thrown by sickness or the fortune of war into the power of the invaded, and this dreadful spirit of personal hatred was kept alive by the exactions and severe retaliations of the invader; but no great general exertion to drive the latter from the soil was made, at least none was sustained with steadfast courage in the field: manifestoes, decrees, lofty boasts, like a cloud of canvas covering a rotten hull, made a gallant appearance, but real strength and firmness could nowhere be found.

Strange indeed was the spectacle presented. Patriotism supporting a vile system of government, a popular assembly working to restore a despotic monarch, the higher classes seeking a foreign master, the lower armed in the cause of bigotry and misrule. The upstart leaders, secretly abhorring freedom though governing in her name, trembled at the democratic activity they excited; and while calling forth all the bad passions of the multitude repressed the patriotism that would regenerate as well as save: the country suffered the evils without enjoying the benefits of a revolution. Tumults and assassinations terrified and disgusted the sensible part of the community, a corrupt administration of the resources extinguished patriotism, neglect ruined the armies. The peasant-soldier, usually flying at the first onset, threw away his arms and went home; or, attracted by the licence of the *partidas*, joined the banners of men, the most part originally robbers, who were as oppressive to the people as the enemy; and these *guerilla* chiefs would in their turn have been quickly exterminated, had not the French, pressed by the British battalions, been compelled to keep in large masses: this was the secret of Spanish constancy. Copious supplies from England and the valour of the Anglo-Portuguese troops supported the war, and it was the gigantic vigour with which the duke of Wellington resisted the fierceness of France, and sustained the weakness of three inefficient cabinets that

delivered the Peninsula. Faults he committed, who in war has not? yet shall his reputation stand upon a sure foundation, a simple majestic structure which envy cannot undermine, nor the meretricious ornaments of party panegyric deform. The exploits of his army were great in themselves, great in their consequences; abounding in signal examples of heroic courage and devoted zeal, they should neither be disfigured nor forgotten, being worthy of more fame than the world has yet accorded them—worthy also of a better historian.





## NOTICES.

---

OF the manuscript authorities consulted in this history, those marked with the letter S. the author owes to the kindness of marshal Soult.

For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign sketched out by king Joseph, he is indebted to his grace the duke of Wellington.

The returns of the French army were extracted from the original half-monthly statements presented by marshal Berthier to the emperor Napoleon.

Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to say more, than that the author had access to the original papers, with the exception of Dupont's Memoir, of which a copy only was obtained.

---

M. Thiers, in the ninth volume of his 'History of the Consulate and Empire' has, and no doubt will continue to misrepresent the character of the British army, and misstate the numbers of French and English engaged in the Peninsula. For that unfairness I rebuked him, through the medium of the *Times* journal (see latter end of this volume), and I corrected his errors as to the French forces by references to the imperial muster-rolls, references beyond cavil, because I had access to the original books bound in *green*, which were prepared for Napoleon's private information every fortnight, and I, on good advice, avoided the *yellow* bound returns, which were concocted to mislead friends and enemies during the war. M. Thiers in reply, has laid down very succinctly three startling positions,—viz., 1°. That his numbers must be accurate, because he obtained them from a laborious comparison of contradictory documents.—2°. That my knowledge of facts was entirely derived from some subordinate officers of Marshal Soult's staff.—3°. That he, M. Thiers is, in respect to the admission

of an enemy's merit, incontestibly the most impartial and generous historian of Europe!

Cockatoos scream out 'Pretty cockatoo,' with great complacency, while their auditors think them very noisy disagreeable birds, and it is possible M. Thiers' estimate of his own merits may be no better founded. At all events he has not attained to it by comparing contradictory opinions; for in the world there is but one, namely, that he is capable of anything, except firmness in danger, to forward his projects. He shall not, however, calumniate the British army with impunity, and it is only necessary to examine two of the three positions above-mentioned to demonstrate how untrustworthy he is as an historian. For, in the first place, it is evident that he knew not of the imperial muster-rolls until I informed him of their existence, or he would not have laboured through a mass of contradictory documents, circuitously to reach a vague result, when such authentic documents as the emperor's muster-rolls were open to him. And next, M. Thiers had, or had not, seen my work when he wrote his reply to my letter in the *Times*. If he had not seen it, he disregarded the decencies of literature and of society in asserting, without knowledge of the fact, that it rested on no authorities beyond some of marshal Soult's staff. But if M. Thiers had seen my work, he, with an effrontery painful to characterize, asserted what every page refutes; and this disregard of facts where investigation and proof were so easy, deprives him of all title to credence where he treats of obscure transactions.

---

In former editions all obligations to friends and strangers for materials have been acknowledged, and it is but just, therefore, now to avow what is due to a lady, without whose aid my work could not have been written with a competent knowledge of events.

When the immense mass of king Joseph's correspondence, taken at Vitoria, was first placed in my hands, I was dismayed at finding it to be a huge collection of letters, without order, and in three languages, one of which I did not understand; many also were in very crabbed and illegible characters, especially those of Joseph's own writing, which is nearly as difficult to read as Napoleon's: the most important documents were in cipher, and there was no key! Despairing of any profitable examination of these valuable materials, the thought crossed me of giving up the work, when my wife undertook, first to

arrange the letters by dates and subjects, next to make a table of reference, translating and epitomizing the contents of each; and this, without neglecting for an instant the care and education of a very large family, she effected in such a simple and comprehensive manner, that it was easy to ascertain the contents of any letter and lay hands on the original document in a few moments. She also undertook to decipher the secret correspondence, and not only succeeded, but formed a key to the whole, detecting even the nulls and stops; and so accurately, that 'when in course of time, the original key was placed in my hands there was nothing to learn. Having mentioned this to the duke of Wellington, he seemed at first incredulous, observing I must mean that she had made out the contents of some letters; several persons had done this for him, he said, but none had ever made out the nulls or formed a key, adding, 'I would have given twenty thousand pounds to any person who could have done that for me in the Peninsula.'

Lady Napier's mode of proceeding she has thus described:—

'Many letters amongst Joseph Buonaparte's correspondence were entirely in cipher; perhaps about one-half of the contents of some letters were in that form; others had only a few words occasionally in cipher. These few words proved in many cases to be either the name of some particular general or "*corps d'armée*," or the numbers of the particular army which was the subject of the letter. No key was at first sent. Lady Napier began her attempts to decipher by these occasional words, judging by analogy with respect to the remainder of the letters what they were likely to be, and guessing several monosyllables and short words, which she found occurred very frequently, such as No. 13, which she imagined meant "*de*," No. 514 "*armée*," &c. &c. A little trouble and patience confirmed those guesses, and these first discoveries were of great use in the prosecution of the task; No. 13 not only meaning "*de*" as a single word, such as *duc de Dalmatie*, *corps d'armée*, &c., but representing *de* as the component syllable of longer words, such as *independant*, *desordre*, &c.

'When a certain number of these discoveries had been made, Lady Napier found a few letters in which the short sentences had already been deciphered and the translation written over them; these confirmed her own previous guesses, and some new syllables were added to her vocabulary. Thus she had discovered in a great measure a key to this mode of ciphering, and had made considerable progress in translating both the mixed and the entirely ciphered correspondence when the key of the cipher was found and sent to general Napier. Afterwards

the task was of course comparatively easy, though from the multiplicity of numbers, and the minute, intricate, varied subdivision of words, it was still a work of time and patience.

‘In the course of the early attempts Lady Napier remarked several numbers often recurring, which she believed to be nulls, unmeaning, and at all events forming no part of any words or sentences, and as such discarded them. On examining the original key, she found that most of these meant full stops, commas, marks of interrogation, parentheses, &c; and a few of them were intended to nullify the number that preceded them.’

To this simple account of a task, requiring wondrous subtilty, it is necessary to add, that she made out all my rough, interlined, and illegible manuscripts when I could scarcely do it myself, and wrote out the whole work fair for the printers, it may be said three times, so frequent were the changes made; but her statement conveys no just impression of the concentrated thought, the patient acuteness, the quiet perseverance and constancy required, and for many years exercised, unabated by severe suffering from illness and heavy grief. A strong heart, an unclouded brain, and invincible resolution, enabled her however, not only to do this but to make other exertions, of a different nature, requiring such an enduring fortitude, that the power exercised seemed, even to those who beheld it, scarcely credible.

W. NAPIER.

*October, 1850.*



# HISTORY

OF THE

## PENINSULA WAR.

---

### BOOK THE FIRST.

#### CHAPTER I.

THE hostility of aristocratic Europe forced the republican enthusiasm of France into a course of military policy, outrageous in appearance, in reality one of necessity; for up to the treaty of Tilsit, her wars were essentially defensive. Her long and bloody continental struggle was not for pre-eminence amongst ambitious powers, not a dispute for some accession of territory or momentary political ascendancy, but a deadly conflict to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate, equality or privilege be the principle of European civilization. The French revolution was however pushed into existence before the hour of its natural birth. The aristocratic principle was still too vigorous, too much identified with the monarchic, to be successfully resisted by virtuous democracy, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy, rioting in innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed, yet scarcely showing their grey hairs. The first military events of the Revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Lyons, the civil war of La Vendée, the slight though successful resistance made to the duke of Brunswiek's invasion, the frequent and violent change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were proofs that the French

revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking, when the wonderful genius of Napoleon, baffling all reasonable calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only one capable of supporting the crude production.

That great man, perceiving the revolution was not sufficiently in unison with the feelings of the age, endeavoured to disarm or neutralize monarchical and sacerdotal enmity, by restoring a church establishment and becoming a monarch himself. His vigorous character, and the critical nature of the times, rendered him imperious; but while he sacrificed political liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care equality, a sensible good producing increased satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society. This, the real principle of his government the secret of his popularity, made him the people's monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy; and hence Mr. Pitt justly called him 'the child and the champion of democracy;' Mr. Pitt himself being the child and champion of aristocracy. Hence also the privileged classes of Europe, consistently transferred their implacable hatred of the French revolution to his person; for in him they saw innovation find a protector, and felt that he only was able to consolidate the hateful system, and was really what he called himself, 'the State.'

The treaty of Tilsit gave Napoleon a commanding position over the potentates of Europe, but it unmasked the war of principles, bringing England and himself, the champions of equality and privileges, into direct contact. Peace could not be while both were strong, the French emperor had only gained the choice of his future battle field; and as the fight of Trafalgar forbade the invasion of England, he with fertile genius purposed to sap her naval and commercial strength by barring the continent against her manufactures. This continental system was however inoperative where not enforced by French troops. It failed in Portugal, British influence being there paramount, notwithstanding the terror inspired by the emperor, because self-interest is lasting, fear momentary, wherefore Portugal was virtually an unguarded province of England, from

whence and from Gibraltar English goods passed into Spain. To check this traffic by force was not easy, and otherwise impossible.

Spain was to France nearly what Portugal was to Great Britain. Friendship for England's enemy naturally followed the well-known seizure of the Spanish frigates in time of peace. The French cause was therefore popular in Spain, and the weak court subservient; yet nothing could keep the people from a profitable contraband trade—they would not yield to a foreign power what they refused to their own government. Neither was aristocratic enmity to Napoleon asleep in Spain; a proclamation, issued before the battle of Jena, and hastily withdrawn after that action, indicated the true feelings of the Spanish court.

Monsieur de  
Champagny's  
Report,  
21st Oct.  
1807.

This state of affairs turned the emperor's thoughts towards the Peninsula, and a chain of strange events soon induced him to remove the Bourbons, and place his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. He thought the people, sick of an effete government, would be quiescent, and his uninterrupted good fortune, matchless genius, and vast power, made him disregard ulterior consequences. Hence the cravings of his military and political system, the dangerous vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and still more the temptation offered by a miraculous folly, outrunning even his desires, urged him to a deed, which, well accepted would have proved beneficial to the people, but enforced contrary to their wishes was unhallowed by justice or benevolence. In an evil hour for his own greatness and the happiness of others he commenced the fatal project. Founded in violence, attended with fraud, it spread desolation through the Peninsula, was calamitous to France, destructive to himself, and the conflict between his hardy veterans and the vindictive race he insulted was of unmitigated ferocity; for the Spaniards defended their just cause with proverbial, hereditary cruelty, while the French struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions.

Napoleon in  
Las Casas,  
vol. ii.  
4th part.

Napoleon, although startled at the energy of the Peninsulars, then bent his whole force to the work—England lent her

power in opposition—and the two leading nations of the world were thus brought into contact when both were disturbed by angry passions, eager for great events, and of astonishing dominion. The French empire, including Upper Italy, the confederation of the Rhine, Switzerland, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependent states of Holland and Naples, enabled Napoleon, through the conscription, to array an army numerous as the host which followed the Persian of old, and though like it gathered from many nations, trained with Roman discipline, and led with Carthaginian genius. The officers, habituated to victory, were bold and enterprising, as the troops they led were hardy and resolute. And to this land-power was joined a formidable navy, for though the ships of

Napoleon's  
Memoirs,  
Las Casas,  
7th part.  
Lord Col-  
lingwood's  
letters, vide  
Appendix.

Exposé de  
l'Empire,  
1807-8-9-13.

Napoleon in  
Las Casas,  
vol. ii. 4th  
part.

Ibid., 6th  
part.

France were chained in harbours, her naval strength was only rebuked, not destroyed. Inexhaustible resources for building, vast establishments, a coast line of immense length, and the creative genius of Napoleon was nursing a navy, which the war then impending between England and the United States promised to render efficient. Maritime commerce was fainting, yet the French internal and continental traffic was robust, manufactures were rapidly improving, the debt was small, and financial operations conducted with exact economy; the supplies were all raised within the year without great pressure of taxation, and from a metallic currency. There seemed no reason therefore why

Napoleon should fail to bring any war to a favourable conclusion; for by a happy combination of vigour and flattery, of order, discipline, and moral excitement, adapted to the genius of his people, he had created a power seemingly resistless. And it would have been so if applied to only one great object at a time, but this the ambition of the man, or rather the force of circumstances, did not permit.

England, omnipotent on the ocean, was little regarded as a military power; her enormous debt, yearly augmenting in an accelerated ratio, a necessary consequence of anticipating the national resources and dealing in a fictitious currency, was sapping her vital strength. Merchants and manufacturers



were indeed thriving from incidental circumstances, but the labouring population suffered and degenerated; pauperism and its sure attendant crime were augmenting in the land, and the community splitting into classes, one rich and arrogant, the other poor and discontented—the first profiting, the second distressed by the war. Of Ireland it is unnecessary to speak, her wrongs, her misery, peculiar and unparalleled, are but too well known, too little regarded.

This comparative statement, so favourable to France, would, however, be a false criterion of relative strength with regard to the struggle in the Peninsula. A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon the operations of a general; it reconciles men to desertion, sanctifies want of zeal, furnishes pretexts for cowardice, renders hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, glory less satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. The invasion of Spain, whatever its real origin, was an act of violence repugnant to the feelings of mankind; the French were burthened with a sense of its iniquity, the British exhilarated by a contrary sentiment. All the continental nations had smarted under the sword of Napoleon, yet none were crushed except Prussia; a common feeling of humiliation, the hope of revenge, the ready subsidies of England, were therefore bonds of union among their governments stronger than treaties: France could calculate on their fears, England on their self-love. Hatred of French principles was general with the privileged classes of Europe, and they personally hated Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to institutions growing out of the revolution; because his victories, baffling their hopes, had shaken their hold of power. Chieftain and champion of new France, he was constrained to continue his career until her destiny was accomplished; and this necessity, overlooked by the generality, furnished plausible ground for imputing insatiable ambition, of which ample advantage was taken. Rapacity, injustice, insolence, even cowardice, were said to be inseparable from the French character; and, it was more than insinuated, that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous and disinterested. Unhappily, history is a record of crimes, and the arrogance of men buoyed up by a spring-tide of military

glory, did with allies, as well as with vanquished enemies, produce sufficient disgust to insure belief in false accusations.

Napoleon was the contriver and support of a political system, requiring time and victory to consolidate; he was the connecting power between the new social views and what was still vigorous in the old; he held them together, yet belonged to neither, and was in danger from both. His power, unsanctified by prescription, had to be as delicately as it was vigorously exercised, and was rather peremptory than despotic: there were questions of administration with which he dared not meddle even wisely, much less arbitrarily. Customs, prejudices, and the dregs of revolutionary licence, rendered his policy complicated and difficult, the policy of his adversaries easy; for the delusion of parliamentary representation gave the English government unlimited power over persons and property, and a corrupt press gave it nearly the same power over the public mind. English commerce, penetrating as it were into every home on the face of the globe, supplied a thousand channels of intelligence; the spirit of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of patriotism, was universally on the side of Great Britain; and those twin curses, paper-money and public credit, so truly described as 'strength in the beginning, weakness in the end,' were recklessly used by statesmen, whose policy discarded the rights of posterity.

These were the adventitious elements of England's power, and her natural resources were many and great. If credit is to be given to the census, the population was at that period twenty millions; France reckoned but twenty-seven millions when Frederick the Great said, 'If he were her king, not a gun should be fired in Europe without his leave.' The French army was very formidable from numbers, discipline, and skill, and bravery; yet, contrary to general opinion, the British army was not inferior, save as to numbers: in discipline it was superior, because a national force will bear a sterner code than a mixed one will suffer. With the latter, military crimes may be punished, when moral offences can hardly be repressed. Men will endure severity in regulations they know to be necessary, but the constraint of petty though wholesome rules,

they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny when not bound by national ties and customs; the disgrace of bad conduct attaches only to the people under whose colours they serve. Great, indeed, is the genius which keeps men of different nations firm to their colours, and enforces a rigid discipline. Napoleon's military system was, from this cause, looser than the British, which combines the solidity of the German with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the Peninsula had proved its excellence, the British troops were absurdly underrated in foreign countries and despised in their own. They could not then move in large bodies so readily as the long practised French, but the soldier was stigmatized as stupid, the officer ridiculed, and a British army coping with a French one for a single campaign was considered a chimera.

Very subject to false impressions are the English; and being proud of their credulity, as if it were a virtue, they eling to error with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. An ignorant contempt for the soldiery was prevalent long before the ill-succcess in 1794 and 1799 seemed to justify public prejudice; the cause of those failures was not traced; the excellent system introduced by the duke of York was disregarded; and England, at home and abroad, was, in 1808, scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier swallowing armies in its fortresses, at least two hundred thousand soldiers, the best dis-  
Appendix.  
No. XVIII.  
ciplined, and best equipped in the universe, together with an immense recruiting establishment, and the power of drawing, through the militia, without limit on the population. Many were necessarily employed in defence of the colonies, yet enough remained to furnish a force greater than Napoleon had at Austerlitz, double that with which he conquered Italy. In material resources also, the superiority of English mechanical skill was shown, and that intellectual power which in science, arts, and literature is nationally conspicuous, was not wanting to her generals in war.

## CHAPTER II.

FOR many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain had been distracted by domestic quarrels; the son's hand was against the mother, the father's against the son; and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest, while seeming to act for the party whose cause they espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the queen of the Two Sicilies. He was a weak old man, governed by his wife, and she by don Manuel Godoy, of whose person she was enamoured even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the royal guards, this man had been raised to the highest dignities, and was called Prince of the Peace! a strange title to be connected for ever with one of the bloodiest wars filling the pages of history. Ferdinand, prince of the Asturias, hated this favourite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth, and apparently forlorn condition, made the people partake of his feelings; thus the disunion of the royal family, extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court, involved the nation in ruin. The hatred of Spaniards is so venomous, that Godoy who was really a mild good-natured man, has been overloaded with imprecations, as if he alone had been the cause of all disasters; but it was not so. The canon Escoiquiz, a subtle intriguer, the chief of Ferdinand's party, finding the influence of Godoy too strong, looked for support in a powerful quarter; and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the 11th of October, 1807, to the emperor Napoleon, complaining of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father. He prayed therefore for the interference of the 'hero destined by Providence,' so runs the text, 'to save Europe and to support thrones;' asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family, and desired

Nellerto,  
the ana-  
gram of  
Llorente.



his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. He received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and his father denounced him to the emperor as guilty of treason, and projecting the assassination of his own mother. Napoleon seized this pretext for interfering in the domestic policy of Spain,—and thus the honour and independence of a great people were jeopardized by the squabbles of the most worthless persons in the nation.

A short time before this, Godoy, instigated by ambition, or fearing the death of the king would expose him to Ferdinand's vengeance, proposed to the French emperor the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the aid of Spain if a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. Napoleon adopted this project. Under pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might pour troops into Spain, and seize a prize which the royal squabble, referred to his arbitration, placed within his reach. A secret treaty and a dependent convention was therefore concluded at Fontainebleau, by marshal Duroc on the part of France, Ugenio Ysquierdo on the part of Spain. It was ratified by Napoleon the 29th of October, 1807, and provided, 1°. That the house of Braganza should be driven from Portugal, and that kingdom divided into three portions, one of which, the Entre Minho e Duero, including the city of Oporto, was to be called North Lusitania, and given to the dispossessed sovereign of Etruria. 2°. The Alemtejo and Algarves to form a principality for Godoy, who was still to be in some respects a dependent on the Spanish crown. 3°. The Tras os Montes, Beira, Estremadura, and Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then exchanged, under certain conditions, against English conquests. 4°. The transmarine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided, and within three years the king of Spain to have the title of Emperor of the two Americas.

The convention provided that France was to employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry. The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one-third of



the infantry, and from thence to march to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry, 10,000 were to occupy the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto; 6,000 to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. Meantime, 40,000 men assembling at Bayonne, were to take the field by the 20th of November should England interfere, or the Portuguese people resist; and if the king of Spain, or any of his family, joined the army, the command was to be vested in the person so joining; with that exception, the French general was to be obeyed whenever the troops of the two nations came into contact. During the march through Spain, the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, paid by their own. The revenues of the conquered provinces were to be administered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the province was held.

This treaty and convention certainly enabled Napoleon to pour forces into Spain without creating much suspicion. Yet it does not follow, as some authors have asserted, they were contrived by the emperor to render the royal family odious to the world, and debar interest in their fate, when it should be convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to themselves. Such a policy, founded on the error that justice and not interest sways governments, would have been silly. Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History speaks not of the time when the inhabitants wanted spirit; the natural obstacles to invasion had often baffled large armies; and the long line of communication from Bayonne to the frontier could only be supported with Spanish co-operation. Moreover England could so easily give aid, that it is probable Napoleon's first design accorded with the literal meaning of the treaty, and his subsequent projects arose as the wonderful imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest. The convention also sent Spanish armies to the north and south, from whence they could most readily succour their own country; and, in fact, Solano's and Taranco's troops did form the nucleus and strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, one of which gained the victory of Baylen, and the other contended for it at Rio Seco.

From Bayonne, the force destined to invade Portugal

actually entered Spain before the treaty was signed. It was called '*The first army of the Gironde*,' and was commanded by Junot, a young general, bold and ambitious, but of greater reputation than he could support, and his conscript soldiers were ill fitted to endure the hardships awaiting them. He marched in small divisions, and the Spaniards, from latent fear, or the dislike to foreigners usual with a secluded people, were unfriendly.

Thiebault,  
Exp. du  
Portugal.

At Salamanca he halted to complete the organization, and await a favourable moment for passing into Portugal, but political events marched so fast that the emperor ordered an immediate advance; whereupon the Braganza family emigrated, and the French entered Lisbon while Spain was bending to the first gusts of that hurricane which was to sweep over her with such destructive violence.

Judicial proceedings had been instituted against Ferdinand for treason and intended matricide. He was absolved of those horrid crimes, but acknowledged his other offences, saying he had been instigated by his friends to deeds he abhorred; nevertheless, the intrigues continued, and Napoleon's plans were thereby necessarily advanced. And though the Fontainebleau convention provided only for a reserve at Bayonne, other troops were assembled at different points, and, in December, two corps entered Spain, and marched to Vittoria. The one, under general Dupont, was called '*The second army of the Gironde*,' the other, under marshal Monecy, was called '*The army of the Côte d'Océan*.' They mustered fifty-three thousand men, forty thousand being with the eagles. Dupont soon advanced upon Valladolid, from whence four thousand seven hundred of his men, designed to reinforce Junot, moved to Salamanca. These armies seemed to follow the natural line of communication with Portugal; but Dupont and Monecy really cut off the northern provinces from Madrid, and secured the road from Bayonne to that capital. Small divisions continually reinforced them, and twelve thousand men, under general Duhesme, penetrating by the Eastern Pyrenees, entered Barcelona.

Return of  
the French  
army. Ap-  
pendix.  
Journal of  
Dupont's  
Operations,  
MSS.

Notes of  
Napoleon.  
Appendix,  
No. II.

The royal family quarrel was now brought to a crisis. The king, deceived and frightened, was going, it is said, to take refuge in America, and preparations for a journey to Seville were in progress, when, on the 17th of March, the prince's grooms commenced a tumult, the populace of Aranjuez joined, and quietness was only restored by an assurance that no journey was contemplated. On the 18th the Madrid populace sacked the house of Godoy, and the 19th the riots recommenced in Aranjuez. The favourite secreted himself, but was discovered and on the point of being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. Charles, terrified by the violence of his subjects, had abdicated the day before, that event was proclaimed at Madrid the 20th, and Ferdinand was declared king to the great joy of the people. The fable of the frogs demanding a monarch was repeated.

During these transactions, Murat, grand duke of Berg, having assumed command of the French in Spain, passed the Somosierra, and the 23rd entered Madrid with Moncey's corps and a fine body of cavalry. Dupont also marched by Segovia to the Escorial and Aranjuez. Ferdinand arrived at Madrid the 24th, and though he was not recognised as king by Murat, that dangerous guest demanded the sword of Francis I., and it was delivered to him with much ceremony. Charles, however, protested to Murat that his abdication had been forced, and also wrote to Napoleon in the same strain.

This state of affairs disquieted the emperor, and he sent general Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation with which Murat had seized the capital. However, previous to Savary's arrival, Don Carlos, the brother of Ferdinand, departed from Madrid, hoping to meet the emperor, who was confidently expected in that city. He was followed on the 10th by Ferdinand, who had instituted a supreme junta, of which his uncle Don Antonio was president, and Murat a member. The true causes of their journey have not yet been exposed, and perhaps when they shall be made known, some petty intrigue will be found to have had more influence than the grand machinations attributed to Napoleon, who could

Napoleon  
in Las  
Casas.

not have anticipated such surprising weakness when framing a great political scheme.

Everywhere the people displayed anger and alarm at Ferdinand's journey. At Vittoria they cut the traces of his carriage, and gallant men offered to carry him away by sea, despite of the French troops on the road. Unmoved by their zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter he received from Napoleon, who, withholding the title of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, Ferdinand continued his progress, and the 20th of April found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. His father had, meanwhile, resumed the royal authority under the protection of Murat, and then obtaining Godoy's liberty, quitted Spain, and also placed himself, his cause and kingdom, in the emperor's hands. These events were sufficient to drive a more cautious people than the Spaniards into action, if other measures had not exposed the French designs; but their troops, admitted frankly into several fortresses, had abused that hospitality, and by various artifices got possession of the citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, Pampeluna in Navarre, and of Figueras, Monjuik, and Barcelona in Catalonia. Thus, in a time of profound peace, a foreign force was suddenly established in the capital, on the communications, and in the principal fortresses; its chief was admitted into the government, and the nation was laid prostrate, without a blow struck, a warning voice raised, or a suspicion excited in time to resist an intrusion on which all gazed with stupid amazement.

It is idle to attribute this event to Napoleon's subtlety, and Godoy's treachery; such a calamity could only result from previous bad government, and the consequent degradation of public feeling. It is however easier to oppress the people than to destroy their generous sentiments; and when patriotism is lost amongst the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower. In the Peninsula it was not found, it started into life with a fervor and energy ennobling even the wild and savage form in which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils—the good feeling displayed was the people's own, their cruelty, folly, and perverseness were the effects of long misgovernment.



Napoleon had many reasons for meddling with the affairs of Spain; there seems no good one for his manner of doing it. The Spanish Bourbons could not be sincere friends to France while he held the sceptre, and the proclamation issued before the battle of Jena, evinced their secret enmity. It did not follow that the people sympathised with the government, but Napoleon looked more to the court than the nation. Had he brought them into collision first—and many occasions could have been found—he would have appeared, not as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, but as the deliverer of a great people.

Ferdinand's journey, Godoy's liberation, Charles's flight, Murat's seat in the junta, and the concentric movement of the French troops towards Madrid, awaked all the slumbering passion of the Spaniards, producing tumults and assassinations. At Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23rd<sup>1</sup> of April, and the country people joined the citizens against the French. A division of infantry and some cavalry of Dupont's corps, then quartered at Aranjuez, restored order, but the agitation of the public mind increased; for the French troops being of the last conscription, young, and only disciplined after they entered Spain, their apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the Spaniards, who pride themselves upon personal prowess. The swelling tumour broke at last. On the 2nd of May, the people gathered in front of the Madrid palace about a carriage, designed as they supposed to convey Don Antonio to France. They would not, they said, let the last of the royal family be spirited away, and, with imprecations, cut the traces. At that moment, La Grange, Murat's aide-de-camp, came up; he was maltreated, and in an instant the whole city rose in commotion. The unarmed French soldiers, expecting no violence, were killed in every street, and the hospital was attacked, but the attendants and sick men defended it successfully. The alarm spread to the camp outside the city, the cavalry galloped in by the gate of Alcala, general Lanfranc entered the Calle Ancha de Bernardo with three thousand infantry, and when crossing the street of Maravelles, a cannon was discharged against his column by Daois and Velarde, two Spanish officers in a state



of great excitement from drink. The French voltigeurs immediately killed them, and the column continuing its march, released, not without bloodshed, several superior officers besieged in their quarters. The cavalry, treating the affair as a mere riot, for no Spanish soldiers took part, only sought to make prisoners, though some persons were killed or maimed by the horses. Finally, tranquillity was restored in the city by the exertions of general Harispe, marshal Moncey, and Gonzalvo O'Farril, but the peasantry of the neighbourhood, armed and in considerable numbers, beset the gates after nightfall, and about sixty were killed or wounded by the guard.

Memoir of  
Azanza and  
O'Farril.

Murat, incensed at the loss of his soldiers, had the prisoners capitally condemned by a military commission, yet, when the municipality urged the cruelty of visiting this natural ebullition of an injured and insulted people so severely, he yielded to their arguments, and forbade execution. Nevertheless, general Grouchy, in whose immediate power the prisoners remained, exclaiming, that his own life had been attempted, that the blood of French soldiers was not to be spilt with impunity, that the captives had been condemned by a council of war and should be executed, proceeded to shoot them in the Prado, and forty were thus slain before Murat could interfere. Next day, the Spanish authorities discovering that a colonel of the Imperial Guards still retained many prisoners, applied to Murat, for their release, and it is said by some, though denied by others of greater authority, that the colonel, hearing of this, and enraged at the loss of his choice soldiers, put forty-five of his captives to death, before his bloody proceedings could be stayed.

This celebrated tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard, has been represented by authors who adopt all the reports of the day, sometimes as a wanton massacre, sometimes as a barbarous political stroke to impress a dread of French power. It was neither. The fiery temper of the Spaniards, excited by strange events and the recent tumults against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable, and so it happened. If the French had stimulated this disposition to violence, with a view to an example, they would have

prepared some check on the Spanish garrison; they would not have left their hospital unguarded, or have so arranged, that their own loss should surpass that of the Spaniards; finally, they would have profited from their policy after having suffered the injury. Moncey and Harispe were, however, most active in restoring order, and, including the peasants killed outside the gates and the executions afterwards, the whole number of the Spanish slain did not exceed one hundred and twenty, while more than five hundred French were killed. Amongst the wounded were seventy of the imperial guards, which would alone disprove any premeditation; for if Murat were base enough to sacrifice his men with such a detestable policy, he would have given the conscripts to slaughter rather than the select soldiers of the emperor.

Manifesto of  
the council  
of Castile.  
Page 28.

Surgical  
Campaigns  
of Baron  
Larrey.

It was certainly accidental and not bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute secret motives and exaggerate the loss of life. The Spaniards sought to impress the provinces with an opinion of French ferocity, and thereby excite them to insurrection. The French, feeling such an impression could not be effaced by an accurate relation, encouraged the worst accounts, to convey a terrible idea of their power and severity. Hence the extraordinary stories propagated, of citizens immolated by Murat in numbers varying from five to fourteen thousand. It is the part of history to reduce such amplifications; yet none can be unmoved by the gallantry and devotion of a populace which dared to assail an army, rather than abandon one of their princes. Such, however, were the Spaniards throughout the war. Prone to sudden and rash actions, they were fierce and confident individually, and, though weak in military execution, always manifested an intuitive perception of what was great and noble.

This commotion was the forerunner of insurrections in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable. Unprincipled villains, taking this opportunity to direct the passions of the multitude under the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people against whomever it

pleased them to rob or to destroy. Pillage, massacres, assassination, cruelties of the most revolting kind were everywhere perpetrated, and the intrinsic goodness of the cause disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, Badajos, and Valencia, pre-eminent in barbarity when all were barbarous! The first burst of popular feeling being thus misdirected, the energy of the people was wasted, and lassitude succeeded the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for to shine in the work of butchery is casier than to establish discipline, which can alone sustain the courage of the multitude in the hour of trial.

To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than the convention warranted, a variety of reports had been propagated. At one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers were dispatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to be the theatre of great events; and a mysterious importance was given to the movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court, which fear and sloth disposed for belief of anything but the truth, and to impose upon a people whose unsuspicious ignorance was at first mistaken for tameness. Active agents also sought to form a French party in the capital; and as the tumults of Aranjuez and Madrid taught Napoleon how fierce the Spanish temper was, he enjoined more caution upon Murat than the latter was disposed to practise; for his precipitation disclosed the emperor's real plans before they were ripened; his concentric movement on the capital, and his resolution to control the provincial government, had alarmed the people, and the riot at Toledo indicated their feelings before the explosion at Madrid placed them in direct hostility. He seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence, and his natural impetuosity urged him to appear as a conqueror before a ground of quarrel was laid; yet he was not entirely without excuse, for a letter received by him about this period from Napoleon, contained these expressions; '*The duke of Infantado has a party in Madrid; it will attack you; dissipate it, and seize the government.*'

At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid. Charles reclaimed his rights in presence of Napo-

leon, and commanded Don Antonio to relinquish the presidency of the governing junta to Murat, who received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. This appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity, were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the council of Castille, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period, the old monarch had again ceded his authority to Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned with large pensions to the tranquillity of private life. The right to fill the throne, thus rendered vacant, was assumed by the emperor, in virtue of Charles's cession, and he desired that a member of his own family might be chosen king of Spain. After some hesitation, the council of Castille, in concert with the municipality of Madrid and the governing junta, declared their choice to have fallen upon Joseph Buonaparte, then king of Naples; and the Cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and archbishop of Toledo, acceding to this arrangement, wrote to Napoleon a formal explicit adhesion to the new order of things. Joseph was already journeying from Naples to Bayonne, where he arrived the 7th of June, the principal men of Spain having been previously invited to meet there on the 15th. This was called the Assembly of the Notables. Ninety-one Spaniards of eminence appeared, unanimously accepted Joseph as their king, and discussing in detail a new constitution presented by Napoleon, after several sittings adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions.

Calculated to draw forth all the resources of Spain, this constitution, compared to the old system was a blessing, and would have been received as such under different circumstances; now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, and the Asturias, the people fiercely declared their determination to resist French intrusion. Nevertheless Joseph crossed the frontier on the 9th of July, and on the 12th arrived at Vitoria. The inhabitants, still remembering Ferdinand's journey to Bayonne, seemed disposed to hinder his entrance; but their opposition did not break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued his progress. The 20th of July he entered

Madrid. The 24th he was proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities usual upon such occasions, thus making himself the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a nation's hatred! With a strange accent he called from the midst of foreign bands upon a fierce and haughty race, to accept a constitution which they did not understand, his hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms, his claims, upon the consent of an imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise, this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch!



## CHAPTER III.

JOSEPH required the council of Castille to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution, but that body, hitherto obsequious, met his orders with a remonstrance; for war, virtually declared on the 2nd of May, was at this time raging in all parts of the peninsula, and the council was secretly apprized that a great misfortune had befallen the French arms. It was no longer a question between Joseph and some reluctant public bodies; it was an awful struggle between great nations; and how the spirit of insurrection, breaking forth simultaneously in every province, was nourished in each until it acquired the consistence of regular warfare, shall now be shown.

Just before the tumult of Aranjuez, the marquis of Solano y Soccoro, commanding the Spanish auxiliary force of the Alentejo, received an order from Godoy to take post near Andalusia, to cover the projected journey of Charles IV. Napoleon, aware of this order, would not interrupt its execution, and Solano quitted Portugal without difficulty; but in the latter part of May, observing the general agitation, he repaired to his government of Cadiz, where five French sail of the line and a frigate had just taken refuge from the English fleet. Seville was in a ferment, and Solano being required to head an insurrection in favour of Ferdinand, refused and went to Cadiz. Meanwhile certain persons at Seville, assuming the title of the 'Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies,' declared war in form against the intrusive monarch. They called on the troops in the camp of San Roque to acknowledge their authority, ordered all men between sixteen and forty-five to take arms, and directed Solano to attack the French squadron. He refused to acknowledge this self-constituted government, and while hesitating to commit

his country in war with a power whose strength he knew better than the temper of his countrymen, he was cruelly murdered. His abilities, courage, and unblemished character, have never been denied, yet there is too much reason to believe the junta of Seville sent an agent expressly to procure his assassination. This was followed, at Seville, by the death of the Conde del Aguilar, universally admitted to be virtuous and accomplished, yet, without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly butchered in the streets by a mob, said to be instigated by Gusman de Tilly, a member of the new junta, and described as a man 'capable of dishonouring a whole nation by his crimes.'

Previous to these murders, admiral Purvis, commanding a British squadron off Cadiz, had offered, in concert with general Spencer, who happened to be near with an expedition of five thousand men, to co-operate in an attack upon the French ships. This offer was, on the death of Solano, renewed to his successor, don Thomas Morla, who, for reasons to be hereafter mentioned, refused, and reduced the hostile squadron himself. But before this event, in April, general Castaños, then commanding the camp at San Roque, had resolved to resist the French, and opened a communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibraltar. He was the first Spaniard who united prudence with patriotism. Readily acknowledging the self-constituted junta, he stifled the suggestions of self-interest with a virtue rare amongst his countrymen, and united himself closely with the British commanders: from them he obtained arms, ammunition, and money, and, at the instance of Sir Hew, the merchants of Gibraltar advanced a loan of forty-two thousand dollars.

Sir Hew  
Dalrymple's  
correspondence.

The murders at Cadiz and Seville were imitated in every part of Spain; hardly can a town be named in which some innocent and worthy persons were not slain. Grenada, Carthagená and Valencia

reeked with blood. Miguel Saavedra, governor of the last city, escaped at first by flight, but, returning, was deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar Calvo, a canon of San Isidro in Madrid, then appeared in Valencia, and collecting a band of fanatics,

Moniteur.  
Azanza and  
O'Farril:  
Nellerto.

commenced a massacre of the French residents ; and his ruthless villany was unchecked until, French victims failing, his thirst for murder urged him to menace the local junta of government. This body, with the exception of Mr. Tupper, the English consul, had not opposed his previous violence, but now readily found the means to crush him : while in the act of braving their authority he was seized by stratagem and strangled, together with two hundred of his band. Serbelloni, captain-general of the province, then proceeded to organize an army, acting in unison with the old count Florida Blanca, who had meanwhile put himself at the head of the Murcian insurrection.

In Catalonia the presence of the French troops at first repressed popular effervescence ; the insurrection broke out notwithstanding at Manresa, and spread to all parts of the province.

In Aragon the arrival of don Joseph Palafox kindled the fire of patriotism. He had escaped from Bayonne, and his family were greatly esteemed, as of the noblest among a people absurdly vain of their ancient descent. The captain-general, fearing a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the province, but this circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape from Bayonne, increased the passions of the multitude ; a crowd surrounding his abode, forced him to assume the command, the captain-general was confined, some persons were murdered, and a junta was formed. Palafox was considered by his companions as of slender capacity and great vanity, and there is nothing in his exploits to render the justness of this opinion doubtful. It was not Palafox who upheld the glory of Aragon, it was the spirit of the people, which he had not excited and could so little direct, that, for a long time after the commencement of the first siege, he was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza, his courage and fidelity being distrusted by the population he is supposed to have ruled.

This state of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logroño became the focus of an insurrection which extended along most of the valleys of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces, the spirit of independence was as fierce,

and as decidedly pronounced, accompanied also by the same excesses. In Badajos the conde de la Torre del Frenio was butchered by the populace, and his mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph. At Talavera de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar fate by a hasty flight. Leon presented a wide unbroken scene of anarchy, and all who opposed the people's wishes were slain.

Gallicia held back for a moment, but the example of Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the insurrection was in full force, produced a general movement. A junta was formed, and Filanghieri, an Italian, governor of Coruña, was desired to exercise the functions of royalty by declaring war in form against France. Like every man of sense in Spain, he was unwilling to commence a revolution upon such uncertain grounds; the impatient populace sought his death, and though saved at the moment by the courage of an officer of his staff, his horrible fate was only deferred. Able and sincerely attached to Spain, he exerted himself to organize the military resources of the province, and no suspicion attached to his conduct; yet such was the inherent ferocity of the people and of the time, that the soldiers of the regiment of Navarre seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, and, according to some, stuck him full of bayonets; according to others, planted their weapons in the ground, tossed him on to their points, left him there to struggle, and disbanded themselves.

The Asturians had been the first to exercise the indefeasible democratic right of establishing a new government when the old one ceased to afford protection: a local junta declared war against the French, and sent deputies to solicit assistance from England. The great towns in Biscay and the Castilles were overawed by fifty thousand foreign bayonets, but the peasantry commenced a war in their manner against the stragglers and the sick, and thus a hostile chain cast round the French army was completed in every link. This simultaneous rising of a whole nation was beheld by the rest of Europe with astonishment and admiration—astonishment at the energy of a people deemed unnerved and debased—admiration at a spectacle which, seen at a distance, and its odious parts unknown, presented the ideal beauty of Numantian virtue. In England,



all classes, with a generous sympathy, attributed to disinterested vigour of character, what was really the effect of many co-operating causes, many of which were anything but commendable.

Constituted as modern states are, with systems ill adapted to nourish intense feelings of patriotism, it would have been miraculous if real grandeur had been displayed by a nation which, for two centuries, had been debased by civil and religious despotism. The Spanish character, in relation with public affairs, is marked by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory, improvident, singly and in mass, they cherish an absurd confidence that everything suggested by their heated imaginations is practicable; they see no difficulties, and the obstacles encountered are attributed to treachery; hence the sudden murder of so many virtuous men in this commotion. Kind and warm in his attachments, savage in his enmity, the Spaniard is patient under privations, firm in bodily suffering, prone to sudden anger, vindictive, remembering insult longer than injury, bloody and cruel in revenge. With a natural perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as his passions always overrule his reason, his performance is mean. In this war, the tenacity of vengeance peculiar to the people supplied the want of cool persevering intrepidity, and led to deeds of craft and cruelty rather than daring open warfare. The abstraction of the royal family, and Napoleon's insulting pretensions to the crown, aroused all the national pride; the tumults of Madrid and Aranjuez had prepared the public for violent movements, and the French protection of Godoy increased the ferment, because a dearly-cherished vengeance was thereby frustrated at the moment of its expected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited the uncontrollable fierceness of Spanish passion. Then came the tumult of Madrid, swollen, distorted, cast like Cæsar's body before the people, to excite them to frenzy; and madly they arose, not boldly to confront a danger understood, but to slake their thirst of blood.

Godoy's administration had trenched on church property, and France and Italy gave testimony that Joseph would continue that policy. This involved the interests and stimulated



the activity of monks and priests, who easily persuaded an ignorant people that the aggressive stranger was the foe of religion, and accursed of God. By processions, miracles, prophecies, distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints to lead the armies, the patriots were fanaticised, and in all parts the clergy were zealously active; monks and friars were invariably the leaders in tumult, or at the side of those who were, instigating them to murder and cruelty. Buonaparte found the same cause producing similar effects during his early campaigns in Italy; and if that country had been as favourable for protracted resistance, and been as powerfully aided by England, Spain would have been rivalled, perhaps surpassed in partizan warfare.

Napoleon's  
Mémoires,  
Campagne  
d'Italie,  
Venise.

Napoleon's continental system was another spring in this complicated machinery. It threatened the already decayed commerce of the maritime towns, and the contraband trade, carried on in Spain to an incredible extent, was certain of destruction; with that trade the fate of one hundred thousand excise and custom-house officers was involved. A preventive system, organized after the French manner, and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would have crushed smuggling, which was, in truth, only a consequence of monopolies and internal restrictions upon the trade of one province with another—vexations abolished by the constitution of Bayonne. The activity and intelligence of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, the corruption of revenue officers, the lawlessness of smugglers, were thus agitated against the invaders, and hence the readiness at Gibraltar to lend Castaños money.

Appendix.  
No. 9.

Civilization also was, in Spain, at that point which best suits insurrection. If the people had been aware of their deficiencies, they would have submitted; if really enlightened, the invasion could not have happened. But in a country where the comforts of society are less attended to than in any other part of Europe, where a warm and dry climate renders it agreeable to sleep the greatest part of the year in the open air, and where nearly all men went armed, it was easy for energetic leaders to assemble large masses of credulous, excited peasants.

No story was too gróss for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. ‘Es verdad, los dicen,’ ‘It is true, they say it,’ was the invariable answer when an absurd report was doubted. Temperate in food, possessing little furniture, hoarding all the gold he can get, a Spaniard is little concerned to relinquish his abode; his doing so must not be measured by an English scale; and, once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of his spirits and the brilliancy of his sky make the angry peasant careless of wandering. The evils afflicting Spain, previous to the invasion, had tended also to prepare the people for violence. Poverty, disease, famine, the loss of commerce, restrictions on internal trade, unequal taxation, oppression; they had endured all, and could not be enthusiastie for such a

Historia de  
la Guerra  
contra Na-  
poleon.

system. But they had been taught by the clergy to believe Godoy the sole author of their misery, and to look to Ferdinand as the redresser of their grievances. The French were the protectors of the former, the oppressors of the latter, and it was easy to add this bitterness to the natural hatred of foreign domination.

Such were the principal causes of this revolution, so fertile of great events, without producing one man of eminent capacity to control, or direct the spirit thus accidentally excited. Clearly does this fact show the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and interests brought together. It cannot be attributed to deficiency of natural talent, the genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and vigorous; but there was no common bond of feeling, save hatred to the French, by which a great man could influence large masses. Sagacious persons saw very early, that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated, yet disclosing only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were; that the cause must fail unless supported by England; and that she would not let her resources be wielded by men whose views and policy might afterwards thwart her own. Nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall of Napoleon, not the regeneration of Spain, was the object of her cabinet.

Spanish public feeling was fierce in expression, because political passions will always be vehement at first with a people new to civil commotion, and unused to have their heat evaporate in public discussions. The result was a wonderful change in the affairs of Europe; it seems yet undecided whether for better or worse. In their struggle, the Spaniards developed more cruelty than courage, more violence than intrepidity, more personal hatred than enthusiasm; they opened a wide field for the exertions of others, presented the fulcrum for a lever which moved the civilized world, but the impelling power came from another quarter. Useful accessories they were; as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit, nor skill sufficient to resist the prodigious force by which they were assailed. If they seemed at first heedless of danger, it was not because they were prepared to perish rather than submit, but that they were reckless of provoking a power whose terrors they could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised.

It is not surprising that great expectations were at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities; there is not any people more attractive in the intercourse of society. Their majestic language, fine persons, and becoming dress; their lively imaginations; the inexpressible beauty of their women, and the air of romance they throw over every action, and infuse into every feeling, combine to delude the senses and impose upon the judgment. As companions, they are the most agreeable of mankind, but danger and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. ‘Never do to-day what you can put off until to-morrow,’ is the favourite proverb of Spain.

## CHAPTER IV.

THE commotion of Aranjuez taught the French emperor that he was to deal with a people who would not be quiescent under insult; and, though he pursued his secret policy without relinquishing hope of success, he arranged a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed his forces, that when Spain poured forth her swarthy bands, he could concentrate masses on the most important points, combined in a manner to overwhelm separately each province, no three of which could act in concert without first beating a French corps; and if any was so beaten, the others could unite and re-take the offensive. It was this skill which enabled seventy thousand men, spread over a great extent of country, to brave the simultaneous fury of eleven millions of people, without being trampled under foot, and lost amidst the tumultuous uproar.

In a political view the inconvenience of suffering a regular Spanish army to take the field was evident. To characterise the opposition of the Spanish people, as a partial insurrection of peasants instigated by some evil-disposed persons to act against the wishes of the respectable part of the nation, would give some colour to the absorbing darkness of the invasion—while the permitting an insurrection of peasants, to take form and consistence as an army, would have been a military error, dangerous in the extreme. Napoleon, knowing scientific war to be only a wise application of force, laughed at the delusion of those who regarded the want of regular armies as a favourable circumstance, and hailed the undisciplined peasant as the better defender of the country. He knew a general insurrection to be a military anarchy, a thing of no endurance. He knew that the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, not the volunteers of Lexington, established American independence; that the veterans of



Arcole and Marengo, not the republicans of Valmy, fixed the fate of the French revolution. Wherefore he strove to hinder the gathering of regular soldiers, a thing easy to happen, for the organized Spanish forces were in May above one hundred and twenty thousand of all arms. Fifteen thousand were in Holstein, under the marquis of Romana, but twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in Portugal; the remainder, in which were comprised eleven thousand Swiss and thirty thousand militia, were dispersed in various parts of the kingdom, principally in Andalusia. There was also a local reserve called the urban militia, much neglected indeed, and more a name than a reality, yet the advantage of such an institution was considerable; men were to be had in abundance, and as the greatest difficulty in a sudden crisis is to prepare the framework of order, it was no small resource to have one known to the people.

Historia de  
la Guerra  
contra  
Napoleon  
Bonaparte.

Of the French army, eighty thousand strong exclusive of those with Junot, seventy thousand were in the field; the rest were sick or in depôts. The possession of the fortresses, and the positions occupied, gave it strength, but it had many weak points. Composed chiefly of conscripts, it mustered in the ranks, French, Italians, Poles, and even Portuguese, whom Junot had expatriated, and some of these last remained in Spain until the war terminated. A few of the imperial guards were employed, and here and there an old regiment of the line to give the young troops consistence; but with these exceptions the French army was a raw levy, fresh from the plough and unacquainted with discipline: so late even as August, many of the battalions had not completed the first elements of their drill, and if they had not been formed upon good skeletons, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would have been trifling. This fact explains, in some measure, the otherwise incomprehensible checks and defeats which the French sustained at the commencement of the contest; it likewise proves how little vigour there was in Spanish resistance at the moment of the greatest enthusiasm.

Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 3.

Thiebault.

Dupont's  
Journal,  
MSS.



Napoleon attended principally to the security of Madrid. As the capital, and centre of all interests, its importance was manifest, and the great line of communication between it and Bayonne was early and constantly covered with troops. Murat, by drawing Moncey and Dupont to Madrid, and by his own haughty demeanour, forced on the crisis, and compelled Napoleon to hasten the advance of other troops, thus making a greater display of force than was consistent with his policy. For while the movements on the capital provoked the Spaniards, it stripped the line of communication with France, and the arrival of fresh battalions to remedy this error generated additional anger at a critical period.

To fill the void left by Moncey's advance, a fresh corps entered Spain, and being by degrees augmented to twenty-three thousand men, was called the 'army of the Western Pyrenees.' Marshal Bessières assumed the command, fixed his headquarters at Burgos, occupied Vitoria, Miranda de Ebro and other towns, and pushed advanced posts into Leon. He thus protected the line from Bayonne to the capital, menaced the Asturias and Biscay, commanded the valley of the Duero, and kept the kingdom of Leon and the province of Segovia in check. Burgos became the centre and pivot of his operations, and intermediate posts and fortresses connected him with Bayonne, where a reserve of twenty thousand men was formed under general Drouet.

Napoleon could, under the convention, send forty thousand men into the north of Spain. The exercise of this right being expected, did not create much alarm, but he had not indicated any desire to pass troops by Catalonia; neither the treaty, nor the convention, authorized that measure; nor could the supporting of Junot be used as a pretence. Nevertheless, so early as the 9th of February, eleven thousand infantry, sixteen hundred cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery, under the command of general Duhesme, crossed the frontier at La Jonquera, and marched upon Barcelona, leaving a detachment at the town of Figueras, the strong citadel of which commands the principal pass of the moun-

Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 2.

St. Cyr.  
Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 2.

tains. In Barcelona Duhesme remained under the plea of waiting for instructions from Madrid relative to a pretended march upon Cadiz. His secret orders were to obtain exact information concerning the Catalonian fortresses, depôts, and magazines,—to ascertain the state of public feeling,—to preserve a rigid discipline,—scrupulously to avoid giving any offence to the Spaniards, and to communicate with marshal Moncey, then commanding all the French troops in the north of Spain.

Duhesme's  
Instructions,  
Jan. 28th.  
Vide St. Cyr.

Political affairs soon indicated serious results, and when the troops in the north were in a condition to execute their orders, Duhesme, whose report had been received, was directed to seize the citadel of Barcelona, and the fort of Monjuick. The citadel was gained by stratagem; the fort, of celebrated strength, was surrendered by the governor Alvarez, because that brave and worthy man knew that from a base court he should receive no support. It is said, that, stung by the disgrace of his situation, he was at one time going to spring a mine beneath the French detachments, but his mind, betraying his spirit, sunk under the weight of unexpected events. What a picture of human weakness! The boldest shrinking from the discharge of their trust, like the meanest cowards—the wisest following the march of events, confounded and without a rule of action! When the heroic Alvarez could think the disgrace of surrendering his charge at the demand of a perfidious guest a less misfortune than the anger of a miserable court, what must the state of public feeling have been? And how can those who, like O'Farril and Azanza, served the intruder, be with justice blamed, if amidst the general stagnation they could not perceive the elements of a salutary tempest. Napoleon seeing these things, might well enlarge his ambitious designs. He erred not in the projection, so much as in the execution of design. Nations, like single persons, are creatures of circumstances; now weak, trembling, submissive; anon, proud, haughty, daring; novel events often affect public sentiment in a manner distinct from, and even opposed to the national character.

The Barcelona treachery was repeated at Figueras, the

impregnable citadel of Fernando fell into the hands of the French detachment left there, and Catalonia being thus opened, the magazines of Barcelona were filled, and Duhesme's troops took the title of the 'army of the Eastern Pyrenées.' This affair was momentous. Napoleon earnestly desired it to terminate before the events at Madrid should disclose his ulterior views. Barcelona, with its immense population, great riches, good harbour, and strong forts, might be called the key of the south of France, or Spain, as it happened to be in possession of the one or the other. The proximity of Sicily, where a large British army was kept in a state of constant preparation, made it more than probable an English force would reach Barcelona, to establish a war at the threshold of France; and Napoleon, seeing the extent of that danger, obviated it at the risk of rendering abortive the attempt to create a French party in Madrid. For he well knew that thirty or forty thousand British troops, occupying an intrenched camp in front of Barcelona, supported by a powerful fleet, and having reserved depôts in Sicily and the Spanish islands, might have been so wielded as to give ample occupation to a hundred and fifty thousand French. Protected by such an army, the Spanish levies might have been organized and instructed; their actual numbers could have been masked, increased, or diminished; the fleet would be ready to co-operate, and the south of France, whence the provisions of the enemy must have been drawn, would have been exposed to descents, and the inconvenience of actual hostilities. The Spanish provinces of Valencia, Mureia, and even Andalusia, being thus covered, the war would have been drawn to a head, and concentrated about Catalonia, the most warlike, rugged, sterile portion of Spain. Duhesme's success obviated this danger; the French troops were immediately increased to twenty-two thousand men, their general corresponded directly with Napoleon, and Barcelona became the centre of a system, distinct from that which held the other corps rolling round Madrid as their point of attraction.

That capital is situated in a plain. A semicircular range of mountains called the Sierra de Guadarama, the Carpentanos, and the Sierra de Guadalaxara, sweep in one unbroken

chain from west to east, falling on the Tagus at either end. All the direct communications between Madrid and France, or between the former and the northern provinces of Spain, pass over one or other of these Sierras, which are separated from the Pyrenees by the valley of the Ebro; from the Biscayan and Asturian mountains by the valley of the Duero.

There are four principal roads leading from France to Madrid.

First, a royal causeway passing the frontier at Irun, runs near San Sebastian, and thence through a wild country, full of dangerous defiles, to the Ebro; it crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, goes to Burgos, and then, turning short to the left, is carried over the Duero at Aranda; it surmounts the Carpentanos by the Somosierra pass, and then descends upon the capital.

Second, an inferior road penetrating by St. Jean Pied de Port, Pampeluna, and Tafalla; it crosses the Ebro at Tudela, and enters the basin of Madrid by the eastern range of the Sierra de Guadalupe, where the declination of the mountains presents a less rugged barrier than the snowy summits of the northern and western part of the chain.

Third, a road, not practicable for guns, threads the Pyrenees by Jaca, passes the Ebro at Zaragoza, and uniting with the second, crosses the Guadalupe ridge.

The fourth is the great route from Perpignan by Figueras, Gerona, Barcelona, Cervera, Lerida, and Zaragoza, to Madrid.

Zaragoza, being the capital of a province, uniting two great roads, and containing one of the great Spanish arsenals, was of strategic importance. An army could, from thence, operate by either bank of the Ebro, intercept the communication between the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, and block three out of the four great routes to Madrid. Had the French occupied it in force, their army in the capital could have acted with security against Valencia; and the united forces of Galicia and Leon would have been less dangerous when the Burgos road ceased to be the only line of retreat from Madrid. Nevertheless, Napoleon neglected Zaragoza at first, because, having no citadel, a small body of troops could not control the inhabitants; and a large force, creating suspicion too



soon, would have barred the attempts on Pampeluna and Barcelona, objects of still greater importance.

Murat and Savary remained at Madrid. They appeared to direct the execution of the emperor's projects, but he distrusted their judgment, and exacted the most detailed information of every movement and transaction. In the course of June, Murat, suffering from illness, quitted Spain, leaving behind him a troubled people, and a name for cruelty foreign to his character. Savary remained the sole representative of the new monarch. He was in the midst of commotion, and on every side beheld the violence of insurrection, the fury of an insulted nation. Each Spanish province had its junta of government, alike enraged, yet not alike dangerous.

Cabanes'  
War in  
Catalonia.  
1st Part.

Catalonia had great resources, but it was in Murcia and Valencia the garrisons of Barcelona, Montjuick, and Figueras rallied on the patriotic standards, and being mostly Spanish and Walloon guards, furnished the basis of an army which could be well supplied by those rich provinces, and furnished from the arsenal of Carthagena. A direct movement on Madrid from this quarter could only provoke a battle, not much to be feared by Savary; but a march on Zaragoza, to unite with the Aragonese, would have menaced the French communications, supported the Catalonian warfare, and given a point of union for three great provinces. In this lay the sting of the Valencian insurrection, to besiege Zaragoza and prevent the junction was the remedy.

Andalusia was of great importance. Solano's troops were disciplined; a large veteran force was in the camp of San Roque, under Castaños; the garrisons of Ceuta, Algeziras, Cadiz, Granada, and other places were united; a superb cannon foundry at Seville, and the arsenal of Cadiz, furnished the means of equipping a train of artillery; an active intercourse was maintained between the patriots and the English, and the supremacy of the Seville junta was admitted by those of Granada, Jaen, and Cordova, and by the army of Estremadura. Thus Andalusia, rich, distant from the capital, and well fenced by the Sierra Morena, afforded means to establish a systematic war, by drawing together

W. Stuart's  
Letters; vide



all the scattered elements of resistance in the southern and western provinces of Spain and Portugal. This danger, pregnant with future consequences, was, however, not immediate; there was no line of offensive movement against the flank or rear of the French army open to the Andalusian patriots; and as a march against Madrid would have been tedious and dangerous, the true policy of the Andalusians was palpably defensive.

Parliamentary Papers,  
1810.

In Estremadura, neither the activity nor means of the junta were at first sufficient to excite much attention; but in Leon, Old Castille, and Galicia, gathering clouds indicated a perilous storm. Gregoria Cuesta was captain-general of the two former kingdoms. Inimical to popular movements, haughty and resolute, he at first checked the insurrection with a rough hand, and thus laid the foundation for quarrels and intrigues which afterwards impeded the military operations, and split the northern provinces into factions; yet finally he joined the side of the patriots. Behind him, the kingdom of Galicia had, under the direction of Filanghieri, organized a large force, chiefly composed of the troops with which Taranco had seized Oporto. The garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña, and a number of soldiers flying from the countries occupied by the French, swelled this army; British agents were active to blow the flame of insurrection, and money, arms, and clothing were poured into the province through their hands, because Coruña afforded easy intercourse with England.

Close communication was maintained between the Gallician and Portuguese patriots, and the facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war in Galicia was, therefore, as great as in Andalusia. The resources were perhaps greater, on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and the advantage of position was in favour of Galicia, because the sources of her strength were as well covered from the direct line of the French operations; the slightest offensive movement upon her part, by threatening the communications of the French army in Madrid, endangered the safety of any corps, marching from the capital against the southern provinces. To be prepared against the Gallician forces was therefore of pressing importance; a defeat from that quarter would have

been felt in all parts of the army; and no considerable, or sustained operation, could be undertaken against the other insurgent forces until her strength had been first broken. This was the great object in the north, because Biscay and the Asturias had neither regular troops nor fortified towns; and the contracted shape of those provinces placed them within the power of the French, who had nothing to fear as long as they could hold the sea-ports.

From this sketch it results, that Savary, in classing the dangers of his situation, should have rated Galicia and Leon in the first, Zaragoza in the second, Andalusia in the third, and Valencia in the fourth rank, and so regulated his operations. Napoleon thus looked at the affair, but Savary, wavering in his opinions, missed the spirit of his instructions, and sunk under difficulties created by himself.

Fifty thousand French and eighty guns were disposable for offensive operations in the beginning of June. Collected into one mass, they were sufficient to crush any or all the insurgent armies, but it was necessary to assail several points at once. In doing this, the safety of each minor body depended upon the stability of the base whence it emanated, and the security of each base depended on its communications with France: in other words, Bayonne was the base of operations against Madrid, and Madrid the base of operations against Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia. To combine all the movements of a vast plan, embracing the operations against Catalonia, Aragon, Biscay, the Asturias, Galicia, Leon, Castille, Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia, in such a simple manner, as that the different armies, working upon one principle, might mutually support and strengthen each other, and at the same time preserve their communication with France, was the great problem to be solved. It required a master mind, and from Bayonne Napoleon directed the general movement, and with the greatest caution; for it is an error, though a very general one, to suppose he plunged into the contest without foresight, as having to do with adversaries he despired.

In his instructions to Savary he says, '*In a war of this sort it is necessary to act with patience, coolness, and upon calcu-*

lation.' 'In civil wars it is the important points only which should be guarded—we must not go to all places;' and he forbade the spreading of troops over the country without the power of uniting upon emergency, as a dangerous display of activity. His principle may be illustrated by a closed hand thrust forward and the fingers afterwards extended; while the wrist is sound, the hand and fingers may be moved, but a wound in the former paralyzes the whole. Hence the careful distribution of troops along the Burgos road; hence the seizure of the fortresses, and the reserves at Bayonne.

When the insurrection commenced, Bessières was ordered to put Burgos in a state of defence—to detach four or five thousand men, under Lefebvre Desnouettes, against Zaragoza,—to destroy the manufactory of arms at Placencia in Guipuscoa—to keep down the insurgents of Biscay, the Asturias, and Old Castille,—to observe the army assembling in Galicia—to occupy and watch with jealous care, the port of Santander and the coast towns. A reinforcement of nine thousand men was prepared for Duhesme, to enable him to tranquillize Catalonia, and co-operate with a division marching from Madrid against Valencia. Drouet's reserve at Bayonne was nourished by drafts from the interior; it supplied Bessières with reinforcements, and afforded a detachment of four thousand men to watch the openings of the Pyrenean valley, especially towards Jaca, then in possession of the Spanish insurgents. A smaller reserve was established at Perpignan; another body watched the openings of the eastern frontier; and all the generals commanding corps, or even detachments, were directed to correspond daily with Drouet.

The rear, thus secured, the main body at Madrid commenced offensive operations. Moncey marched, with part of his corps upon Cuenca, to bar the march of a Valencian army upon Zaragoza,—Dupont went, with ten thousand men, against Cadiz,—and the remainder of his and Moncey's troops were kept near Madrid as reserves. Napoleon ordered Segovia to be put in a state of defence—Gobert's division of Moncey's corps to

Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 2.

S.  
Journal of  
Moncey's  
Operations.  
MSS.

Napoleon's  
notes. Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 1.

co-operate with Bessières on the side of Valladolid—and moveable columns to scour the country in rear of the acting bodies, uniting again at stated times upon points of secondary interest. Thus linking his operations together, he hoped, by grasping as it were the ganglia of the insurrection, to reduce it to a few convulsive motions. How the execution failed in the hands of his lieutenants shall be shown in the next chapters, but his plan embraced every probable chance of war, and even provided for the uncertain contingency of an English army landing upon his flanks at either end of the Pyrenean frontier. Neither his power, nor his fortune, nor the contempt he felt for the military power of the Spaniards made him remiss. The conqueror of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of peasants, as if Frederick the Great had been in his front, and yet he failed! Such is war!

## CHAPTER V.

## OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BESSIÈRES.

THIS officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a general revolt took place. On his right, the bishop of Santander excited the inhabitants to take arms. In his rear, a mechanic assembled some thousand armed peasants at the town of Logroño. In front, five thousand men seized the Spanish artillery dépôt at Segovia; an equal number assembled at Palencia, advanced to the town of Torquemada; and Cuesta took post, with some regular troops and a body of organized peasantry, on the Pisuerga at Cabeçon.

Moniteur.

Victoires et  
Conquêtes  
des Fran-  
çais.

Bessièrès, who had twelve thousand disposable men, sent moveable columns to disarm the towns and attack the insurgents, and he was aided by a division of Dupont's reserve, under general Frère, coming from the side of Madrid. The operations were rapid. General Verdier, falling on Logroño the 6th, dispersed the peasantry, and barbarously put the leaders to death after the action. General Lassalle, passing the Pisuerga with a brigade of light cavalry, defeated the Spaniards at Torquemada on the 7th, pursued with a merciless sword, burned that town, and entered Palencia the 8th. Frère broke the insurgent force at Segovia, and took thirty pieces of artillery. General Merle, marching through the country between the Pisuerga and the Duero, joined Lassalle with a division of infantry at Dueñas on the 12th, and they overthrew Cuesta, at Cabeçon, with great slaughter, the loss of his artillery, and several thousand muskets.

The flat country being thus subdued, Lassalle remained to keep it under, while Merle, marching northward, commenced operations, in concert with general Ducas, against the pro-



vince of Santander. On the 20th, the latter drove the Spaniards from the pass of Soncillo; the 21st he forced the pass of Venta de Escudo, descending the valley of the river Pas, and approached Santander the 22nd. Merle, after some resistance, penetrated by Lantueño, followed the course of the Besaya to Torre La Vega, then turned to his right, and entered Santander on the 23rd. Ducos arrived at the same time, the town submitted, and the bishop fled with the greatest part of the clergy. The authorities of Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and Santander were then compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph. Those provinces were disarmed, and so awed by the activity of Bessières that no further insurrections took place; his cavalry raised contributions and collected provisions without the least difficulty: Frere's division then returned to Toledo, and from thence marched to San Clemente, on the borders of Murcia.

While Bessières broke the northern insurrection, Lefebre Desnouettes' march brought on the first siege of *Cavallero.* Zaragoza. To that place had flocked from the most distant parts, soldiers flying from Madrid and Pampeluna, engineers from the school of Alcala, and all the retired officers in Aragon. With their assistance Palafox's forces were rapidly organized; the arsenal of Zaragoza furnished him with arms, and numerous battalions were posted on the roads leading to Navarre. The baron de Versage, an officer of the Walloon guards, occupied Calatayud with a regiment of students, and a levy made there by him, protected the powder-mills of Villa Felice and kept the communication with Soria and Siguenza: the people of Tudela broke their bridge on the Ebro, and Palafox reinforced them with five hundred fuzileers.

*s.* Lefebre commenced his march from Pampeluna  
*Journal of* the 7th of June, having three or four thousand  
*Lefebre's* infantry, some field batteries, and a regiment of  
*Operations.* Polish cavalry. On the 9th he forced the passage  
*MSS.* of the Ebro, barbarously put the leaders of the  
 insurrection to death after the action, and then  
 continued his movement by the right bank to  
*Moniteur.* Mallen. Palafox defended the Huccha with ten  
*Victoires et*  
*Conquêtes*  
*des Français.*  
*Cavallero.*

thousand infantry, two hundred dragoons, and eight guns, but he was overthrown on the 13th. Another combat and victory on the 14th carried Lefebre across the Xalon. The 15th he was on the Huerba, in front of the heroic city.

#### FIRST SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

Zaragoza contained fifty thousand inhabitants. The city was on the right of the Ebro, the suburb on the left, but connected by a stone bridge. The vicinity was flat, and on the suburb side marshy. The Huerba cuts the plain on the right bank, flowing in a deep cleft perpendicularly towards the town, until close to the walls, when, turning to the right, it falls into the Ebro, nearly opposite to the mouth of the Gallego, which cuts the plain in like manner on the left bank. The convent of San Joseph, on the right of the Huerba, covered a bridge over that torrent, and at eighteen hundred yards distance rose the Monte Torrero. On this hill, which commanded all the plain, and overlooked the town, several store-houses, built for the use of the canal, were entrenched and occupied by twelve hundred men; the canal itself, a noble work, furnished water-carriage, without a single lock, from Tudela to Zaragoza. Surrounded by a low brick wall, the city presented no regular defences, and possessed very few guns in a serviceable state; but the houses were strongly constructed, for the most part of two stories, each story vaulted and nearly fire-proof. Every house had its garrison, and the massive convents, rising like castles around the circuit and inside the place, were crowded with armed men.

Cavallero.  
Siege of  
Zaragoza.

Lefebre Desnouettes' movements had cut the direct communication with Calatayud, and forced the baron Versage to retire to Belchite; and when Palafox occupied the olive groves and houses between the convent of St. Joseph and Monte Torrero, his men, cowed by previous defeats, were easily driven from thence on the 16th. The town was then closely invested on the right bank of the Ebro; and so great was the terror of

s.  
Journal of  
Lefebre's  
Operations.  
MSS.

Cavallero. the Spaniards, that some of the French penetrated without difficulty into the street of San Engracia, and were like to have taken the city. Palafox and his brother Franciseo, having an escort of one hundred dragoons, endeavoured, under pretence of seeking succour, to pass out by the suburb at the moment the French were entering by the side of San Engracia; but the plebeian leaders, suspicious of his intentions, would not suffer him to depart without a guard of infantry, commanded by *Tio*, or goodman, Jorge. It was this person and *Tio* Marin who defended the city. Palafox, who has gathered the honours, would have fled at one gate while the enemy was pressing in at another, and Zaragoza was on the verge of destruction; for the streets were filled with clamour, the troops making little resistance, and all things in confusion. However the French, fearful of an ambuscade or ignorant of their advantages, retired, and the people changing, as if inspired, from the extreme of terror to that of courage, suddenly fell to casting up defences, piercing loop-holes in the walls of the houses, constructing ramparts with sand-bags, and working with such vigour under the direction of their engineers, that in twenty-four hours they put the place in a condition to withstand an assault. Lefebvre then, confining his operations to the right bank of the Ebro, established posts close to the gates, and waited for reinforcements.

Meanwhile, Palafox recrossed the Ebro at Pina, joined Versage at Belehite, and having collected seven or eight thousand men and four pieces of artillery, gained the Xalon in rear of the French. From thence he proposed to advance through Epila and relieve Zaragoza by a battle, but his officers, amazed at this project, resisted his authority, and would have retired upon Valencia. Nevertheless, ignorant of war, and probably awed by *Tio* Jorge, he expressed his determination to fight, saying with an imposing air, 'that those who feared might retire.' Touched with shame all agreed to follow him to Epila, but two French regiments, detached by Lefebvre, defeated them on the march with great loss; and Palafox, notwithstanding his speech, must have fled early, for he reached Calatayud in the night, and yet,

many of his troops arrived there unbroken the next morning. After this disaster, leaving Versage at Calatayud to make fresh levies, he repaired, with all the beaten troops that he could collect, to Belchite, and, always accompanied by Tio Jorge, regained Zaragoza on the 2nd of July.

During his absence Lefebvre took Monte Torrero by assault, and had been joined by a division of infantry and a battering train under Verdier. Having then twelve thousand men, he attacked the convents of St. Joseph and the Capuchins, the day Palafox returned. The first assault on St. Joseph failed, the second succeeded; the Capuchins, after some fighting, was set fire to by the Spaniards. The suburb was not invested, and Napoleon, blaming this mode of attack, sent orders to throw a bridge across the Ebro,—to press the siege on the left bank, and profit of the previous success, by raising a breaching battery on the convent of St. Joseph. A bridge was accordingly constructed at St. Lambert, two hundred yards above the town, and two attacks were carried on at the same time; but the emperor now directed Lefebvre to rejoin Bessières with a brigade, and then constituting the ten thousand men who remained with Verdier a separate corps, gave him the command.

S.  
Journal of  
Lefebvre's  
Operations.  
MSS.

Verdier pressed the siege, and sent detachments against the insurgents, who were forming small armies on every side to enclose him in his camp. And it is remarkable that with so few men, and daily fighting with the besieged, he could scour the country, and put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tudela, Jaca, and Calatayud, without any assistance, save what the garrison of Pampeluna gave him. In one of these expeditions the powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed, and the baron Versage driven towards Valencia.

Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 2.

Cavallero.

In the course of July several unsuccessful assaults were made on the gates of El Carmen and the Portillo. The besieged, reinforced by eight hundred old soldiers of the regiment of Estremadura, made a sally to retake the Torrero, but were beaten with the loss of their commander. Regular



approaches were then commenced against the quarter of Santa Engracia, and against the castle of Aljaferia, which stood outside the walls on the west. Two hundred Spanish guards, volunteers of Aragon and some artillerymen, now entered the place, and the French force was augmented to fifteen thousand, by the arrival of two veteran regiments.

On the 3rd, the breaching batteries opened, the place was bombarded, and a Spanish powder magazine, situated in the Cosso, a public walk formed along the ancient Moorish ramparts, exploded with a great destruction. The place was summoned in vain, and on the 4th, the convent of Santa Engracia was stormed. The French penetrated to the Cosso, where a terrible tumult took place; for while some Spaniards defended the houses, and some the streets, others fled by the suburb to the country beyond, and were charged by the cavalry on that side. Cries of treason, the sure signal of assassination then arose on every side, the public hospital for mad persons was set on fire, and the insane creatures came forth, mingling with the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing or moping, according to the character of their disorder. All seemed lost, when some of the French began to plunder, and one column, seeking a way to the bridge, got entangled in the Arco de Cineja, a long crooked street, and were driven back. Then the Zaragozans recovered courage, and fighting desperately, set fire to the convent of Francisco, which checked the attack: at close of day the French remained in possession of one side of the Cosso, the Spaniards of the other. From this time the fighting was murderous and constant, one party endeavouring to take, the other to defend the houses. Skill was nearly useless, Verdier was too weak to make rapid progress, and disastrous events having taken place in other parts of Spain, he received, about the 10th, orders from the king to raise the siege, and retire to Logroña.

S.  
Journal of  
Lefebvre's  
Operations.  
MSS.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Professional expertness and enterprise do not constitute a great general. Lefebvre Desnouettes, active and bold,



defeated the insurgents in several actions, with a tithe of their numbers, and scoured the open country; the same Lefebre, wanting the higher qualities of a general, failed where that intuitive sagacity which reads passing events aright was required. Thousands in the French army could have done as well as he in the field, few could have reduced Zaragoza; and yet it is manifest she owed her safety to accident; the desperate resistance was more the result of chance than of any peculiar virtue.

2°. Defeated at Mallen, at the Xalon, at the Monte Torrero, at Epila, the Spaniards were terrified when the French penetrated into the town. The flight of Palafox under the pretence of seeking succour; the assault which called forth the energy of the Zaragozans, and failed only because the French troops plundered, and missing the road to the bridge missed that to victory, prove that accident saved the city. It is these nice conjunctures that men of genius know how to seize while others leave them to the decision of fortune. Nevertheless, Lefebre and Verdier, especially the latter, displayed vigour and talent; for it was no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty miles on every side, at the same time investing double their own numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardour as to reduce to extremity a city so defended.

3°. Romantic tales of women rallying the troops and leading them forward at the most dangerous periods of this siege were current; but their truth may be doubted. Yet, when suddenly environed with horrors, the sensitiveness of women driving them to a kind of frenzy, might have produced actions above the heroism of men, and in patient suffering their superior fortitude is acknowledged by all nations: wherefore, neither wholly believing nor absolutely denying these exploits, it may be remarked, that for a long time afterwards, Spain swarmed with Zaragoza heroines, clothed in half uniforms and theatri-cally loaded with weapons.

4°. Two circumstances principally contributed to the success of the defence. The bad discipline of the French, and the system of terror established by the Spanish leaders. Few soldiers can be restrained from plunder when a town is taken by assault; yet there is no period when the chances of war are

so sudden, so decisive; none where the moral responsibility of a general is so great. Will military regulations alone secure the necessary discipline at such a moment? The French army has a stern code; the English army is the best regulated of modern times; yet Lefebvre failed to take Zaragoza in default of discipline; and in the course of this work it will appear, that no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more licence upon rich neighbours, than did the English troops upon the Spanish towns taken by storm. National institutions only will produce that moral discipline necessary to make a soldier fulfil his whole duty; yet the late Lord Melville was not ashamed to declare in parliament, that the worst men made the best soldiers; and this odious, narrow-minded, unworthy maxim had its admirers. That a system of terror was employed at Zaragoza is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Torrero, ostensibly for suffering himself to be defeated, but, according to some, for the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death; a general of artillery was killed without any trial; and the chief engineer, a man of skill and undaunted courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned. The slightest word, or even gesture of discontent, was punished by murder.

Cavallero.

A stern band of priests and plebeian leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a tool, ruled with such furious energy, that resistance to the enemy was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders: suspicion was the warrant of death, and this system ceased not until the town was taken in the second siege.

## CHAPTER VI.

## OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

BARCELONA, when it fell into the hands of the French, had a Spanish garrison of four thousand men. Affrays soon happened between the soldiers of the two nations, and Duhesme, fearing a serious collision, permitted the Spaniards to escape by whole parties; he even sent the regiment of Estremadura entire to Lerida, where it was denied admittance, and made its way to Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand citizens also fled from Barcelona to join the patriotic standard; and although after the first ebullition at Manresa, the insurrection lingered awhile, the Gerona junta was very zealous, a general commotion was manifestly at hand, and there were, including those who came out of Barcelona, five thousand veterans in Catalonia; ten thousand more were in the Balearic islands; an English army was in Sicily, English fleets in the Mediterranean; and the Catalonian constitution compelled the active male population to assemble in each district with arms and ammunition, whenever the *somaten* was rung; hence the term *somatenes*, and these warlike peasants well knew by tradition the military value of their mountain holds.

Cabanes,  
1st Part.

Hostilities soon commenced, and Duhesme, following his original instructions, detached five thousand two hundred men, under general Chabran, to secure the fortresses of Taragona and Tortosa, to incorporate the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen, and to aid marshal Moncey against Valencia. At the same time, some three thousand Swiss, Germans, and Italians, under general Swartz, were sent by the way of Martorel and Montserrat to Manresa. This general had orders to raise contributions, and put down the insurrection; to destroy the powder-mills at Manresa, get possession of Lerida, incorporate the Swiss

troops found there, place five hundred men in the citadel, and finally to enter Aragon and co-operate with Lefebvre against Zaragoza. He quitted Barcelona the 3rd and 4th of June, but a heavy rain induced him to halt the 5th at Martorel, and the 6th he resumed his march carelessly and without military precautions, although his expedition was known, and the somatenes, ringing out among the hills, had brought together in arms all the peasants of eight districts. At the pass of Bruch, the most active, assisted by a few old soldiers, observing Swartz's careless march, opened a distant fire from the rocks. He was surprised, but beat the Catalans from their post, and pursued them to Casa Mansana, a distance of five miles, where they separated and fled, part towards Montserrat, part towards Igualada. Swartz then halted, and the Catalans rallying in rear of Casa Mansana, drove his advanced guard back, whereupon he hastily retired towards Esparraguera, followed and flanked by clouds of somatenes, whose courage and numbers increased every moment. At Esparraguera, a long single street, the inhabitants prepared an ambush, but Swartz, learning their design, passed to the right and left, and reached Martorel the 7th. He lost a gun and many men, and returned in such disorder, that Duhesme, foreseeing a general explosion, immediately recalled Chabran.

That officer had entered Taragona the 8th without encountering an enemy; but when he returned, the insurgents were posted at Vendrills, Arbos, and Villa Franca, and spread along the banks of the Llobregat. From Vendrills they fell back to Arbos, where the French beat them, set fire to the town, and proceeded to Villa Franca. Here the excesses, so common among the Spaniards, were not spared. The governor, an old man, was murdered, together with several of his friends; and the perpetrators of these crimes, as might be expected, made no defence against the enemy. Duhesme, moving out of Barcelona to meet Swartz, cleared the Llobregat, took some guns, burned San Boy, and sent general Lechi to meet Chabran. When his force was thus re-united, he detached Chabran, with his own and Swartz's brigade, to Manresa; but the somatenes, reinforced with regular



troops and artillery, again defended the pass of Bruch, and Chabran, more timid even than Swartz, fled, after a slight skirmish, from those gallant peasants, and was pursued with scoffs and a galling fire to the very walls of Bareelona. This success, attributed to the holy influence of the Lady of Montserrat, spurred on the insurrection. Gerona, Rosas, Hostalrich, and Taragona took arms; the somatenes of the Ampurdan forced the French to abandon the town of Figueras, and confine themselves to the fort of Fernando; the country between the Ter and the Besos swarmed with insurgents, and the communication with France was cut off.

Duhesme now took six thousand of his best troops, with eight pieces of artillery, and marched against Gerona. To avoid the castle of Hostalrich, he followed the coast line, and was attended by a French privateer. The somatenes immediately assembled in two great bodies, one on the Moneada heights, six miles from Bareelona; the other on the ridge of Mongat, which at the same distance abuts upon the sea. At Mongat the Spaniards had an entrenched castle, and a battery of fifteen guns, but were beaten by Duhesme on the 17th, and a detachment from Barcelona defeated those at Moneada. The 18th, Duhesme took Mattaro, and plundered it. The 19th, he beat the somatenes at St. Pol. The 20th, at nine o'clock, he appeared before Gerona. This town is built on the right of the Ter, but the Oña, a confluent of that river, flows through the place. On the eastward, rocky hills overlook the town at different distances. Fort Mont Jouy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest height, five hundred yards distant from the walls. Three other forts, called the Constable, St. Anne, and the Capuchins, connected by a ditch and rampart so as to form one irregular outwork a thousand yards long, crowned a second ridge five, eight, and twelve hundred yards from Gerona, sixteen hundred from Mont Jouy, from which it was also separated by the valley and stream of the Gallegan.

South-west, between the left of the Oña and the Ter, the country is comparatively flat, but full of hollows and clefts near the town. The body of the place there, was defended by a ditch, and five regular bastions connected by a wall with

towers. Westward, the city was covered by the Ter. On the east it was fortified with a long wall and towers, with irregular bastions at each extremity, and having small detached works at the opening of the valley of Gallegan. The garrison, composed of the regiment of Ultonia, three hundred strong, and some artillery-men, was assisted by volunteers, citizens and somatenes, who assembled on the left of the Ter to dispute the passage of the river.

Duhesme, after provoking some shot from the forts, occupied the village of St. Eugenia in the plain, and then, feigning to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent in preparing ladders for the attack, but at five o'clock

in the evening the French artillery opened from  
St. Cyr.

the heights of Palau, and a column crossing the Oña, passed between the outworks and the town, and throwing out a detachment to check the garrison of the former assaulted the gate of El Carmen, but the attempt failed with great loss to the assailants. Two hours after, another column, advancing by the left of the Oña, assaulted the bastion of Santa Clara, but with little arrangement or discipline. The storming party had only three or four  
Lafaille.

ladders; and though, by favour of the hollows, it reached the walls unperceived, and though the Neapolitan colonel, Ambrosio, and the engineer, Lafaille, actually gained the top of the ramparts, the confusion prevented success. Next day, Duhesme tried negotiation, and it is said the town would have yielded, if, dreading a longer absence from Barcelona, he had not suddenly quitted his camp, and returned by forced marches, leaving Chabran with some troops in Mattaro as he passed. During his absence, the victorious somatenes of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower country, got artillery from Taragona and other fortresses, planted batteries at the different passages of the river, and being joined by the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen from Taragona, had entrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel.

Regular officers now took the command of the peasants. Colonel Milans assembled a body at Granollers; Juan Clàros put himself at the head of the peasants of the Ampurdan;

colonel Baget took the command of those at Bruch ; and when Chabran, after resting at Mattaro, made a foraging excursion through the district of El Valles, Milans, who held the valley of the Congosta, encountered him near Granollers. Both sides claimed the victory, but Chabran retired to Barcelona, and Milans remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th, Duhesme caused the somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked. Lechi menaced those at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, while the brigades of Bessières and Goullus, crossing the river at San Boy, surprised a battery, and turned their line. Lechi then passed by the bridge of Molinos, ascended the left bank, took all the artillery, burnt several villages, and put the insurgents to flight. They rallied at Bruch and Igualada, and, returning the 6th, infested the vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of all the hills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their operations with Milans ; other parties also collected between the Besos and the Ter, the line of insurrection extended to the Ampurdan, and Juan Clàros occupied the flat country about Rosas. The French garrison of Fernando had partly burned the town of Figueras, but were themselves blocked up in the fort by the somatenes of the Pyrenees, and the Imperieuse and the Cambrian, English frigates, cruized between Rosas and Barcelona. Meanwhile a nest of privateers was formed in Palamos Bay, a junta was established at Lerida, intercommunication was had with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balcaric Islands, and it was decreed that forty tercios or regiments, selected from the somatenes, should be organized and paid as regular troops, and forty more form a reserve without pay.

This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon by the moveable columns watching the valleys of the eastern Pyrenees, he ordered general Reille, then commanding the reserve at Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march to the relief of Fernando de Figueras. This effected, Reille, with a force increased by drafts from the interior of France to nine thousand, was to assault Rosas and besiege Gerona ; and the emperor thought the fall of Gerona would induce the surrender of Lerida, and so tranquillize Catalonia, that five thousand men might be detached towards Valencia.

Reille, having two battalions of Tusean recruits, conducted a convoy safely to Figueras, and raised the blockade the 10th of

July; not, however, without difficulty, for his troops were greatly terrified, and could scarcely be kept to their colours. On the same day, Duhesme,

Foy's  
History.

designing a second attack on Gerona, quitted Barcelona with six thousand infantry, some cavalry, and a battering train of nine guns, together with a great train of country carriages, transporting ammunition and stores. General Lechi remained with five thousand men in Barcelona, and the citizens were

Lord Col-  
lingwood's  
Despatch.

disarmed. Reille meantime having received his reinforcement from France, invested Rosas, whereupon Juan Clàros raised the country in his rear, the Montague, English seventy-four, arrived on the coast, and her captain, Otway, joining the migueletes with some seamen and marines, a skirmish took place, which obliged Reille to retire with the loss of two hundred men.

Duhesme's march was again by the coast, and difficult. The somatenes broke up the road, Milans hung on his left, the Imperieuse under lord Cochrane, aided by some Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right, and he was forced to halt for five days near Arenas de Mar. At last, dividing his troops, he sent one part over the mountains to Villagorguin, the other to St. Isiele. The first attacked Hostalrich, and failed. The second, beating Milans, dispersed the somatenes on the Tordera, and Duhesme again united his troops under the walls of Gerona, but he lost many carriages. The 23rd he dispersed the migueletes guarding the left bank of the Ter, and then Reille, coming from Figueras with six thousand men, took post at Puente Mayor, and the town was invested. The garrison, composed at first of five hundred migueletes and the regiment of Ultonia, was reinforced the 25th, with thirteen hundred of the regiment of Barcelona, and two guns. Nevertheless, in the night of the 27th, a French column, passing the valley of Galligan, gained the table of Mont Jouy, seized three fortified towers which the Spaniards abandoned in a panic, and Duhesme, after an examination, resolved to break ground there. But a great change had occurred in Catalonian affairs. The insurrection hitherto confined to the



somatenes was consolidated by a treaty between lord Collingwood, commander of the British fleet, and the marquis of Palacios, captain-general of the Balearic isles; a treaty, which set the Spanish fleet and troops, hitherto blockaded in the islands by the English, free. Palacios then sent the regiment of Barcelona to Felice di Quixols, from whence, as before stated, it reached Gerona. Palacios himself disembarked with four thousand men and thirty-seven guns at Taragona, and his arrival excited such a vehement desire for fighting, that the supreme junta repairing to that town, immediately made the marquis their president, and commander-in-chief, subject, however, to the tutelar Saint Narcissus, who was, at the same time, proclaimed generalissimo by sea and land, the symbols of authority being solemnly laid on his coffin. The first act of Palacios was to send the count of Caldagues with eighteen hundred men and four guns, to re-establish the line of the Llobregat; and that officer having formed a post at the bridge of Molino del Rey, fixed his quarters at Martorel, and was joined by colonel Baget with three thousand new levies. This line was only a few miles from Barcelona, but it was a very strong one, and the right bank was steeper, had easier communications than the left bank, a commanding view, and rough defiles behind fitted to cover a retreat.

Llchi, thus hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, because the mountains, filling the space between the Llobregat and the Besos, send their shoots within two and three miles of Barcelona, and the somatenes of the Manresa and Valls districts skirmished from thence daily with the French outposts. Beyond the Besos, bounding Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty continuous ridge, extending to Hostalrich, runs parallel to and at the distance of two or three miles from the sea coast, separates the main from the marine roads, and sends its shoots down to the water's edge. This ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut the communication with Duhesme, and invested the castle of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The Cambrian and Imperieuse frigates blockaded the harbour of Barcelona; and lord Cochrane bringing the latter alongside of Mongat, landed his

marines, and having, in concert with the somatenes, taken it, destroyed the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down in such a manner as to block the road. Thus, when Duhesme commenced the siege of Gerona, he was cut off from Barcelona and that city was menaced. Reille's communication with Figueras was likewise interrupted; convoys were attacked the 28th St. Cyr. of July and 3rd of August, and so fiercely on the 6th, that a Neapolitan battalion lost a hundred and fifty men.

Palacios, whose forces augmented daily, sent Caldagues to succour Gerona, at the head of three or four thousand troops, part migueletes, part regulars; he was to interrupt the progress of the siege, and the marquis designed to follow himself with greater forces. Caldagues, making a circuit by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and San Celoni, reached Hostalrich the morning of the 10th, where his force was increased to five thousand men and four guns. On the 14th he reached Castellar, a small place behind the ridges overlooking Gerona, five miles from the French camps, where Juan Clàros met him with two thousand five hundred migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Spanish Guards from Rosas. Milans also joined him with eight hundred somatenes, and a communication with the junta of Gerona was opened. At this time the Mont Jouy was hard pressed, but the French, ignorant of Caldagues' approach, had heaped their forces in the plain between the left of the Oña and the Ter, leaving but a slender guard on the hills, and one battalion to protect the batteries raised against Mont Jouy. The Spanish general, an enterprising man, sent several columns on the 16th, against the weak part of the besiegers' line, and, at the same time, the garrison sallied from Mont Jouy; the French were thus overpowered, and driven across the Ter. The Catalans re-formed on the hills, expecting to be attacked; but Duhesme and Reille waited until dark, and then fled, the one to Figueras, the other to Barcelona, leaving artillery and stores behind. Duhesme designed to retreat by the coast, but hearing at Callella that the road was cut, the somatenes on the heights, and an English frigate ready to rake his columns, he destroyed his ammunition, threw his artillery over the rocks, took to the mountains, and forced a passage through the somatenes to Mongat, where Lechi met him and covered the retreat to Barcelona.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Three great communications piercing the Pyrenean frontier of Catalonia, lead directly upon Barcelona. First, the Puycerda road penetrating between the sources of the Segre and Ter. Second, the Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and the Fluvia. Third, the Figueras road, between the sources of the Muga and the sea coast.

The first and second unite at Vich; the second and third are connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle Follit, to Gerona; the third, also dividing near the latter town, sends one branch through Hostalrich, the other by the coast. After the union of the first and second at Vich, a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Barcelona, turning the Muga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an infinity of minor streams, which in their rapid course to the Mediterranean furrow all the country between the eastern Pyrenees and Barcelona. The third is the direct and best communication between Perpignan and the capital of Catalonia; but it crosses all the above-named rivers, and their deep channels and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army.

2°. All these roads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona, are separated by craggy mountain ridges scarcely to be passed by troops. The two first, leading through wild and savage districts, are incommoded by defiles, and protected by a number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing towns, is blocked to an invader by the fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, Gerona on the Ter, Hostalrich on the Tordera. Palamos and other castles impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet. Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona.

On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobregat cuts off that city from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Anguera, and Francoli rivers descend in deep channels to the coast; the spaces

between being gorged with mountains, and studded with fortified places which command the main roads. So few and contracted are the plains and fertile valleys, that Catalonia may, with the exception of the rich parts about Lerida and the Urgel, be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity depends upon manufactures and commerce. Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the heart of the province, and who holds it, may suck the strength of Catalonia away. But a French army, without a commanding fleet to assist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona. The troops must be supplied by convoys from France; the fortresses on the line of communication taken and provisioned; the active intelligent population of the country beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fastnesses, and warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable of: for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after their own manner.

3°. It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme showed little military forethought, in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich and Taragona with garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. This negligence made the repulse of Swartz and Chabran vital; it enabled some poor, injured, indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, which forced Napoleon at this time to send thirty thousand men to the relief of Barcelona, occupied for several years afterwards large armies, and never entirely ceased until the French retired.

4°. Duhesme's energy and intelligence have been praised by Napoleon. Yet an absence of military arrangement and discipline marked his operations in Catalonia. Witness his attacks on Gerona, the want of ladders, the confusion of the assaults; his raising of the second siege and flight from Caldagues, whose enterprise, though successful, should have been made fatal to himself. In these matters Duhesme displayed no talent. In the sacking of Mattaro and the burning of villages, which he executed with the extremest rigour permitted by the harshest laws of war, an odious energy was apparent; and as the ardour of the somatenes was increased by this severity,

Notes, Appendix,  
No. 2.

St. Cyr.



his conduct was as impolitic as it was barbarous.

It has, however, been said, that Lechi was the man who perpetrated these things, against the wishes of Duhesme, who was humane and just. Lafaille.

5°. The Catalans united to the usual cruelty of Spaniards more than their usual vanity and superstition. Their courage was however higher, their patriotism purer, their efforts more sustained; the somatenes were bold in battle, the populations of the towns firm, and some of the juntas apparently disinterested. The praise merited, and bestowed, upon the people of Zaragoza is great, yet Gerona more justly claims the admiration of mankind. For the Aragonese troops were by Lefebre driven from the open country in crowds to their capital, where a little would have made them surrender; it was only at the last hour that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put forth all their energy. Gerona, attacked by a greater force and possessing fewer means of defence, without any internal system of terror to counterbalance their fear of the enemy, manfully resisted from the first. The people of Zaragoza rallied on their hearthstone, those of Gerona stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, the contemporary occurrences in Valencia must be related.

#### OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY.

After Calvo and his murderous followers had been strangled, the horrid aspect of the Valencian insurrection was entirely changed. The spirit of murder was checked, and the patriotic energy assumed a much nobler appearance. Murcia and Valencia were united, and thirty thousand men, armed and provided with artillery, attested the resources of these rich provinces and the activity of their chiefs. The Valencians then resolved to march on Aragon. Napoleon foreseeing this, had, on the 30th of May, directed Moncey, with ten thousand men upon Cuenea, to watch the country between the lower Ebro and Carthagena; and to act against the city of Valencia if he judged it fitting. From Cuenea, a short movement to the left would place him between Valencia and Zaragoza; a few marches to the

S.  
Journal of  
Moncey's  
Operations,  
MSS.

right would place him on the junction of roads leading from Carthagena and Valencia to Madrid; and if he marched against Valencia, Chabran was to co-operate from the side of Catalonia. The operations of Lefebre Desnouettes at Zaragoza, and of Duhesme in Catalonia, were thus covered from the Valencians, and the flank of the French at Madrid protected from the Murcians.

Moncey reached Cuenca the 11th of June, and there learning how very fierce the Valencians were, how strong their army, and also that their project was to relieve Zaragoza, he resolved to attack their city. Supposing Chabran to be then at Tortosa, he ordered him to march at once upon Castellon de la Plana, a town eastward of the Guadalaviar, for he designed to clear all the country westward of that river himself. He fixed the 25th June as the latest period for the union of the two columns near Valencia, and quitting Cuenca the 17th, marched by Tortola, Buenaches, Matilla, and Minglanilla, to the bridge of Pajaso upon the river Cabriel, where he arrived the 21st. Hitherto he had seen no inhabitants, fear or hatred had caused all to fly, but the bridge was defended by some Spanish guards, a Swiss regiment, and a body of armed peasants, and this sudden apparition at an important pass, after such desolation, prognosticated a desperate conflict, yet scarcely any resistance was made, and Chabran was immediately apprised of this success, and directed to effect a junction at Valencia the 27th or 28th.

On the 22nd Moncey reached Utiel; but ten or twelve thousand patriots having rallied, were entrenching themselves on his left, at Cabrillas, in advance of the Siete Aguas, and that position was very strong, for the flanks rested on steep mountains, and the only approach in front was through high scarpèd rocks, whose tops, crowned by armed peasants, were inaccessible on the French side. A direct assault was hopeless, but the Spaniards were deceived by feints, while Harispe turned their left, dispersed them, and took all their guns, ammunition, and baggage. The Swiss regiment then came over to the French, and Moncey resuming his former line of march, reached Valencia the 27th. The ancient walls of this celebrated place were complete, the approaches covered with works newly raised

or repaired, the citadel in a state of defence, and the population willing to fight. A city containing eighty thousand people actuated by violent passions cannot be easily overcome, and Valencia had also artificial strength. Built on low ground, and encircled with numerous canals, and cuts for irrigation, its deep ditch was filled with water. No approach could be made except against the gates, but it is said a smuggler promised to betray the place during the attack, and it is probable some secret understanding of that kind induced Monecy to assail. An advanced guard of four thousand men, commanded by Joseph Caro, a brother of Romana, was entrenched at Quarte, behind the canal of Mislata, five miles in advance of Valencia, but after a vigorous resistance were chased into the city with the loss of some guns, and the next day the French occupied the principal avenues of the town.

Enthusiastic while Monecy was distant, his appearance filled the Valencians with terror, and a vigorous assault might have succeeded; yet the favourable opportunity, if it really existed, quickly passed away. Padre Rico, a friar, distinguished by his resolution, bearing a cross in one hand, and a sword in the other, aroused the sinking spirit of the multitude; fear of retaliation for the massacre of the French residents gave force to his exhortations; and as undisciplined masses pass suddenly from one extreme to another, he soon produced enthusiasm. While the impression of Caro's defeat was fresh, the governor was summoned; he declared his resolution to fight, and the French fire opened, but was soon overpowered by the heavier metal of the place. A warm skirmish at the suburbs and the gates ensued, the Valencians fought well, and when night fell no impression had been made on the defenders. Repulsed with loss at every point, the situation of the marshal became delicate. Persons sent to seek Chabran could gain no intelligence of his movements; the secret connexions in the town, if any there were, had failed; the ammunition was nearly expended, and the army was enumbered with seven or eight hundred wounded men, among them the general of engineers: Monecy relinquished his attack, and fell back to Quarte.

When it is considered, that in a great city, only a small

number of persons can estimate justly the immense advantages of their situation and the comparative weakness of an enemy, it must be confessed the Valencians' spirit was great; but it ended there. Nothing worthy of such an energetic commencement was afterwards performed, although very considerable armies were either raised or maintained in the province.

While still at Quarte, marshal Moncey ascertained that the captain-general, Serbelloni, was coming from Murcia upon Almanza, with design to intercept his communication by Chieva and Buñol; wherefore, relinquishing the line of Cuenca, he resolved to attack the Spaniards on their march. Directing his movement on Torrente, he halted at night, and next day forced a march to Alcira, one league from the Xucar, and from that place advised Chabran of the change. Serbelloni, surprised and disconcerted by this rapidity, took a position to defend the passage of the Xucar, and the line was strong; but the Spaniards imprudently occupied both banks, and in this situation were attacked on the morning of the 1st of July. The division on the French side of the river was overthrown, the passage forced without loss of time, and Serbelloni retired to the heights of San Felipe, covering the main road from Alcira to Almanza, and hoping to secure the defiles in front of the latter town. Moncey was again too quick for him. Leaving San Felipe to his left, he continued his march by another route, and seized the defiles near Almanza late in the night of the 2nd. The Spanish troops approached his position, yet he dispersed them at daybreak on the 3rd, captured some of their guns, and entered Almanza. He afterwards marched by Albonete and Chinchilla to Albacete, where he got intelligence that Frere's division, which he expected to find at San Clemente, was gone to Requena.

To understand this state of affairs it must be remembered, that when Dupont and Moncey quitted Madrid, Savary retained Vedel's and Gobert's divisions from the former, and Frere's from the latter, as reserves. Frere had been sent to aid Bessières, but soon returned; and following Napoleon's orders, Gobert should then have been sent to Valladolid, Frere to San Clemente, a central point from whence he could have taken the road to Seville to aid Dupont; or the road from



Cuenca to Valencia, to aid Moncey's advance; or the road from Valencia to Murcia, to aid his retreat. Savary sent both Vede and Gobert direct to Dupont, and Frere to Requena, on the Cuenca road, when Moncey was on the road to Murcia; and this he did because the people of Cuenca had overpowered a French detachment left there; but he also directed Caulaincourt from Tarancon against these insurgents, who were broken with great slaughter and Cuenca was pillaged on the very day Moncey defeated Serbelloni. Thus Frere, who had quitted San Clemente the 26th of June, found Requena tranquil, heard of Caulaincourt's success, of Moncey's march on Murcia, and returned with troops sickly and exhausted by useless marches in the heat of summer.

Moncey now re-organized his forces, and was preparing artillery and other means for a second attempt against Valencia, when Savary, alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake in the north, recalled Frere towards Madrid; whereupon Moncey, extremely offended that Savary, inflated with momentary power, should treat him with so little ceremony, abandoned San Clemente, and returned by the way of Ocaña to the capital.

Foy's  
History.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Moncey's campaign was proclaimed by the Spaniards as a decisive failure, and it produced extravagant hopes of final success; a happy illusion if the chiefs had not partaken of it; but, with self-gratulations and exaggerations, they stifled reason. Moncey's operation was in the nature of a moveable column. The object was to prevent the junction of the Valencian army with the Aragonese; the attempt upon the city was an experiment, to produce great effects if successful, and, failing, was of trifling consequence in a military view: Valencia was not the essential object of the expedition, and the general campaign depended upon the armies in Old Castile.

Appendix,  
No. 7.

2°. It was consoling that a great city had not fallen; yet a want of real nerve in the Spanish insurrection was visible. Murcia and Valencia acting in concert, contained two of the

richest sea-port towns in the Peninsula; their united force amounted to thirty thousand organized troops, exclusive of the armed peasants in various districts; and the populace of Valencia were recent from the massacre of French residents. Here then a strenuous resistance was to be expected, yet, nevertheless, Moucey, whose force was at first only eight thousand, and never exceeded ten thousand, warred without cessation for a month, forced two of the strongest mountain passes, crossed several difficult rivers, and even penetrated the suburbs of Valencia. Disappointed of assistance from Catalonia, he yet extricated himself, defeated his opponents in five actions, killed and wounded a number equal in amount to the whole of his own force, and made a circuit of three hundred miles through a hostile populous country, without any serious loss, without any desertion from the Spanish battalions incorporated with his own, and, what was of more importance, having those battalions increased by desertions from the enemy. The real objects had been attained, the plan of relieving Zaragoza was frustrated, the organization of an efficient Spanish force retarded. Moncey did not capture Valencia, because, to use Napoleon's words, '*a city, with eighty thousand inhabitants, barricadoed streets, and artillery placed at the gates, cannot be* TAKEN BY THE COLLAR.'

3°. Frere's march to Requena, so hurtful to the French, won for Savary a severe rebuke from the emperor: 'It was a folly,' he said, 'to dream of reinforcing Moncey, because, if that marshal failed in taking the city by a sudden assault, it became an affair of artillery, and twenty thousand men, more or less, would not enable him to succeed.'—'Frere could do nothing at Valencia, he could do a great deal at San Clemente, because from that post he could support either Madrid or general Dupont.' Moncey also was slightly blamed, for not halting within a day's march of Valencia, in order to break the spirit of the people, and make them feel the weight of the war. But his justification was, that his line of operations from Cuenca was infested by insurgents, his ammunition nearly exhausted, and he could hear nothing of Chabran,—that the whole force of Murcia was collecting upon his flank and rear, the country favourable for his adversaries, and his army

much encumbered by a number of wounded men: to re-open his communication with Madrid was therefore prudent.

4°. By some authors, the repulse at Valencia has been classed with the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen. There was, however, a wide difference between the events, the generals, and the results. Moncey, although old, was vigorous, active, and decided, and the check he received produced little effect. Dupont was irresolute, slow, and incapable, if not worse; but before describing his campaign, the operations against the armies of Gallicia and Castille must be related.

## CHAPTER VII.

## OPERATIONS AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA.

WHILE Bessières' moveable columns, ranging over the Asturian and Biscayan mountains, dispersed the insurgent patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and prepared to advance again towards Burgos. He was supported by the Gallician army, which Filanghieri had organized without difficulty, because the abundant supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt, and Spanish patriotism always required large sums of money. Taranco's soldiers, joined to the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña, had been increased by new levies to twenty-five thousand men; and being well equipped, and provided with a considerable train of artillery, had encamped at Manzanal, a strong post in the mountains twelve miles behind Astorga.

This city offered great advantages to the Spaniards; its Moorish walls were complete, and susceptible of being strengthened to sustain a short siege. But a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while the army of Galicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta remained at Benevente: neither could Bessières, with any prudence, attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri had commenced an entrenched camp in the mountains. When he was murdered, Joachim Blake succeeded him, and probably fearing a similar fate if the army remained stationary, left one division at Manzanal, and marched to unite with Cuesta. Bessières immediately collected his scattered columns at Palencia, and his plan, founded upon instructions from Bayonne, was to strike at Cuesta while Blake was still behind Astorga; then to drive the Gallicians back to the mountains, overrun the



flat country with his cavalry, and open a communication with Portugal; and, after receiving certain reinforcements which were being prepared for him, he was to subdue Galicia, or move to the assistance of Junot, as might seem most fitting.

At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the great military scheme was brought to its first vigorous test. On Bessières' success depended the invasions of Valencia and Andalusia, because Bessières' defeat would shake the French hold of Madrid, which was the base of those operations. It was for this Napoleon had directed Segovia to be occupied, Gobert to enter Valladolid, and Vedel and Frere to remain in La Mancha; the one a few marches from Madrid, the other at San Clemente, to connect Dupont and Moncey with the capital. Savary, misjudging the relative importance of the different points, sent Vedel and Gobert to reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter from beyond the Morena; and he sent Frere to Requeña, and Caulaincourt to Cuenca; thus dispersing and harassing his reserves in the south, when the essential interest was at stake in the north. Now, struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere, Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont to Madrid; too late to take part with Bessières in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate Moncey's projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the ruin of Dupont. In this manner, steering his vessel against every wind that blowed, he could not fail of storms.

Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors. He relied on the ability of Bessières for a remedy, but to Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July:

*'The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if Gobert's division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere's had occupied San Clemente, with a moveable column three or four marches upon the route of general Dupont. Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Moncey, harassed and enfeebled by marches and countermarches, the position of the French army is become less advantageous.'*

*'Marshal Bessières is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with*

*fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive the rebels into Gallicia and seize Leon. If his operations succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French army will again be as good as it was.*

*‘If general Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Bessières cannot pursue him, as, in that case, he would be menaced by the army of Gallicia, whose advanced guard is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able to assemble six or seven thousand men and march upon Cuesta; the citadel of Segovia must be occupied by three or four hundred convalescents, with some guns and six weeks’ biscuit. It was a great fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general ordered it;’ of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, and situated between two routes, it deprives the army of all its communications, and the enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable for some time, and will ensure to the army the important position of Segovia.*

*‘If general Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become better; of course it will be still better if he does so after a defeat.*

*‘If marshal Bessières faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object must always be to cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible; he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the three thousand troops of the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room for hesitation. If Bessières retires without a battle, he must be reinforced instantly with six thousand men. If he retreats after a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary to make great dispositions; to recal Frere, Gobert, Caulaincourt, and Vedel by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him*

*always; however, seven or eight marches off), then to crush Cuesta and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check.'*

Before Bessières could collect his troops, Blake had effected a junction with Cuesta at Benevente, and three courses were open to them.

1°. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering Gallieia.

2°. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of Astorga, while Cuesta's Castilians made forced marches through Salamanca and Avila to Segovia.

3°. To advance together into the plains, and try the fate of a battle.

Cuesta, assuming the command, chose the last, though he had few horsemen and Bessières had many. He left, against Blake's wishes, a division at Benevente to protect his stores, and led twenty-five thousand regular infantry, a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery, in the direction of Palencia. Savary was dismayed. To use Napoleon's expressions, *'he who had been hitherto acting as if the army of Galicia was not in existence, now acted as if Bessières was already beaten.'* But that marshal, firm and experienced, withdrew even his garrison from the important post of Santander, collected fifteen thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palencia, and moved forward on the 12th of July to the encounter. He had two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four guns in first line; four battalions and some horse grenadiers of the guard, with six guns in reserve. Halting at Ampudia, and Torre de Mormojon the 13th, on the 14th he drove back some Spanish cavalry, and at nine o'clock reached Rio Seco to spring on Cuesta, as an active wild beast leaps on a heavy domestic animal.

S.  
Journal of  
Bessières'  
Operations.

#### BATTLE OF RIO SECO.

The first line of Spaniards, and the heavy guns occupied the edge of a steppe of land, having an abrupt fall towards the

French. The second line, composed of the best troops, augmented, not strengthened, by some eighteen thousand armed peasants, was a great distance behind the first, and Rio Seco was in rear of the centre. Bessières, startled at their numbers, doubted if he should attack; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta's disposition, he ordered Lasalle to make a feint in front with the light cavalry, while himself, marching obliquely to the right, overlapped the left of the Spaniards. Having thus enclosed the entire flank, he, without hesitation, thrust the whole of Merle's and Mouton's divisions and the imperial guards, horse and foot, between the lines, and put the first into confusion; at that moment Lasalle charged, all the Spanish front went down, and fifteen hundred dead bodies strewed the field.

Bessières' ranks were, however, disordered, and Cuesta made a gallant effort to retrieve the day. Opening a fire from his lighter artillery, he pushed the second line forward, and with his right wing took six guns; but the left wing hung back and exposed the flank of the right. Bessières immediately fell on this naked flank with Merle's division and the horse grenadiers, while the fourteenth provisional regiment made head against the front. The Spaniards overcame and broken

in the fierce struggle then dispersed. Meanwhile,

S.  
Journal of  
Bessières'  
Operations.

the first line had rallied in Rio Seco, but were again overthrown by Mouton's division, and fled over the plain under the swords of the cavalry.

Mr. Stuart's  
Papers.

Five or six thousand men killed or wounded on the field, twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen guns,

and large stores of ammunition, were the result of this battle. The fugitives sought safety in all directions, chiefly towards Benevente. The generals separated in wrath, Blake made for the Gallician mountains Cuesta went towards Leon, the division left at Benevente dispersed. The French had fifty killed, three hundred wounded. They halted the 15th, but the next day entered Benevente and captured many thousand English muskets, and vast quantities of ammunition, clothing, and provisions.

The communication with Portugal being now opened, Bessières thought to give his hand to Junot; but hearing the



fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued them by the road of Villa-fere, and hearing on the march that Cuesta had gone to Mayorga, turned aside to that place, and captured there another great collection of stores; for the Spanish general, with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country. Bessières then entering the city of Leon remained until the 29th, received the submission of the municipality, and made preparations to carry the war into Gallicia. Meanwhile, the junta of Castille and Leon, whose authority had hitherto been restrained by Cuesta, retired to Puente-Ferrada, assumed supreme authority, and as the quarrel between the generals was now rancorous they sided with Blake. This appeared a favourable occasion to tamper with the fidelity of the chiefs. Bessières sent his prisoners back, argued the hopeless state of the insurrection, offered the vice-royalty of Mexico to Cuesta, and promised military rank and honours to Blake. Neither would listen to him, and he marched against Gallicia, but had only reached Puente Orbigo when he was recalled to protect the king: Dupont had surrendered with a whole army in Andalusia, the victory of Rio Seco was rendered useless, the court was in consternation, and Bessières, returning to Mayorga, took a defensive position.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Blake was overruled by Cuesta, and it is hard to say whether the latter or Savary committed most errors. Had Gobert's division gone to Valladolid, Bessières would have had twenty-two thousand men and forty pieces of artillery in the field; a force not too great, when the fate of three French armies depended upon a fight, to which the Spaniards might have brought double the number. Cuesta chose a field of battle where his enemy's powerful cavalry had free scope; and when he should have brought up every man, he left ten thousand good troops to guard positions that could not be approached until he was beaten. His time also was ill chosen. Had he waited a few days, eight English frigates, and a Spanish force, under general Da Ponte, would have attacked

Santander to weaken and distract Bessières, an enterprise stopped by the defeat at Rio Seco. Once united with Blake, Cuesta's base was Galicia. He should have kept his stores within the mountains, instead of protecting them in the plains with a force which should have been in the battle.

2°. Bessières redeemed Savary's errors, and Napoleon, while praising the one, thus expressed his discontent to the other for having looked more to Andalusia than Leon :

*'A check given to Dupont would have a slight effect, but a wound received by Bessières would give the army a locked jaw. Not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys, that does not feel the affairs of Spain are involved in the affairs of Bessières; how unfortunate then, that in such a great event you have wilfully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself.'* This was before the battle.

When he heard of the victory, he exclaimed, 'It is the battle of Almanza—Bessières has saved Spain!' Joseph then entered Madrid with the veteran brigade of Rey, and some thousand French guards, and all fears on the side of Leon were allayed; Zaragoza was pressed by Verdier, Valencia was menaced by Moncey from San Clemente, and the affairs of Andalusia only seemed doubtful, but Frere and Caulaincourt's troops were disposable. The French held the centre in force, the Spaniards were scattered on the circumference, and though strong in Andalusia, Napoleon's combinations were being successful, when a sudden catastrophe baffled his genius and raised sinking Spain. From Andalusia the blow came; for there disorder had triumphed over valour and discipline, inexperienced men had defeated practised generals, and the vicissitudes of war were exemplified in a strange manner. An undisciplined multitude, ill directed, in one day broke an immense plan, wisely conceived, and, up to that moment, happily conducted; and this stroke which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a scar, conspicuous, because of many it was the only unseemly one.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

DUPONT marched against Cadiz with the Spanish Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding—Barbou's French infantry—Fresia's cavalry—a marine battalion of the imperial guards, and eighteen pieces of artillery. Three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns from the army of Portugal, were to join him at Seville: three other Swiss regiments were in Andalusia, and it was hoped they and the troops at San Roque would come over to the French army. He traversed La Mancha in May, entered the Morena by the Despenas Perros, and reached Andujar the 2nd of June. There he learned that a supreme junta was established at Seville, minor juntas in Granada, Jaen, and Cordoba; that war was declared against the French, the whole of Andalusia in arms, the Swiss regiments ranged under the Spanish banners: lastly, that Avril's detachment, from Portugal, had halted in Tavora and would return to Lisbon.

Journal of  
Dupont's  
Operations,  
MSS.

Dupont immediately wrote to Murat and Savary for reinforcements, closed up the rear of his columns, established an hospital at Andujar, and crossing the Guadalquivir, continued his march towards Cordoba, following the left bank of the river. Two leagues from that ancient city the road recrossed the Guadalquivir by a long stone bridge, at the farthest end of which stood the village of Alcolea, in front of which the French arrived the 7th. The Spanish general, Echevaria, had fortified the head of the bridge, placed twelve guns in battery on the right bank, and barred the passage, with three thousand regulars, and ten thousand new levies and smugglers. He had a reserve encamped near Cordoba, and

a cloud of armed peasants, from the side of Jaen, hovered on the hills behind the French, ready to fall on their rear when they should attack the bridge. Dupont made his cavalry, Swiss regiments, and marine battalion, face the hills, while he stormed the bridge with Barbou's division, and the Spaniards were soon driven across the river, and fled in confusion to the camp at Cordoba. The peasants coming down from the hills, during the battle, were beaten back by the cavalry, and Dupont, leaving the marines at Aleolea, advanced to complete the victory. The Spaniards took refuge in Cordoba and opened a fire of musketry from the walls, but the French having burst the gates with their field-pieces, a confused fight ensued, and Echevaria's men fled along the Seville road pursued by the cavalry. The infantry were very licentious at first, but the citizens took no part in the contest, discovered no aversion to the French, and when the disorders necessarily attendant on a street fight ceased, the town was protected. Dupont fixing his quarters there, sent patrols even to Ecija, without finding an enemy. All were submissive, but in Seville, the arrival of the fugitives so terrified the junta, that its greater dread of the populace alone prevented a flight to Cadiz; the members even talked of abandoning Spain for South America.

Nellerto.

Castañõs, now captain-general, was in march with seven thousand regular troops from San Roque; he reached Seville the 9th, had a conference with the junta, and proceeded to rally Echevaria's force, which had assembled at Carmona. It was, however, so disorganized, so moody, that he returned, and having persuaded the president Saavedra to accompany him, fixed his quarters at Utrera, drew together three thousand regulars from the nearest garrisons, called up the new levies, and hastened the march of his own men from San Roque. He also pressed general Speneer to disembark and take a position at Xeres; but that officer sailed to Ayamonte,—thus augmenting a general distrust of the English, prevailing at the time and secretly fomented by Morla and several members of the junta. Andalusia was lost if Dupont had advanced. Instead of pushing his victory, he wrote to Savary for reinforcements, and to Avril for aid,

Sir Hew  
Dalrymple's  
Papers.



remaining meanwhile in Cordoba, overwhelmed with imaginary dangers. For though Castaños did in a few days collect at Carmona and Utrera seven or eight thousand regulars, and fifty thousand fresh levies, and had intercepted Dupont's desponding letters, such was his own hopelessness, that under pretence of completing the defences of Cadiz, he embarked the heavy artillery and stores at Seville, designing, if Dupont advanced, to burn the limbers of his field guns, and retreat to the Isla de Leon. Nevertheless he continued to organize his forces, being assisted by the marquis of Coupigny, a crafty French emigrant of some experience in war; and Reding, a Swiss, bold, honest, and enterprising, but without judgment, and of very moderate talent for war.

Appendix,  
No. 13.  
Section 8

Castaños desired to make Cadiz a place of arms with an entrenched camp, where aided by ten or twelve thousand British troops, he might organize an efficient army; but he had only the name and cares of a general without the authority. Morla was his enemy, and many of the junta, determined to use their power for gain and the gratification of private vengeance, fearing he would control their lawless proceedings, thwarted him, humoured the insolent caprices of the populace, and meddled with affairs foreign to the war. Hence as their forces augmented, fear evaporated, and plans were laid for surrounding Dupont. One detachment of peasants was sent under regular officers to occupy the passes of the Morena leading on Estremadura; another marched from Granada in company with a regiment of the line to seize Carolina, and cut off the communication with La Mancha; a third, under colonel Valderañs, proposed to attack the French in Cordoba without any assistance; and this eagerness for action was increased by a knowledge of the situation of affairs in Portugal, and by rumours exaggerating the strength of Filanghieri and Cuesta. It was believed the latter had reached Valladolid and offered Murat the option of abiding an attack or retiring immediately to France by stated marches, and that the prince was fortifying himself in the Buen Retiro. These reports caused the defensive plan of Castaños to be rejected; and Dupont's despatches,

Sir Hew  
Dalrymple's  
Papers,  
MSS.

still magnifying his danger and pressing urgently for reinforcements, being again intercepted, it was resolved to attack Cordoba immediately.

Dupont's fears outstripped Spanish impatience. After ten days of inactivity, by which he lost the immediate fruit of his victory, the lead in an offensive campaign, and the imposing moral force of French prowess, he resolved to fall back to

Andujar, because Savary at this period promised no succour save what Moncey, after subduing Valencia, could give by the circuitous route of

Murcia. He retreated the 17th of June, followed by Coupigny

with the advanced guard of the Andalusians. On the line of march, and in Andujar, he had terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity; his stragglers

had been assassinated, his hospital taken, sick men, medical attendants, couriers, staff officers, in fine, all who were too weak for defence had been butchered with extraordinary barbarity: four hundred had perished in this miserable manner

since the fight at Alcolea. The fate of colonel Renè was horrible. Employed on a mission to

Portugal previous to the breaking out of hostilities, he was on his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached to no army,

engaged in no operations of war, yet he was first cruelly mutilated, then placed living between deal planks and sawed in two!

At Andujar Dupont collected provisions, designing to remain until reinforced, but he sent the naval captain, Baste, to punish the city of Jaen, from whence the bands had come to murder his sick. The soldiers, inflamed by the barbarity of their enemies, inflicted a severe measure of retaliation; for it is the nature of cruelty to reproduce itself in war, and therefore, although the virtue of clemency is in all persons most becoming, it is peculiarly so to an officer, the want of it leading to such great evils. Castaños remained quiet, and Dupont, hearing Vedel was coming from La Mancha with a convoy, a division of infantry and some detachments, sent Baste with a fresh column to aid him at the Despeñas Perros, now occupied by insurgents and smugglers from Granada. This pass was of

Journal of  
Dupont's  
Operations.

Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 1.

Whitting-  
ham's  
Secret Cor-  
respondence  
with sir H.  
Dalrymple,  
MSS.

Journal of  
Dupont.

Foy's  
History.

Victoires et  
Conquêtes  
des Fran-  
çais.

incredible strength, the Spaniards were entrenched and had artillery, but their commander, a colonel of the line, deserted to the French, and before Baste could arrive, Vedel had forced his way to Carolina, left a detachment there, and descended to Baylen, a small place sixteen miles from Andujar. The Granada insurgents were however still numerous at Jaen, and menaced the Linhares road; wherefore Vedel sent Cassagne to disperse them and gather provisions. They were defeated with great slaughter, and Jaen was taken, but Cassagne lost two hundred men and brought back no food.

July.

Vedel's arrival did not allay Dupont's fears. The position of Andujar covered the main road to Carolina, yet it could be turned eight miles below by the bridge of Marmolexo; sixteen miles higher up by the roads leading from Jaen by the ferry of Mengibar to Baylen; and beyond them other roads led by Ubeda and Linhares to the passes of El Rey and Despeñas Perros. The Guadalquivir was fordable in many places, the regular force under Castaños daily increased, the population was actively hostile, and the young French soldiers drooped under privations and the heat of the climate: six hundred were sick, and the whole discouraged. It is at such times the worth of the veteran is felt. In battle the ardour of youth appears to shame the cool indifference of the old soldier; but when the strife is between fortune's malice and man's fortitude, between human suffering and human endurance, the veteran becomes truly formidable while the young soldier yields to despair. Vedel had placed Ligier Bellair's brigade at Mengibar, having a detachment beyond the ferry; this outpost was driven over the river the 13th, but the 15th, Gobert, who should have been aiding Bessières, reached Baylen with his division and some cuirassiers. Vedel then marched to Mengibar, and it was full time, for the whole Spanish army was now on the opposite bank of the river.

Dupont's  
Journal.Foy's  
History.Vedel's  
Precis  
of Opera-  
tions.

When Dupont's retreat frustrated the project of surrounding him in Cordoba, Castaños would have resumed his defensive plan; and the junta acquiesced at first, but getting intelligence of

Whitting-  
ham's Cor-  
respond-  
ence, MSS.

Vedel's approach, ordered their general to attack Andujar before Dupont was reinforced. Castaños advanced to Porcuñas with twenty-five thousand regular infantry, two thousand cavalry, and very heavy artillery. The numbers of the armed peasantry under officers of the line, varied from day to day, but the whole multitude, regulars and irregulars, was not less than fifty thousand; hence Vedel's presence did

Whitting-  
ham's Cor-  
respond-  
ence.

not much abate the general fierceness. Castaños was the least sanguine, and hearing that Spencer had returned to Cadiz, again prayed him to take

post at Xeres, and thus give a point of retreat in the event of disaster: Spencer consented to disembark, yet refused to stir beyond Port St. Mary. From the 1st to the 11th of July, the

*Ibid.* Spaniards remained in position near Porcuñas, and

then a council of war resolved that Reding should cross the Guadalquivir at Mengibar and gain Baylen; that Coupigny should cross at Villa Nueva, between Mengibar and Andujar, to support Reding; that Castaños, advancing to the heights of Argonilla, should assail Andujar in front, while Reding and Coupigny, descending from Baylen, attacked it in rear; and a detachment of light troops under colonel Cruz was to pass at Marmolexo, and seize the passes leading through the Morena to Estremadura.

In pursuance of this plan, Reding, with one division and four thousand armed peasants, drove Ligier Bel-

*Ibid.*

lair's outpost across the Guadalquivir on the 13th, and Coupigny advanced to Villa Nueva. The 15th Castaños crowned the heights of Argonilla with a great multitude, Coupigny skirmished with the French cavalry post at Villa Nueva, and Reding attacked Ligier Bellair, but retired at the

Dupont's  
Journal.  
Foy.

approach of Vedel. When Dupont saw the heights of Argonilla covered with enemies he sent to

Vedel for succour, broke the bridge at Marmolexo, occupied an old tower on that of Andujar, and detached cavalry parties to watch the fords above and below. Castaños cannonaded the bridge of Andujar that evening, and the next day attacked the French in front, while Cruz, who had passed


Vedel's  
Precis.

the river near Marmolexo, fell upon their rear: Cruz was chased to the hills by a single battalion, and the battle ceased at Andujar before Vede,





# Explanatory Sketch OF THE BATTLE OF BAYLEN



who had marched all night, could arrive. Reding had meanwhile passed the river at Mengibar, driving Ligier Bellair before him; but Gobert came up and renewed the fight until he was mortally wounded, when his successor, Dufour, fell back to Baylen, and Reding returned to Mengibar: a report that the Spaniards were moving by Linhares on the passes behind the French then reached Dufour, who, finding Reding did not follow him, credited it and retreated to Carolina.

Dupont heard on the evening of the 16th, that Mengibar had been forced, and sent Vedel to Baylen, but with such vague instructions, that he followed Dufour the 17th; whereupon Reding, who had remained inactive at Mengibar, being now joined by Coupigny, seized Baylen in the night, with twenty thousand combatants of all kinds, and throwing out a post of observation towards Carolina, took a position facing Andujar. The armies were thus interlaced in a strange manner. Dupont was between Reding and Castaños, Reding between Dupont and Vedel. It was an affair of time, yet Castaños remained tranquil in his camp, and Dupont, although he knew on the 17th of Vedel's march to Carolina, did not quit Andujar until the night of the 18th. His movement was undiscovered by Castaños, and at daybreak he reached the Tiedras, a torrent with rugged banks, only two miles from Reding's position, which was strong, shaded with olive trees, and intersected by deep ravines. The French general passed the Tiedras to attack, leaving Barbou at the bridge of Rumblar with some of the best battalions to watch for Castaños, and guard the baggage-train, which was very large and mixed with the troops. At first he gained ground, but his men, sinking with fatigue and heat, could not force the principal points, and lost courage. Two thousand were killed or hurt, the Swiss went over to the Spaniards, and about noontide Dupont, wounded and despondent, proposed an armistice, which Reding, who could scarcely hold his ground, joyfully granted, fearing Vedel's arrival. That general had quitted Carolina at five in the morning of the 19th, the sound of battle became distinct as he advanced, yet he halted at Guaroman, two leagues from Baylen, for several hours, to refresh his men and to ascertain if any enemy was at Linhares. When the firing had entirely ceased, he resumed his march, and coming

Foy.

Journal of  
Dupont's  
Operations,  
MSS.

upon the rear of Reding, after some fighting, captured two guns and made fifteen hundred prisoners. An aide-du-camp of Dupont's then brought him an order to cease the attack, whereupon he awaited the result of this singular crisis.

Whitting-  
ham's Cor-  
respond-  
ence, MSS.

Castaños did not discover Dupont's retreat until eight hours after his departure, and then only sent La Peña's division in pursuit. La Peña reached the Tiedras about five o'clock, and soon after, one Villoutreys, a French officer, passed his posts, going to ask

Castañes' consent to the terms accepted by Reding. The 20th, generals Mareseot and Chabert went to Andujar, empowered by Dupont to conclude a convention. They proposed that the French army should retire peaceably upon Madrid, and Castañes agreed, but Savary's letter, written just before the battle

Whitting-  
ham's Cor-  
respond-  
ence, MSS.

of Rio Seco, to recall Dupont, being intercepted, was at this moment brought to the Spanish headquarters. Dupont's and Vedel's surrender was then demanded, their troops to be sent to France by sea, the first as prisoners of war, the second under convention; and without hesitation these terms were accepted!

Meanwhile Vedel proposed a joint attack on Reding, and general Privé gave like counsel. Dupont in reply, ordered Vedel to give up his prisoners, and retire to Carolina. Castañes menaced Dupont with a massacre if Vedel did not return, and he gave the

order to recall to Vedel, who came back, and surrendered! Thus eighteen thousand French soldiers laid down their arms before a raw army, incapable of resisting half that number led by an able man. Nor did this end the disgraceful transaction. Villoutreys, as if to show how far fear and folly combined will debase men, passed the Morena with a Spanish escort, gathered up the detachments left by Dupont in La Mancha, even to within a short distance of Toledo, and sent them to Andujar as prisoners under the convention: he even informed Castañes how to capture two French battalions guarding the passes into La Mancha. And these unheard-of proceedings were quietly submitted to by men belonging to that army which, for fifteen years, had been the terror of Europe! a proof how much the character of soldiers depends upon their immediate chief.



This capitulation, shameful in itself, was shamefully broken. The French troops were maltreated, and numbers of them murdered in cold blood, especially at Lebrixa, where above eighty officers were massacred in the most cowardly manner: with their swords, they kept the assassins for some time at bay, in an open space, but a fire from the neighbouring houses was continued until the last of those unfortunate gentlemen fell. No distinction was made between Dupont's and Vedel's troops. All who survived the march to Cadiz, after being exposed to every species of indignity, were cast into the hulks at Cadiz, whence a few hundreds escaped two years afterwards, by cutting the cables of their prison-ship and drifting upon a lee shore in a storm. The remainder, transported to the desert island of Cabrera, perished by lingering torments in such numbers that few remained alive at the termination of the war. Dupont himself was permitted to return to France, and take with him all the generals: general Privé, who had remonstrated strongly against the capitulation, and pressed Dupont on the field to force a passage through Reding's army was, however, left behind!

Victoires et  
Conquêtes.

Morla, after a vain attempt to involve lord Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple in the transaction, formally defended the conduct of the junta in breaking the capitulation; and soon afterwards, with consistent, shameless villany, betrayed his own country.

This capitulation was secretly known in Madrid as early as the 23rd or 24th of July; but the French were unable to acquire distinct information, until the king sent two divisions into La Mancha to open the communication. At Madrilejos one hundred and twenty miles from Baylen, they met Villoutreys with his Spanish escort, collecting prisoners, and apparently intending to proceed in his disgraceful task to the very gates of Madrid. The divisions then retraced their steps, Joseph called a council of war, and it was proposed to unite all the French forces, place a small garrison in the Retiro, and fall upon the Spanish armies in succession as they advanced towards the capital. But a dislike to the war prevailed in the higher ranks of the French army, the injustice of it was too glaring, and a retreat, which might, perchance, induce Napoleon to desist,

Foy's  
History.

was adopted. The king marched, on the 1st of August, by the Somosierra; Bessières covered the movement until the court reached Burgos, and then fell back himself, and in a short time the French were all behind the Ebro, the siege of Zaragoza was raised, and the triumphant cry of the Spaniards was heard throughout Europe.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Dupont's corps, when it first entered Spain, was about twenty-four thousand men, with three thousand five hundred horses; of these twenty-one thousand were fit for duty. It was afterwards strengthened by a provisional regiment of cuirassiers, a marine battalion of the guard, and the Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding; it could not therefore have been less than twenty-four thousand fighting men in Andalusia. The whole of Vedel's and great part of Gobert's division joined before the capitulation, and eighteen thousand effective men laid down their arms; the loss by wounds, desertion, and deaths in hospital or the field, was therefore about five thousand.

2°. The order for marching upon Cadiz came from Bayonne before the insurrection broke out, wherefore Dupont should have demanded fresh orders, when he found affairs different from what Napoleon had contemplated. If the emperor judged it necessary to reinforce him with a detachment from Portugal before the insurrection broke out, his first orders were clearly annulled when so great a war had commenced, and when the detachment from Portugal had failed to join. Dupont said he marched to Cordoba with the conviction that success was hopeless: a dam-  
natory avowal.

Dupont's  
Memoir,  
MSS.

3°. At Cordoba he remained torpid for ten days, the second of a series of indefensible errors. He should have followed up his victory, or retired to Andujar at once, since he could not defend himself at Cordoba. An advance would have given him Seville and time for the arrival of his second and third divisions. He had indeed only ten thousand men at first, but

he says he defeated forty thousand at Alcolea without loss to himself; against such armies he risked little by advancing. He retired from Cordoba, he said, because to fight when a victory would be useless, was against all discretion; yet to make no use of victory is the same thing, and he should never have gone beyond Andujar, unless to enter Seville. These errors were, however, redeemable. The check given to the patriots at Jaen, the arrival of Vedel, and the opportune junction of Gobert, proved, that not fortune but common sense had deserted Dupont; the Spaniards, by extending in his front from Argonilla to Mengibar offered him an easy victory, which he neglected, and their false movements appeared skilful.

Dupont's  
Journal of  
Opera-  
tions.

4°. At Mengibar a variety of roads branch off, leading to Jaen, to Linhares, to Baylen, and other places. From Andujar, a road, nearly parallel with the Guadalquivir, went to the ferry of Mengibar, forming the base of a triangle, Baylen being the apex; the distance of this town from the ferry is about six miles; from the ferry to Andujar eighteen; from the latter to Baylen sixteen miles. Fifteen miles above Baylen, the town of Carolina, situated in the gorge of the Sierra Morena, was the point of communication with La Mancha, the line of retreat: hence Baylen, not Andujar, was the pivot of operations. The French were least numerous, yet Dupont disseminated his forces, and let Castaños take the initiative. Dupont's men were exhausted by useless marches,—his orders were mistaken or disobeyed,—one position was forced,—another abandoned, and he finally surrendered with eighteen thousand men, because his fighting force was reduced to two thousand. What became of the rest? Why had he so few? Thousands never fired a shot. Was there then something worse than incapacity? Dupont's own officers, and the Spaniards alike declared that his personal baggage was filled with plunder, and to save it he surrendered.

Dupont's  
Journal,  
MSS.

5°. Two courses, either of which promised success, were open on the 14th. First, to send all incumbrances to La Mancha, secure the passes, unite the fighting men at Carolina and fall on the first Spanish corps which advanced; if this

attack failed, a retreat was secure. Second, to occupy Carolina by a detachment, place posts of observation at Andujar and Mengibar, unite the mass on the 15th at Baylen, and await the enemy. If the Spaniards had presented themselves simultaneously on both roads, the position was strong for battle, the retreat open; if one came before the other, they might have been beaten in detail.

6°. Reding's march was in the right direction, and should have been followed by the whole army. The Argonilla heights would have screened the movement, and a rear guard with some heavy guns, left in front of Andujar, would have deceived Dupont. Castaños when separated from Reding was endangered. Vedel's arrival from Mengibar, gave Dupont twelve thousand fighting men on the morning of the 16th, enough to overthrow Castaños at Argonilla, and afterwards take Reding in flank while Gobert assailed his front. Dupont let the occasion pass, sent Vedel to Baylen, followed himself two days later, and, meeting with Reding, joined battle, hoping that Vedel, who had gone further, would return. To force Reding's position before Castaños could come up was essential, yet he formed a reserve, a first and second line, and half a dozen puny columns of attack, instead of marching his infantry, cavalry, and artillery to strike for life and honour at one point. The battle should have been one of half an hour, he made it one of ten hours; yet so badly did the Spaniards fight, that neither prisoner nor gun was lost in the action. Reding's fears of the result were evinced by his ready acceptance of the armistice. And then Vedel's capitulation after his retreat was secured!—Vedel, who might have disputed the victory by himself! Joseph called Dupont's surrender a '*defection*.'

Appendix,  
No. 6.

7°. Castaños, active in preparation, was in the field slow, and his movements generally false. The attempt to turn the French position at Andujar by detaching four thousand men across the river, was ill conceived, badly supported, and to be classed with the isolated movement of Reding. This last general certainly gained the victory; yet, if Vedel had returned from Carolina the 19th with ordinary diligence, Baylen would have seen the Spaniards defeated. Reding



instead of taking a position there, should have fallen down at once on Dupont's rear, leaving a force to watch and delay Vedel; he knew not the value of time, and acted rashly, yet fortune favoured him, and with her aid war is but child's play.

8°. Joseph's retreat from Madrid, judged as a political or military measure, was unwise. Bessières had seventeen thousand victorious soldiers, with forty guns, and had paralyzed the northern insurgents. The Andalusian force was too distant from the Valencians to form a junction, and their united regular troops would not have exceeded forty thousand combatants, ill provided, and under jealous, independent chiefs. The king, without weakening Bessières too much, could have put in line twenty thousand infantry, five thousand horse and eighty guns. Rio Seco had indicated what such an army could do, and policy and honour alike called for daring, to put away the ignominy of Baylen.

9°. Madrid being abandoned, the line of the Duero should have been taken. Holding Aranda as a centre, and fortifying Somosierra, Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, and Soria as posts in the circumference, two ordinary marches would have carried a reserve from Aranda to any point. The northern would thus have been cut off from the southern insurgents; for Blake could not safely make a flank movement by the Guadarama to join Castaños, nor could Castaños alone remain at Madrid while the king held the Somosierra. The siege of Zaragoza might have continued, because from Aranda the march was not longer than from Valencia; Soria was only three marches, and from thence Verdier could have been succoured if the Valencians menaced him; and Castaños could not have disturbed the siege under a month.

10°. Joseph by adopting the line of the Ebro abandoned the plan of confining each province to its own insurrection, and thus virtually resigned the throne. For however rash the insurrection might appear at first, no patriot could hold back when the rude energy of the people had triumphed. In this manner Napoleon was baffled without having miscalculated difficulties or resources. Bessières' operations only had been quite successful, yet the loss of a whole army could

have been borne, so vigorously and wisely had the emperor's plan been concocted, if the king by abandoning Madrid and raising the siege of Zaragoza had not given undue force to the catastrophe of Baylen. Even then, the political hold only was shaken off, the military grasp was scarcely loosened: the Spaniards could not follow up their victory. Napoleon in Joseph's place would have decided the fate of Spain, for there were many resources. Suppose the troops before Zaragoza, and all the detachments on the line of communication had concentrated at Pampeluna; that Joseph uniting with Bessières had marched forty thousand strong into Portugal. He would have arrived about the period of the battle of Vimiero, and overwhelmed the English: a demonstration against Seville would then have sufficed to keep the Andalusians at home, and three months later Napoleon would have been on the Ebro with two hundred thousand men!

11°. In its moral effects the battle of Baylen was one of those events which, insignificant in themselves, cause great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat of Rio Seco, the preparations of Moncey for a second attack on Valencia, the miserable plight of Zaragoza, the despondency of the ablest men of Spain, and the disgust and terror generally excited by the excesses of the populace, weighed heavy on the Spanish cause: one victory more, and the moral as well as the physical force of Spain would have been crushed. The victory of Baylen opened as it were a new crater for Spanish pride, vanity, and arrogance; the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed, every man thought himself a Cid, and, in the surrender of Dupont, saw, not the deliverance of Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. 'We are obliged to our friends the English,' was a common phrase among them when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army; 'we thank them for their good-will, we shall escort them through France to Calais, the journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage; they shall not have the trouble of fighting the French, and we shall be pleased to have them spectators of our victories.' This absurd confidence might have led to great things if supported by wisdom, activity, and valour, but it was 'a voice, and nothing more.'

## BOOK THE SECOND.

## CHAPTER I.

NAPOLEON'S uninterrupted success for so many years had given him a moral influence doubling his actual force. Exciting at once, terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the attention of an astonished world, and, openly or secretly, all men acknowledged the power of his genius: the continent bowed before him, and in England absurd and virulent libels on his person and character constantly increasing, indicated the growth of secret fear. His invasion of Spain was at first viewed with anxiety rather than with the hope of arresting it; but when the full extent of the injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited; a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take place in the affairs of the world, prevailed among all classes of society; and when the Spanish people rose against the man feared by all, the admiration which energy and courage exact, even from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious of the same qualities.

No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusiasm. The party in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their own political existence, saw with joy the stamp of justice and high feeling, for the first time, about to be affixed to their policy. The party out of power having always derided the impotence of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular armies alone were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse their approbation to a struggle, originating with, and being maintained entirely by the multitude: the people at large exulted that the superiority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was acknowledged. The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore, universally

hailed as an auspicious event; their wishes were forestalled, their suggestions received with eagerness, their demands complied with; and the riches of England were so profusely tendered by the ministers, as to engender an incredible arrogance and extravagance with the patriots. There is a way of conferring a favour which appears like accepting one, and this secret being discovered by the English cabinet, the Spaniards soon demanded as a right what they had at first solicited as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too generous, gratitude in state affairs is a delusion, the appearance of disinterested kindness never deceives and should never be assumed.

The capture of the Spanish frigates in time of peace had placed Great Britain and Spain in a state of hostility without a declaration of war. The invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between them without a treaty; for the cessation of hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succours had been sent to the juntas. The ministers seemed, by their precipitate measures, to be more afraid of losing the assistance of the Spaniards, than prepared to take the lead in a contest, which could only be supported by the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of a statesman with rank and capacity to establish the influence of England by judicious counsels and applications of succour, a number of obscure and inexperienced men were sent to various parts of the Peninsula, and were empowered to distribute money and supplies at discretion. Instead of carefully sifting the information obtained from such agents, and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the arrangement of a comprehensive plan which might be supported vigorously, the ministers formed crude projects, parcelled out their forces in small expeditions without any definite object, altered their plans with every idle report, and changed their commanders as lightly as their plans. Discarding all prudent considerations, and entering into formal relations with every knot of Spanish politicians assuming the title of a supreme junta, the government dealt with unsparing hands, enormous supplies at the demand of those self-elected authorities. They made no conditions, took no security for the succours being justly



applied, and with affected earnestness renounced the right of interfering with the Spanish internal arrangements, when the ablest Spaniards expected and desired such interference to repress folly and violence. England was entitled, in policy and justice, to direct the Spanish councils. Spain solicited her aid in a common cause, and a generous, vigorous interference was necessary to save that cause from a few ignorant, conceited men accidentally invested with authority.

Mr. Stuart's  
Letters.  
Lord W.  
Bentinck's  
ditto.

Numerous and ill-chosen military agents also produced infinite mischief. Selected principally because they spoke Spanish, few of them had any knowledge of war beyond regimental duty, and there was no controlling authority: each did what seemed good to him. The Spanish generals willingly received men whose inexperience was a recommendation, and whose friendship could advance their consequence. Their flattering confidential politeness diverted the attention of the agents from the true objects of their mission; they looked not to the efficiency of the armies, but adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the chiefs, and by their reports, raised erroneous notions as to the relative situations of the contending forces. Some exceptions there were, but the ministers were better pleased with the sanguine than the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their judgment. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent, were gratuitously found for every occasion, and money, arms, and clothing were demanded incessantly, and supplied with profusion. The arms were however generally left in their cases to rot or to fall into the hands of the enemy, and sometimes they were sold to foreign merchants; the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back; the money always misapplied, was sometimes embezzled by those who received it for the nation; more often employed to forward the private views of the juntas to the detriment of public affairs; and it is a fact that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and trace the

Vide In-  
structions  
for sir Tho.  
Dyer, &c.  
Parliamentary Papers,  
1809.

Appendix,  
No. 13.  
5th Section.

progress of Junot's invasion of Portugal, by which the whole circle of operations in the Peninsula will be completed. The reader can then take a general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when Sir Arthur Wellesley, disembarking in the Mondego, commenced those campaigns which have filled the world with his glory.

#### INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

Peremptory orders forced Junot to advance from Salamanca at an unfavourable season, when the roads were Thiebault. nearly impracticable, and part of his troops still in the rear. He met the Spanish contingent, destined to act under his orders, at Alcantara, the latter end of November, 1807; but the march to that town nearly disorganized his inexperienced army, and he could obtain no succours from the Spanish authorities. Their repugnance, openly manifested, was so embarrassing, that his chief officers, dismayed at the accumulating difficulties, would have had him discontinue his operations. Junot was firm. He knew no English force had reached Lisbon. The cowardice of the court there was notorious, and he commenced one of those hardy enterprises which astound the mind by their success, and leave the historian in doubt, whether to praise the happy daring or stigmatize the rashness of the deed.

Without money, without transport, without ammunition sufficient for a general action, with an auxiliary force of Spaniards by no means well disposed to aid him, Junot led a raw army through the mountains of Portugal, on the most dangerous and difficult line by which that country can be invaded. Ignorant of what was passing in the interior, he knew not if he was to be opposed, nor what means were prepared to resist him; but trusting to the inertness of the Portuguese government, the rapidity of his movements, and the renown of the French arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and suddenly appeared in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he obtained the first information of the true state of affairs. Lisbon was tranquil, the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, the court still remained on shore.

On hearing this, and, animated by the prospect of seizing the prince regent, he pressed forward, and reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus. One vessel dragged astern within reach of a battery, the French general himself fired a gun at her, and meeting, on his return to Lisbon, some Portuguese troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort for his person, and thus attended, passed through the streets of the capital.

Nature alone had opposed the progress of the invaders, yet such were the hardships endured, that of a column which numbered twenty-five thousand at Alcantara, two thousand tired grenadiers only entered Lisbon with their general. Fatigue, want, tempests, had scattered the remainder along two hundred miles of rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peasantry, well acquainted with the strength of their fastnesses, and proud of successful defences made by their forefathers against former enemies. Lisbon itself contained three hundred thousand inhabitants and fourteen thousand regular troops; a powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbour, and the commander, Sidney Smith, urged the court to resist, offering to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of the town; his offers were declined, and the people, confounded by the strange scene and disgusted with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, evinced no desire to impede the march of events. Three weak battalions sufficed to impose a foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of Napoleon's maxim:—*'In war the moral is to the physical force as three to one.'*

The prince regent, after having at the desire of the French government expelled the British factory, sent the British minister plenipotentiary away from his court, sequestered British property, and shut the ports of Portugal against British merchants; after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness, was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence, a miserable example of helpless folly, he lingered until the reception of a *Moniteur* dated the 13th of November, announced, in startling terms, that his

reign was over! Lord Strangford, the British plenipotentiary, whose previous efforts to make the royal family emigrate had entirely failed, was then on board the squadron with the intention of returning to England; but sir Sidney threatened to bombard Lisbon if the prince regent hesitated any longer, and thus urged on both sides, he embarked with his whole court, and sailed for the Brazils on the 29th of November, a few hours before Junot arrived.

Lord Strangford's despatch relating this event, although dated the 29th of November on board the *Hibernia* was written the 19th December in London, and so worded as to create a notion that his exertions during the 27th and 28th caused the emigration. This was quite contrary to the fact; for the prince regent, yielding to the united pressure of the admiral's menaces and the annunciation in the *Moniteur*, embarked on the 27th, before Lord Strangford reached Lisbon, and actually sailed without having had even an interview with that nobleman, who consequently had no opportunity to advance or retard the event in question. Nevertheless, lord Strangford received the red riband and sir Sidney Smith was neglected.

This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Brazils, gave England great commercial advantages, and placed Portugal at her disposal for the approaching conflict; but it was disgraceful to the prince, insulting to the brave people he abandoned, and impolitic, as forcing men to inquire how subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their need? How the nation could belong to a man who did not belong to the nation? It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole mass; yet, after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural state and asserts its intrinsic superiority: so a privileged class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national character. There is, however, a point where the people, like the gold, no longer suffering such a degradation, will separate themselves with violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers. Until that time arrives, a nation may appear sunk in hopeless lethargy when it is capable of great and noble exertions: thus it was with



the Portuguese, who were at this time unjustly despised by enemies and mistrusted by friends.

Pursuant to the convention of Fontainebleau, the invaders formed three distinct corps. The central one, composed of the French troops and the Spanish auxiliaries under Caraffa, penetrated, by the Sobreira Formosa roads to Abrantes, whence Caraffa marched to Thomar. Meantime the right corps under Taranco, marching from Galicia, established itself at Oporto, while the marquis of Solano, with the left, entered the Alemtejo, and fixed his quarters at Setúbal. The Spaniards suffered no hardships. The French were so distressed, that three weeks after Junot's arrival in Lisbon, only ten thousand men were with the eagles; and the privations endured induced a violence, giving birth to that hatred so remarkable between the French and Portuguese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill-will of the inhabitants; it is difficult to make them understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare. Old soldiers blame nobody, but know how to extract subsistence, and in most cases without exciting enmity.

Junot passed the month of November in collecting his army, securing the military points round Lisbon, and in preparations to supplant the power of a council of regency, to whom the prince had delegated the sovereign authority. While his troops were scattered on the line of march, and the fortresses were held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been dangerous to provoke the enmity of this council, and its members were treated with studious respect. They were however of the same leaven as the court they emanated from, and Junot soon deprived them of an importance conferred by the critical situation of affairs during the first three weeks. The Spanish forces were well received in the north and in the Alemtejo, but Taranco died soon after his arrival at Oporto, and the French general Quesnel was sent to command the province. Junot also took possession of Elvas, and detached sixteen hundred men under general Manrin to the Algarves; and when Solano was ordered to withdraw from Portugal, nine French battalions and the cavalry under the command of Kellerman,

Thiebault.  
Foy.

Return of  
the French  
army.  
Appendix,  
No. 28.

entered the Alemtejo and occupied the fortress of Setuval. Caraffa's division, replaced at Thomar by a French force, was then distributed in the vicinity of Lisbon, but disposed on both sides of the Tagus.

As the treaty of Fontainebleau was unknown to the Portuguese, the Spaniards were better received than the French. Indeed, the treaty was little regarded by Junot, who soon proved that he held Portugal as belonging entirely to France. When his stragglers had come up, when the troops had recovered strength, and he knew a reinforcement of five thousand had reached Salamanca, he assumed paramount authority. He interfered with all the state departments, gave Frenchmen all the lucrative offices, demanded a loan of two hundred thousand pounds, and made his promises and protestations of amity frequent and loud in proportion to his encroachments. At last being created duke of Abrantes by Napoleon, he threw off all disguise, suppressed the council of regency, seized the government, and introduced beneficial reforms, but made the nation feel that he was a conqueror. The flag and arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France, five thousand Portuguese soldiers were incorporated with the French, and eight thousand sent away under the marquis of Alorna and Gomez Frere, two noblemen of greatest reputation amongst the native officers. The rest of the troops were disbanded.

An extraordinary contribution of four millions sterling was now demanded by Napoleon, under the strange title of a '*State Ransom*.' This sum was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the emperor to reduce it one half. He likewise, on his own authority, accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the church plate, and the royal property, in part payment; yet the people were still unable to raise the whole amount, for the court had carried the greatest part of the church plate and bullion from the kingdom. It had also drawn large sums of money from the people, under the pretext of defending the country, and with this treasure departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid. Discontent and misery prevailed, yet the

tranquillity of Lisbon during the first month was remarkable. The populace were submissive to a police, established under the prince by the count de Novion, a French emigrant, and continued by Junot. No European capital suffers so much as Lisbon from the want of a good police, and the French general conferred an unmixed benefit by giving full effect to Novion's plans. Yet so deeply rooted is the prejudice for ancient customs, that no act gave more offence than cleansing the streets and killing the wild dogs infesting them. A French serjeant who displayed zeal in destroying those disgusting, dangerous animals, was assassinated.

During March and April, Junot's military system was completed. The arsenal of Lisbon contained Thiebault. abundance of naval and military stores, and thousands of excellent workmen, who soon renewed the artillery, the ammunition, the carriages, and all the minor equipments of the army. Two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and seven lighter vessels of war were refitted, armed, and employed to defend the entrance of the Tagus and to awe the city. The army, reinforced and better disciplined, well fed and clothed, had gained confidence from success, and was become a fine body of robust men. It was re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, commanded by the generals Laborde, Loison, Travot, and Margaron. General Taviel directed the artillery; general Kellerman commanded in the Alemtejo; general Quesnel in Oporto; general Maurin in the Algarves. Junot governed from Lisbon. The fortresses of Faro in Algarve, of Almeida, of Elvas, La-Lippe, St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, the forts between Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus, and those of Ericia and Peniche, were furnished with French garrisons. Estremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes were put in the best state their decayed ramparts would permit.

Including the French workmen and marines attached to it, the army was above fifty thousand strong, nearly forty-five thousand being fit for duty; that is to say, fifteen thousand five hundred Spaniards, five thousand Portuguese, and twenty-four thousand four hundred French. Of these last, six thousand

Return of  
the French  
army. Ap-  
pendix,  
No. 28.

six hundred infantry were distributed in Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, Abrantes, and Setuval; sixteen hundred were in the Algarves. Four hundred and fifty cavalry were at Valência d'Aleantara in Spanish Estremadura, and three hundred and fifty held posts of communication from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra. Fifteen thousand of all arms remained disposable.

Lisbon contained all the civil, military, naval, and greatest part of the commercial establishments, the only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds of the riches of the whole kingdom. It formed a centre, which was secured by the main body of the French, while on the circumference strong posts gave support to the operations of their moveable columns. The garrison of Peniche secured the only harbour between the Tagus and the Mondego in which a large disembarkation of English troops could take place, and the little fort of Figueras, held by a small garrison, blocked the mouth of the last river. The division of Thomar secured all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides of the Zezere. From Abrantes to Estremos, Elvas, and Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through a country suitable for the cavalry, which was all quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English, and a large rich tract enclosed by posts, so that any insurrection could be reached by a few marches and immediately crushed; the connexion between the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, the entrance defended by the refitted vessels of war, and a light squadron was prepared to communicate with South America. Nine Russian line-of-battle ships and a frigate, which, under the command of admiral Siniavin, had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, and formed an unwilling but not unimportant auxiliary force.

These military arrangements were Junot's own, and suitable enough, if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in Portugal only as a division to be rendered subservient



to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula. Wherefore, in the month of May, he ordained that general Avril should lead three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, to co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia; and that Loison should march on Almeida with four thousand to co-operate with Bessières in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain. General Thiebault complains of this order, as injurious to Junot, ill-combined, and the result of a foolish vanity, which prompted the emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have ensured the capture of Seville; and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been eminently useful to control the country behind Bessières, when the latter invaded Galicia: moreover it was well placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. The emperor's combinations, if fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to bear on the defence of Portugal.

Such was Junot's military attitude in May. His political situation was not so favourable. His natural capacity was considerable, but neither enlarged by study nor strengthened by mental discipline. Of intemperate habits, indolent in business, prompt and brave in action, quick to give offence, ready to forget an injury, he was at one moment a great man, the next below mediocrity. At all times he was unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity. He had many difficulties to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances, incompatible with good policy towards Portugal. He was not, however, without resources for establishing a strong French interest, if he had possessed the ability and disposition to soothe a nation which had been as it were accidentally bowed to a foreign yoke.

Both the pride and poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence of ancient usages, interfered with Junot's policy.

Napoleon in  
Las Casca.  
Foy.

The monks, and most of the nobility, were inimical. All the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers, in the pay of England, were directed to undermine his plans and render him and his nation odious; but he had possession of the government and capital, he had a fine army, he could offer novelty, so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and fame of Napoleon to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the many, and there were abundance of grievances to remedy and wrongs to redress in Portugal. Among the best educated men, and in the universities, there existed a strong feeling against the Braganza family; and such an earnest desire for reformed institutions

that steps were actually taken to have prince Foy.

Eugene declared king of Portugal: nor was this spirit extinguished at a much later date.

With these materials and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French interest. An active good government would soon have reconciled the people to the loss of an independence which had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of troops who were to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, gave rise to oppression, private abuses followed close upon public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke out in quarrels and assassinations, severe punishments ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous, creating rage not terror, for the nation had not tried its strength in battle and would not believe it was weak. Meanwhile the ports were rigorously blockaded by the English fleet,

and as the troubles of Spain interrupted the corn Thiebault.

traffic, by which Portugal had been usually supplied, the unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, war-contributions, and a foreign yoke. With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil; yet the first five months of Junot's government were, with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon when the arms of Portugal were taken down, undisturbed by commotion. Nevertheless the whole country was ripe for insurrection.

An abundant harvest gave Junot relief from his principal difficulty, but as one danger disappeared another presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the Portuguese; the neighbouring juntas communicated with the Spanish generals in Portugal; the capture of the French fleet in Cadiz became known; assassinations were multiplied; and the pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet. English agents actively promoted this spirit, and the appearance of two English squadrons at different points of the coast having troops on board, alarmed the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese, who discovered their hatred in various ways. Amongst other modes, an egg was exhibited in a church bearing an inscription intimating the speedy coming of Don Sebastian, who, like Arthur of romantic memory, is supposed to be hidden in a secret island, some day to re-appear and restore his country's ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers. Other eggs prophesied unpatriotically; yet the belief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal. Many persons, not of the uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean in the hopes of descrying the island in which their long-lost hero was detained.

## CHAPTER II.

AT Oporto the first serious blow was struck. The Spanish insurrection became known there in June, and Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made Quesnel and his staff prisoners, called together the Portuguese authorities, declared them free to act as they judged fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Galicia with his army and captives. The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance. The boldest succeeded, and the insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto. It soon extended along the banks of the Douro and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast.

Junot now resolved to disarm all the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, not an easy operation, for Caraffa's division was six thousand strong, and it was difficult, without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, to collect an equal force of French. The Spanish regiments were suspicious and reluctant to obey the Thiebault.

French generals, and one, quartered at Alcaccer do Sal, resisted the orders of Junot himself. To avoid a tumult was also a great object, because in Lisbon, fifteen thousand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and water-carriers, and in a popular movement these men would naturally assist their countrymen. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Junot, having heard of Bellesta's defection, instantly formed his plan, and the next morning the Spanish troops assembled under various pretexts, in small numbers, at places where they could make no resistance, were disarmed and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus, with exception of eleven hundred, who made a timely escape. Thus, in the



course of twenty-four hours and with little bloodshed, a very serious danger was averted. This stroke produced an effect, but did not prevent the insurrection becoming general; all persons carrying orders, or commanding small posts of communications, were suddenly cut off; and the French general, reduced from fifty to twenty-eight thousand men, was suddenly thrown upon his personal resources for the maintenance of his conquest, and even for the preservation of his army. The Russian squadron indeed contained six thousand seamen and marines; but they consumed a great quantity of provisions, and could not be judged useful allies, unless an English fleet attempted to force the entrance of the river.

At first Junot thought of seizing Badajoz to secure a retreat, but was deterred by the assembling of an Estremaduran army under general Galluzzo. Meanwhile, Avril's column returned to Estremos, and it is probable never intended to do otherwise. Loison had been ordered to march upon Oporto, and reaching Almeida the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta's defection, had on the 12th, partly by Thiebault. menace, partly by persuasion, got possession of Port Conception, a strong but ill-placed Spanish work on that frontier. He then attempted to penetrate the Entre-Minho e Douro by Amarante, but his division was weak, he feared Bellesta might fall upon his flank, and advanced timidly. At Mezam Frias he was opposed, and his baggage was menaced by other insurgents, whereupon he fell back to Villa Real, and after a trifling skirmish, crossing the Douro at Lamego, marched to Castro d'Airo. There, being harassed by the armed peasants, he turned and defeated them, and then marched upon Coimbra, from whence he dislodged an insurgent force, and was about to scour the country, when he received one of twenty-five despatches sent to recall him; the rest had been intercepted. Uniting his columns and placing his sick and weak men in Almeida, he augmented the garrison to twelve hundred and fifty, ruined Fort Conception, and marched by Guarda towards Lisbon.

An insurrection had also broken out in the Algarves. It began near Faro, and general Maurin, then lying sick in that town, was made prisoner. Some Portuguese troops, attached

to the French force, joined the insurgents, many Andalusians prepared to cross the Guadiana, and general Spencer appeared off Ayamonte with five thousand British troops. Colonel Maransin, who had succeeded Maurin, immediately retired to Mertola, leaving his baggage, military chest, and above a hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the patriots: Spencer would not land, and the pursuit went not beyond the Algarve mountains. The circle of insurrection was now fast closing round Junot. Emissaries from Oporto excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra, where a French post was overpowered and a junta formed whose efforts spread the flame to Condeixa, Pombal, and Leiria. A student named Zagalo, mixing boldness with address, forced a Portuguese officer with a hundred men to surrender the fort of Figueras at the mouth of the Mondego; Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Zezere; the Spaniards, under Galluzzo, crossing the Guadiana at Juramenha, occupied that place and Campo Mayor, and a great though confused body of men menaced Kellerman at Elvas. Avril was unmolested at Estremos and a small garrison kept Evora tranquil; but the vicinity of Setuval was in commotion, the populace of Lisbon unquiet, and at that moment, Spencer, whose force report magnified to ten thousand men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus.

Junot held a council of war, and decided on the following plan: 1°. To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by the ships of war. 2°. To secure the Spanish prisoners by mooring the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the city. 3°. To arm and provision the forts of Lisbon, and remove the powder from the magazines to the ships. 4°. To abandon all fortresses in Portugal, save Setuval, Almeida, Elvas, and Peniché, and to concentrate the army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, he proposed to defend the capital as long as possible, and then crossing the Tagus, move upon Elvas, and retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as might be expedient. This plan was not executed, the first alarm died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, the insurrection was grappled with, and proved to be more noisy than dangerous.

Kellerman having recalled Maransin from Mertola, was going to march on Lisbon, when the inhabitants of Villa Viciosa drove a company of French troops into an old castle, yet when Avril came from Estremos to their aid, the Portuguese fled, and several were killed in the pursuit. The town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa, but Maransin marching from Mertola, and making forty miles in eighteen hours, suddenly defeated the patriots, and pillaged the place. He had eighty men killed or wounded, and Thiebault writes, that an obstinate combat took place in the streets. The patriots however really never made head against a strong body during the whole insurrection. How indeed was it possible for a collection of miserable peasants, armed with scythes, pitchforks, old fowling-pieces, and a little bad powder, under the command of some ignorant countryman, or fanatic friar, to maintain a battle against an efficient and active corps of French soldiers? There was an essential difference between the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections. The Spaniards had many great and strong towns, and large provinces in which to collect and train forces at a distance from the invaders, while in Portugal the naked peasants were forced to go to battle the instant even of assembling. The loss which Maransin sustained must have been the killing of stragglers who, in a consecutive march of forty miles, would have been numerous.

This blow quieted the Alemtejo for the moment. Kellerman cleared his neighbourhood of all Spanish parties, placed a commandant in La-Lippe, concentrated the detachments under Maransin and Avril, and proceeded himself towards Lisbon, where Junot was in great perplexity. The intercepting of his couriers and isolated officers, and the detection of all his spies, had exposed him to every report which the fears of his army or the ingenuity of the people could give birth to; and few nations can vie with the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fabrication of plausible reports. Among those current was the captivity of Loison. However, nothing was certain, save that the insurgents of the Mondego valley were marching towards Lisbon; wherefore Margaron was sent with three thousand men and six guns to disperse them and open a communication with Loison. They retired to Leiria, and many

Thiebault. dispersed; the remainder were attacked the 5th  
 Accursio of July, and a scene like that at Beja ensued; the  
 de Neves. French boasted of victory, the Portuguese spoke  
 only of butchery and pillage. In such a combat it is difficult  
 to say where fighting ends and massacre begins. Peasants  
 are observed firing and moving from place to place without  
 order; when do they cease to become enemies? More dangerous  
 single than together, they can hide their arms in an instant  
 and appear peaceable, the soldier passes and is shot from  
 behind.

This example at Leiria did not prevent a rising at Thomar  
 and Alcobaça, and Margaron was thus placed between two  
 fresh insurrections at the moment he had quelled one; English  
 squadrons with troops on board were said to be hovering off  
 the coast; and from the reports about Loison his safety was  
 despaired of, when he suddenly arrived at Abrantes. He had  
 quitted Almeida the 2nd, at the head of three thousand five  
 hundred men, and moving by Guarda, Sarsedas, and Sardoval,  
 reached Abrantes the 8th. During this rapid march he  
 defeated the insurgents several times, notably at Guarda,  
 where it has been absurdly asserted he killed twelve hundred;  
 as if three thousand men without cavalry or artillery could do  
 so amidst rugged mountains in half an hour, for that was the  
 duration of the action. The truth is, the peasants, terrified at  
 reports spread by Loison himself, fled on all sides; and not  
 more than two hundred were killed and wounded during his  
 whole march of nearly two hundred miles. Kellerman had  
 meanwhile quelled the people of Alcobaça, and those of  
 Thomar were quieted. At Coimbra, the insurgents gathered  
 strength, and the last of the native soldiers deserted the French  
 colours; a Spanish corps, assembled at Badajos, was joined by  
 the Portuguese fugitives, and under one Moretti,  
 Thiebault. menaced the Alemtejo, which was in commotion,  
 for a number of patriots were in arms at Alcaacer  
 Parliamen- do Sal, and in communication with the English  
 tary Papers, fleet.  
 1809.

Junot, neglecting the northern people, turned upon the  
 Alemtejo, as being his line of retreat to Spain, and the country  
 fit for horsemen; wherefore Loison, crossing the Tagus, marched



with seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and eight guns, to Montemor, and drove some insurgents to Evora. Leite, a Portuguese general, was in position there with the main body and three or four thousand Spaniards, brought to his aid by Moretti, but Loison directing Margaron and Solignac against the flanks, fell upon the centre himself, and the battle was short; the Spaniards hung back, the Portuguese fled; there was a great and confused concourse, a strong cavalry was let loose upon the fugitives; and many were driven into the deserted town, where in despair they turned upon the French, but the greater part were slain, and the place pillaged. The French lost two or three hundred, the slaughter of the vanquished was great, and disputes arising between the Portuguese and Spaniards the latter ravaged the country in their retreat with more violence than the French. After resting two days Loison again advanced towards Elvas, and drove away the Spaniards who infested that fortress, and were now obnoxious alike to the Portuguese and French. This done he was proceeding to form magazines, when he was recalled hastily to the right bank of the Tagus—a British army had descended on the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the desolating scenes of insurrection.

Thiebault.

Appendix,  
No. 12.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Loison's expedition being made to repress insurrection, was a movement of police rather than of war, and his proceedings were necessarily severe; but they have been falsely represented as a series of disgusting massacres. Desiring to create terror he encouraged the propagation of such rumours at the time, and the credulity of the people was not easily shocked; hence so many anecdotes of French barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra, and the same story being related by persons remote from each other is no argument for its truth. Loison's capture on his march from Almeida was reported to Junot through fifty separate channels; there were men to declare they saw him bound with cords; others to tell how he had been entrapped; some

Thiebault.

named the places he had been carried through; his habitual expressions were quoted; the story was complete, the details consistent, yet totally without foundation.

2°. All the Portuguese accounts of this period are angry amplifications of every real or pretended act of French barbarity and injustice; the crimes of individuals were worked into charges against the whole army. The French accounts are more plausible, scarcely safer as authorities, being written for the most part by actors in the scenes they describe, and naturally concerned to defend their own characters. Military vanity also had its share in disguising the simple facts of the insurrection; for to enhance the merit of the troops, the number of insurgents, the obstinacy of the combats, the loss of the patriots, are all magnified. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such relations, changed the name of battle for massacre; and thus prejudice, conceit, and factious clamour, have combined to violate the decorum of history and perpetuate error.

3°. The French were not monsters, but it would be egregious error to suppose there was no cause for the acrimony displayed against them. Junot, neither cruel nor personally obnoxious to the Portuguese, was a sensual passionate person, and extravagant. Such men are always rapacious as well as generous; and as the character of the chief influences the manners of his followers it may be safely assumed that many aped his vices. The virtuous general Travot was an undoubted exception, and alone in the midst of tumult, he was respected by the Portuguese, while Loison was scarcely safe when surrounded by troops. The execrations poured forth at the mere mention of the "*bloody Maneta*," as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, proves that he committed many heinous acts; and Kellerman was stigmatized for rapacity, as much as Loison was for violence. It is not just however to revile the French for repressing the hostility of the peasantry by military executions: they followed the custom of war, and are not liable to reproof, unless their rigour was excessive. An insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy; they murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy hospitals, poison wells, break down all usages which

Napoleon in  
Las Cases.

soften the enmities of modern nations, wear no badge of hostility, and their devices are secret, their war one of extermination. It must be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilization of modern customs must be discarded for the devastating system of the ancients. To refuse quarter to an armed peasantry and burn their villages may appear barbarous and unjust, whereas, founded upon necessity, it is only the infliction of partial evil to prevent universal calamity. Nevertheless, no wise man will hastily resort to it, or carry it to any great extent.

## CHAPTER III.

NAPOLEON's design against Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret project. In 1806, Mr. Fox had sent lord Rosslyn, lord St. Vincent, and general Simcoe, on a politico-military mission, to warn the Lisbon court that a French invading army was assembling at Bayonne, and to offer the aid of a British force. The Portuguese cabinet affected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox died during the negotiation, and the war with Prussia diverting Napoleon's attention to more important objects, he withdrew his troops from Bayonne. The Tory administration, which soon after overturned the Grenville party, thought no further of this affair. They, indeed, at a later period, sent sir Sydney Smith, with a squadron to Lisbon, but their views were confined to the emigration of the royal family; and they intrusted the negotiation to lord Strangford, a young man of no influence or experience.

Admiral Siniavin's arrival in the Tagus produced an activity which the danger of Portugal had not excited. It was supposed, Russia and England being in a state of hostility, the presence of these ships would intimidate the prince regent and prevent him from passing to the Brazils. Sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of higher rank than sir Sydney Smith, was therefore sent out, with instructions to force the entrance of the Tagus and attack Siniavin. Spencer, then on the point of sailing with five thousand men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and ten thousand men, under sir John Moore, were withdrawn from Sicily to aid this enterprise; but before the instructions were even written the prince regent was on his voyage to the Brazils and Junot ruled in Lisbon. When Moore arrived at Gibraltar he could hear



nothing of sir Sydney Smith, nor of Spencer, and proceeded to England. From thence, after a detention of four months on ship-board, he was despatched with his fine army by the ministers upon that eminently-foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such an extraordinary manner; and had in reality only the disgraceful, factious object, of keeping an excellent general and a superb division of troops, at a distance from the only country where their services were really required.

Spencer's armament, long baffled by contrary winds and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a storm. A part arrived at Gibraltar in the latter end of January, 1808; but on the 5th of February, the governor, sir Hew Dalrymple, believing a French fleet had passed the Straits and run up the Mediterranean, sent the first comers on to Sicily to reinforce that island. Spencer did not arrive until the 10th of March, and, as his instructions comprised the taking of Ceuta, the battalions sent to Sicily were replaced from Gibraltar. The attack on Ceuta was judged in a council of war to be impracticable, and the objects of Spencer's expedition were manifold. He was to co-operate with Moore against the Russian fleet in the Tagus; he was to take the French fleet at Cadiz; he was to assault Ceuta; he was to make an attempt upon the Spanish fleet at Port Mahon. But the wind which brought Moore to Lisbon blowed Spencer from that port; admiral Purvis convinced him the French fleet in Cadiz was invulnerable to his force; Ceuta was too strong, and it only remained to sail to Port Mahon, when the Spanish insurrection breaking out, drew him back to Cadiz with altered views. In relating Dupont's campaign Spencer's proceedings at Cadiz have been noticed; yet it is necessary here to enlarge on those occurrences, which fortunately brought him to the coast of Portugal, at the moment when sir Arthur Wellesley landed in that country.

Castañõs, as commanding at St. Roque, was early an object of interest to Napoleon, and two French officers were privately sent to sound him. He had secretly taken his part, and thinking those officers were coming to arrest him, at first resolved to kill them and fly to Gibraltar, but discovering his mistake,

Sir Hew  
Dalrymple's  
Correspond-  
ence, MS.

treated them civilly and prosecuted his original plans. Through one Viali, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication with sir Hew Dalrymple, and April.

the latter, who had been closely watching the progress of events, not only promised assistance, but recommended several important measures, such as the immediate seizure of the French squadron in Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy communication with South America.

Before Castaños could mature his plans, the insur-

May. rection broke out at Seville, and he acknowledged the authority of the junta. Solano then came to Cadiz, and was pressed by Spencer and Purvis to attack the French squadron. They offered to co-operate if he would admit the British troops into the city, but he expressed great displeasure at this proposal, and refused to treat, an event not unexpected by sir Hew Dalrymple; the offer was made without his concurrence, for he knew the Spaniards were distrustful of Spencer's expedition. Thus a double intercourse was carried on, one confidential between sir Hew and Castaños, the other of a character to increase Spanish suspicion. And when it is considered that Spain and England were nominally at war; that the English commanders were acting without the authority of their government; that they were there, for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had already taken the island of Perexil close to that fortress, little surprise can be excited by Solano's conduct. At his death, Spencer and Purvis renewed their offers to Morla. He also refused and

June. forced the French squadron to surrender; yet his operations were so managed as to raise doubts of his wish to succeed; and he immediately commenced a series of low intrigues, calculated to secure his personal safety, and enable him to betray his country if the French proved the strongest.

After the reduction of the enemy's ships, the people were inclined to admit the English, but the local junta, swayed by Morla's representations, were averse to it; and here, while confirming them in this disposition, he secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, saying, he looked entirely to the British force for the future defence of Cadiz. Thus misdealing, he passed with the people

Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.

for an active patriot without preparing for resistance, and by his double falsehoods preserved a fair appearance both with the junta and the English. Sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle, he early discovered that Morla was an enemy of Castaños, and having more confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse established between them without reference to the transactions at Cadiz. He supplied him with arms and with two thousand barrels of powder, and placing one English officer near him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of a political agent to the supreme junta at Seville. Castaños, as we have seen, afterwards asked Spencer to co-operate, and did not object to his entering Cadiz, but proposed a landing at Almeida to march on Xeres. Spencer would only occupy Cadiz. Morla, in pursuance of his secret designs, then said, it was important to fit out the Spanish fleet, whereupon sir George Smith, employed by Spencer to negotiate, promised money to pay the seamen, who were in a state of mutiny. Neither lord Collingwood nor sir W. Dalrymple would confirm this promise; and as Dupont was then advancing, Morla wished Spencer away, and persuaded him to sail for Ayamonte, to prevent Avril crossing the Guadiana, though he knew that general had no intention of doing so.

Maransin's flight when the British appeared at Ayamonte has been related, and Thiebault says Spencer might have struck a great blow. It would, however, have been imprudent to throw five thousand infantry, without equipment, without cavalry, without a place of arms, into a country where all the fortresses were possessed by an enemy who could bring twenty thousand men into the field. Spencer who knew little of the state of the French merely feigned a landing, by which he aided the insurrection, and then, having received his detachment back from Sicily, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was called to Lisbon in aid of a new project ill-judged and fruitless.

Sir Charles Cotton had closely blockaded the mouth of the Tagus, hoping to make the Russian squadron capitulate from want. This was lord Strangford's device, and had no chance of success; but it

Mr. Canning  
to lord Castle-  
reagh, 28th  
Dec. 1807.

augmented the misery of the people, and Junot amongst other expedients to abate the evil, employed one Sataro, a Portuguese, to make offers to the English admiral. Pretending to come unknown to Junot, this man persuaded Cotton only four thousand French were in Lisbon, and in that error he had called Spencer to the attack. The latter, acting with the advice of Dalrymple and lord Collingwood, came, but

Parliamentary Papers,  
1809.

soon discovered that fifteen thousand men were in, or close to Lisbon, and returned to Cadiz.

Castaños then again pressed him to co-operate with the Spanish army, and he consented to disembark at port St. Mary; he even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres; yet, deceived by Morla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying Cadiz, he resolved to keep his main body close to that city.

Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.

At this period, the insurrection of Andalusia attracted all the intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and Seville, and the confusion of Agramant's camp would have been rivalled, if sir Hew Dalrymple had not checked those political pests. Among the perplexing follies of the moment, one was remarkable, and its full explanation must be left to other historians, who will perhaps find in it and like affairs, a key to that absurd policy which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court. To establish the salique law had been a favourite project of the Spanish Bourbons, and had been promulgated, but never with the formalities necessary to render it valid: the nation was averse to the change. Some of the Seville junta now secretly sought to revive this law,

Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.

designing to make the prince of Sicily regent, who would then, Ferdinand and his brother dying without issue, as it was supposed they would do in France, succeed, to the prejudice of Carlotta of Portugal. In this view, Robertoni, a Sicilian agent, appeared at Gibraltar, where he seemed to act under the auspices of England, while forwarding this desire; but sir Hew Dalrymple, having accidentally discovered that the British cabinet disapproved of his object, sent him away.

Castaños, deceived by the intriguers, was inclined to support



the pretensions of the Sicilian prince to the regency; he even proposed to use Dalrymple's name to give weight to his opinions, which would have created great jealousy in Spain, but sir Hew promptly refused his sanction. The affair then seemed to droop, yet in the middle of July an English man-of-war suddenly appeared at Gibraltar, having on board prince Leopold of Sicily, with a court establishment, chamberlains with keys, ushers with white wands; and the duke of Orleans, who came with the prince, made no secret of their intention to negotiate for the regency, and demanded a reception in Gibraltar. Sir Hew refused to permit the prince or any of his attendants to land; and as the captain of the ship, whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take him back to Sicily, his situation was painful: to relieve him, sir Hew consented to admit him as a guest, if he would divest himself of any public character and sent the duke away.

Sir William Drummond, British envoy at Palermo, Mr. Viali, and the duke of Orleans, were the ostensible contrivers of this notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in a local junta would have appointed a regency for Spain, paved the way for altering the laws of succession in that country, established their own sway over the other juntas, and created interminable jealousy between England Portugal and Spain. With whom the plan originated does not clearly appear. Drummond's representations induced sir Alexander Ball to provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the duke of Orleans,

Appendix,  
No. 8.

in reality for prince Leopold, with whose intended voyage sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted. That the prince should have desired to be regent of Spain was natural; that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a British ship of the line, when the English government disapproved of his pretensions, was strange. Drummond, the intimate friend of Mr. Canning, could scarcely have proceeded such lengths without secret instructions from some member of his own government; yet lord Castlereagh expressed unqualified approbation of sir Hew's decisive conduct upon the occasion! Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential communication with each

Ibid.

other? or was lord Castlereagh's policy secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues?

It is now necessary to return to Portugal.

In Oporto the bishop was placed at the head of the insurrectional junta and claimed the assistance of England. 'We hope,' said he, 'for an aid of three hundred thousand cruzado novas, arms and accoutrements, cloth for forty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, three thousand barrels of cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions, and an auxiliary body of six thousand men at least, including some cavalry.' This extravagant demand would imply that an immense force had been assembled by the prelate; yet he could not put five thousand organized men in motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any feasible or rational mode of employing the succours he demanded. This, his preposterous requisition, was not rejected by the English ministers, who sent agents to Oporto and other parts, with power to grant supplies, on the improvident system adopted for Spain: and they produced precisely the same cavils, intrigues, waste, insubordination, inordinate vanity, and ambition among the ignorant upstart men of the day.

More than half a year had now elapsed since Napoleon first poured his forces into the Peninsula. Every moment of that time was marked by some extraordinary event, and a month had passed since a general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of arms. Yet the British cabinet was still unacquainted with the real state of public feeling in the Penin-

sula, and with the Spanish character; and with a disposable army of eighty thousand excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its plans, and unprepared for any vigorous effort. Agents were indeed despatched to every accessible province, the public treasure was scattered with heedless profusion, the din of preparation was heard in every department; but the bustle of confusion is easily mistaken for the activity of business, and time, removing the veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed all their dull and meagre features: the treasure was squandered without judgment, the troops dispersed without

Parl. Pap.  
Lord Castle-  
reagh to sir  
A. Wellesley,  
21st June.

meaning. Ten thousand soldiers exiled to Sweden, proved the truth of Oxenstiern's address to his son; as many more, idly kept in Sicily, were degraded as the guards of a vicious court; Gibraltar was unnecessarily filled with fighting men; and Spencer wandered between Ceuta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, seeking, like the knight of La Mancha, for a foe to combat.

A considerable force remained in England, but it was not ready for service; nine thousand men, collected at Cork, formed the only disposable army for immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South America! upon what principle of policy it is not necessary to inquire, but such was the intention; perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city. The Tory administration, relinquishing this scheme of conquest, directed sir Arthur Wellesley to inform Miranda, the military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to expect assistance, but that all attempts to separate the colonies of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English government. Thus the troops assembled at Cork became available, and sir Arthur being appointed to command them, sailed on the 12th of July, to commence that long and bloody contest in the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious manner.

Two small divisions were, soon after, assembled for embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of generals Anstruther and Acland; yet a considerable time elapsed before they were ready to sail, and a singular uncertainty in the views of the ministers at this period, subjected all the military operations to perpetual and mischievous changes. Speneer, supposed to be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz and await sir Arthur's orders; the latter was permitted to sail under the impression that Speneer was actually subject to his command, while other instructions empowered Speneer, at his own discretion, to commence operations in the south, without reference to sir Arthur Wellesley's proceedings. Admiral Purvis, who, after

Parliamentary Papers,  
1808.

Ibid.  
Lord Castle-  
reagh to sir  
A. Wellesley,  
30th June.

Ibid.

Lord Castle-  
reagh to gen.  
Spencer, 28th  
and 30th

June.

Do. to adm.

Purvis, 28th  
June.

lord Collingwood's arrival had no separate command, was authorized to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control the operations of sir Arthur by calling for the aid of his troops, that general being enjoined to pay all due obedience to any such requisition! Yet sir Arthur himself was informed, that the accounts from

Cadiz were bad; that no disposition to move either there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar was visible, and the cabinet were unwilling he should go to the southward, whilst the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the northward. Sir Charles Cotton was informed that Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent at the mouth of the Tagus; but sir Arthur himself had no definite object given for his own operations, although his instructions pointed to Portugal. Thus in fact no officer, naval or military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception of Purvis; who being only second in command for his own service, was really authorized to control all the operations of the land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had been declared unfavourable for any operations at all! These inconsistent orders were calculated to create confusion and prevent all vigour of action. More egregious conduct followed.

In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the Asturian deputies, although sir Hew Dalrymple's despatches gave more

Parl. Pap.

Lord Castle-  
reagh to sir  
A. Wellesley,  
30th June.

recent and extensive information than any supplied by those deputies. The latter left Spain at the commencement of the insurrection, were ill-informed of what was passing in their own province, ignorant of the state of other parts of the Peninsula, and of no capacity to advise in momentous affairs. But though sir Arthur Wellesley was so vaguely instructed as to his military operations, he was expressly told, the intention of the government was to enable Portugal and Spain to throw off the French yoke; and ample directions were given to him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsula. He was informed how to demean himself in any disputes arising between the insurgent nations, how to act with relation to the settlement



of the supreme authority during the interregnum. He was directed to facilitate communications between the colonies and the mother country, and offer to arrange any differences between them. The terms upon which Great Britain would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were imparted to him; and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause! The Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilised to adopt this fine recommendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit, at a time when no man's life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a week's purchase.

Sir Hew was commanded to furnish sir Arthur with every information which might be of use in the operations; and when the tenour of these instructions, and the great Indian reputation enjoyed by the latter, are considered, it is not to be doubted he was designed to lead the army of England. Yet, scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded. Not by one man whose fame and experience might have justified the act, but with a sweep, beyond mere vacillation, he was reduced to the fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which he had, fifteen days before, received the most extended instructions. Sir Hew was now appointed to the chief command; and sir John Moore, who had suddenly and unexpectedly returned from the Baltic, having by his firmness and address saved himself and his troops from the madness of the Swedish monarch, was, with marked disrespect, directed to place himself under the orders of sir Harry Burrard, and proceeded to Portugal. Thus two men, comparatively unknown and unused to the command of armies, superseded the only generals in the British service whose talents and experience were indisputable. The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep as to baffle investigation; but that task scarcely belongs to this history: it is sufficient to show the effects of envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home to their possessors.

Parl. Pap.  
Lord Castle-  
reagh to  
sir H. Dal-  
rymple,  
28th June.

Notwithstanding these changes, the uncertainty of the minister's plans continued. The same day that sir Hew was

Parl. Pap.  
Lord Castle-  
reagh to sir  
A. Wellesley,  
15th July.

appointed, a despatch, containing the following project of campaign, was sent to sir Arthur. 'The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter (the coast of Portugal) are, 1st, to provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus; 2ndly, to have such an additional force disposable beyond what may be indispensably requisite for that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under general Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that may be concerted. His Majesty is pleased to direct that the *attack upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to*; and as the whole force, of which a statement is enclosed, when assembled, will amount to not less than thirty thousand, *it is considered that both services may be provided for amply*. The precise distribution, as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend upon circumstances, to be judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed advisable to fulfil the assurance which lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have given to the supreme junta of Seville, under the authority of my despatch of (no date), that it was the intention of his Majesty to employ a corps of ten thousand men to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter; a corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the senior officer of the Tagus, at his discretion to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may put that important place out of the reach of immediate danger, *even though it should for the time suspend operations against the Tagus*.' The date of this despatch was the 6th of July, but to mislead the public it was purposely left out in the copy laid before Parliament. The inconsistent folly of the document is however sufficiently apparent.

To occupy Cadiz was a favourite project with the Cabinet. Neither Spencer's unsuccessful effort to gain admittance, nor the representations of sir Hew, who had ground to believe the attempt would bring down the army under Castaños to oppose it by force, had any weight with the ministers. They did not see, that in a political view, such a measure, pressed as a preliminary, would give a handle for misrepresentation; and that, in a military view, the burden of Cadiz would clog operations in Portugal. Adopting all projects, and weighing none, they displayed the most incredible confusion of ideas; for the plan of sending ten thousand men to Seville, was said to be in pursuance of a promise made by sir Hew to the junta, whereas the despatch of that general, quoted as authority for this promise of help, contained nothing of the kind, and was even written *before any junta existed!*

But at this period, personal enmity to Napoleon and violent party prejudices, had so disturbed the judgments of men relative to that monarch, that any information speaking of strength or success for him, was regarded with suspicion. The ministers, as commonly happens in such cases, became the dupes of their own practices, listening with complacency to all those tales of mutiny among his troops, disaffection of his generals, and insurrections in France, which the cunning or folly of their agents transmitted to them. Hence sprung such projects as the one above, the false calculations of which may be exposed by a short comparative statement. The whole English force disposable was not much above thirty thousand men, and was distributed off Cadiz, off the coast of Portugal, on the eastern parts of England, and in the Channel. The French in Spain and Portugal were about a hundred and twenty thousand men, and they possessed all the Portuguese and most of the Spanish fortresses. The English army had no reserve, no fixed plan; it was to be divided, and act upon a double line of operations. The French had a strong reserve at Bayonne, the grand French army of four hundred thousand veterans was untouched and ready to succour the troops in the Peninsula if they required it.

Happily, this visionary plan was in no particular followed by the generals entrusted with the execution. The catastrophe

of Baylen marred the great combinations of the French emperor, fortune drew the scattered divisions of the English army together, and the decisive vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley, sweeping away these cobweb projects, obtained all the success the bad arrangements of the ministers would permit. In the next chapter the proceedings of the first British campaign in the Peninsula shall be related; but it was fitting first to expose the previous preparations and plans of the cabinet, lest the reader, not being fully awakened to the difficulties cast in the way of the English generals by the incapacity of the government, should, with hasty censure or niggard praise, do the former injustice: for as a noble forest hides many noisome swamps and evil things, so the duke of Wellington's actions have covered the innumerable errors of the ministers.



## CHAPTER IV.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S expedition sailed from Cork, he preceded it to Coruña, and on the 20th of July conferred with the Gallician junta, who told him of the battle of Rio Seco after the Spanish manner. It had not changed their policy, which was, in truth, a constant effort to obtain money and avoid personal inconvenience. They refused the aid of troops, but demanded arms and gold, and while the conference went on, an English frigate arrived with two hundred thousand pounds; then they desired to be rid of their guest, and recommended him to operate in the north of Portugal. They gave a false statement of the number of Spanish and Portuguese in arms near Oporto, promised to reinforce them with another division, and gave still more incorrect information of Junot's strength, and thus persuaded sir Arthur not to land in Galicia, though it was at the merey of Bessières, having neither men nor means to resist his progress.

Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

Mr. Charles Stuart, the British envoy to the junta, came with the general, and quickly penetrating the flimsy veil of Spanish enthusiasm, informed his government of the true state of affairs; but his despatches were unheded, while the inflated reports of the subordinate civil and military agents were blazoned forth, and taken as sure guides. Sir Arthur proceeded to Oporto, where he found colonel Browne, an intelligent officer employed to distribute succours, who told him no Spanish troops were in the north of Portugal, and the Portuguese force was upon the Mondego, to the south of which river the insurrection had spread. Eight thousand French were supposed to be in their front, and some great disaster

Colonel  
Browne's  
Correspondence.

Parliamentary  
Papers,  
1809.

Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative.  
Court of Inquiry.

was to be expected, because, 'with every good will in the people, their exertions were so short-lived, and with so little combination, there was no hope of their being able to resist the advances of the enemy;' in fact, only five thousand regulars and militia, half armed and associated with ten or twelve thousand peasants without any arms, were in the field.

A large army was made out upon paper by the bishop of Oporto, who proposed various plans of operation, which sir Arthur was not inclined to adopt. After some discussion, the prelate agreed that the paper army should look to the defence of the Tras os Montes against Bessières, and the five thousand soldiers on the Mondego should be joined by the British.

The English general then hastened to consult sir Charles Cotton upon the descent at the mouth of the Tagus, which had so long haunted the imaginations of the ministers; but the strength of the French, the bar of the river, the disposition of the forts, the difficulty of landing in the immediate neighbourhood, where a heavy surf broke in all the undefended creeks and bays, convinced him such an enterprise was inadvisable, if not impracticable. To land north of Lisbon far enough to

Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative.  
Court of Inquiry.

Sir H. Dalrymple's and lord Colingwood's Correspondence.

avoid a disputed disembarkation; or, to proceed southward, join Speneer, and act against Dupont, remained. Sir Arthur judged the latter unpromising while Junot held Portugal, and Bessières hung on the northern frontier. Spanish jealousy would, he foresaw, produce tedious negotiations, and waste the season of action, or the campaign would be commenced without a place of arms.

To take the field permanently with fourteen thousand against twenty thousand French strongly posted in the Morena, and having communication with their main body at Madrid, would be folly, unless assured of the fighting qualities of the Spanish troops, which were unknown. A momentary advance would be useless, and in a protracted campaign, the line of operations, running parallel to the Portugal frontier, would require a covering army on the Guadiana to watch Junot.

Lord Castlereagh's double line of operations violated all

military principles; but Spencer now announced, that he was at St. Mary's, and free from any Spanish engagements; a fortunate circumstance, scarcely to be expected,—wherefore sir Arthur ordered him to sail to the Mondego, and immediately went there himself. At the Mondego he received official notice of sir Hew Dalrymple's appointment and the sailing of sir John Moore's troops, yet this mortifying intelligence did not relax his activity. Having heard of Dupont's capitulation, he sent fast sailing vessels to look for, and conduct Anstruther's armament to the Mondego, and resolved, without waiting for Spencer, to disembark,—a determination marking the vigour of his character. He felt sure Dupont's defeat would prevent Bessières entering Portugal, but he estimated Junot's force at sixteen or eighteen thousand men, a number, indeed, below the truth, yet sufficient to make the hardiest general pause before he disembarked with nine thousand, having no certainty that his fleet could remain even for a day in that dangerous offing—another officer also was to profit from success, while failure would ruin his own reputation with the English public, always ready to deride Indian generals.

Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative.  
Court of Inquiry.

It was difficult to find a place to land. The coast, from the Minho to the Tagus, save at a few points, is rugged and dangerous; all the river harbours have bars, and are difficult of access even for boats. With the slightest breeze from the seaboard, a terrible surf breaks along the whole coast; and when the south wind, which usually prevails from August to the winter months, blows, a more dangerous shore is not to be found in any part of the world.

Seventy miles northward of the Lisbon Roek, the small peninsula of Peniché offered the only safe and accessible bay adapted for a disembarkation; but the anchorage was within range of the fort, which contained a hundred guns and a garrison of a thousand men. The next best place was the Mondego river; there the little fort of Figueras, now occupied by English marines, secured a free entrance, and sir Arthur adopted it. The landing commenced the 1st of August, and the weather was favourable, yet the operation was not completed before the 5th, and on that day, with singular good fortune, Spencer

Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative.  
Court of Inquiry.

arrived. He had not received sir Arthur's orders, but with ready judgment sailed for the Tagus the moment Dupont surrendered, and was by sir C. Cotton directed to the Mondego. The two corps, however, could only furnish twelve thousand three hundred men, and a veteran battalion was not disembarked, being destined for Gibraltar.

When the troops were on shore, the British general repaired to Montemor Velho, to confer with don Bernardim Freire de Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in-chief, who proposed to unite all the troops, relinquish the coast, march into the heart of Beira, and commence an offensive campaign. He promised ample stores of provisions, but sir Arthur placed no reliance on his promises. He gave Freire five thousand stand of arms with ammunition, refusing to separate from his ships; for seeing clearly the insurgents were unable to give any real assistance, he resolved to act with reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger. Irritated at this refusal, Freire reluctantly consented to join the British army, but pressed sir Arthur to hasten to Leiria, lest a large magazine filled as he affirmed with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into the enemy's hands; wherefore the advanced guard of the English army quitted the Mondego the 9th, taking the road to Leiria, and the main body followed the next day.

Sir Arthur's plan embraced three principal objects:

1°. To hold on by the coast for ship supplies, thus avoiding a drain of men to protect magazines on shore, and covering the landing of reinforcements from England.

2°. To keep the troops in mass, to strike an important blow.

3°. To strike that blow as near Lisbon as possible, and bring the affairs of Portugal to a crisis.

Possessing very good military surveys of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, he was anxious to operate where he could avail himself of this resource; but the inexperience of his commissariat staff and the want of cavalry, rendered his movements slow and circumspect. The insurrection was a generous yet feeble effort, and its prolongation,

Sir A. Wel-  
lesley's Nar-  
rative.  
Court of  
Inquiry.



rather the result of terror than of hope; the blow had been hastily struck in the moment of suffering, and the patriots, conscious of weakness, trembled when they reflected on their own temerity. Bernardim Freire had received arms and equipments complete for five thousand soldiers, yet his army at Leiria did not exceed six thousand men of all arms fit for action; and besides this force, there were, in all the provinces north of the Tagus, only three thousand infantry under the command of the marquis of Valladeres, half of whom were Spaniards: the lofty style adopted by the junta of Oporto in their communications with the British ministers was ridiculous.

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.

Upon the other side, Junot, who had received information of the English descent in the Mondego, as early as the 2nd, was embarrassed by the distance of his principal force, and the hostile disposition of the inhabitants of Lisbon. He also knew of Dupont's disaster, and exaggerated notions of the insurrection were entertained by himself and his principal officers. The patriots of the Alentejo and Algarves, assisted by some Spaniards, and animated by manifestos and promises assiduously promulgated from the English fleet, had once more assembled at Alcacer do Sal, from whence they threatened the garrison of St. Ubes, and those French posts on the south bank of the Tagus, immediately opposite to the capital, which was very unquiet. The anticipation of coming freedom was apparent in the wrathful looks and stubborn manners of the populace, superstition was at work to increase the hatred and the hopes of the multitude, and it was at this time the prophetic eggs, denouncing death to the French, and deliverance to the Portuguese, appeared. But less equivocal indications of approaching danger were to be drawn from the hesitations of Junot, who, wavering between his fear of an insurrection in Lisbon and his desire to check the immediate progress of the British army, exhibited a mind yielding to the pressure of events.

Thiebault.

Loison was in the neighbourhood of Estremos with seven or eight thousand men; two thousand five hundred men were in the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida; a few hundred were at Abrantes; a thousand in Santarem; a thousand in Peniché;

general Thomieres, with one brigade, was near Aleobaça. The main body was in Lisbon and its vicinity, on both sides of the Tagus, the right bank of which was studded with the forts of Caseaes, St. Antonio, St. Julian's, Belem, and the eitadel. Between those places smaller works continued the line of fire against ships entering by the northern passage. On the other

bank, fort Bugio, built upon a low sandy point, crossed its fire with St. Julian's, at the south entrance. The Thiebault.

fort of Palmela crowned the heights of that name, and St. Ubes and Traffaria completed the French posts. The communication between the banks was maintained by the refitted Portuguese ships of war, the Russian squadron, and the numerous large boats of the Tagus.

When the English disembarked, Junot directed Loison to march by Portalegre and Abrantes, and sent Laborde from Lisbon the 6th, to watch sir Arthur, and cover Loison's march. Laborde moved by Rio Mayor and Candeiros to Leiria, where he expected to unite with Loison. Junot remained in Lisbon to awe the citizens by his presence, but he embarked all the powder from his magazines, took additional precautions to guard his Spanish prisoners, and put the eitadel and forts into a state of siege. Meanwhile, being disquieted by the patriots assembled at Aleaeer do Sal, he sent Kellerman with a moveable column to disperse them, directing him to secure the country towards Setuval, withdraw the garrison, abandon all

the French posts on the south of the Tagus except *Ibid.*

Palmela, and collect the whole in one mass on the heights of Almada, where an entrenched camp had been already commenced. Kellerman had scarcely departed, when two English regiments, the one from Madeira the other from Gibraltar, arrived off the bar of Lisbon, causing new distractions, and increasing the turbulence of the populace, and in this perplexity the duke of Abrantes lingered until the 15th, when the progress of sir Arthur forced him to assume the command of the army in the field.

Loison entered Abrantes the 9th, and Laborde arrived at Candeiros, from which point he could either move upon Aleobaça and Leiria, or form a junction with Loison upon the side of Santarem. The 10th, Loison halted at Abrantes, but Laborde

moved to Alcobaça, where he was joined by Thomieres and the garrison of Peniché. And while the hostile bodies were thus in a state of attraction, news of Bessières' victory at Rio Seco came to the French army, and of the king's flight from Madrid to the British army. Both were exultant. Sir Arthur's advanced guard, however, entered Leiria before Laborde, and was joined by Freire, who immediately seized the magazines, and gave no share to the British. On the 11th, sir Arthur's main body arrived, and next day the whole advanced. Laborde had sought for a position in the vicinity of Batalha, but finding the ground too extensive, fell back in the night of the 12th to Obidos, a town with a Moorish castle, built on a gentle eminence in the middle of a valley. Occupying this place with his piquets, he posted a small detachment at the windmill of Brilos, three miles in front, and retired the 14th to Roriça, a village six miles to the southward, situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Torres Vedras, Montechique, and Alcoentre, and overlooking the whole valley of Obidos. In this position he preserved his communication with Loison, but Peniché was thereby uncovered. Wherefore he sent the fourth Swiss regiment, with exception of the flank companies, to regarrison that important point. Three hundred men were also detached by him to the right by Bombarral, Cadaval, and Segura, to obtain intelligence of Loison. For that general, ascertaining, by a movement towards Thomar on the 11th, that the allies were in Leiria, had fallen back the same day to Torres Novas, and reached Santarem the 13th, and his exhausted troops were unable to renew their march before the 15th. Sir Arthur's first movement had thus cut the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, caused a loss of several forced marches to the former, and compelled the latter to risk an action with more than twice his own numbers.

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.


As the armies approached the Portuguese became alarmed; for, notwithstanding the language of their manifestos, and bombastic conversation, a conviction of French invincibility pervaded all ranks. The leaders, knowing their own deficiency, and incredulous of English courage, dreaded a battle, because defeat would render it hard to make terms, whereas, with five


or six thousand men in arms, they could secure a capitulation. The Oporto junta, already aiming at supreme authority, foresaw also, that even with victory, it would serve their particular views to have an army untouched and disconnected with a foreign general. Freire, well instructed in the secret designs of this party, resolved not to advance beyond Leiria, but as a mask demanded provisions from the English, choosing to forget the magazine he had just monopolized, and the bishop's formal promise to feed the British troops.

This extraordinary demand, that an auxiliary army just landed, should nourish the native soldiers instead of being itself fed by the people, was met by sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong remonstrance. He had penetrated Freire's secret motives, yet, feeling the importance of a Portuguese force acting in conjunction with his own, he first appealed to his honour and patriotism, admonishing him, that he would forfeit all pretension to either if he let the British fight without assistance. The appeal did not touch Bernardim, and he pretended a design to act independently by the line of the Tagus. Sir Arthur then changed from rebuke to conciliation, urging him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but keep behind the English and await the result. The advice was agreeable to Freire, and colonel Trant, a military agent, persuaded him to place fourteen hundred infantry, with two hundred and fifty cavalry, under the English general. This defection of the native force was, however, a serious evil. It shed an injurious moral influence, and deprived sir Arthur of troops whose means of gaining intelligence, and local knowledge, might have compensated for his want of cavalry. Nevertheless, continuing his march, the advanced guard entered Caldas the 15th, on which day Junot reluctantly quitted Lisbon, with a reserve composed of two thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and ten pieces of artillery: he also took with him his grand parc of ammunition, and a military chest, containing forty thousand pounds.

Travot remained at Lisbon with more than seven thousand men, including two battalions of stragglers and convalescents. Palmela, the Bugio fort, and the heights of Almada, absorbed two thousand of these, to cover  
Thiebault.







the shipping from the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who re-assembled under the Monteiro Mor at Setuval, when Kellerman retired. A thousand were placed in the ships of war to guard the powder, and the Spanish prisoners; two thousand four hundred were in the citadel; one thousand distributed in Belem, St. Julian's, Cascaes, and in Ericeia, a fort northward of the Rock of Lisbon, commanding a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra: finally, a thousand were at Santarem, to guard a large depôt of stores. Thus, if the garrisons of Elvas, Peniché, and Almeida be included, nearly one-half of the French army was rendered inactive; those in the field were separated, without any sure point of junction in advance, and yet each too weak singly to sustain an action. Junot seems to have reigned long enough in Portugal, to forget that he was merely the chief of an advanced corps whose safety depended upon activity and concentration. The reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from whence it was to march to Otta; but the rope ferry-boat of Saccavem being removed by the natives, it cost twenty-four hours to throw a bridge across the creek at that place; and the 17th, when the troops were on their march, Junot hastily recalled them to Villa Franca, because the English were said to have landed near the capital. This proving false, the reserve resumed the road to Otta under the command of general Thiebault, and Junot in person went to Alcoentre, where he found Loison, and assumed the personal direction of his division.

Sir Arthur was pressing Laborde. On the 15th he had attacked his post at Brilos, and drove his piquets from Obidos, but some companies of the 95th and 60th rifles had pursued for a distance of three miles, and being outflanked by a superior force, were only saved by an opportune advance of general Spencer: two officers and twenty-seven men killed and wounded in this skirmish gave a salutary check to rashness without abating confidence. Next day Laborde's position was recognised. The road passed through a valley, closed to the southward by some high table land, on which stood the village of Roriça, from whence the French overlooked the country as far as Obidos. The points of defence in front, and on the hills at each side, were occupied

Sir A. Wel-  
lesley's  
Despatch.

by small detachments, and one mile in rear, a very strong ridge, about three-quarters of a mile long and parallel to the French position, offered a second defensive line. The road led by a steep defile over this ridge, which was called the height of Zambugeira or Columbeira, and beyond it, lofty mountains, stretching from the sea-coast to the Tagus like a wall, filled all the space between that river and the ocean down to the Rock of Lisbon. The valley was bounded on the English left by a succession of ridges rising like steps, until they were lost in the great mass of the Sierra de Baragueda, itself a shoot from the Monte Junto.

Laborde's situation was embarrassing. Loison was at Alcoentre, the reserve at Villa Franca; that is, one and two marches distant from Roriça; hence, if he retired upon Torres Vedras, his communication with Loison would be lost; if he fell back on Montechique, he exposed the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra; to unite with Loison at Alcoentre was to open the shortest road to Lisbon; to remain at Roriça was to brave three times his own force. Nevertheless, encouraged by the local advantages of his position, and justly confident in his own talents, Laborde resolved to abide the assault, with a feeble hope that Loison might arrive during the action.

#### COMBAT OF RORIÇA.

Early in the morning of the 17th, thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty allied infantry, four hundred and seventy cavalry, and eighteen guns, issued from Obidos, and soon afterwards broke into three distinct columns of battle.

The left, commanded by general Ferguson, was composed of his own and Bowes's brigade of infantry, reinforced by two hundred and fifty riflemen, forty cavalry, and six guns, forming a total of four thousand nine hundred combatants. He marched by the crests of the hills adjoining the Sierra de Baragueda, being destined to turn the right flank of Laborde's position, and oppose the efforts of Loison, if that general, who was supposed to be at Rio Mayor, should appear during the action:

The right, under Trant, composed of a thousand Portuguese



infantry, and fifty horse of the same nation, moved by the village of St. Amias, with the intention of turning the left flank of the French.

The centre, nine thousand strong with twelve guns, commanded by sir Arthur in person, marched straight against the enemy by the village of Mahmed. It was composed of Hill's, Nightingale's, Catlin Crawford's, and Fane's brigades of British infantry, four hundred cavalry, two hundred and fifty of which were Portuguese, accompanied by four hundred light troops of the same nation. As this column advanced, Fane's brigade, extending to its left, drove back the French skirmishers and connected Ferguson with the centre. Meanwhile the latter approached the elevated plain upon which Laborde was posted, and Hill, moving on the right of the main road, supported by the cavalry and covered by the fire of his light troops, pushed forward rapidly to the attack; on his left Nightingale displayed a line of infantry preceded by the fire of nine guns; Crawford's brigade and all the remaining pieces of artillery, formed a reserve. Fane's riflemen now crowned the nearest hills on the right flank of the French, the Portuguese troops showed the head of a column beyond St. Amias on the enemy's left, and Ferguson was seen descending from the higher grounds in the rear of Fane: Laborde's position seemed desperate, but with the dexterity of a practised warrior he evaded the danger, and, covered by his cavalry, fell back to the heights of Zambugeira.

To dislodge him fresh dispositions were necessary. Trant continuing his march, was to turn his left; Ferguson and Fane united, were directed through the mountains to turn his right. Hill and Nightingale advanced against the front, which was of singular strength, and only to be approached by narrow paths winding through deep ravines. A swarm of skirmishers, starting forward, soon plunged into the passes, and spreading to the right and left, won their way among the rocks and tangled evergreens that overspread the steep ascent. With greater difficulty the supporting columns followed; their ranks were disordered in the confined and rugged passes, the hollows echoed with a continued roll of musketry, the shouts of the advancing soldiers were loudly answered by the enemy,

and the curling smoke, breaking out from the foliage on the side of the mountain, marked the progress of the assailants, and showed how stoutly the defence was maintained.

Anxiously watching for Loison, Laborde gradually slackened his hold on the left, yet elung tenaciously to the right, still hoping to be joined by that general, and the ardour of the 9th and 29th English regiments favoured this skilful conduct. It was intended, they should take the right-hand path of two leading up the same hollow, and thus have come in upon Laborde's flank in conjunction with Trant's column; but the left path led more directly to the enemy, the 29th followed it, the 9th was close behind, and both regiments advanced so vigorously as to reach the plain above before the lateral movements of Trant and Ferguson could shake the credit of the position. The right of the 29th arrived first at the top, under a heavy fire; ere it could form colonel Lake was killed, and some French companies, which had been cut off on the right, gallantly broke through the column, carrying with them a major and fifty or sixty other prisoners. The head of the regiment, thus pressed, fell back, but rallied on the left wing below the brow of the hill, and being joined by the 9th, whose colonel, Stewart, also fell in this bitter fight, the whole pushed forward again and regained the dangerous footing above.

Laborde, who brought every arm into action at the proper time and place, endeavoured to destroy these regiments before they could be succoured; he failed, yet gained time to rally his left wing upon his centre and right. Now the 5th regiment, following the right-hand path, arrived, the English were gathering thickly on the heights, and Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the centre, recovered the true line and was rapidly passing the French right. Laborde then retreated by alternate masses, protecting his movements with short vigorous charges of cavalry, and at Zambugeira attempted another stand; but the English bore on too heavily and he fell back disputing the ground to the Quinta de Bugaglieria. There he halted until his detachments on the side of Segura rejoined him, and then taking to the narrow pass of Runa marched all night to gain

the position of Montechique, leaving three guns on the field of battle and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors. The loss of the French was six hundred killed and wounded, among the latter Laborde himself. The British had two lieutenant-colonels and nearly five hundred men killed, taken, or wounded, and as not more than four thousand men were actually engaged, this fight was very honourable to both sides.

Thiebault.

Appendix,  
No. 19.

A little after four o'clock the firing ceased, and sir Arthur, hearing Loison's division was at Bombaral, only five miles distant, took a position for the night in an oblique line to that which he had just forced; his left rested upon a height near the field of battle, his right covered the road to Lourinham. Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected their junction at the Quinta de Bugagliera, and that both were retiring to Montechique, he resolved to march the next morning to Torres Vedras, by which he would have secured an entrance into the mountains. Before nightfall he heard that Anstruther's and Acland's divisions, accompanied by a large fleet of store ships, were off the coast, the dangerous nature of which rendered it necessary to provide for their safety by a quick disembarkation. This changed his plans, and he resolved to seek some convenient post, which being in advance of his present position would likewise enable him to cover the landing of these reinforcements: the vigour of Laborde's defence had also its influence; before an enemy so bold and skilful no precaution could be neglected with impunity.

Sir A. Wel-  
lesley's  
Evidence.  
Court of  
Inquiry.

## CHAPTER V.

WHILE the combat of Rorica was being fought, some Portuguese insurgents took Abrantes, and destroyed the German garrison. Junot felt a battle was inevitable, and when sir Arthur marched to Lourinham on the 18th, he quitted Cercal with Loison's division, crossed the line of Laborde's retreat, and reached Torres Vedras the evening of the same day. The 19th being joined by Laborde, and the 20th by his reserve, he re-organized his army and prepared for a decisive action. Sir Arthur had taken a position at Vimiero, a village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to cover the march of general Anstruther's brigade, which with great difficulty and some loss landed on the morning of the 19th on an open sandy beach called Paymayo. On the 20th the French cavalry scoured the country, carried off some women from the rear of the English camp, and hemmed the army round so closely that no information of Junot's position could be obtained. In the night Acland's brigade was disembarked at Maceira bay, whereby the army was increased to sixteen thousand fighting men with eighteen pieces of artillery, exclusive of Trant's Portuguese and of two British regiments under general Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus. Thus the principal mass of the English army was irrevocably engaged in the operations against Junot, while the ministers were still so intent upon Cadiz, that they had sent either Anstruther or Acland out with an appointment as governor of that city!

Estimating the French army at eighteen thousand men, sir Arthur judged that Junot could not bring more than fourteen thousand into the field; he designed, therefore, to strike the first blow, and follow it



up so as to prevent the enemy from rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. Before quitting the Mondogo he had given sir Harry Burrard notice of his intentions, advising him also to let sir J. Moore disembark in that river and march on Santarem, to protect the left of the army, block the line of the Tagus, and menace the French communication between Lisbon and Elvas. This movement he judged a safe one, because Junot would defend Lisbon against the coast army; and if he relinquished that capital to retreat to Almeida by Santarem, Moore could on that strong ground check him. Moreover, Valladeras had three thousand Spaniards at Guarda, and Freire was with five thousand at Leiria, and might support the British at Santarem.

From Vimicro to Torres Vedras was about nine miles. The French cavalry completely shrouded Junot's position, but it was known to be strong and difficult of approach, by reason of a long defile through which the army must penetrate in order to reach the crest of the mountain; there was however a road leading between the sea-coast and Torres Vedras, which turned the latter and opened a way to Mafra. Sir Arthur had an exact military survey of that road, and designed by a forced march on the 21st, to turn the position of Torres Vedras and gain Mafra with a strong advanced guard, while the main body, seizing some advantageous heights a few miles short of that town, would be in a position to intercept the French line of march to Montechique.


Sir A. Wellesley's  
Evidence.  
Court of  
Inquiry.

Hence the army was re-organized during the 20th in eight brigades of infantry and four squadrons of cavalry, and every preparation was made for the next day's enterprise; but at that critical period of the campaign, the ministerial arrangements which provided three commanders-in-chief begun to work. Sir Harry Burrard arrived in a frigate off the bay of Maceira, and sir Arthur, checked in the midst of his operations on the eve of a decisive battle, repaired on board to report the situation of affairs. He renewed his former recommendation relative to the disposal of sir John Moore's troops; but Burrard, having previously resolved to bring the latter down to Maceira, forbade any offensive movement until the

whole army should be concentrated: whereupon sir Arthur returned to his camp.

Although somewhat vaguely defined as a position the ground occupied by the army was strong. Vimiero, situated in a valley through which the little river of Maceira flows, contained the parc and commissariat stores; the cavalry and the Portuguese were on a small plain behind the village, in front of which was a rugged height with a flat top, commanding all the ground to the southward and eastward for a considerable distance. Upon this height Fane's and Anstruther's infantry, with six guns, were posted. Fane's left rested on a churchyard, blocking a road which led over the extremity of the height to Vimiero. Anstruther's troops were partly on Fane's right, partly in reserve. A mountain, commencing at the coast, swept in a half circle close behind the right of the Vimiero hill, and commanded, at rather long artillery range, all its upper surface. The first, second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades of infantry, with eight guns, occupied this mountain, which was terminated on the left by a deep ravine dividing it from another strong and narrow range of heights over which the road from Vimiero to Lourinham passed. The right of these last heights also overtopped the hill in front of Vimiero; but the left, bending suddenly backward after the form of a crook, returned to the coast and ended in a lofty cliff; there was no water upon this ridge, wherefore only the fortieth regiment and some piquets were placed there.

In the night of the 20th, about twelve o'clock, sir Arthur was aroused by a German officer of dragoons, who with some consternation reported that Junot, coming with twenty thousand men to attack, was distant but one hour's march. Undisturbed by this inflated report, he merely sent out patrols, warned the piquets to be alert, and before day-break had his troops, following the British custom, under arms. The sun rose and no enemy appeared; but at seven o'clock, a cloud of dust was observed beyond the nearest hills, and at eight an advanced guard of horse was seen to crown the heights to the southward, sending forward scouts on every side. Scarcely had this body been descried, when a force of







infantry, preceded by other cavalry, was discovered moving along the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham with a rapid pace, and threatening to turn the left of the British position. Column after column followed in order of battle. The French were evidently coming to fight, but the right wing of the British was not menaced by this movement, and the second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades were therefore directed to cross the valley behind the Vimiero height and take post where the fortieth regiment and the piquets stood. As they reached this ground, the second and third brigades were disposed in two lines perpendicular to the front shown by Fane and Anstruther, and the fourth and eighth were to have formed a third line, but ere the latter could reach the summit the battle had commenced. This flank movement was not seen by the enemy. A line of skirmishers, thrown out on the descent to the right, covered the flank of the two brigades, the cavalry was drawn up in the plain on the right of Vimiero, and the fifth brigade and Portuguese were detached to the returning ridge of the crook, thus covering the extreme left and rear of the position. Hill remained with the first brigade on the mountain which the others had quitted, furnishing a support to the centre and a reserve to the whole; yet the ground between the armies was so wooded and broken, that after the French had passed the ridge where they had been first desiried no correct view of their movements could be obtained; wherefore the British, being weak in cavalry, were forced to wait patiently until the columns of attack were close upon them.

Junot had quitted Torres Vedras the evening of the 20th, intending to fall on the English army at day-break, but the defile in his front retarded the march and fatigued the troops. He found the British order of battle presenting two faces of a triangle, the apex, formed by the height in front of Vimiero, well furnished; the left face seemingly naked, for the piquets only could be seen, and the march of the four brigades across the valley was hidden from him. Concluding the principal force to be in the centre, he resolved to form two connected attacks, the one against the apex, the other against the left, which he thought an accessible ridge: but a deep ravine, trenched as it were along the base, rendered it almost imper-

vious to an attack, except at the extremity, over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham passed. He had nearly fourteen thousand fighting men organized in four divisions. Three were of infantry, one of cavalry, there were twenty-three pieces of very small artillery, each division was composed of two brigades, and at ten o'clock they commenced the

#### BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

Thiebault. Laborde marched with one brigade against the  
Foy. centre, Brennier led another against the left, Loison followed at a short distance. Kellerman moved with a reserve of grenadiers behind Loison; the cavalry under Margaron, thirteen hundred, were, one part on the right of Brennier another in rear of the reserve; the artillery, distributed among the columns, opened its fire wherever the ground was favourable. Laborde's and Brennier's attacks were to have been simultaneous, but the latter, coming unexpectedly upon the ravine before mentioned as protecting the English left, got entangled among the rocks and water-courses; thus Laborde alone engaged Fane and Anstruther, and under a heavy and destructive fire of artillery which smote him front and flank; for the eighth brigade, then in the act of mounting the heights where the left was posted, seeing the advance of the French columns against the centre, halted, and opened a battery against their right.

Sir A. Wellesley's Despatch. Junot perceiving this break of combination, ordered Loison to support Laborde's attack with one brigade, and directed another under Solignac to turn the ravine in which Brennier was entangled, and so fall upon the left extremity of the English line; but Fane seeing Loison's advance, and having discretionary power over the reserve artillery, directed colonel Robe to bring it up, thus forming with the divisional guns a powerful battery. Loison and Laborde now formed one principal and two secondary columns of attack; of the latter, one advanced against Anstruther's brigade, the other endeavoured to penetrate by a road which passed between the ravine and a church on the extreme left of Fane. The main column under Laborde, preceded by a multitude of light troops, mounted the

face of the hill with great fury and loud cries, the English skirmishers were forced back upon the lines, and the French masses reached the summit, but shattered with the terrible fire of Robe's artillery, and breathless from their exertions. In this state, being first struck with musketry at the distance of half pistol shot, they were charged in front and flank by the fiftieth regiment, and overthrown.

Before this, the fifty-second and ninety-seventh regiments, of Anstruther's brigade, had repulsed the minor attack on that general's right, and he had detached the second battalion of the forty-third to the churchyard on Fane's left, where it was when Kellerman reinforcing its opponents with a column of grenadiers, sent them on at a running pace. Those choice soldiers beat back the advanced companies of the forty-third, but to avoid Robe's artillery which ransacked their left, they dipped a little into the ravine on the right, and were immediately taken on the other flank by the guns of the fourth and eighth brigades. Then, when the narrowness of the way and the sweep of the round shot was crushing and disordering the French ranks, the forty-third, rallying in one mass, went furiously down upon the very head of the column, and with a short but fierce struggle drove it back in confusion. In this fight the British regiment suffered severely, and so close was the combat, that Patrick, sergeant-armourer of the forty-third, and a French soldier, were found dead, still grasping their muskets with the bayonets driven through each body from breast to back!

Now the French fell back along the whole front, and colonel Taylor, riding out from the right of the central hill, led the few horsemen he commanded into the midst of the confused masses; scattering and sabreing them; but then Margaron, coming suddenly down to their support, slew Taylor and cut the half of his squadron to pieces, and Kellerman immediately threw his reserved grenadiers into a pine wood in advance to cover the retreat. All else was disorder. The woods and hollows were filled with wounded and straggling men, seven guns were lost, and the beaten masses retired towards the Lourinham road, in a direction nearly parallel to the British front, leaving the road from Vimiero to Torres Vedras open.

Sir Arthur forbade pursuit, partly because Kellerman's grenadiers still held the pine wood flanking the line of retreat, partly because Margaron's horsemen, riding stiffly between the two armies, were not to be lightly meddled with. In this state while Brennier was hampered in the ravine, Solignac, coming by the crest of the ridge above, encountered Ferguson's brigade, which closed the left of the English position. He expected to find a weak flank, but encountered a front of battle on a depth of three lines and protected by steep declivities on either side; a powerful artillery swept away his foremost ranks, and on his right, the fifth brigade and the Portuguese were seen marching by a distant ridge towards the Lourinham road, threatening his rear. Scarcely had he shown a front, when Ferguson, taking the lead vigorously attacked, and the ground widening as the British advanced, the regiments of the second line running up in succession constantly increased the front; then the French, falling fast under the fire, drew back fighting until they reached the farthest declivity of the ridge. Their cavalry made several vain efforts to check the advancing troops, but Solignac was carried from the field severely wounded, and his retiring division, outflanked on its left, was cut off from the line of retreat and thrown into the low ground about the village of Peranza, where six guns were captured. Ferguson, leaving the eighty-second and seventy-first regiments to guard those pieces, continued to press the disordered columns, but at this moment Brennier having at last cleared the ravine, came unexpectedly upon those two battalions and retook the artillery; his success was but momentary; the surprised troops rallied upon the higher ground, poured in a heavy fire of musketry, and returning to the charge with a shout, overthrew him and recovered the guns. Brennier himself was wounded and made prisoner, and Ferguson having completely separated the French brigades, would also have forced the greatest part of Solignac's to surrender, if an unexpected order had not obliged him to halt. The discomfited troops then re-formed under the protection of their cavalry with admirable quickness, and making an orderly retreat, were soon united to the broken brigades falling back from the attack on the centre.

Brennier being brought to sir Arthur Wellesley the moment



he was taken, eagerly demanded if Kellerman's reserve had yet charged; the English general quickly ascertained from the other prisoners that it had, and thus knew the enemy's attacks were exhausted, that no considerable body could be still hidden in the woods on his front and that the battle was won. Thirteen guns had been taken; the fourth and eighth brigades had suffered very little; the fifth and Portuguese brigades had not fired a shot; neither had the first, and it was now two miles nearer to Torres Vedras than any part of the French army, which was in great confusion. The relative numbers before the action were in favour of the English, that disparity was increased; a portion of the army had defeated the enemy when entire, a portion then could effectually follow up the victory; and as it was only twelve o'clock, sir Arthur resolved with the five brigades of the left wing to press Junot closely, hoping to drive him over the Sierra da Baragueda and force him upon the Tagus, while Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, seizing the defile of Torres Vedras, should push on to Montechique and cut him off from Lisbon.

If this decisive operation had been executed, Junot would probably have lost all his artillery and several thousand stragglers. Then buffeted and turned at every point, he would have been glad to seek safety under the guns of Almeida or Elvas; and he could not have accomplished that if Moore's troops had been landed in the Mondego. But sir Harry Burrard, who was present during the action, though partly from delicacy and partly from approving sir Arthur's arrangements he had not hitherto interfered, now assumed the chief command. From him the order arresting Ferguson's victorious career had emanated, and further offensive operations were forbidden, for he had resolved to wait in the position of Vimiero until the arrival of sir John Moore. The adjutant-general Clinton, and colonel George Murray the quarter-master-general, supported sir Harry's views, and sir Arthur's earnest representations could not alter their determination.

Burrard's decision was certainly erroneous, yet error is common in an art which at best is but a choice of difficulties. The circumstances of the moment were imposing enough to sway most generals. The

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.

French had failed in the attacks, yet rallied with surprising quickness under the protection of a strong and gallant cavalry. Sir Harry knew that the artillery carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service, the draft horses few and bad, the commissariat parc in the greatest confusion, and the hired Portuguese carmen making off with their carriages in all directions. The English cavalry was totally destroyed, and Spencer had discovered a line of fresh troops on the ridge behind that occupied by the French army. Weighing all these things in his mind with the caution natural to age, Burrard refused to hazard the fortune of the day upon what he deemed a perilous throw; and Junot, who had displayed all that reckless courage to which he originally owed his elevation, was enabled by this unexpected cessation of the battle to re-form his broken army. Twelve hundred fresh men joined him at the close of the contest, and then, covered by his cavalry, he retreated with order and celerity until he regained the command of the pass of Torres Vedras, and at dark the relative position of the two armies was the same as on the evening before.

One general, thirteen guns, and several hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors, and the total loss of the French was estimated at three thousand men; an exaggeration no doubt, yet it was certainly above two thousand, for their closed columns were exposed for more than half an hour to sweeping discharges of grape and musketry, and the dead lay thickly together. Thiebault reduces the number to eighteen hundred, and says the whole French army did not much exceed twelve thousand men; from which he deducts nearly three thousand for sick, stragglers, and those other petty drains which torment a general-in-chief. But this army was composed of men selected and organized in Thiebault. provisional battalions expressly for the occasion; one-half had only been in the field for a fortnight, all had two days' rest at Torres Vedras, it is therefore evident the absentees bear too great a proportion to the combatants. A French order of battle found upon the field gave a total of fourteen thousand men present under arms, of which thirteen hundred were cavalry; and this amount agrees too closely

with other estimates, and with the observations made at the time, to leave any reasonable doubt of its authenticity or correctness.

Sir Harry Burrard's control was soon over. Early on the morning of the 22nd, sir Hew Dalrymple disembarked and assumed the chief command. Thus in the short space of twenty-four hours, during which a battle was fought, the army fell successively into the hands of three men, coming from the ocean with different views, habits, and information, and without any previous opportunity of communing even by letter: and they were brought together at a moment when it was more than probable they must all disagree. For when sir Hew was appointed to the command, sir Arthur was privately recommended to him by the minister, as a person to be employed with more than usual confidence; and this unequivocal hint was backed with such an overbearing force by the previous reputation and recent exploits of the latter, that it could not fail to produce some want of cordiality. Sir Arthur could not do otherwise than take the lead in discussing affairs of which he had more than laid the foundation, and sir Hew would have forfeited all claims to independence in his command, if he had not exercised the right of judging for himself between the conflicting opinions of his predecessors.

After receiving information upon the most important points, and taking a hasty view of the situation of the army,—although the wounded were still upon the ground, and the wains of the commissariat employed to remove them,—sir Hew directed an advance on the 23rd. But, with Burrard, he thought the matter perilous, requiring the concentration of all the troops and means, wherefore he persisted in bringing sir John Moore down to Maceira. Sir Arthur opposed this. The provisions on shore would not, he said, supply more than eight or nine days' consumption for the troops already at Vimiero; the country could furnish no assistance; and the fleet was a precarious resource, because the first of the gales common at that season of the year, would certainly send it from the coast, if it did not destroy a great portion of it. Sir Hew however thought the separation of the troops more

Sir H. Dalrymple's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

dangerous than the chance of distress from such events, and his position was embarrassing. The bishop of Oporto had failed in his promise of assisting the troops with draft cattle,—as indeed he did in all his promises—the artillery and commissariat were ill supplied with mules and horses; the cavalry was a nullity; and the enemy, with exception of his actual loss in killed and wounded, had suffered nothing from a defeat which did not deprive him of a single position necessary to his defence.

While weighing this state of affairs, he was informed that Kellerman, bearing a flag of truce and escorted by a strong body of cavalry, was at the outposts to demand a conference. This was very unexpected; but Junot after regaining Torres Vedras had occupied Mafra, and was preparing to fight again when he received intelligence that Lisbon was on the point of insurrection, whereupon he hastily sent a false account of the action to that city, together with a reinforcement for the garrison, and then consulted his generals as to further measures. It is an old and sound remark that ‘a council of war never fights,’ and Kellerman’s mission was the result of the above consultation. He demanded a cessation of arms, and proposed the basis of a convention to evacuate Portugal. Nothing could be more opportune, and sir Hew readily accepted the proposal. He knew, from an intercepted plan of operations sketched by the chief of the French engineers colonel Vincent, that Junot possessed several strong positions in front of Lisbon; that a final retreat upon Almeida, or across the river upon Elvas, was considered a matter of course and easy of execution. Hence the proposed convention was an unexpected advantage offered in a moment of difficulty: the only subject of consideration was the nature of the articles proposed by Kellerman. Sir Hew, necessarily ignorant of many details, had recourse to sir A. Wellesley, who, taking an enlarged view of the question, coincided as to the policy of a convention, by which a strong French army would be quietly got out of a country it had complete military possession of, a great moral effect in favour of the general cause produced, and an actual gain made of men and time for the further prosecution of the war in Spain. He observed

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.



— 1°. That a kingdom would be liberated with its fortresses and arsenals, and the excited population of the Peninsula might then be pushed forward in the career of opposition to France under the most favourable circumstances. 2°. The Spanish army of Estremadura, containing the most efficient body of cavalry in the Peninsula, could be reinforced by four or five thousand Spanish soldiers who were prisoners on board the vessels in the Tagus; it could then unite with the other patriot armies, when every addition of force must increase the confidence and forward the impulse which the victory of Baylen and the flight of Joseph had given to the Spaniards. 3°. The sacrifice of lives to be expected in carrying the French positions in Portugal, all the difficulties of reducing the fortresses, and the danger of losing a communication with the fleet, would be avoided by this measure, the result of which would be complete as the most sanguine could expect from the long course of uncertain, unhealthy operations, which must follow a rejection.

Proceedings  
of the Court  
Inquiry.

But while admitting the utility of the measure itself, he differed as to the mode of proceeding, and a long discussion, in which Burrard took a part, followed the opening of Kellerman's mission. Sir Arthur's first objection was, that in regard of form Kellerman was only entitled to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. Sir Hew argued, that the policy and utility of the convention being recognised, it would be unwise to drive the French to the wall on a point of ceremony, and therefore accepted the proposition. The basis of a definitive treaty was then arranged, yet subject to the final approbation of sir Charles Cotton, without whose concurrence it was not to be binding.

The first four articles declared the fact of the armistice, the mode of proceeding, the line of demarcation, the positions of the two armies, including that of the Portuguese troops under Freire. The fifth, declared the French were not to be prisoners of war; their persons and property, public or private, were without any detainer to be transported to France. Sir Arthur objected to this article, as affording cover for the abstraction of Portuguese property; but Kellerman said it was

to be taken in the fair sense of property justly obtained, and upon that assurance it was admitted.

Article 6th, guaranteed from political persecution all French residents, all subjects of powers in alliance with France, all Portuguese who had served the invaders or become obnoxious for their attachment to them.

Article 7th, stipulated for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon, as far as the Russian fleet was concerned. At first Kellerman proposed to have the Russian fleet guaranteed from capture with leave to return to the Baltic, but this was peremptorily refused. Indeed, the French negotiator's only object was to entangle the Russians in the French negotiation, that the former might, if the armistice should be broken, be forced into a co-operation.

Sir Arthur strenuously opposed this article. He argued, that the interests of the two nations were not blended. They stood in different relations towards the British army, and it was an important object to keep them separate, as the French general would, if pressed, leave the Russians to their fate. The British operations had not been so rapid and decisive as to enable them to capture the fleet before the question of neutrality could be agitated; the right of the Russians to such protection was therefore undoubted, and it was desirable to admit it; because, independent of the chances of their final capture, they would be prevented from returning to the Baltic which in fact constituted their only point of interest when disengaged from the French: viewed as allies of the latter they became of great weight. Finally, it was an affair concerning the Portuguese, Russians, and British, the French had no right to interfere. Sir Hew finding the discussion of this question tedious, and considering sir Charles Cotton alone could finally decide, admitted the article as a form, without acquiescing in its propriety.

Article 8th provided, that guns of French calibre, and the horses of the cavalry, were to be transported to France.

Article 9th stipulated, that forty-eight hours' notice should be given of a rupture.

This sir Arthur opposed. He considered it unnecessary for the interests of the British army, favourable to the French; if

hostilities recommenced, the latter would have forty-eight hours to make arrangements for their defence, for the passage of the Tagus, for the co-operation of the Russian fleet. Sir Hew thought it was an absolute advantage to gain time for the preparations of the British army, and for the arrival of sir John Moore.

An additional article provided, that all the fortresses held by the French, which had not capitulated before the 25th of August, should be given up to the British. The basis of a convention being thus arranged, Kellerman returned to his chief, and colonel Murray carried the proposed articles to the English admiral.

Previous to landing, sir Hew had received none of the letters addressed to him by sir Arthur Wellesley, had met no person, during his voyage, from whom he could obtain authentic information; and being at first occupied by the negotiations with Kellerman was uninformed of many details of importance. Thus he was totally ignorant of the existence of Bernardim Freire Andrada and his Portuguese army; and was greatly surprised to receive a visit and formal remonstrance against the convention from that functionary, the day after Kellerman's departure. It was difficult to manage this interview with propriety, because Andrada had plausible objections; but his remonstrances were merely the commencement of an intrigue to be explained hereafter.

When the articles were shown to sir Charles Cotton he refused to concur, declaring he would conduct a separate treaty for the Russian ships. With this answer Murray returned on the 24th, having first, in reply to a question put by the French officer who accompanied him on board the *Hibernia*, declared, that nothing had passed between him and the admiral which ought to preclude further negotiation. Sir Hew was now urged by sir Arthur to give notice without further explanation, that hostilities would recommence, leaving it to Junot to renew propositions, if he chose to do so separately from the Russians. Sir Hew, however, felt bound in honour by Murray's observation to the French officer, not to take the advantage. He likewise felt disinclined to relinquish a negotiation, which, from certain circumstances, he deemed upon the point of being crowned with

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.

success. He therefore despatched Murray to Lisbon, to inform Junot of the admiral's objection, and give notice of the consequent rupture of the armistice. Colonel Murray was moreover empowered to enter into and conclude a definitive treaty

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.

upon a fresh basis, and meanwhile the whole army was pushed forward to Ramalhal. Sir John Moore's troops had landed at Maceira Bay, yet the order to repair there did not reach them until several regiments had been disembarked in the Mondego, and the re-shipping of these, together with contrary winds, caused a delay of four days. At Maceira also, great difficulty and some loss was sustained in getting on shore, an operation only effected by five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy; the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and not more than thirty remained fit for service at the conclusion.

On the 27th, information was received from Murray that a fresh treaty was in agitation upon an admissible basis, and next day, the 28th, the army took a new position at Torres Vedras. During these events Lisbon was vehemently agitated. Hope and fear were magnified by the obscurity of affairs, and the contradictory news spread by the French and by the Portuguese excited joy or grief almost to frenzy. Junot made every effort to engage Siniavin in the negotiation, and the latter, necessarily forced to put his ships in a guarded attitude, contributed powerfully to control the populace, and give strength to an opinion industriously spread, that he would make common cause with the French. Nevertheless he gave early notice that he would treat separately, and the French being thus left to themselves, brought all the machinery of their diplomatic subtlety into play, with a view to amend their position. Thus among other schemes, Junot opened a separate communication with sir Hew Dalrymple, when Murray, invested with full powers, was engaged in daily conferences with Kellerman; and the difficulty of coming to a conclusion, was increased by the suspicion and jealousy incident to such a singular transaction, where two foreign nations were seen bargaining, one of them honestly, for the goods and interests of a third, yet scarcely hinting even at the existence of the latter. The French being the weakest were most subtle, and to protect vital questions



advanced extravagant claims. The Portuguese leaders, no longer fearing a defeat, protested against the convention, passed the line of demarcation, fired on the French patrols and menaced Lisbon from the side of Santarem. This movement and the attack on the patrols were promptly disavowed by sir Hew; yet they kept suspicion awake, and the misunderstandings arose at last to such a height, that Junot, seeming for a moment to recover his natural energy, threatened to burn the public establishments and make his retreat good at the expense of the city: a menace which nothing could prevent him from executing. However a definitive treaty was finally concluded at Lisbon on the 30th, and soon afterwards ratified in form.

This celebrated convention, improperly called of Cintra, consisted of twenty-two original and three supplementary articles, upon the expediency of many of which sir Arthur Wellesley and the commander-in-chief disagreed; but as their disagreement had reference to details, not the general principle, the historical importance is null. An informality on the part of Junot caused some delay in the ratification of the instrument, yet the British army marched to take the position near Lisbon, assigned to it by the 11th article. On the road, sir Hew met two Russian officers, charged to open a separate negotiation for the Russian squadron, but he refused to receive their credentials, and referred them to sir Charles Cotton. Thus baffled in an attempt to carry on a double treaty, for a naval one was already commenced, Siniavin, whose conduct appears to have been weak, was forced to come to a conclusion with the English admiral. At first he claimed the protection of a neutral port, but singly he possessed none of that weight which circumstances had given him before the convention. He was answered, that the British flag waved on the forts at the mouth of the Tagus; and this was true, for the third and forty-second regiments, under general Beresford, having taken possession of them in virtue of the convention, had improperly hoisted the British colours. Foiled by this proceeding, the justice of which is somewhat doubtful, Siniavin agreed to surrender upon the following terms.

1°. The Russian ships, with their sails, stores, &c., were to

be held by England, as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a peace between the two governments of the contracting parties.

2°. The admiral, officers, and seamen, without any restriction as to their future services, were to be transported to Russia at the expense of the British government.

Two additional articles were, subsequently to the ratification of the original treaty, proposed by the Russians and assented to by the English admiral. The first stipulated that the imperial flag should be displayed even in the British harbours, as long as the Russian admiral remained on board. The second provided that the ships and their stores should be delivered at the appointed time in the same state as when surrendered.

The rights of the Portuguese were not referred to, but sir Charles Cotton was justified in that point

Parl. Pap.  
1809.

by his instructions, which authorized him to make prize of the Russian fleet. Siniavin thus suffered all the inconvenience of hostilities and the shame of striking his colours, without having violated in any manner the relations of amity in which his nation stood with regard to Portugal. On the other hand, for the sake of a few old and decaying ships, the British ministers made an injudicious display of contempt for the independence of their ally,—for with singular inconsistency, they permitted the officers and crews, the real strength of the squadron, to return to the Baltic, although scarcely a year had elapsed, since the national character had

Parl. Pap.  
1809.

Admiralty  
Instruc-  
tions to sir  
C. Cotton,  
16th April,  
1808.

Ibid.

Mr. Welles-  
ley Pole to  
sir C. Cotton,  
17th Sept.  
1808.

been defiled in that quarter to suppress a navy inimical to Great Britain. This inconsistency belonged wholly to the ministers; for the two original articles of the treaty only were confirmed by them, and they were copied from the Admiralty instructions delivered to sir Charles Cotton four months previous to the transaction. Yet that officer, by the very men who had framed those instructions, was with matchless effrontery rebuked for having adopted a new principle of maritime surrender!

On the 2nd of September head quarters were established at Oyeras, the right of the army occupied the forts at the mouth

of the river, the left rested on the heights of Bellas. The French concentrated in Lisbon with piquets and guards as if in front of the enemy, and at night the sentries fired upon whoever approached their posts; the police disbanded of their own accord, and the city became a scene of turbulence, anarchy and crime. Notwithstanding the presence of their enemies, the inhabitants testified their joy and evinced their vengeful feelings in a remarkable manner. They refused to sell any provisions, or to deal in any manner with the French; they sung songs of triumph in their hearing, and in their sight fabricated thousands of small lamps for the avowed purpose of illuminating the streets at their departure; the doors of many houses occupied by the troops were marked in one night; men were observed bearing in their hats lists of Portuguese or Frenchmen designed for slaughter, and the quarters of Loison were threatened with a serious attack. Yet amidst all this disorder and violence, general Travot and some others of the French army, fearlessly and safely traversed the streets, unguarded save by the reputation of their just and liberal conduct when in power, a fact extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive of Loison's misconduct. Junot himself was menaced by an assassin, but he treated the affair with magnanimity, and in general he was respected although in a far less degree than Travot.

Thiebault.

Ibid.

Dread of an explosion, which would compromise at once the safety of his army and the city, induced the French general to hasten the period when an English division was to occupy the citadel and take charge of the public tranquillity. Meanwhile emissaries from the junta of Oporto fomented the disposition of the populace to commit themselves by an attack upon the French; the convention was reprobated, and endeavours were fruitlessly made to turn the tide of indignation even against the English as abettors of the invaders. The judge of the people, an energetic but turbulent fellow, issued an inflammatory address, in which, calling for a suspension of the treaty, he designated the French as robbers and insulters of religion. The Monteiro Mor, heading a rabble dignified with the title of an army, took possession of the south bank

of the Tagus, and issued a protest against the convention, the execution of which he had the audacity to call upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt, but the latter sent his communications to sir Hew Dalrymple, who treated them with the contemptuous indignation they merited. In the midst of this confusion and intrigue, sir John Hope, appointed English commandant of Lisbon, took possession of Belem castle the 10th, and of the citadel the 12th, and by his firm and vigorous conduct abated the public effervescence, and repressed the disorders, which were great and gave facility for the commission of any villany. Junot embarked the 13th. The first division of his army sailed the 15th; it was followed by the second and third divisions, and on the 30th, all the French, except the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida, were out of Portugal.

Much trouble and contestation had attended the execution of the convention. Lord Proby, the English commissioner, was joined by Beresford on the 5th; but their united labours were scarcely sufficient to accomplish a task, in the prosecution of which disputes hourly arose. Anger, the cupidity of individuals, and opportunity, combined to push the French beyond the bounds of decency; several gross attempts were made to appropriate property which no interpretation of the stipulations could sustain; the most odious being the abstraction of manuscripts and rare specimens of natural history from the national museum, and the invasion of the *deposito publico*, or funds of money awaiting legal decision for their final appropriation. Those dishonest attempts were checked with a strong hand, and at last, a committee representing the three nations was appointed by the commissioners on both sides. Their office was to investigate complaints, and do justice by seizing upon all contraband baggage embarked by the French; a measure attended with excellent effect. It must however be observed, that the loud complaints and violence of the Portuguese, and the machinations of the bishop of Oporto, seem to have excited the suspicions of the British and influenced them more than the real facts warranted: the national character of the Portuguese was not then understood, nor the extent to which they fabricated falsehoods generally known.

Party writers have not been wanting since to exaggerate



the grounds of complaint. The English have imputed fraud and evasions of the most dishonourable kind to the French; the latter have retorted by accusations of gratuitous insult and breach of faith, inasmuch as their soldiers, when on board the British ships, were treated with cruelty in order to induce them to desert. It cannot be affirmed that all the error was on one side, yet it appears consonant to justice that as the French were originally aggressors and acting for their own interest, while the British interfered only for the protection of the Portuguese, indecorous zeal on the part of the latter was more excusable than in their opponents. The British commissioners acquitted Junot of any personal impropriety; and his public orders, denouncing severe punishments for such malpractices, corroborated this testimony; yet Kellerman, in his communications with sir Hew, did not scruple to insinuate matters to the duke's disadvantage. The British commander's personal good faith and scrupulous adherence to justice, have however never been called in question.

Sir H. Dalrymple's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

To define the rights of each side, it is proper that the original rights of the French should be separated from those acquired under the convention. Much of the clamour against the authors of the treaty sprung from confounding those essentially distinct points. Conquest being the sole foundation of the first, defeat if complete extinguished them; if incomplete, nullified a part only. Junot was not entirely conquered, and had lost none of his rights of conquest, but agreed to exchange an insecure tenure of the whole for the secure tenure of a part. With respect to the latter, restitution of plunder made anterior to the convention was out of the question. If officially made, it was part of the rights of conquest bargained for by the convention; if the produce of private rapacity, to what tribunal could the innumerable claims for restitution, which would follow such an article, be referred? The terms of the convention were the rights of each party; there were no other. If an army surrenders at discretion, the victors may say with Brennus, Woe to the vanquished, but a convention implies some weakness and must be weighed in the scales of prudence, not those of justice.

## CHAPTER VI.

BERNARDIM FREIRE's interview with sir H. Dalrymple at Vimiero has been noticed as the commencement of an intrigue. He opposed the armistice then, ostensibly on general grounds, but really, as sir Hew thought, because the bishop and junta of Oporto were not named in the instrument; and he left one Ayres Pinto de Souza to protect Portuguese interests. Souza was soon apprised that a definitive convention was being negotiated, and he and Freire were invited to state their views. Neither of them replied, but when the treaty was concluded they clamoured loudly. The British, who were only auxiliaries, they said, were treating with the French for Portuguese interests, and had concluded a convention which protected the enemy from the punishments due to rapine and cruelty. It was more favourable than the relative strength of the parties warranted; no notice was taken of the Portuguese government, nor of the native army in the Alemtejo; men obnoxious to the nation for aiding the invaders, were screened from vengeance; and the fortresses were bargained for as if they appertained to the English army, which would give jealousy to Spain as well as Portugal, would injure the general cause, and enable French emissaries to create disunion. They dwelt also upon the importance of the native forces, the strength of the insurrection, and insinuated that separate operations were likely to be carried on notwithstanding the treaty.

Noble words often cover pitiful deeds. This remonstrance, apparently springing from the feelings of a patriot whose heart was ulcerated by the wrongs of his country, was but a cloak for miserable interested intrigues. The bishop of Oporto, a meddling ambitious priest, had early conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the insurrectional authorities, and transferring the seat of government from Lisbon to

Oporto. He expected great opposition, and thought by inveigling the English commanders to countenance his pretensions, he might, with the aid of Freire's force and his own influence, succeed. With this view he wrote to sir Charles Cotton, the 4th of August, in which was enclosed, as his letter described it, 'The form of government with which they, the junta of Oporto, meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisbon should be free from the French.' This missive and its enclosure were by sir Arthur placed with other public documents in the hands of sir Hew when the latter first landed at Maceira. The document itself declared that 'The body of government had taken the glorious resolution of restoring the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent, and of recovering the crown of Portugal for its lawful sovereign, Juan VI., their prince.' But this glorious resolution was burdened with many forms and restrictions; and, although the junta professed an intention to re-establish a regency, they declared, 'that if this new regency should be interrupted by a new invasion of the French, or by *any other thing*, the junta would immediately take the government on itself, and exercise the authority and jurisdiction which it had done ever since its institution.'

Thus prepared for some cabal, sir Hew replied to Freire's remonstrance, 'That if the government of Portugal had not been mentioned in the treaty, neither had that of England, nor that of France,—the convention was purely military, and for the present concerned only the commanders in the field. With regard to the fortresses, and to the British army being an auxiliary force, the first was a measure of military precaution, and the latter in no way rendered doubtful by any act which had been committed. He was instructed by his government to aid in restoring the prince regent of Portugal to his lawful rights without secret or interested motives; the Portuguese general had been invited to assist in the negotiations, and if he had not done so, the blame rested with himself.' To this might have been justly added, that Freire by withdrawing his troops at the most critical moment of the campaign, had dis-entitled himself to assume a high tone towards those he had so disgracefully deserted in the hour of danger. He was silenced by this answer; but the English general was soon

taught that the bishop and his coadjutors, however incapable of great affairs, were subtle plotters.

In his first interview with Bernardim, sir Hew had said, 'no government lawfully representing the prince regent existed in Portugal.' This was true, for an independent junta was likewise established in Algarvé; and the regency, invested by the prince with supreme authority, was dispersed and partly in the power of Junot. This observation, so adverse to the prelate's views, was transmitted to him by Freire, together with a copy of the armistice; and the bishop knew that document had been rendered null by sir C. Cotton, and a definitive convention differing materially from it, was being concluded; but keeping silent on that matter, he forwarded a copy of the armistice to Da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, accompanied with invectives and misrepresentations. Souza placed the copy and the bishop's letter before the secretary of state, Mr. Canning, and delivered an official note, in which, adopting the ideas of the prelate and junta, he spoke of them as the representatives of his sovereign, and the supreme power in Portugal. But the intriguing efforts of the party were not confined to formal communications with the ministers. The daily press teemed with invectives against the English general, and ex-parte statements, founded on the provisions of an armistice never concluded, were palmed upon a public always hasty in judging of such matters; thus a prejudice against the convention was raised before either the terms or the events which led to it, were known. For sir Hew had neglected to transmit information to his government until fifteen days after the commencement of the treaty, and the ministers, unable to contradict or explain any of Souza's assertions, were placed in a mortifying situation which disposed them to take a discontented view of the real treaty. The bishop pretended to know nothing of the convention, hence the silence of Freire during the negotiation; but once concluded, a clamour was raised in Portugal similar to that excited in England, and both nations appeared to be equally indignant at the conduct of the general when in fact his proceedings were unknown to either.

There were other than Portuguese coadjutors. The baron Von Decken, a Hanoverian officer employed as a military



agent at Oporto, was subject to sir Hew Dalrymple's orders; but he was also to communicate directly with the secretary of state in England. He arrived at Oporto the 17th August, and the same evening, in concert with the bishop, concocted a project admirably adapted to forward the views of the latter. They agreed that the prelate was the fittest head of the government, and as he could not, he said, quit Oporto, that the seat of government ought to be transferred to that city. Two obstacles to this arrangement were foreseen. 1°. The prince regent had nominated a regency, and left full instructions for the filling up of vacancies arising from death or other causes. 2°. The people of Lisbon and the southern provinces would certainly resist any change in the seat of government. To obviate these difficulties, Von Decken wrote largely in commendation of the proposed arrangement, villifying the conduct of the regency, and urging sir Hew to sanction the ambitious project, and employ the British troops to control the people of Lisbon should they oppose the bishop's plans. To conciliate the members of the regency it was proposed to admit some in the new government, and Francisco Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal Castro, were named as the only men faithful to their sovereign. The last had been minister of worship under the French, and was therefore unfaithful; but he was half-brother to the bishop, Castro being legitimately born. Under pretext of sparing the feelings of the people of Lisbon, it was farther proposed, to appoint a Portuguese commandant subject to the British governor, yet with a native force under his orders to conduct all matters of police; and the bishop took the occasion to recommend a particular general for that office.

Appendix,  
No. 11.

Civil dissension and all its evils were foretold as the certain consequences of rejecting this plan; but sir Hew's answer was peremptory and decisive. He reprimanded Von Decken, and put an end to the bishop's hopes of support from the British army. This second repulse completed the mortification of the prelate and his junta, and they set no bounds to their violence. Efforts were made to stimulate the populace of Lisbon to attack both French and English, in the hope that the terrible scene would eventually prevent the re-establish-

ment of the old regency, and render the transfer of government to Oporto an easy task. Hence the outrageous conduct of the Monteiro Mor and of the judge of the people, and the former's insolent letter calling upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention. The people at large, however, took little interest in these factions, for on the 3rd of September, sir Hew received instructions from home, relative to the formation of a new regency, entirely at variance with the plan arranged between the bishop and Von Decken, and no difficulty attended the execution. But here, as in the case of the Sicilian prince, we are arrested by the singularity of the transaction. General Charles Stewart, brother of lord Castlereagh, was the bearer of Von Decken's first letter; he would not knowingly have lent himself to an intrigue subversive of his brother's views as explained in the official instructions sent to sir Hew; neither is it likely Von Decken should plunge into such a delicate and important affair in one hour after his arrival at Oporto, if he had not been secretly authorized by some member of the English cabinet. Are we then to seek for a clue to these mysteries, in that shameful Machiavelian policy which soon afterwards forced lord Castlereagh to defend his public measures by a duel?

The usual fate of plans laid by men more cunning than wise, attended the bishop of Oporto's projects; for a moment he rendered the convention of Cintra odious to the Portuguese, but that people soon acknowledged with gratitude the real services of the English army, and exulted in a treaty which freed their country from the invaders. Well might they exult to see twenty-five thousand bold and skilful soldiers, reluctantly quitting the strongholds of the kingdom, and maintaining the haughty air of an army capable on the slightest provocation, of again seeking the decision of battle. The Portuguese people were contented, but the Spanish general Galluzzo appears to have favoured the views of the Oporto faction. Detachments of his troops, and of Portuguese refugees, principally from the northern provinces and commanded by a Spaniard, were acting in conjunction with the insurgents of the Alentejo, but disputes arose between the two nations; for the Spaniards treating Portugal as a conquered

country, denied the authority of general Leite, who was not of the bishop's party, and insulted him personally: they even seized his military chest at Campo Mayor, and in all things acted with the utmost violence and rapacity.

Appendix,  
No. 12.

Galluzzo himself was required by his own government to join the Spanish armies concentrating on the Ebro. Instead of obeying, he collected his forces near Elvas, and when he heard of the convention invested Lalippe and denied its validity as affecting that fort. Girod de Novillard commanded the French garrison, and he had compelled the inhabitants of Elvas to shut their gates against the Spaniards and supply him daily with provisions; Galluzzo's proceedings were therefore manifestly absurd, and his attacks were confined to a trifling bombardment, the utmost damage sustained being the knocking away the cornices and chimneys of the governor's house, the only part not protected by bomb proofs of the finest masonry.

Lord Burghersh, appointed to communicate with the Spanish troops in Portugal, gave Galluzzo, early in September, a copy of the convention, and told him the troops of his nation, confined on board the hulks at Lisbon, were by that treaty released, and would be clothed, armed, and sent to Catalonia. Sir Hew also wrote to him on the 5th of September, repeating this intelligence, and requesting him to withdraw his men from the Alemtejo where they were living at the expense of the people. Galluzzo took no notice of either communication. Pretending he had opened his fire against Lalippe before the date of the convention, and no third party had a right to interfere, he would grant no terms to the garrison, nor permit any but Portuguese to enter the fort. Yet at this moment the Spanish armies on the Ebro were languishing for cavalry which he alone possessed; and Girod, despising his efforts, avowed an intention, if the fate of the French army at Lisbon should render such a step advisable, to blow up the works and march openly through the midst of Galluzzo's troops.

Colonel Ross was finally detached with the 20th regiment to receive the fort from Girod, and to escort the garrison to Lisbon under the terms of the convention. He sent a flag of truce by major Colborne, who was also furnished with an

autograph letter from Kellerman, and was received with civility. Girod would not, however, yield his post without more complete proof of the authenticity of the treaty, and proposed to send a French officer to Lisbon. He did not affect to disbelieve Colborne's information, but he would not surrender while a doubt capable of being removed was attached to the transaction; and so acting, he did well and like a good soldier. General D'Arcy, commanding the Spanish investing force, granted a truce of six days for the journey of the officers appointed to go to Lisbon; yet on their return it was not without great difficulty and delay they were permitted to communicate with Girod; and no argument could prevail upon Galluzzo to relinquish the siege. Wherefore, after a warm correspondence, sir Hew ordered Hope to advance with a considerable body of troops, and if pushed to extremity, to force the Spaniard to desist.

Galluzzo's conduct was preposterous. He put aside the convention by which his nation profited, he insulted and injured the Portuguese who desired his absence, and he set at naught his own government. For he pretended to act under the junta of Seville, and an accredited agent of that junta, Laguna, was then at Lisbon receiving the Spanish soldiers liberated by that convention which he rejected, receiving also money and arms and British vessels to carry them to Catalonia. One more peaceable effort was made to persuade Galluzzo, and avoid violent measures productive of mischief. Colonel Graham repaired upon the 25th of September to Badajos, and his arguments backed by the approach of the powerful division under Hope, were finally successful; Girod evacuated the forts, and his garrison proceeded to Lisbon escorted by the 52nd regiment. The French and British troops agreed very well together, striving only in the vigour and military order of their marches; but the Swiss and French soldiers did not accord, and many of the latter wished to desert. At Lisbon the whole were

Appendix  
to Colonel  
De Bosset's  
Parga, p. 134.

embarked, and the transports being detained for some time, major de Bosset, an officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, persuaded a thousand to desert, who were afterwards received into the



British service. Girod complained of this as a breach of faith, and it was an equivocal act, yet one common to all armies, and if done simply by persuasion, excusable.

Almeida now surrendered, and the French marched to Oporto, and were going to embark, when the populace would have slain them if great exertions had not been made by the British officers to prevent that detestable cruelty; the English escort was weak, yet resolute to sustain its honour, and would have fired upon the multitude if the circumstances had become desperate. Nevertheless, several French soldiers were assassinated, and in spite of opposition their baggage was landed and pillaged, the excuse being, that church plate was to be found amongst it, an accusation easily made, difficult to be disproved to the satisfaction of a violent mob, and likely enough to be true. This tumult shows with what facility men adapt themselves to circumstances, and regulate their most furious passions by the scale of self-interest. In Oporto the suffering from the invasion was trifling, compared to the misery endured at Lisbon, yet the inhabitants of the former were much more outrageous. In Lisbon the persons who had inflicted the worst evils upon the people were daily exposed, more or less, to violence, and suffered none. In Oporto, men until that moment unseen of the multitude were hardly rescued from its frantic revenge. In both cases fear regulated the degree of hatred shown, and hence we may conclude that national insurrections will never successfully resist an organized force, unless the mechanical courage of discipline be grafted upon the first enthusiasm.

While the vexatious correspondence with Galluzzo was going on, sir Hew Dalrymple renewed his intercourse with Castaños and prepared to prosecute the war in Spain. The Spanish prisoners, four thousand in number, had been sent to Catalonia, and the British army was cantoned in the Alemtejo along the road to Badajos; some staff officers were despatched to examine the roads through Beira, with a view to a movement on that line also, and general Anstruther was sent to Almeida to arrange a passage for the army, if it should enter Spain that way. Lord William Bentinck was employed at Madrid, to communicate with the Spanish generals and the

central junta, and to arrange the best line of march the mode of providing magazines and the plan of campaign. But in the midst of these affairs, and before the garrison of Elvas arrived at Lisbon, sir Hew Dalrymple was called home to answer for his conduct relative to the convention. The command then devolved upon sir Harry Burrard, but he also, after holding it a short time, was recalled to abide the fury of the most outrageous and disgraceful public clamour ever excited by the falsehoods of venal political writers. Sir John Moore remained in command.

The editors of the English daily press, adopting all the misrepresentations of the Portuguese minister, had judged the silence of government to be the consequence of its dissatisfaction at the convention, and broke forth with such a torrent of rabid malevolence, that right and justice were overborne, and the voice of truth stifled by their obstreperous cry. Many of the public papers were printed with mourning lines around the text which related to Portuguese affairs; all called for punishment; some talked of death to the guilty before it was possible to know if any crime had been committed; the infamy of the convention was the universal subject of conversation; a general madness prevailed, and, like the Athenians after the sea-fight of Arginusæ, the English people, if their laws had permitted, would have capitally condemned their victorious generals. To satisfy the raging multitude a court of inquiry was directed to assemble at Chelsea and investigate the transactions relating to the armistice and the definitive convention. Sir Arthur Wellesley, sir Harry Burrard, sir Hew Dalrymple, and most of the other generals engaged at Vimiero, were called before it; a minute investigation of all the circumstances took place, and a detailed report terminated with a declaration, that no further judicial measures seemed to be called for. This was not satisfactory to the government. The members of the court were required to state separately, whether they approved or disapproved of the armistice and convention. Four approved; three disapproved of the convention; and among the latter was lord Moira, who furnished a criticism, laboured, but not touching the pith of the question. The proceedings of the board were dispassionate and impartial, but the report

was not luminous; a thing to be regretted, because the rank and reputation of the members were sufficiently great to secure them from the revenge of party, and they were favourably placed for giving a severe and just rebuke to popular injustice.

Thus ended the last act of the celebrated convention of Cintra, the very name of which will always be a signal record of the ignorant and ridiculous vehemence of public feeling. The armistice, the negotiations, the convention, the execution of its provisions, were commenced, conducted, concluded, at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had not the slightest connexion, political, military, or local. Yet lord Byron has sung, that the convention was signed in the marquis of Marialva's house at Cintra; and the author of the 'Diary of an Invalid,' improving upon the poet's discovery, detected the stains of ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion!

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. General Thiebault says, the scattered state of the French army in the beginning of August, rendered its situation desperate, but the slowness of sir Arthur Wellesley saved it: others have accused him of rashness. Junot's troops were disseminated, yet to beat an army in detail, a general must be acquainted with the country, well informed of his adversary's movements, and rapid in his own. But rapidity in war depends as much upon the experience of the troops as the energy of the chief. The English army was raw, the staff and commissariat novices, the artillery scantily and badly horsed, few baggage or draft animals were to be obtained in the country, and there were only a hundred and eighty cavalry mounted. Such impediments are not to be removed in a moment, and therein lies the difference betwixt theory and practice, between criticism and execution.

2°. To disembark the army without waiting for reinforcements, was a bold, not a rash measure. Sir Arthur knew the French troops were scattered, although he was not aware of the exact situation of each division; the bishop of Oporto had promised him good assistance, and the Portuguese would have been discouraged if he had not landed. Weighing these cir-

circumstances he disembarked, and the event proved he was right. He had full time to prepare his army, his marches were methodical, he was superior in numbers to his enemy in each battle. His plans, characterized by a due mixture of enterprise and caution, were not beyond his force, and yet capable of being enlarged without inconvenience.

3°. In the action of Rorica there was something to censure. The movement against Laborde's first position was well executed; the subsequent attack against the heights of Zambugeira was faulty: the march of Ferguson's and Trant's divisions would have dislodged Laborde from that strong ridge without any attack on the front. It is said sir Arthur so designed, but some mistake caused Ferguson to alter the direction of his march from the flank to the centre. This, if true, does not excuse the error, the commander-in-chief being present at the attack in front, might have restrained it until Ferguson had recovered the right direction; it is more probable sir Arthur expected no vigorous resistance, and wishing to press the French in their retreat, pushed on the action too fast.

4°. Towards the close of the day, the line of Loison's march was in the power of the English general. If he had sent two thousand men to watch Laborde, left one thousand to protect the field of battle, and moved the remaining ten thousand against Loison, then at Cercal, eight miles distant, it is probable the latter would have been surprised and totally defeated: at all events he could only have saved himself by a hasty retreat, which would have broken Junot's combinations and scattered his army in all directions.

5°. Sir Arthur Wellesley marched to Lourinham to cover the immediate landing of his reinforcement and stores, because a south-west wind would, in one night, have sent half the fleet on shore in a surf unequalled for fury; such indeed was the difficulty of a disembarkation, that a detachment from the garrison of Peniché would have sufficed to frustrate it. The existence of a French reserve, reported to be four thousand men, was known, its situation was unknown, and it might have been on the coast line; hence great danger to Anstruther if he attempted a landing without being covered, greater still if he remained at sea. The reasons then for the march to Lourin-



ham were cogent, and outweighed the advantages of attacking Loison; yet it seems an error not to have occupied Torres Vedras on the 18th; the disembarkation of Anstruther's force would have been equally secured, the junction of the French army impeded, and the consequent battle of Vimiero prevented.

6°. It is just to applaud a gallant, although unsuccessful foe. The confident manner in which Laborde felt for his enemy—the occupation of Brilos Obidos and Roriça in succession, by which he gained time for Loison's junction—the judgment with which he maintained the position of Roriça—the obstinacy with which he defended the heights of Zambugeira, were proofs of skill, and facility of command rarely attained.

7°. Sir Arthur estimated Laborde's numbers at six thousand men, and this was corroborated by the information gained from a wounded French officer during the action. It is possible at Alcobaça there might have been so many, but in the action he could only have had five thousand. It is difficult to judge an enemy's force by the eye, nearly impossible to do so when he is skilfully posted, and, as in the present case, desirous of appearing stronger. Six hundred men, sent on the 14th to Peniché, and three companies employed on the 16th and 17th to keep open the communication with Loison by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura, must be deducted from six thousand. Laborde after the convention, positively denied that he had so many. Thiebault indeed says, only one thousand nine hundred were present under arms, but this assertion is inaccurate, and even injurious to the credit of Laborde, because it casts ridicule upon his really glorious deed of arms.


Sir A. Wellesley's Evidence. Court of Inquiry.

8°. To many officers the position of the British at Vimiera appeared weak from its extent, dangerous from its proximity to the sea, into which the army must have been driven if defeated. The last objection is well founded, and shows how unsafe it is to neglect the principles of art even for a moment. The ground was occupied as a temporary post, without any view to fighting a battle, and the line of retreat by Lourinham was for the sake of a trifling convenience left uncovered; sir Harry Burrard then stopped the movement projected by sir Arthur Wellesley for the 21st, and meantime Junot took the

lead: had he been successful against the left, there would have been no retreat for the British army. The extent of the position, although considerable for a small army, was no cause of weakness, the line of communication from right to left was shorter and easier for the British defence than it was for the French attack, and the movement was covered by the centre which was very strong. The only real defect was having no line of retreat.

9°. The project of seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra at the close of the battle, was one of those conceptions which distinguish great generals, and it is harsh to blame sir Harry Burrard for not adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and had he not been confirmed in his view by the advice of his staff, there was in the actual situation of affairs ample scope for doubt: the facility of executing sir Arthur's plan was not so apparent on the field of battle as it may be in the closet. The French cavalry was numerous, unharmed, full of spirit; upon the distant heights behind Junot, a fresh body of infantry had been discovered by Spence, and the nature of the country prevented any accurate judgment of its strength being formed, the English gun-carriages were much shaken, and so badly and scantily horsed, that it was doubtful if they could keep up with the infantry in a long march; the commissariat was in great confusion, the native drivers were flying with the country transport; the Portuguese troops gave no promise of utility, and the English cavalry was destroyed. To overcome obstacles in the pursuit of a great object is the proof of a lofty genius: but Murray's and Clinton's objections to the attempt, exonerates sir Harry and places the vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley in a strong light. It was doubtless ill-judged of Burrard, considering the ephemeral nature of his command, to interfere at all with the dispositions of a general who was in the full career of victory, and whose superior talents and experience were well known. But it excites indignation to find a brave and honourable veteran borne to the earth as a criminal, and assailed by the most puerile, shallow writers, merely because his mind was not of the highest class. Sir Arthur was the first to declare before the court of inquiry that sir Harry had decided upon fair military reasons.



Scale 10 Miles

### British route

..... *Loisons* D<sup>e</sup>

+. . . +. . . +. *Route of the Reserve*



10°. Double lines of operation are generally disadvantageous and opposed to sound principles, but the expediency of landing Moore's troops at the mouth of the Mondego and pushing them to Santarem was unquestionable; and the probable consequence of such a movement must be considered ere sir Arthur Wellesley's foresight can be justly appreciated.

Lisbon, situated near the end of a tongue of land lying between the sea-coast and the Tagus, is defended to the northward by vast mountains, which rising in successive and nearly parallel ranges, end abruptly on a line extending from Torres Vedras to Alhandra on the Tagus. They can only be passed at certain points by an army, and the intersections of the different roads form so many strong positions. Moreover the great mass of the Monte Junto, which appears to lead perpendicularly on to the centre of the first ridge, stops short at a few miles distance, and sends a rugged shoot, called the Sierra de Barragueda, in a slanting direction towards Torres Vedras, from which it is only divided by a deep defile. From this conformation it results, that an army marching from the mouth of the Mondego to Lisbon, must either pass eastward of the Monte Junto and follow the line of the Tagus, or keep westward and come upon the position of Torres Vedras.

If sir Arthur had adopted the first of these lines, his subsistence must have been drawn by convoys from the Mondego; the enemy's numerous cavalry would then have cut his communications, and he would have had to retreat, or force the positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and Lumiar, or Bellas, where the right is covered by the Saccavem creek, the left by the impassable Sierra dos Infernos. On the other line, Torres Vedras was to be carried, and then Mafra or Montechique, following the direction of Junot's retreat. If Mafra was forced, and it could not well be turned, a line of march, by Cassim and Quelus, upon Lisbon, would have been opened to the victors. But that way, longer than the route through Montechique and Loures, would, while it led the English army equally away from the fleet, have entangled it among the fortresses of Ereceira, St. Antonio, Cascaes, St. Julian's, and Belem. Supposing the Montechique to be forced, the position of Lumiar offered a third line of defence, and lastly, the

citadel and forts of Lisbon would have sufficed to cover the passage of the Tagus, and a retreat upon Elvas would have been secure.

Serious difficulties therefore awaited a single line of operations, and the double line was strictly scientific. For if sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego, had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have turned Torres Vedras and Montechique; and sir Arthur, on the other side, would have turned the Sierra dos Infernos by the road of Quelus. The French central situation would not have availed, because the distance between the British lines of movement would at first be more than a day's march, and their near approach to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. Junot must have abandoned the capital and fallen vigorously upon Moore with a view to overwhelm him and gain Almeida or Elvas; or have concentrated his forces, and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded Moore every facility for resistance, and sir Arthur's corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers, with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result of such an encounter, he had crossed the Tagus and pushed for Elvas, Moore could likewise have crossed that river, and harassed his retreat. It follows that to re-embark Moore's army after it had landed at the Mondego and bring it down to Maceira Bay was an error which, no convention intervening, might have proved fatal to the success of the campaign. And it was rendered more important by the danger incurred from the passage, for the transports were not seaworthy, and the greatest part would have perished had a gale of wind come on from the south-west.

Captain Pul-  
teney Mal-  
colm's Court  
of Inquiry.

11°. The project of seizing Mafra by a rapid march on the morning of the 21st, if successful, would have forced Junot to a hurried retreat by Enxara dos Cavelleiros upon Montechique, at the risk of being attacked during his march; if he had moved by the longer route of Ruña and Sobral, the British army would have reached Lisbon before him. But was it

possible to gain ten miles in a march of sixteen? was it possible to evade an experienced general, who, being only six miles off, possessed a formidable cavalry which could neither be checked nor interrupted by the small escort of horse in the British camp? was it possible to avoid a defeat, during a flank march on a road intersected by a river and deep gullies, the beds of torrents? The rigid adherer to rules would say no, but sir Arthur affirmed afterwards that certain circumstances of ground would have rendered the operation successful.

A night march is an obvious mode of effecting such an enterprise, not always the best where expedition is required. Great generals have usually preferred the day-time, trusting to their skill in deceiving the enemy, while their army made a forced march to gain the object in view; thus, Turenne at Landsberg, deceived the archduke Leopold in broad day-light; Caesar, in a more remarkable manner, overreached Afranius and Petreus near Lerida, and Pompey at Asparagium. Nor were the circumstances at Vimiero unfavourable to sir Arthur Wellesley. He might have pushed some light troops, his cavalry, the marines of the fleet, the Portuguese auxiliaries, and a few field pieces, to the entrance of the defile of Torres Vedras before day-break, with orders to engage the French outposts and make demonstrations as for a general attack. This would have occupied the enemy while the main body, profiting from the woods and hollows through which the by-road to Mafra led, might have gained such a start as would have insured success.

But suppose Junot, instructed by his spies and patrols, or divining the intention of the British general, held the masking division in check with a small force, while he moved by the Puente de Roll, or some other cross road, and there were several, against the flank of the English entangled among hollows and torrents. What would have been the result? History points to Condé and the battle of Senef. It could however be no ordinary general who conceived such a project. Success would have ranked sir Arthur among the eminent commanders of the world, though he had never performed any other exploit. 'The statue of Hereules, cast

by Lysippus, was only a foot high; yet,' says Pliny, 'it expressed the muscles and bones of the hero more grandly than the colossal figures of other artists.'

12°. So many circumstances sway the judgment of an officer in the field, which do not afterwards appear of weight, that caution should guide animadversion on an unfortunate commander; nevertheless, Junot's faults during this campaign were too glaring to be mistaken. He lingered too long at Lisbon; he was undecided; he divided his army unnecessarily; he discovered no skill on the field of battle. The landing of the English was a crisis, and he had only two points to consider. Could the French forces under his command defend Portugal without assistance? If not, how could it best aid Napoleon's general plans against the Peninsula? The first point could not be ascertained without a battle; the second required the army to keep concentrated to preserve a retreat on Spain, leaving for the British troops the sieges of Elvas and Almeida. If the two plans had been incompatible, the last was preferable to fighting in a country universally hostile: but they were not incompatible.

Junot's pivot of movements was Lisbon. He had to fall upon the English army, without resigning that capital to the Portuguese insurgents. He could not do the first without using the great mass of his forces, nor avoid the last without skilful management and great rapidity. The citadel and forts about Lisbon enabled a small force to control the populace, and resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few days; the Russian admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese, was forced by his fear of the English to preserve a guarded attitude, and did materially contribute to awe the multitude, who looked upon him as an enemy. The ships of war fitted out by Junot, were floating fortresses requiring scarcely any garrisons, yet efficient instruments to control the city without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners and magazines for powder and arms, which might otherwise have fallen into the power of the populace. Instead of delaying so long in the capital, troubling himself about the assemblage at Alcaer do Sal, and detaching Laborde with a weak division to cover the march of Loison, Junot should have taken the



most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon. Abandoning the left bank of the Tagus, with exception of Palmela and the Bugio, necessary to the safety of his shipping, he should have seized upon the principal families of the capital as hostages, threatened to bombard the city if refractory; and leaving only the garrisons of the citadel, forts, and ships, behind him, he should have proceeded, not to Leiria which was too near the enemy to be a secure point of junction with Loison, but to Santarem, where both corps might have united without danger or fatigue.

General Thomieres, meantime, putting a small garrison in Peniché, could have watched the movement of the British general, and thus from eighteen to twenty thousand men would have been assembled at Santarem by the 13th at farthest. From thence two easy marches would have brought the whole to Batalha, near which place the lot of battle might have been drawn without trembling. If it proved unfavourable to the French, the ulterior object of renewing the campaign on the frontier was in reserve. The number of large boats at Lisbon could have transported the army over the Tagus, in a few hours, if the stores had been embarked before Junot moved towards Batalha. Once in the Alemtejo, with a good garrison in Abrantes, it could not have been followed until the forts at the mouth of the Tagus were reduced and the fleet sheltered in the river; and long before the British could have menaced the Alemtejo Elvas would have been provisioned from the magazines collected by Loison after the battle of Evora; the campaign could then have been prolonged until the great French army coming from Germany crushed all opposition. That Junot would attempt something of this nature formed the basis of sir Arthur's plans, and colonel Vincent's intercepted memoir treated it as a settled operation. But Junot's desponding mood, though his threat to burn Lisbon during the negotiation showed that he knew his resources, was observed by all around him; and it is curious that Sattaro, his Portuguese agent, being for some purpose in the British camp, told sir Arthur, before the battle, that Junot would willingly evacuate Portugal on terms.

13°. When the French, fourteen thousand in number, occu-

pied Torres Vedras, that position was nearly impregnable; but though seventeen thousand British could scarcely have carried it by force, they might have turned it in a single march by the coast road; yet Junot neither placed a detachment on that side, nor kept a vigilant watch by his patroles. Hence, if sir Arthur's movement had not been arrested by Burrard, it must have succeeded; because Junot was en-

Thiebault. tangled in the defiles of Torres Vedras from six o'clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in the morning of the 21st. The two armies would thus have changed camps in the space of a few hours without firing a shot: Junot would have lost Lisbon, and been placed in a ridiculous situation.

14°. In the battle Junot's army was inferior, yet he formed two separate attacks, which enabled sir Arthur to beat him in detail without difficulty. The comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the heaping of the English army on their right when the position first opened to the view, plainly indicated the true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent's position; if victorious the sea would have swallowed those who escaped his sword; if repulsed, a retreat was open, and the loss could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks, that took place.

15°. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied after such a severe check was admirable; but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been successful; against the British it must always fail: the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is good for all movements short of the actual charge; but, as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a firm line aided by artillery. The repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and

wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor advance nor retreat, without increasing the confusion. No example of courage can be useful, no moral effect produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm and even victorious when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, columns are the soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.

16°. It is surprising, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras, occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and establish the war on the frontiers. Kellerman ascertained during the negotiation that Moore was not arrived, and without him the position of Montebique could neither be attacked nor turned. There was nothing in the armistice, or the way it had been agreed to, which rendered it dishonourable to take such an advantage; and the opening thus left for Junot was sir Arthur's principal objection to that preliminary.

17°. Although parts of the convention were objectionable in point of form, parts imprudently worded, taken as a whole it was fraught with prudence. Suppose sir Arthur, unperturbed by sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan; that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces, had been driven upon the upper Tagus. He was still master of flying to Almeida or Elvas; and the thousand men in Santarem could have joined him on either line. Then the advantages of a convention would have been appreciated. The army, exclusive of Moore's division, had neither provisions, nor means of transporting provisions, for more than ten days; the fleet was the only solid resource, but a gale from any point between south and north-west would have driven the ships away or cast them on a lee-shore. It was therefore indispensable to secure the mouth of the Tagus for the safety of the fleet; and

this could only be done by occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and St. Julian's, the last of which would alone have required ten days open trenches, and a battering train which must have been dragged by men over the mountains; for the artillery horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and no

Proceedings  
of the Court  
of Inquiry.

countriy animals were to be found. In the mean time, the French troops in Lisbon, upon the heights of Almada, and in the men-of-war, retiring

tranquilly through the Alemtejo, would there have united with Junot; or, if he fell back upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La-Lippe. Meanwhile, Siniavin must have surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner, or joined the French with his six thousand men; and it may

Appendix,  
No. 22.

here be observed, that even after the arrival of Moore, only twenty-five thousand British infantry were fit for duty.

Let it be supposed the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water. Seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season of the most pestilent of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? Ameida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, taking into consideration only the known and foreseen obstacles, it is certain that six months more would have been wasted before the country could have been entirely freed from the invaders; but long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again! The conclusion is inevitable. The convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon, we look in vain for that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara; and wonder to see the man, who in the face of an English fleet, in contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared with a few hundred tired grenadiers to seize upon Lisbon, so sunk in energy, that with twenty-five thousand good



soldiers he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention to save an army which was in very little danger. But such is the human mind, the momentary slave of every attraction, though ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, even a throne was within his view. When he proposed the convention the gorgeous apparition was gone ; toil and danger were at hand, fame flitted at a distance, and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words. 'I was going to send Junot before a council of war, when fortunately the English tried their generals and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend !'

## BOOK THE THIRD.

## CHAPTER I.

THE convention of Cintra, followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, disconcerted the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto, and restored Portugal to comparative tranquillity. The simple minded people would not heed the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors, and what may be called the convulsive struggle of the war terminated. At first a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the Spaniards and Portuguese; a wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, passionate reckless resentment, were common to both. Soon, however, the finer marks of national character impressed by their different positions in the political world became visible. Spain, holding from time immemorial a high rank among the great powers, more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice; unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited the days of the emperor Charles V.; whereas Portugal, always fearing the ambition of her powerful neighbour, and relying for safety as much upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, readily submitted to the direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive of the most beneficial results.

The national difference was not immediately perceptible. At this period the Portuguese were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that, from every quarter enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to complete the destruction

of a baffled and dispirited enemy ; the vigour, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism was in every man's mouth, Napoleon's power and energy seemed weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales, and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious, than the generally entertained opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded, almost untouched ; those of the latter were too slender even to support the weight of victory ; in Spain the whole structure of society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which merely awakened the slumbering strength of France.

Foresight, promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon ; while with the Spaniards prudence was punished as treason, and personal interests everywhere springing up with incredible force wrestled against the public good. At a distance the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty strength, when in truth it was a fantastic object, stained with blood, and tottering from weakness. The helping hand of England alone was stretched forth for its support, all other assistance was denied ; for the continental powers, although nourishing secret hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy turned coldly from the patriots' cause. The English cabinet was indeed sanguine, and yet the ministers, while anticipating success in a preposterous manner, displayed little industry and less judgment in their preparations for the struggle ; nor does it appear that the freedom of the Peninsula was much considered in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection as a mere military opening, through which Napoleon might be assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the great moral consequences of such a stupendous event,—consequences which were indeed above their reach of policy . they were neither able nor willing to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for conferring a benefit upon mankind.

This opportunity for restoring the civil strength of a long degraded people by a direct recurrence to first principles, was, however, such as has seldom been granted to a sinking nation. Enthusiasm was aroused without the withering curse of faction ;

the multitude were ready to follow whoever chose to lead; the weight of ancient authority was, by a violent external shock, thrown off; the ruling power fell from the hands of the few, to be caught by the many, without the latter having thereby incurred the odium of rebellion or excited the malice of mortified grandeur. There was nothing to deter the cautious for there was nothing to pull down; the foundation of the social structure was already laid bare, and all the materials were at hand for building a noble monument of human genius and virtue: the architect alone was wanting. No anxiety to ameliorate the moral or physical condition of the people in the Peninsula was evinced by the ruling men of England; and if any existed amongst those of Spain, it evaporated in puerile abstract speculations. Napoleon indeed offered the blessing of regeneration in exchange for submission, but in that revolting form, and accompanied by the evils of war, it was rejected: in the clamorous pursuit of national independence, the independence of man was trampled under foot. The mass of the Spanish nation, blinded by personal hatred, thought only of revenge; the leaders, arrogant and incapable, neither sought nor wished for any higher motive of action. Without unity of design, and devoid of arrangement, their policy was mean and personal, their military efforts abortive, and a rude unscientific warfare disclosed at once, the barbarous violence of the Spanish character and the utter decay of Spanish institutions.

After Joseph's retreat from Madrid, the insurrection of Spain may be said to have ceased. From that period it became a war between France and the Peninsula. The fate of the latter was then entrusted to organized bodies of men, the first excitement subsided, and, as danger seemed to recede, all the meaner passions resuming their empire, rendered the transactions multifarious and confused. The establishment of a central supreme junta, the caprices of the Spanish generals and their interminable disputes; the proceedings of the French army before the arrival of the emperor; the operations of the grand army after his arrival; the campaign of the British auxiliary force; form so many distinct actions, connected indeed by one great catastrophe, yet each attended by a number



of minor circumstances of little importance if viewed separately, but showing, when combined, the complicated nature of the disease which destroyed the energy of Spain. For the advantage of clearness, therefore, it will be necessary to sacrifice chronological order; and as frequent reference must be made to the proceedings of a class of men whose interference had a decided, and in many cases a very disastrous influence upon the affairs of that period, a brief account shall be given of the English agents, under which denomination both civil and military men were employed: the distinction was only nominal, for, generally speaking, each person assumed the right of acting in both capacities.

Mr. Charles Stuart, as envoy, was the chief of the civil agents, and the persons subordinate to him were, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Duff, and others, consuls and vice-consuls. He remained at first at Coruña.

Mr. Hunter was stationed at Gihon in the Asturias. Mr. Duff proceeded to Cadiz, and the others were, in like manner, employed at different ports. They were all empowered to distribute money, arms, succours of clothing and ammunition; and the want of system and forethought in the cabinet was proved by the injudicious zeal of their inferior agents, each of whom conceived himself competent to direct the whole of the political and military transactions: Mr. Stuart even had some trouble to establish his right of control.

The military agents were of two classes. Those sent from England by the government, and those employed by the generals abroad.

Sir Thomas Dyer, assisted by major Roche and captain Patriek, proceeded to the Asturias. The last officer remained at Oviedo, near the junta of that province; Roche went to the head-quarters of Cuesta. Dyer, after collecting some information, returned to England.

Colonel Charles Doyle organized the Spanish prisoners at Portsmouth, and sailed with them to Coruña. He was accompanied by captain Carrol and captain Kennedy, and during the passage a singular instance of turbulent impatience occurred. The prisoners, who had been released, armed and clothed by England, were as enthusiastic in their expressions

of patriotism as the most sanguine could desire, but at sea they mutinied, carried the transports into different ports of the Peninsula, disembarked, and proceeded each to his own home.

Colonel Browne was despatched to Oporto, major Green to Catalonia.

Sir Hew Dalrymple had before sent captain Whittingham to attend general Castaños, and placed major Cox near the supreme junta of Seville. The former accompanied the headquarters of the Andalusian army until the battle of Tudela put an end to his functions. The latter watched the supreme junta's proceedings, advising and remonstrating, when necessary, in a manner extremely judicious and praiseworthy.

All the above-named gentlemen were in full activity previous to the commencement of the campaign in Portugal; but when the convention of Cintra opened a way for operations in Spain, sir Hew Dalrymple sent lord William Bentinck to Madrid, that he might arrange a plan of co-operation with the Spanish generals, and transmit exact information of the state of affairs. Such a mission was become indispensable. Up to that period the military intelligence received had been very unsatisfactory. The letters from the agents contained abundance of commonplace expressions relative to the enthusiasm and patriotism visible in Spain; vast plans were said to be under consideration, some in progress of execution, and complete success was confidently predicted. Nevertheless, every project proved abortive or disastrous, without lowering the confidence of the prognosticators, or checking the mania for grand operations, which seemed to be the disease of the moment.

Lord William Bentinck's mission was confirmed by the English ministers, and the system of the military agents was regulated by marking out certain districts and appointing a general officer to superintend each. Major-general Broderick was sent to Galicia; major-general Leith, with a large staff, proceeded to the Asturias; Biscay, Castille, Leon, and even Catalonia, were included in his mission, and seemingly he was to prepare for landing an English army on the coast of Biscay. Major-general Sontag went to Portugal, and at the same time,

Sir H. Dalrymple's  
Papers, MSS.

sir Robert Wilson, furnished with arms, ammunition and clothing for organizing three or four thousand men levied by the bishop of Oporto, took with him a large regimental staff, and a number of Portuguese refugees, and succeeded in forming a partizan corps afterwards known as the Lusitanian legion. Brigadier-general Decken, at first destined for Spain, was finally directed to Oporto, where he arrived the 17th of August, and immediately commenced that curious intrigue which has been already mentioned in the campaign of Vimiero.

Sir John Moore sent colonel Graham to the Spanish headquarters on the Ebro, and kept lord William Bentinck at Madrid, whither Mr. Stuart also went. In their correspondence, and that of major Cox from Seville, may be seen how Spain was then afflicted and her cause ruined. The distribution of supplies, and the independent powers of the military agents immediately employed by the ministers, gave them extraordinary influence, which they used most injudiciously, neglecting their real mission and taking leading parts in matters with which they had no concern. Thus colonel Doyle, leaving captain Kennedy at Coruña, and captain Carrol with Blake, went to Madrid and obtained the rank of general for himself, and of lieutenant-colonel for his two subordinates; and, from his letters, it would seem, he had a large share in arranging the general plan of campaign, and the formation of a central supreme government. He attached himself principally to the duke of Infantado, a young man of moderate capacity, with a predilection for the petty intrigues called policy at the Spanish court. Whittingham gained the confidence of Castaños, and was employed to inspect the Spanish armies on the Ebro, and report upon their efficiency previous to executing the plan of campaign. But neither he nor Doyle had any clear view of affairs; their opinions, invariably and even extravagantly sanguine were never borne out by the result.

Sir John  
Moore's Cor-  
respondence,  
MS.

Whitting-  
ham's Let-  
ters, MS.

The Spanish leaders soon perceived the advantage of flattering young men who had control of enormous supplies. Demonstrations of respect and confidence were lavished on the

subordinates, especially on those who accepted Spanish rank ; but neither lord William Bentinck nor Mr. Stuart could procure the adoption of a beneficial measure, or even establish the ordinary intercourse of official business. The leading men wished to create a false impression of affairs, and so secure the English supplies without being fettered in the application of them ; the inferior agents answered this purpose, and, satisfied with their docility, the generals were displeased if more than one agent came to their respective camps. Captain Birch, an intelligent engineer, writing from Blake's quarters, says, ' General Broderick is expected here ; but I have understood the appearance of a British general at these head-quarters might give jealousy. General Blake is not communicative, yet captain Carrol appears to be on the best footing with him and his officers ; and captain Carrol tells me he informs him of more than he does any of his generals.' Soon after this, general Broderick did arrive, and complained, that ' general Blake's reserve was such, he could only get answers to the most direct and particular questions, but by no means caudid and explicit replies to general inquiries.'

Mr. Stuart's  
Letters, MS.  
Lord W.  
Bentinck's  
Letters, MS.  
Appendix,  
No. 13, § 6.

Sir John  
Moore's Cor-  
respondence,  
MS.

Letter to Mr.  
Stuart, MS.  
Sept. 13.

This subtlety was successful. Widely different were Spanish affairs judged by the military agents' reports, and Spanish affairs brought to the test of battle ; yet the fault was less with the agents than with the ministers. It was difficult for the former to act aright. Living with military chiefs in the field, holding rank in their armies, dependent on them for every convenience, they were forced to see as the general saw, and report as he wished : a simple spy would have been more efficacious ! Sir John Moore recalled all the inferior agents under his control, and urged on the ministers that only one channel of communication between the Spanish authorities and the British army should exist. He observed, that each military agent thought the events under his own peculiar cognizance the only matters of importance. Some of those persons treated sir H. Dalrymple and himself as having an auxiliary force to be moved, divided, and applied at their requisition, and thought the military stores of England were entirely at their disposal.



Mr. Hunter demanded cavalry and horse artillery to act with the Spaniards in the Asturian plains; infantry to garrison their seaport towns. Dyer was convinced the horsemen and guns should have been at Rio Seco, and that, aided with two thousand British cavalry and twenty pieces of artillery, the Spaniards would, in six weeks, have all the French troops 'in a state of siege.' General Leith says: 'Whatever may be the plan of operations, and whatever the result, I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to recommend to your consideration, the great advantage of ordering all the disposable force, of horse or car artillery, and light infantry, mounted on horses or mules of the country, without a moment's delay to move on Palencia, where the column or columns will receive such intelligence as may enable them to give the most effectual co-operation.' Whittingham, at the same period, mentioning the wish of general Castaños that some British cavalry should join him, writes, 'I cannot quit this subject without once more repeating, that the efforts of the cavalry will decide the fate of the campaign. Should it be possible for your excellency to send one thousand or fifteen hundred horse, the advantages that would result are incalculable.' And while these pressing recommendations came the one from Oviedo, the other from Tudela, Doyle, writing from Madrid thus expresses himself: 'Certain it is, that if your army were here, the French would evacuate Spain before you got within a week's march of them; indeed, even the light cavalry and two thousand light troops, sent on cars to keep up with the cavalry, to show our friends the nature of outpost duty, would, I think, decide the question.'—'A respectable corps of British troops, landed in Catalonia, would so impose, that I have no doubt of the good effects.' This last proposition relative to Catalonia was a favourite plan of all the leading men at Madrid; so certain were they of success on the Ebro, that finding no British force was likely to be granted, they withdrew eight or nine thousand men from the army near Tudela, and directed them upon Lerida.

Having thus explained the system of military agents, the reader will recognise them again in the actions, now to be narrated, of the armies which they joined.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers, MSS.

OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER THE BATTLE OF BAYLEN.

When that victory drove Joseph from Madrid, the patriotic troops, guided by the caprice of the generals, moved in various directions, without a fixed object, and without concert; all persons seemed to imagine the war ended, and that rejoicing and triumph should occupy good Spaniards. The Murcian and Valencian army separated. General Llamas, with twelve thousand Murcian infantry and a few cavalry, went to Madrid. St. Marc, a Fleming by birth, wisely marched with his Valencians to succour Zaragoza. On the road he joined forces with the baron de Versage, and the united troops, sixteen thousand strong, entered Zaragoza the 15th, Verdier and Lefebre having raised the siege the day before, leaving their heavy guns and stores behind them. They were pursued by the Valencians and Aragonese, but on the 19th their cavalry turned and defeated the Spanish advanced guard. On the 20th Lefebre took a position at Milagro. On the 21st, St. Marc and Versage occupied Tudela, and the peasantry of the valleys, assembling on the left flank of the French, threatened their communications. Meanwhile Palafox, engaged in rejoicing, did not begin to repair the defences of Zaragoza until the end of the month.

Cavallero.

He also assumed supreme authority, and in various ways discovered inordinate presumption, decreeing, among other acts, that no Aragonese should thereafter be liable to the punishment of death for any crime.

Castaños' army was the most efficient in Spain. It contained thirty thousand regular troops, provided with a good train of artillery and flushed with recent victory; yet it was constrained to remain idle by the junta of Seville, who detained it to secure a supremacy over the other juntas of Andalusia, and even recalled a part for an ostentatious triumph in that city. It was a month after the capitulation of Dupont, before Castaños entered the capital, at the head of a single division of seven thousand men; another of the same force was left at Toledo, and the rest of his army was quartered in the Sierra Morena.

Cox's Correspondence,  
MSS.

Whittingham's Correspondence,  
MSS.

The Estremaduran infantry at first composed of new levies, was afterwards strengthened by some battalions of the Walloon and Royal Guards, and equipped by sir Hew Dalrymple. Following a treaty between the juntas of Badajos and Seville, the Estremaduran cavalry, four thousand strong, was to be given to Castaños, and, Cuesta excepted, no other general had horsemen. They were useless in Estremadura, yet orders and entreaties, and the interference of sir Hew Dalrymple, alike failed to make Galluzzo send them either to Castaños or Blake; nor would he, as we have seen, desist from his pretended siege of La-Lippe, although it delayed the evacuation of Portugal. Meanwhile the Spanish captives released by the convention of Cintra, were clothed, armed, and sent to Catalonia in British transports, which also carried ten thousand muskets with ammunition for the Catalans.

Sir H. Dalrymple's  
Papers, MSS.

It has been before stated, that fifteen hundred Spaniards, commanded by Valladeras, co-operated with the Portuguese during the campaign of Vimiero. They never penetrated beyond Guarda, were destitute of money, and in great distress; they could neither subsist on the spot nor march away: sir Hew relieved them by a timely advance of ten thousand dollars, and they joined Blake in the mountains behind Astorga. Blake's reserve division had not been engaged at Rio Seco; he was therefore able, with the resources of the province and succours from England, to form a new army of thirty thousand infantry. When Bessières retired, Blake occupied Leon, Astorga, and the pass of Manzanal; he dared not enter the plains without cavalry, and the junta of Castille and Leon, then at Ponteferrada, ordered Cuesta, who had one thousand dragoons at Arevalo, to transfer them to the Gallician army. Instead of obeying, the arbitrary old man, exasperated by his defeat, and quarrel with Blake, retired to Salamanca, collected and armed ten thousand peasants, annulled the proceedings of the junta, and menaced the members with punishment for resisting his authority as captain-general; Blake protected them; and while the generals disputed, three thousand French cavalry descended the Douro,

Ibid.

Doyle's  
Letters.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

scoured the plains, and raised contributions in face of both their armies. Blake finally quitted his cantonments in September, and, skirting the plains on the north-east, carried his army by forced marches to the Moñtana St. Ander, a rugged district dividing Biscay from the Asturias. The Capt. Carrol's Letters. junta of the latter province had received enormous succours from England, but made no answerable exertions. Their district was strong, and eighteen thousand men were said to be in arms, but only ten thousand were promised to Blake, and only eight thousand joined him.

Catalonia had little direct connexion with the main armies, and at this period little influence on the general plan of campaign. Thus it appears, that one month after the capitulation of Dupont, only nineteen thousand infantry without cavalry, and under more than one independent general, were collected at Madrid; that only sixteen thousand men were in line upon the Ebro; that the other Spanish armies, exclusive of that in Catalonia computed at eleven thousand men, were many days' march from the enemy and from one another; that the chiefs, quarrelling with their respective juntas and among themselves, were inactive, or, as in the case of Galluzzo, doing mischief. These feeble and dilatory operations were partly owing to the inaptitude of the generals, principally to the unbounded vanity, arrogance, and selfishness of the local governments, among whom the juntas of Galicia and Seville were most remarkable for ambition. Instead of concerting means to push the success of Baylen, they were devising schemes to insure the permanency of their own power, using the money of both England and Spain for this pernicious object. In every part a spirit of interested violence prevailed, patriotism was chilled, and the efforts of sensible men were nugatory or caused their own destruction. This state of affairs condemns Joseph's retreat. Without drafting a man from the garrisons of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian; without interfering with the troops employed on the communications of Biscay and Navarre, that monarch drew together fifty thousand good troops in twenty days after he had abandoned his capital. At the head of such a force, or even of two-thirds of it, he might have bid defiance to the inactive, half-organized, and scattered



Spanish armies. It was so necessary to have maintained himself in Madrid, that no disproportion of numbers should have induced his hurried retreat. Baylen excited his fears, but from his sagacious brother it only drew the following observation: *'The whole of the Spanish forces are not capable of beating twenty-five thousand French in a reasonable position.'* The abandonment of Madrid would, if the Appendix,  
No. 4. Spaniards had pursued a general plan of action, have been fatal; but the stone of Cadmus had been cast among them, and the juntas turning upon one another forgot the common enemy.

Ferdinand was now again proclaimed king of Spain, with a pomp and rejoicing obstructive of all business except that of intrigue. Castaños assumed the title of captain-general of Madrid, partly to forward his being appointed generalissimo, partly to escape the injurious control of the Seville junta; for the authority of the captains-general though superseded in most of the provinces by the juntas was not universally so. He expected to be appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies; but he was of an indolent disposition, and it was soon seen that until a central and supreme government was established no such salutary measure would be adopted. In the mean time, the council of Castille, not generally popular with the people and hated by the juntas, was accepted as the provisional head of the state in the capital; its authority was, however, merely nominal, and the necessity of showing some front to the enemy was the only link of connexion between the Spanish armies.

Evil consequences were soon felt. Scarcely had the French quitted Madrid when the people of Biscay prepared to rise, an event, if well supported, of incalculable advantage; but the Biscayans had neither arms nor ammunition, the French were close to them, and the nearest Spanish force was the feeble Asturian levy. A previous junction of that force with Blake was indispensable; but that effected, and due preparation made, an insurrection of Biscay, protected by forty thousand regular troops and supplied from the sea-board with money and stores, would have compelled the French to abandon the Ebro or fight a battle. And Blake might have risked that, if the Andalusian, Murcian, Valencian, and Aragonese armies assem-

bling near Tudela had at the same time menaced the enemy's left flank. In every point of view it was an important event, and the Biscayan impatience should have been restrained; but Infantado, Doyle, and others at Madrid, hastened the explosion, and the rash manner in which they proceeded is shown in the following extracts from Doyle's despatches:—

‘I proposed to general Blake that he should send officers to Biscay to stir up the people there, and into the Asturias to beg that, of their 15,000 men, 8,000 might be pushed into Biscay to Bilbao, to assist the people, who were all ready, and only waited for arms and ammunition, for both of which I wrote to Mr. Hunter at Gihon, and learned from him that he had sent a large supply of both, and some money to Bilbao, where already 14,000 men had enrolled themselves. The remainder of the Asturias I begged might instantly occupy the passes from Castille into the Asturias and Biscay, that is to say, from Reynosa in the direction of Bilbao.’ Some days after he says, ‘My measures in Biscay and Asturias have perfectly succeeded; the reinforcements of arms, ammunition and men (5,000 stand of arms, and ammunition in proportion,) have reached Bilbao in safety, and the Asturias have taken possession of the passes I pointed out, so that we are all safe in that part of the world.’

In this fancied state of security affairs remained until the 16th of August, when Blake, being still in the mountains of Galicia, the English supply arrived in the port of Bilbao, and the explosion took place; General Merlin, with three thousand grenadiers, immediately came down on the unfortunate Biscayans, Bilbao was taken, and to use the gloomy expression of king Joseph, ‘the fire of insurrection was quenched with the blood of twelve hundred men.’ Fortunately, the stores were not landed, and the vessels escaped from the river, but by this blow, one of the principal resources which Blake had a right to calculate upon in his future operations was destroyed; and, although the number admitted by the Spaniards to have fallen was less than the above quotation implies, the spirit of resistance was severely checked. The evil was unmixed and deplorable, yet created no sensation beyond the immediate scene of the catastrophe; triumphs and

rejoicings occupied the people of Madrid and Zaragoza; and it is difficult to say how long the war would have been neglected, if Palafox had not been roused by the re-appearance of a French corps, which retook Tudela, and pushed on to the vicinity of Zaragoza itself. This took place immediately after the expedition against Bilbao; it was intended to suppress the insurrection of the valleys, and to clear the left flank of the French army. Palafox thus roughly aroused, wrote intemperately to the council of Castille, ordered all the troops in the capital to come to the Ebro, and menaced the members personally for previous delay. Being without weight of character, and his remonstrances founded on his own danger and not supported by any clear view of affairs, his presumptuous tone gave general offence. He chiefly aimed at Castaños, who was also menaced with the stoppage of pay and subsistence for his army by the junta of Seville if it quitted the capital before a central government was established; but at the same time that junta was strenuously intriguing to prevent such establishment.

Appendix,  
No. 8.

Whitting-  
ham's Letters,  
MSS.

Whitting-  
ham's Letters,  
MSS.

A council of all the generals commanding armies was held at Madrid the 5th of September. Castaños, Llamas, Cuesta, Infantado, and some others assembled; Blake gave his proxy to Infantado; Palafox was represented by a colonel of his own staff. Cuesta proposed that a commander-in-chief should be appointed; the others were too jealous to adopt this step, yet agreed to move to the Ebro. Llamas, with the Murcians, was to occupy Tarazona, Agreda, and Borja,—La-Peña, with two Andalusian divisions, then in Madrid, was to march to Logroña and Najera,—the other divisions were to follow in due time, and when La-Peña should reach Logrona, Llamas was to enter Cascante, Corella, and Calahora.

Mr. Stuart's  
Letters,  
Parliamentary  
Papers.

This united force was to be called the army of the centre; and once in its positions, Palafox, under whose command St. Marc's division acted, was to push forward to Sanguessa by the left bank of the Ebro, and turn the enemy on the Aragon river. It was hoped Blake would arrive at Palencia

and form a timely junction with the Asturians, and Cuesta promised to march upon Burgo del Osma, to fill up the space between Blake and the army of the centre. The head of La-Peña's column was to be at Soria on the 15th of September, and it was confidently expected that this vicious plan, in which every military principle was violated, and the enemy's troops considered, with regard to position, as a fixed immovable mass, would cause the total destruction of the French army: the only fear was, that a hasty flight into France would save it from Spanish vengeance! Whittingham, echoing the sentiments of the Spanish generals with reference to this plan, writes, 'As far as my poor judgment leads me, I am satisfied if the French persist in maintaining their present position, we shall in less than six weeks have a second edition of the battle of Baylen!'

To move La-Peña and Llamas, money was required, none could be got at Madrid, and the maritime provinces inter-

Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence. cepted all the English supplies. In this difficulty Doyle drew bills upon the English treasury, and upon the government of Seville, making the

Doyle's Letters. latter payable out of two millions of dollars just transmitted to the junta through Mr. Duff. These

bills would have been dishonoured if, just before they were presented, major Cox had not remonstrated

Cox's Letters. strongly upon the destitute condition of the army; and his representations, at first haughtily and evasively received, became effectual when the junta discovered that a plot against their lives, supposed to have been concocted at Madrid, was on the eve of execution. They had become hateful from their domineering insolence and selfishness; public feeling was against them, and alarmed for the consequences, they sent off 200,000 dollars to Madrid, and published a manifesto, in which they inserted a letter, pretended to have been addressed to Castaños on the 8th, giving him full powers to act for the public good. The object was to pacify the people, and save their dignity by appearing to have acted voluntarily; but Castaños published the letter in Madrid with its true date of the 11th, showing that to Cox's remonstrance and not a sense of duty this change of conduct was due.



This supply enabled the troops to move, and 40,000 fresh levies were enrolled; yet Napoleon's foresight in disarming the people had been so effectual, only 3,200 firelocks could be procured. A singular expedient then presented itself to the imagination of Infantado and other leading persons in Madrid: Doyle, at their desire, wrote to sir Hew Dalrymple in the name of the supreme council, to have *the firelocks of Junot's army, and the arms of the Portuguese people*, forwarded to the frontier, and from thence carried by post to the capital! This novel proposition was made when England had already transmitted to Spain 160,000 muskets, a supply considerably exceeding the whole number of men organized throughout the country. Fifty thousand had gone to Seville, where the junta shut them up in the arsenals, and left the armies defenceless; for to neglect real resources, and fasten upon the most extravagant projects, is peculiarly Spanish. No other people could have thought of asking for a neighbouring nation's arms at such a conjuncture. No other than Spanish rulers could have imagined the absurdity of supplying their levies, momentarily expecting to fight upon the Ebro, with the arms of a French army still unconquered in Portugal! But this project was only one among many proofs afforded at the time, that Cervantes was as profound an observer, as he was a witty reprove of the extravagance of his countrymen.

Parliamentary Papers,  
1810.

## CHAPTER II.

## INTERNAL POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS.

SHORT as the period was, between the first breaking forth of the insurrection and the arrival of Mr. Stuart at Coruña, it sufficed to create disunion of the worst kind. The juntas of Leon, of the Asturias, and of Galicia, were at open discord; and each province was split into parties, hating each other with as much virulence as if they had been of a hundred years' growth. The English supplies were considered, by the authorities into whose hands they fell, as a peculiar donation to themselves, and appropriated accordingly; one junta would not assist another with arms when there was a surplus; nor permit their troops to march against the enemy, beyond the particular province in which they were organized. The provincial nobility and gentry, who had seized power, were men of contracted views, proud, arrogant—as extreme ignorance suddenly clothed with authority will always be—and generally disposed to provide for relations and dependants at the expense of the common cause, which with them was subordinate to local interests. Jealousy of their neighbours regulated the proceedings of all the juntas, and their projects for increasing their own, or depressing a rival government's influence, were characterized by absurdity and want of principle.

To isolate Galicia, and seemingly with design to unite it with Portugal, was the object of its junta. They contracted an independent alliance with the junta of Oporto, complained that the Estremadura army obeyed the junta of Seville, sent troops under Valladeras to aid the Portuguese, and yet refused to unite for defence with the Castilles, unless a formal treaty of alliance

Mr. Stuart's  
Letters.  
Parliamentary  
Papers.

Mr. Stuart's  
Letters, MS.

was signed and ratified! Their selfishness and incapacity gave so much disgust, that plots were formed to overthrow their authority. The bishop of Orense and the archbishop of St. Jago were their declared enemies. The last, an intriguing priest, secretly endeavoured to draw Blake's army into his views, he even urged that general to march against the junta, but his letters being intercepted he was arrested; yet neither the stability, nor the personal safety of the junta was secured, for many persons applied to Mr. Stuart to aid in changing the form of government by force. The Asturians were worse than the Gallicians. They refused to assist Blake when his army was suffering, although the stores required by him, and supplied by England, were rotting where they were first landed; money also, sent out in the Pluto frigate for the use of Leon, was detained at Gihon, and Leon itself never raised a single soldier for the cause. Thus, only two months after the first burst of the insurrection, corruption, intrigue, and faction even to the verge of civil war, were raging in the northern parts of Spain.

Like passions were at work in the south, where the junta of Seville made no secret of their ambitious views. They stifled all local publications, suppressed a manifesto of Florida Blanca, who as president of the Murcian junta had recommended the formation of a supreme central government; they wasted their time in frivolous disputes, neglected everything of importance, sacrificed the general welfare, to private interest, gave military promotion without regard to public opinion or merit, repressed patriotism, and rewarded their tools with places of emoluments of which they had not the legal patronage. They usurped the royal prerogative of appointing canons in the church, and their cupidity equalled their ambition; they intercepted the money required by the troops, complained that La Mancha and Madrid, in whose defence they said, *their troops* were sacrificing themselves, did not subsist the force under Castaños. And under pretext of disciplining thirty thousand levies as a reserve, they retained five battalions at Seville as a guard, weakened the army in the field, and never raised a man.

Append'x,  
No. 13, § 5.

Sir H. Dal-  
rymple's  
Papers.  
Cox's Cor-  
respondence.

The canonries filled up by them had been vacant for years, and the salaries appropriated to the public service by Godoy; the junta applied the money to their own and their creatures' emolument, and even contemplated a division of the funds received from England to support the war amongst themselves. Against this flagitious junta also, the public indignation was rife, and a plot was formed to assassinate the members; the municipal authorities remonstrated with them, the archbishop of Toledo protested against their conduct, the junta of Granada refused to acknowledge their supremacy; but so great was their arrogance, so unprincipled their ambition, that the decided and resolute opposition of Castaños alone prevented them from commencing a civil war, by marching the victorious army of Baylen against the refractory Granadans. Such was the real state of Spain, such the patriotism of the juntas, who were at this time filling Europe with the sound of their own praise.

Sir H. Dalrymple's Papers.  
Cox's Correspondence.  
Appendix,  
No. 13, § 5.

In the northern parts, Mr. Stuart endeavoured to reduce the chaos of folly and wickedness, and produce that unity of design and action without which it was impossible to resist the mighty adversary threatening the Peninsula. To abate the conflicting passions of the moment, he judged a supreme authority, upon which the influence of Great Britain could be brought to bear with full force, indispensable; and to convoke the ancient cortes of the realm, the most certain and natural mode of drawing the strength and energy of the nation into one compact mass. But Napoleon's first distribution of the French forces which intercepted direct communication between the provinces interfered; Bessières, Dupont, and Moncey, at that time occupied a circle round Madrid, and would have prevented the local governments of the north from uniting with those of the south if they had been so inclined. A union of deputies from the nearest provinces, to be called the northern cortes, was therefore urged by Mr. Stuart as a preliminary step to ensure the convocation of a general assembly, when such a measure should become practicable. It was however in vain he represented the danger of anarchy

Stuart's Correspondence.  
Parliamentary Papers.



when such violent passions were excited, and such an enemy in the country; in vain he pointed out the embarrassment to the British cabinet, which could not enter into separate relations with every provincial junta: the Spaniards finding no supplies withheld, and their reputation not lowered in England by their infamous actions; finding, in short, the British cabinet ready to gorge their cupidity, flatter their vanity, respect their folly and applaud their wickedness, assented to Mr. Stuart's reasoning but adopted none of his propositions.

Discord in the northern provinces was not even quelled by danger; the disaster at Rio Seco inflamed the violence of faction; and Bessières, if he had not been stopped by Dupont's capitulation, had Old Castille and Gallicia at his mercy. The enthusiasm of those provinces never rose high, he was prepared to use address as well as force, and would have found partizans. Napoleon's skill would then have been apparent; for while Bessières held Gallicia, and Dupont was on the southern frontier of Portugal, Junot could have safely concentrated his whole army, and rendered an English descent nearly impracticable. These great combinations were ruined by Dupont and Joseph, and a greater impulse was given to the insurrection; but, unfortunately for Spain, a wider scope was also given for personal ambition, faction, and follies, which stifled the virtue of the country, and produced ruin.

Dupont's capitulation was made known to the council of Castille before Joseph was informed of it, and the council, foreseeing all the consequences of such an event, refused, as already related, to promulgate officially his accession to the throne. The king permitted this act of disobedience to pass without much notice; he was naturally averse to violence, and neither he nor his brother Napoleon did at any period of the contest for Spain constrain a

Azanza and  
O'Farril,  
Mem.

Spaniard to accept or retain office under the intrusive government. Joseph now went further. He released his ministers from their voluntary oath of allegiance to himself, leaving them free to choose their party once more, and Don Pedro Cevallos and the Marquis of Pinuelo seized the occasion to change with what appeared to them changing fortune. The

others remained steadfast, preferring an ameliorated government under a foreign prince, to what they believed a hopeless struggle, but which, if successful, they knew must end in a degrading native despotism: perhaps also a little swayed by their dislike to England, and by the impossibility of obtaining that influence among their countrymen, which under other circumstances their talents and characters would have ensured.

The council of Castille was not publicly chastised by the intruding monarch, yet secretly he punished the members by a dexterous stroke of policy. Grouchy wrote to Castaños that circumstances required the presence of the French troops in another quarter, and invited him to take immediate possession of Madrid for the preservation of public tranquillity. This was construed to mean the entire evacuation of Spain, and being agreeable to the vanity of the Spaniards was greedily received; it contributed to the subsequent supineness of the nation in preparing for its defence, and Joseph, by appealing to Castaños and treating the council as a nullity, helped its enemies to crush it. All the juntas indeed dreaded the council. That of Galicia would not even communicate with it, declaring that personally the members were attached to the French, and collectively had been the most active instrument of the usurper's government. The junta of Seville endeavoured to destroy the authority of the existing members, and annul the body as a tribunal of the state. Notwithstanding this proscription, the council did not hesitate to seize the reins of government when the French departed, and by the maintenance of public

Sir H. Dal-  
rymple's  
Papers.  
Cox's Cor-  
respondence.

tranquillity and strict repression of reaction presented a striking contrast to the conduct of the provincial juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of excess was encouraged.

To meet this hostility the council lost no time in forming a party. Don Arias Mon y Velarde, dean or president for the time being, wrote a circular letter to the local juntas, pointing out the necessity of establishing a central and supreme power, and proposing that deputies from each province, or nation, as they were sometimes called, should concert with the council how to effect that object. Confessedly the first public body, and acquainted with the forms of business, the council would

have had a preponderating influence in the assembly of delegates ; and it was so reasonable it should take the lead, when authority was wanted to direct the violence of the people before the moment of safety was passed, that all the juntas trembled. The minor ones submitted ; the stronger and more ambitious felt that subtlety would avail better than open opposition to the project.

Following up this blow, the council published a manifesto, containing an accurate detail of the events of the revolution, defending the part taken by its members, and claiming a renewal of the confidence formerly reposed in them by the nation. It was so ably written, that a large party, especially at Valladolid, was formed in favour of its authors ; and the junta of Seville were so sensible of their influence that they intercepted a copy of the manifesto addressed to sir Hew Dalrymple, and suppressed all writings favourable to the formation of a supreme central authority. It was no longer possible to resist the current, which had set strongly in favour of such a measure ; the juntas opposed, but could not openly deny the propriety, and in every province persons of consideration called for a change in that Hydra polity which oppressed the country, and was inefficient against the enemy. All the British functionaries in communication with the Spaniards also urged the necessity of concentrating the executive power.

Universally odious were the juntas. A few generals who had risen under their rule adhered to them ; but Palafox was independent as a successful captain-general ; Castaños declared he would no longer serve under them ; Cuesta was ready to put them down by force of arms, and re-establish the ancient royal audiencias and captains-general. When Bessières' retreat opened the communication with the south, and removed all excuse for procrastination, the juntas of Galicia, Leon, and the Asturias yielded to Mr. Stuart's increasing efforts, and agreed to meet in cortes, at Lugo : Galicia, however, first insisting on a formal ratification of that treaty with Castille already mentioned.

When the time for assembling arrived, the Asturians refused

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

Cox's Correspondence.  
Appendix,  
No. 13, § 5.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

to come, and the remaining juntas held the session without them. The bishop of Orense and the junta of Galicia, were prepared to assert the supremacy of that province over the others. The Bailly Valdez of Castille, an able and disinterested man, being chosen president of the convocation, proposed on the first day of assembly, that deputies should be appointed to represent the three provinces in a supreme junta, assembled in some central place, to convoke the ancient cortes of the whole kingdom, according to the old forms, and to settle the administration of the interior and future succession to the throne. This proposition was carried by the superior number of the Castillians and Leonese; the bishop of Orense protested against it, and the Gallician members strongly opposed it as placing their province on the same footing as others, a glaring injustice, they said, if the numbers of the Gallician army were taken into consideration: they were answered that the Gallician army was paid, armed, and clothed by England, and fed by Castille and Leon.

Meanwhile the influence of the council of Castille increased, and the junta of Seville cunningly took the lead in directing what they could not prevent. The convocation of the cortes they knew would be fatal to their own existence. Wherefore, in a public letter, addressed to the junta of Galicia and dated one day previous to the circular of don Arias Mon, but evidently written after the receipt of the latter, they opposed the assembling of the cortes on the ground that it was 'the prerogative of the king to convoke that body; and if it was called together by any other authority the provinces would not obey;'—'there would be no unanimity.' But the question was one not of form but expediency. If the nation was in favour of such a step, and after events showed the people were not opposed to it, the same necessity which constituted the right of the junta to declare war against the French, another prerogative of the monarch, would have sufficed to legalize the convocation of the national assembly. Their object was to preserve their own power, and they maintained that the juntas, being chosen by the nation, were the only legitimate depositories of authority, and to members of those bodies only, could that authority be

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspond-  
ence.



delegated. Then adopting the suggestion contained in the letter of Arias Mon, they proposed that two deputies from each junta should repair, not to Madrid, but to Ciudad Real or Almagro, and at the moment of meeting be, in fact, constituted governors-general of the kingdom; nevertheless, the local governments were, with due subordination to this central junta, to retain and exercise in their own provinces all the authority with which they had already invested themselves. Thus they had only to choose subservient deputies and their power would be more firmly fixed than before; and this arrangement would have been adopted by the junta of Galicia, had not the rapidity with which Valdez carried his proposition prevented that cause of discord being added to the numerous existing disputes.

Mr. Stuart proceeded to Madrid, and wherever he passed found the same violence of local party feeling, the same disgust at the conduct of the oligarchical provincial governments: pride, vanity, corruption, and improvidence, were everywhere obtrusively visible. The dispute between Blake and Cuesta, raging at the period of the battle of Rio Seco when division was most hurtful to the military operations, was now allayed between the generals; but their political partizans waged war with more bitterness than ever, continuing the feud among the civil branches when union was most desirable. On the one side was the Baili Valdez, deputy to the supreme junta. On the other Cuesta, a man haughty, incredibly obstinate, and not to be offended with impunity when he had power to punish. He had been president of the council of Castille, and he was captain-general of Castille and Leon when the insurrection first broke out. Hating all revolutionary movements, although as inimical to a foreign domination as any of his countrymen, he endeavoured to repress the public effervescence, and maintain tranquillity at the risk of losing his life as a traitor.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

Cuesta was honest as between Spanish and French interests; between his country's cause and his own passions he was not honest. He disliked the local juntas, and consistently wished to preserve the authority of the captains-general and the royal audiencias, both overthrown by those petty governments. But

sullen and ferocious of temper, he employed authority with despotie severity; and was prepared, if opportunity offered, to exercise military influence over the suprême, as well as over the subordinate juntas. He had appointed one for Leon and Castille as a sort of council, subordinate to the authority of the captain-general; but after the battle of Rio Seco the members fled, as before related, to Ponteferrada, assumed the supreme authority, claimed Blake's protection, and commanded Cuesta to deliver his cavalry to that general. Cuesta annulled their proceedings at Ponteferrada; and now declaring the election of Valdez and his colleagues void, as contrary to existing laws, directed the assembling of other juntas conformable to usage.

His mandate was disregarded. Valdez and the other deputies proceeded to form a central supreme government. Cuesta instantly abandoned the field operations, which in the Madrid council he had just promised to aid, fell back with twelve thousand men, seized the deputies, and shut up Valdez in the tower of Segovia, menacing him with military execution. The disorders of the times furnished arguments for this act of stubborn violence. The junta of Castille and Leon had been formed illegally; several districts were omitted in the representation; several deputies chosen by the city of Leon alone; Valdez was made president, although neither a native nor a proprietor, and therefore ineligible to be even a deputy; Leon had appointed representatives for the Castillian districts occupied by the French, and when they retired Castille in vain demanded an equitable arrangement.

Amidst this confusion and violence, the desire for a central government spread over the kingdom. Seville, Catalonia, Aragon, Murcia, Valencia, and the Asturias, sent deputies, and though fresh disputes arose as to the place of assembly, it was finally agreed to meet at Aranjuez. This royal residence was chosen against the wishes of many, and notably of Jovelanos, an eloquent person and of great reputation but pertinacious. He urged that the capital was the meetest spot, but was answered that the turbulent inhabitants of Madrid would impede the government, and the same objection would exist against any other large town. And this argument was held

in Spain, when the people were, in all the official and public papers, represented as enthusiastically united in one common sacred pursuit, and were in the British parliament denominated the ‘universal Spanish nation!’

To seek protection in a corner, instead of courting publicity, augured ill for the intentions of the governors, nor was the augury belied. The junta of Seville, after reviling the council of Castille for its partial submission to the usurper, chose don Vincent Hore, a known tool of Godoy, and Gusman de Tilly who was under a judicial sentence for robbery, for their deputies. Hore declined the appointment, Tilly, braving public disgust, repaired to Aranjuez, and Miñiano, another member of the junta, took his place with an enormous salary as civil resident at the head-quarters of the Andalusian army. The deputies were instructed to confine their deliberations to such subjects as their constituents should furnish; a fraudulent policy, in which Seville took the lead, and when public indignation forced that junta and the Valencian one ostensibly to give way, they substituted secret orders of a like tenour. The greater number of the deputies were tools of the juntas, and anxious only to avoid publicity until they could consolidate their power: hence their dislike of large towns, and their choice of Aranjuez. Florida Blanca, decrepid from age, was chosen first president in rotation for three months, and the formation of an independent executive was scouted; for when Jovellanos proposed a regency selected from their own body, it was replied that the deputies could not delegate their powers: in fine, the juntas, instead of meeting the general desire for central government, were resolved to retain authority.

The assembly, being constituted, immediately summoned Cuesta to release Valdez and repair himself to Aranjuez, where he was denounced by the junta of Castille and Leon as a traitor. Florida Blanca and Castaños urged him to submit, and though at first he haughtily repelled them, he finally yielded, and, after a sharp correspondence with Mr. Stuart, who strove to invigorate the central power, he released Valdez and came to Aranjuez. No formal proceedings were had, but after mutual recrimination Valdez was admitted to the exer-

Cox's Cor-  
respondence.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 6.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspond-  
ence.  
Col. Graham's  
ditto.

cise of his functions, and Cuesta was detained at the seat of government, a state prisoner at large, until subsequent events once more placed him at the head of an army.

Lord William Bentinck now joined Mr. Stuart at Madrid. With coincident opinions they urged upon the central junta the necessity of military preparations; but the folly exhibited in the provinces was here displayed in more glaring colours. The lesser tribunals acknowledged the authority of the assembled deputies; the council of Castille, reluctant to submit yet too weak to resist, endeavoured to make terms, but was forced to unconditional submission. Management of the revenue, a chief for the army, and the total suppression of the provincial juntas, were the three next objects of public anxiety. Castaños was by the public designated as commander-in-chief; his services entitled him to the office, while his moderation and conciliating manners fitted him for it, when so much jealousy was to be soothed, and so many interests reconciled. An account of the past expenditure of English money was also loudly required of the local juntas, and a surrender of the residue demanded. But the central government dividing itself into sections, answering to the departments of state under the king's rule, declared those sections equal supreme and independent, and appointed secretaries, not chosen from their own body, to each.

Florida Blanca assured Mr. Stuart and lord William that Castaños would be named generalissimo, and invited them to confer with him upon the operations of the British troops then coming under Moore from Portugal to the aid of Spain. The necessity for a single chief was admitted by all persons, but so stubborn were the tools of the provincial juntas in the assembly, that in despite of the British agent's efforts and the influence of the British cabinet, the generals were all confirmed in separate and independent commands. The miserable system of the Dutch deputies with Marlborough, and the revolutionary commissaries of France, were partially revived, and the English government was disregarded, though it had then supplied Spain with two hundred thousand muskets, clothing, ammunition,

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspond-  
ence.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspond-  
ence.

Mr. Canning's  
Instructions  
to Mr. Duff,  
MSS.



and sixteen millions of dollars! Such ample succours rightly managed would have secured unlimited influence; but the gifts were made through one set of agents the demands through another; wherefore the first were taken as of right, the last unheeded. The resources of England were thus wasted without materially benefiting Spain; for though the armies were destitute, the central government had contracted a large debt and was without credit. Assuming however the insolence of conquerors dictating terms, rather than the language of grateful allies asking further assistance, it required from England an instant gift of ten millions of dollars, with stores sufficient to supply a well-governed army for years.

All the provincial juntas still retained full power within their respective districts. The central government feared them, but decreed, 1°. That their own persons were inviolable. 2°. That their president should, with the title of highness, receive 25,000 crowns a-year. 3°. That each deputy taking the title of excellency should have a salary of 5000 crowns. 4°. That the collective body should be addressed as majesty. Then thinking themselves sufficiently confirmed they resolved to make a public entry to Madrid, and to conciliate the populace, declare a general amnesty, lower the duties on tobacco, and fling money to the crowd during the procession. Amidst this pomp and vanity the enemy was scarcely remembered, and public business totally neglected. This last evil extended to the lowest branches of administration; self-interest produced abundance of activity, but every department, almost every man, seemed struck with torpor when the public welfare was at stake, and withal, an astonishing presumption was common to the highest and the lowest.

Instead of a generalissimo, a board of generals was at first projected, on whose reports the junta was to regulate the military operations; Castaños was to preside, but finally the plan was deferred with the characteristic remark, *'that when the enemy was driven over the frontier, Castaños would have leisure to take his seat!'* The

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 6.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.  
Lord W. Bentinck's ditto.

Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence.  
Appendix,  
No. 13, § 6.

Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence.

idea of failure never occurred, the government was content if the people believed its daily falsehoods about the French; and the public, equally presumptuous, was content to be so deceived. The soldiers were destitute even to nakedness, and their constancy cruelly abused. They were without arms or bread; the higher orders displayed cupidity, incapacity, and disunion; the patriotic ardour was visibly abating with the lower classes; the rulers were grasping, improvident, untruthful, and boasting; the enemy powerful; the government, cumbrous and ostentatious, was, to use Mr. Stuart's words, 'neither calculated to inspire courage nor increase enthusiasm.'

This picture will be recognised by men who are yet living, and whose exertions were as incessant as unavailing to remedy the evils at the time; it will be recognised by the friends of that great man, sir John Moore, the first victim to the folly and base intrigues of the day; it will be recognised by that general and army, who afterwards won their way through Spain, and found that to trust Spaniards in war was to lean against a broken reed. To others it may appear exaggerated, for without having seen it is difficult to believe the disorders which paralyzed the enthusiasm of a whole people.

#### EXTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS OF SPAIN.

At first these were confined to England, Sicily, and Portugal; the rest of Europe was under the sway or influence of Napoleon. With the Brazils, however, relations were established by the junta, which afterwards, under the cortes, produced serious embarrassments to the British military operations. The ultra-marine possessions of Spain were objects of interest to both sides; but the emperor's active policy balanced the natural preponderance of the mother-country. No effort was made to confirm the adherence of the colonics, or secure their

great resources until long after the insurrection broke out, and then only because Mr. Stuart, in the north, and sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Col-  
 Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.  
 Sir Hew Dalrymple's Papers.  
 lingwood in the south, urged the despatch of vessels to America. Spain's hold of those possessions was indeed slight, for her harsh restrictive system had

long before weakened the colonists' attachment, and Miranda's expedition, though unsuccessful, had kindled a fire not to be extinguished; all foreign statesmen had foreseen that Spain must relinquish her arbitrary government or lose her colonies. The insurrection at home rendered this more certain. Every argument, every manifesto put forth in Europe to animate the Spaniards, told against them in America. Yet for a time the produce of the mines was remitted, many Spanish Americans served in the Spanish armies, and the emperor, though he offered the vice-royalty of Mexico to Cuesta, Blake, and Castaños, and probably to some of the natives, failed to create a French party of consequence. The Americans were unwilling to plunge into civil strife, until the arrogance and injustice of Old Spain, increasing under the insurrectional government, forced them to a rebellion which established the independence of the fairest portion of the globe, and proved how little an abstract love of freedom influenced Spain to resist Napoleon.

With the English cabinet, Spanish intercourse, hitherto conducted by the provincial deputies who first arrived, was now placed on a regular footing. The deputies were recalled at the desire of Mr. Canning; Admiral Apodaca was appointed minister plenipotentiary for Spain; and Mr. John Hookham Frere was accredited with the same title to the central junta. Mr. Stuart, whose ability and energy had contributed so much to the formation of a central government, was superseded by this injudicious appointment, and the political machine was left with every wheel in violent action to proceed without controlling power or guiding influence. Mr. Stuart had, on his own responsibility, repaired to Madrid, and transmitted exact information of what was passing, yet remained for three months without receiving a line from Mr. Canning, to approve, to disapprove, or to direct his proceedings: a remissness indicating the bewildered state of the cabinet, which slowly and with difficulty followed when it should have been prepared to lead. Mr. Canning's tardy, abortive measures, demonstrated the difference between a sophist and a statesman, showing how dangerous is that public feeling, which, insatiable of words, disregards the actions of men, and esteems more the

interested eloquence of an orator like Demades, than the simple integrity, sound judgment, and great exploits of a general like Phocion.

Such being the state of Spain in September and October, it would be instructive to contrast the exertions of the 'enthusiastic Spaniards' during three months of insurrection after Baylen, with the efforts of 'discontented France' in the hundred days of Napoleon's second reign. The juntas were however not devoid of ambition. Before the battle of Baylen, that of Seville was occupied with a project for annexing the Algarves to Spain, and the treaty of Fontainebleau was far from being considered as a dead letter.



## CHAPTER III.

NAPOLEON was chagrined but not dismayed at a resistance he had almost anticipated. He measured the efforts of Spain, calculated the power of foreign interference, and did not misjudge the value of English supplies. He foresaw the danger of suffering an insurrection of peasants to attain a regular form, to become disciplined troops, and to league with powerful nations. To defeat the raw levies was easy; but it was necessary to crush them, that dread of his invincible force might still pervade the world, and the influence of his genius remain unabated. He knew the constitution of Bayonne would contrast well with those chaotic governments, neither monarchical, nor popular, nor aristocratic, nor federal, thrown up by the Spanish revolution; but, before that could give him moral resources, it was essential to develop his military strength.

Imminent was the crisis. Watched by nations whose pride he had shocked without destroying their strength, if he bent all his force against the Peninsula England might excite the continent to arms, and Russia and Austria might unite to raise fallen Prussia. The designs of Austria were covered, not hidden, by the usual artifices of her cunning rapacious cabinet. Subdued Prussia could not be supposed quiescent, and the Tugenbunde, Gymnasiasts, and other secret societies were beginning to disclose themselves. Since persecuted by their governments, they were then encouraged. Baron de Nostiz, Stein the Prussian counsellor of state, generals Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and colonel Sehill, were the contrivers, and their plan was characteristic of Germans, who, plodding even to a proverb in action, possess extravagant imaginations and delight in mystery. Social regeneration was the object, but, as a first step, they designed

Baron Fain's  
Campaign,  
1813.

to drive the French across the Rhine; and they created fear because the extent of their influence was then unknown.

Russia, more powerful perhaps from her defeats because more enlightened as to the cause, gave Napoleon most anxiety. He knew it would tax all his means to meet the hostility of that great empire, which would render his operations in Spain unsuitable to his fame. But with a long-sighted policy he had proposed an interview with the czar, intent to secure the friendship of that monarch, and not unsuccessfully did he strive at first. Indeed at this time he supported the weight of the political world, and every movement of his produced a convulsion. His strength was now taxed, yet confident in his unmatched genius, he sought only a moment of time, certain to make it victory. Meanwhile, sudden and strong of action as the dash of a cataract, he made one of those efforts which have stamped his age with the greatness of antiquity.

His armies were scattered over Europe. In Italy, in Dalmatia, on the Rhine, the Danube, the Elbe, in Prussia, Denmark, Poland, his legions were to be found; over that vast extent five hundred thousand disciplined men maintained the supremacy of France. From those bands he drew the imperial guards, the select soldiers of the warlike nation he governed, the terror of all other continental troops; these and the veterans of Jena, Austerlitz, and Friedland, reduced in number but of confirmed hardihood, were marched towards Spain. A host of cavalry, unequalled for enterprise and knowledge of war, was also directed against that devoted land, and a long train of gallant soldiers followed, until two hundred thousand men, accustomed to battle, had penetrated the gloomy fastnesses of the western Pyrenees; while forty thousand of inferior reputation, drawn from the interior of France, from Naples, Tuscany, and Piedmont, assembled on the eastern ridges of those gigantic hills. The march of this multitude was incessant, and as his soldiers passed the capital, Napoleon, neglectful of nothing which could excite their courage and swell their military pride, addressed to them one of his nervous orations. In the tranquillity of peace it may seem inflated, but on the eve of battle a general should so speak.

‘Soldiers! after triumphing on the banks of the Vistula and

the Danube, you have passed with rapid steps through Germany. This day, without a moment of repose, I command you to traverse France. Soldiers! I have need of you. The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the peninsula of Spain and Portugal: in terror he must fly before you. Let us bear our triumphal eagles to the pillars of Hercules; there also we have injuries to avenge. Soldiers! you have surpassed the renown of modern armies, but have you yet equalled the glory of those Romans, who in one and the same campaign were victorious upon the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria, and upon the Tagus? A long peace, a lasting prosperity shall be the reward of your labours, but a real Frenchman could not, ought not to rest until the seas are free and open to all. Soldiers! all that you have done, all that you will do for the happiness of the French people and for my glory, shall be eternal in my heart!

This said, he sent his army towards the frontiers of Spain, and himself hastened to meet the emperor Alexander at Erfurth. Their conference produced a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive. Spain was by the one, with calm indifference, abandoned to the injustice of the other; but the accession of strength which the treaty and the personal partiality of Alexander, gave the French emperor, led both to think the English cabinet would, if fair occasion offered, enter into negotiations for a general peace, and in a joint letter they thus addressed the king of England,—‘The circumstances of Europe had brought them together; their first thought was to yield to the wish and the wants of every people, and to seek in a speedy pacification the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppressed all nations. The long and bloody war which had torn the continent was at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. If many changes had taken place in Europe, if many states had been overthrown, the cause was to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of maritime commerce had placed the greatest nations; still greater changes might yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, was the interest of the people of the continent, as it was the interest of the people of Great Britain. We entreat your

Majesty,' they concluded, 'we unite to entreat your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, to silence that of the passions, to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, to conciliate all interests, and thus preserving all powers which exist, ensure the happiness of Europe, and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us.'

Mr. Canning in reply addressed letters to the French and Russian ministers, enclosing to each an official note. In that addressed to the Russian, he said,—'However desirous the king might be to reply personally to the emperor, he was prevented by the unusual mode of communication adopted, which had deprived it of a private and personal character. It was impossible to pay that mark of respect to the emperor, without at the same time acknowledging titles which he had never acknowledged. The proposition for peace would be communicated to Sweden and to the existing government of Spain, and it was necessary his majesty should receive an immediate assurance, that France acknowledged the government of Spain as a party to the negotiation. That such was the intention of the emperor could not be doubted, when the lively interest manifested by his imperial majesty for the welfare and dignity of the Spanish monarchy was recollected. No other assurance was wanted, that the emperor could not have been induced to sanction by his concurrence, or approbation, usurpations, the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was dangerous to all legitimate sovereigns.'

The letter addressed to the French minister merely demanded that Sweden and Spain should be admitted as parties to the negotiation. The official note commenced by stating the king's desire for peace, on terms consistent with his honour, his fidelity to his engagements, and the permanent repose of Europe. 'The miserable condition of the continent, the convulsions it had experienced, and those with which it was threatened, were not imputable to his majesty. If the cause of so much misery was to be found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although his majesty could *not be expected to hear with unqualified regret*, that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments; yet, as it was neither the



disposition of his majesty, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in the privations and unhappiness even of nations which were combined against him, he anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent.' Then stating that the progress of the war had imposed new obligations upon Great Britain, the note claimed for Sicily, Portugal, Sweden and Spain, a participation in the negotiations. 'Treaties existed with the three first which bound them and England in peace and war; with Spain, indeed, no formal instrument had yet been executed, but the ties of honour were to the king of England as strong as the most solemn treaties. It was therefore assumed, that the central junta, or government of Spain, was understood to be a party to any negotiation in which his majesty was invited to engage.'

Pereptory was the rejoinder of Russia. The claims of sovereigns, allies of Great Britain, she would admit; the insurgents of Spain she would not acknowledge as an independent power. The Russians, England could recollect one particular instance, had always been true to this principle; moreover, the emperor had acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king of Spain, and was united to the French emperor for peace and for war; he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of Napoleon. Some farther arguments touching the question were advanced, and the note concluded with an offer to treat upon the basis of the '*uti possidetis*' and the respective power of the belligerent parties; or upon *any basis*, for the conclusion of an honourable, just and equal peace. The insulting tone of Mr. Canning's communication was retaliated by the French minister, who also finished by proposing the '*uti possidetis*' as a basis for treating, expressing a hope, that, without losing sight of the inevitable results of the force of states, it would be remembered, that between great powers there could be no solid peace but that which was equal and honourable for both parties. Upon the receipt of these Canning broke off the negotiations, and all chance of peace vanished; but previous to the conclusion of this remarkable correspondence Napoleon had returned to Paris.

What his real views in proposing to treat were, it is diffi-

cult to determine. He could not have expected Great Britain to abandon Spain; he must therefore have been prepared with some arrangement, unless the whole proceeding was an artifice to sow distrust among his enemies. The English ministers asserted that it was so; yet what enemies were they among whom he could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden, Sicily, Portugal! the notion as applied to them was

absurd; it is more probable he was sincere. He  
 O'Meara,  
 Voice from  
 St. Helena,  
 Vol. ii. said so at St. Helena, and the circumstances of  
 the period warrant a belief in that assertion.

The menacing aspect of Austria, the recent loss of Portugal, the hitherto successful insurrection of Spain, the secret societies of Germany, the desire of consolidating his Polish dominions as a barrier against Russia, the breach made in his continental system, the commercial distresses of Europe, were all cogent reasons for a peace: they might well cause him to be suspicious of the future, and render him anxious for an excuse to abandon an unjust, uncertain, onerous contest in the Peninsula. The alliance of Russia only disentangled a part of the Gordian knot; to cut the remainder with his sword was, at this conjuncture, a task which even he might shrink from.

The march of his armies towards Spain proves nothing to the contrary of this supposition. Time was of the utmost consequence. His negotiations proving abortive, it would have been too late to have reinforced his troops on the Ebro, and the event evinced the prudence of his measures in that respect. Rejecting Spain as a party to the conferences for peace is scarcely more conclusive; it would have been to resign his weapon before he entered the lists. England could not abandon the Spaniards, but that was not a necessary consequence of continuing the negotiations. There was a bar put to the admission of a Spanish diplomatist, no bar was thereby put to the discussion of Spanish interests. The correspondence of the English minister would not of necessity compromise Spanish independence; it need not have relaxed hostility, nor retarded succours. And when Napoleon's power, subtlety, and force of genius, and his good fortune in war, and the additional strength gained by the Russian alli-

ance, are contrasted with the scanty means of Spain and the confusion into which she was plunged, it does appear as if her welfare would have been better forwarded by an appeal to negotiation than to battle. It is true Austria was arming, yet Austria had been so often conquered, was so sure to abandon the cause of the patriots and every other cause when pressed, so certain to sacrifice faith and honour to self-interest, that the independence of Spain through the medium of war, could only be regarded as of uncertain hope; a prize to be gained, if gained at all, by wading through torrents of blood, and every misery that famine and the fury of devastating armies could inflict. To avoid such dreadful evils by negotiation was worth trial: justice, urged by the minister of a great nation, is difficult to withstand; no power, no ambition can resist it and be safe.

This view was not in accord with the shifts and subterfuges characterizing the policy of the day. It was thought wise to degrade such a correspondence by a ridiculous denial of Napoleon's titles; praiseworthy to make a state paper, in which such serious interests were discussed, offensive and mean by miserable sarcasm evincing the pride of an author rather than the gravity of a statesman. There is ground also for believing, that hope, derived from a silly intrigue carried on through the princess of Tour and Taxis with Talleyrand and some others, who were even then ready to betray Napoleon, was the real cause of the negotiation having been broken off by Mr. Canning. Mr. Whitbread declared in the House of Commons, he saw no reason for refusing to treat with France, and though public clamour induced him to explain away this expression, he needed not to be ashamed of it. For if the opinion of Cicero, that an unfair peace is preferable to the justest war, was ever worthy of attention, it was so at this period, when the success of Spain was doubtful, her misery certain, her salvation only to be obtained through the baptism of blood.

Upon the 18th of October Napoleon returned to Paris, secure of the present friendship and alliance of Russia, but uncertain of the moment when the stimulus of English subsidies would quicken the hostility of Austria into life.

His peril was great, his preparations enormous. He called out two conscriptions. The first taken from the classes of 1806, 7, 8, and 9, furnished eighty thousand men arrived at maturity; these were destined to replace the veterans directed against Spain. The second, taken from the class of 1810, also produced eighty thousand, which were disposed of as reserves in the dépôts of France. The French troops left in Germany were concentrated on the side of Austria; Denmark was evacuated, and one hundred thousand soldiers were withdrawn from the Prussian states. The army of Italy, powerfully reinforced, was placed under prince Eugene, assisted by Massena. Murat, who had succeeded Joseph in the kingdom of Naples, was directed to assemble a Neapolitan army on the shores of Calabria and threaten Sicily. In fine, no measure of prudence was neglected by this wonderful man, to whom the time required by Austria for the preparation of a campaign, seemed sufficient for the subjection of the whole Peninsula.

The French legislative body was opened the 24th of October. The emperor, after giving a concise sketch of the political situation of Europe, touched upon Spain. 'In a few days I go,' said he, 'to put myself at the head of my armies, and with the aid of God to crown the king of Spain in Madrid! to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon!' Then quitting Paris he went to Bayonne, but the labours of his ministers continued. Their speeches and reports, more elaborately explicit than usual, exposed the vast resources of France, and were calculated to show the danger of provoking the enmity of such a powerful nation. From those documents

it appeared, that the expenses of the year, including the interest of the national debt, were under thirty millions sterling, and completely covered by existing taxes drawn from a metallic currency—that no fresh burthens would be laid upon the nation—that numerous public works were in progress—that internal trade and land commerce were flourishing, and nearly one million of men were in arms!

Mr. Canning's readiness to reject negotiation, and defy this

Imperial  
Decree,  
11th Sept.  
1808.

Exposé de  
l'Empire,  
1809.



stupendous power, would lead to the supposition, that on the side of Spain at least he was prepared for the encounter; yet no trace of a matured plan is to be found in the instructions to the generals commanding in Portugal previous to the 25th of September; nor was the project then adopted, one which discovered any adequate knowledge of the force of the enemy, or of the state of affairs: the conduct of the English cabinet relative to the Peninsula was scarcely superior to that of the central junta. Vague projects, or rather speculations, were communicated to the generals in Portugal, but in none was the strength of the enemy alluded to, in none was there a settled plan of operations: a strange delusion relative to Napoleon's power and intentions guided the English ministers.

It was the 6th of October before a despatch, containing the first determinate plan of campaign arrived at Lisbon. Thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry were to be employed in the north of Spain. Of these ten thousand were to be embarked at the English ports, the remainder to be composed of regiments drafted from the army then in Portugal. Sir John Moore was to command, and was authorized to unite the whole by a voyage round the coast, or by a march through the interior. He chose the latter, 1°. because a voyage at that season of the year would have been tedious and precarious; 2°. because the intention of sir Hew Dalrymple had been to enter Spain by Almeida, and the arrangements which that general had made were for such a march; 3°. because he was informed the province of Galicia would be scarcely able to equip the force coming from England under the command of sir David Baird. He was however to take the field immediately, and fix upon some place, either in Galicia or on the borders of Leon, for concentrating the whole army; the specific plan of operations to be concerted afterwards with the Spanish generals. This was a shallow project. The Ebro was to be the theatre of war, and the head of the great French host coming from Germany was already in the passes of the Pyrenees; the local difficulties impeding the English general were of a nature to render that which was ill begun end worse, and that which was well arranged fail. To be first in

Lord Castle-  
reagh's Des-  
patch.  
Parl. Papers.

the field is a great and decided advantage, yet here the plan of operations was not even arranged when the enemy's first blows were descending.

Sir John Moore had to organize an army of raw soldiers ; and in a poor, unsettled country, just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and griping enemy, he was to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even the officers' baggage. With money, and an experienced staff, such obstacles do not much embarrass a good general ; but here, few of the subordinate officers had served a campaign, and the administrative departments, though zealous and willing, were new to a service where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience from being severely felt. The roads were very bad, the rainy season, so baleful to troops, was at hand, it was essential to be quick, and gold which turneth the wheels of war was wanting. And this, at all times a great evil, was here most grievously felt ; for the Portuguese, accustomed to fraud on the part of their own government and to forced contributions by the French, could not readily be persuaded that an army of foreigners, paying with promises only, might be trusted. Nor was this natural suspicion allayed by observing, that while the general and his troops were without money, the subordinate agents dispersed throughout the country were amply supplied. Sir David Baird, who was to land at Coruña and equip his troops in a country exhausted by Blake, was likewise encompassed with difficulties : from Coruña to the nearest point where he could effect a junction with the forces marching from Lisbon was two hundred miles, and he also was without money.

No general-in-chief was appointed to command the Spanish armies, nor was Moore referred to any person with whom he could communicate at all, much less concert a plan of operations. He was unacquainted with the views of the Spanish government, and was alike uninformed of the numbers, composition, and situation of the armies with which he was to act, and those with which he was to contend. His own genius and twenty-five thousand pounds in the military chest, constituted his resources for a campaign which

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.

Appendix,  
No. 13,  
§§ 1 and 3.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 1.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 4.

was to lead him far from the coast and all its means of supply. He was to unite his forces by a winter march of three hundred miles; another three hundred were to be passed before he reached the Ebro; he was to concert a plan of operations with generals, jealous quarrelsome and independent, their positions extended from the northern sea-coast to Zaragoza, their men insubordinate, differing in customs, discipline, language, and religion from the English, and despising all foreigners: and all this was to be accomplished in time to defeat an enemy already in the field, accustomed to great movements, and conducted by the most rapid and decided of men. The ministers' views were equally vast and inconsiderate, and their miscalculations are the more remarkable, as there was not wanting a man in the highest military situation, to condemn their plan at the time and propose a better.

The duke of York, in a formal minute drawn up for the information of the government, observed, that the Spanish armies being unconnected and occupying a great extent of ground were weak; that the French, concentrated and certain of reinforcements, were strong; that there could be no question of the relative value of Spanish and French soldiers, and consequently the allies might be beaten before the British could arrive at the scene of action: the latter would then, unaided, have to meet the French army, and it was essential to provide a sufficient number of troops for that emergency. Less than sixty thousand would not suffice, and he showed in detail how they could be provided without detriment to any other service: his advice was unheeded.

Appendix,  
No. 24.

At this period also, the effects of that incredible folly and weakness, which marked all the proceedings of the central junta, were felt throughout Spain. In any other country its conduct would have been attributed to insanity. So apathetic with respect to the enemy as to be contemptible, so active in pursuit of self-interest as to become hateful; continually devising how to render itself at once despotic and popular, how to excite enthusiasm and check freedom of expression; how to enjoy the luxury of power without its labour, how to acquire great reputation without

Mr. Stuart's  
Letters, MS.

trouble, how to be indolent and victorious at the same moment. Fear prevented the members from removing to Madrid after every preparation had been made for a public entrance into that capital; they passed decrees repressing the liberty of the press on the ground of the deceptions practised upon the public, yet themselves never hesitated to deceive the British agents, the generals, the government, and their own countrymen, by the most flagitious falsehoods upon every subject, whether of greater or less importance. They hedged their dignity with ridiculous and misplaced forms opposed to the vital principle of an insurrectional government, devoted their attention to abstract speculations, recalled the exiled Jesuits, and inundated the country with laboured state papers while the war was left uncared for. Every application of lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, even for an order to expedite a common courier, was met by difficulties and delays, it was necessary to have recourse to the most painful solicitations to obtain the slightest attention: nor did that mode always succeed.

Sir John Moore strenuously grappled with the difficulties besetting him. He desired that troops who had a journey of six hundred miles to make previous to meeting the enemy, should not at the commencement be overwhelmed by the torrents of rain, which in Portugal descend, at this period, with such violence as to destroy the shoes, ammunition, and accoutrements, and render troops almost unfit for service. The Spanish generals recommended that his march should be by Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, Valladolid, and Burgos, and his magazines formed at one of the latter towns. This advice coincided with previous preparations, and the army was directed upon Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, the artillery and cavalry to move by Alcantara. Almeida was to be the place of arms, and reserve stores and provisions were directed there; but want of money, the unsettled state of the country, and the inexperience of the commissariat, rendered it difficult to procure the means of transport even for the light baggage of the regiments, although the quantity of the latter was so reduced

Appendix, as to create discontent. Sataro, already mentioned  
No. 13, § 6. as Junot's agent, engaged to supply the army, but



dishonestly failed in his contract, and so embarrassed the operations, that the general resigned all hope of being able to move with more than the light baggage, the ammunition necessary for immediate use, and a scanty supply of medicines: his magazines at Almeida were also retarded, and the subsistence of the troops thrown on a raw commissariat unprovided with money. Nevertheless Moore, relying upon its increasing experience, and the activity of lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, did not delay his march. He sent agents to Madrid and other places to make contracts and raise money; for the ministers, with a strange policy, gave the Spaniards all their gold and left the English army to get it back in loans.

Many regiments were in movement, when an unexpected difficulty forced the adoption of fresh dispositions. The native officers and the country people now declared the roads north of the Tagus impracticable for artillery; colonel Lopez, sent by the Spanish government to facilitate the march, confirmed this information; captain Delaney, an intelligent enterprising officer employed to examine the lines of movement, corroborated the general opinion. Junot had indeed brought his guns along those roads, but his carriages had been broken, his batteries rendered unserviceable thereby. There was no remedy, and Moore reluctantly ordered his artillery and cavalry to move by Talavera, Naval Carneiro, the Escorial, the Guadarama, Espinar, Arevalo, and Salamanca. He would have followed with the whole army if the state of the northern roads had been earlier known; but the supplies were all directed towards Almeida, most of the regiments were in march and it was too late to change.

This separation of the artillery violated the maxim which requires the point of concentration to be out of the enemy's reach, but it was forced upon Moore; and the Spaniards had even recommended Burgos and Valladolid as places for magazines. The enemy was declared unable to maintain his defensive positions, and the English general could not suppose Salamanca too advanced for his concentration while covered by the strong Spanish armies said to be overbearing the French on the Ebro. One battery he retained to prove the roads, the remaining twenty-four pieces, the cavalry, a thou-

sand strong, and the pare of many hundred carriages escorted by three thousand infantry took the Talavera road under sir J. Hope, whose capacity and firmness qualified him for the most important commands. The rest of the troops moved by Alcantara, Coria, Abrantes, and Coimbra, upon Ciudad Rodrigo. And with such energy did the general overcome obstacles that his head quarters quitted Lisbon the 26th October, just twenty days after receiving the chief command; a surprising instance of diligence and daring, for to use his own words, 'The army run the risk of finding itself in front of the enemy with no more ammunition than the men carried in their pouches: but had I waited until everything was forwarded, the troops would not have been in Spain until the spring, and I trust the enemy will not find out our wants so soon as they will feel the effects of what we have.'

Expecting everybody to fly except themselves, the Spaniards thought him slow, and from every quarter letters arrived, pressing him to advance. Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, witnessing the sluggish incapacity of the government, judged his support essential to sustain the reeling strength of Spain. The central junta had hitherto contemned the enemy, and the generals and people echoed its boasts; but an intercepted letter addressed by the governor of Bayonne to marshal Jourdan, awoke their fears. It stated that sixty thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry would reinforce the French between the 16th October and the 16th of November: and then, with the impatience usually attending improvidence, the junta so slow itself required others to be supernaturally quick. Meanwhile sir David Baird reached the port of Coruña with his army, and lord William Bentinck had notified his approach, and the junta assured him every facility would be given for disembarkation and supply. No orders were however

issued, no preparations made; wherefore the Coruña junta to avoid trouble, and hoping to drive Baird to another port, would not let him land without permission from Aranjuez, and fifteen days elapsed before an answer could be obtained from a government which was daily reproaching sir John Moore for tardiness!

Sir David Baird had no money. Moore could only give

him: £8000, a sum to be mistaken for a private loan, if the fact of its being public property were not expressly mentioned. Yet at this time Mr. Frere arrived at Coruña with two millions of dollars intended for the use of the Spaniards; and while such large sums, contrary to the earnest recommendations of Mr. Stuart and major Cox, were lavished in that quarter, Baird's penury forced him to borrow from the funds in Mr. Frere's hands. The troops then moved, but wanting all the equipments essential they only marched by half battalions, conveying their stores on country cars hired from day to day: nor was that meagre assistance obtained but at great expense, and by compliance with a vulgar mercenary spirit predominant among the authorities of Gallieia; for the junta promised to procure earriages yet did not until the commissaries offered exorbitant remuneration, whereupon ears were produced: the proerastination of the government being concerted to rob the military chest. In fine, the local rulers were unfriendly, crafty, fraudulent; the peasantry suspicious, fearful, rude, disinclined toward strangers, and indifferent to public affairs: a few shots only were required to render theirs a hostile instead of a friendly greeting.

With Mr. Frere came a fleet, conveying a Spanish force under the marquis of Romana. When the insurrection first broke forth, that nobleman commanded fourteen or fifteen thousand troops serving with the French armies. Castaños, through sir H. Dalrymple, desired the British government to apprise Romana that Spain was in arms, and extricate his army, and Mr. M'Kenzie was selected by the ministers to conduct the enterprise. The Spaniards were in Holstein, Sleswig, Jutland, and the islands of Funen, Zealand, and Langeland. M'Kenzie, through the medium of one Robertson, a catholic priest, opened a communication with Romana, and neither general nor soldiers hesitated. Sir Richard Keats then appeared off Nyborg in the island of Funen, with a squadron detached from the Baltic fleet, and a majority of the Spanish regiments quartered in Sleswig immediately seized all the craft in the harbours, and pushed

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 1.  
Sir John  
Moore to  
lord Castle-  
reagh,  
27th October.  
Appendix,  
No. 13,  
§§ 5 and 6.

Sir Hew Dal-  
rymple's Cor-  
respondence.

across the channel to Funen, where Romana, with the assistance of Keats, had seized the port and castle of Nyborg, without opposition, save from a small Danish ship of war moored in the harbour. From thence the Spaniards passed to Langeland, where they embarked, nine thousand strong, on board the English fleet commanded by sir James Saumarez: the rest of the troops either remained in Sleswig or were disarmed by the Danish force in Zealand. This enterprise was ably conducted, and the readiness of the Spanish soldiery was very honourable, yet the danger was slight to all save Mr. Robertson. Romana, after visiting England, repaired to Coruña, but his troops landed at St. Andero, where they were equipped from the English stores, and then proceeded by divisions to join Blake's army in Biscay.

Nothing was of greater interest than the appointment of a Spanish generalissimo. Sir J. Moore desired lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart to press it on the central government, and to lord Castlereagh he represented the evil of delay, proposing to go himself to Madrid upon the matter. Subsequent events prevented this, and it is doubtful if he could have influenced a government, described by Mr. Stuart, after a thorough experience of its qualities, as 'never having made a single exertion for the public good, neither rewarding merit nor punishing guilt, and being for all useful purposes absolutely null:' the junta's objection to a military chief was not an error of the head, and reason is of little avail against self-interest. Meanwhile what depended on himself was vigorously forwarded and rapidly the British troops marched; but Anstruther had unadvisedly halted the leading column in Almeida, and when Moore reached that town on the 8th of November, he found all the infantry assembled there, instead of being on the road to Salamanca. The condition of the men was superb, their discipline exemplary; on that side all was well; but from the obstacles encountered by Baird, and the change of direction in the artillery, no considerable force could be brought into action before the end of the month, and the Spaniards were wildly hastening events. Lord William said the French were quiet on the Ebro, though reinforced by ten thousand men—that Castaños meant to cross that river at



Tudela—and the Aragōnese were moving by Sor upon Roncevalles, to fall on the French rear while Castaños assailed their left. Moore, foreseeing these movements would bring on a battle, became uneasy for his artillery; and his concern was augmented by finding the guns might have marched with the columns. ‘If anything adverse happens, I have not,’ he writes to Hope, ‘necessity to plead; the road we are now travelling, that by Villa Velha and Guarda, is practicable for artillery; the brigade under Wilmot has already reached Guarda, and as far as I have already seen, the road presents few obstacles, and those easily surmounted; this knowledge was however only acquired by our own officers; when the brigade was at Castello Branco it was not certain it could proceed.’ Thus taught, he told Hope no longer to trust reports, but seek a shorter line by Placentia, across the mountains to Salamanca.

Up to this period all communications public and private, from the English and Spanish governments, and the agents, coincided upon one subject. ‘*The Spaniards were an enthusiastic, a heroic people, a nation of unparalleled energy! their armies were brave, they were numerous, they were confident! one hundred and eighty thousand men were actually in line of battle, extending from the sea-coast of Biscay to Zaragoza; the French reduced to a fourth of this number were cooped up in a corner, shrinking from an encounter; they were deserted by the emperor, they were trembling, they were spiritless!*’ Nevertheless Moore was distrustful. He detected the elements of disaster in the divided commands and lengthened lines of the Spaniards; and early in October predicted mischief. ‘As long as the French remain upon the defensive,’ he observed, ‘it will not be much felt, but the moment an attack is made some great calamity must ensue.’ Yet he was not without faith in the multitude and energy of the patriots when he considered the greatness of their cause.

Castaños was now, by the central junta, named to concert the plan of campaign. Moore, concluding it was a preliminary step towards being generalissimo, wrote to him in a style to ensure cordial co-operation; and thinking this a change of system formed better hopes; they were soon dashed aside. Castaños was superseded even in his subordinate command,

the whole absurdity of the Spanish character broke forth, and confusion followed. At that moment also, clouds arose in a quarter hitherto all sunshine. As the crisis approached, the military agents lowered their sanguine tone, and no longer dwelt upon the enthusiasm of the armies; they admitted, that the confidence of the troops was sinking, and were even in numbers inferior to the French. In truth it was full time to change, for the real state of affairs could no longer be concealed, a great catastrophe was at hand. But what of wildness in their projects, or of skill in the enemy's, what of ignorance, vanity and presumption in the generals, what of fear among the soldiers and of fortune in the events, combined to hasten the ruin of the Spaniards, and how that ruin was effected, shall now be related.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 7.

## CHAPTER IV.

IN the preceding chapters it has been shown that the bad passions and sordid views of the Spanish juntas were nourished by the unwise prodigality of England. Their full boast and meagre performance have been dissected, the bones and sinews of the insurrection laid bare, and compared with the strongly knitted frame and large proportions of the enemy. The inevitable result of a struggle between such ill-matched forces must be anticipated. And now the sudden and terrible manner in which the Spaniards were overthrown by the tempestuous warfare of the French emperor shall be told, the operations of the armies immediately after Joseph's retreat being first related, for, like a jesting prologue to a deep tragedy, they ushered in the great catastrophe.

CAMPAIGN OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES BEFORE  
THE ARRIVAL OF THE EMPEROR.

When Cuesta was removed from command, and the junta of Seville forced to disgorge so much of the English subsidy as sufficed for the immediate relief of the troops in Madrid, all the Spanish armies closed upon the Ebro.

Blake, reinforced by eight thousand Asturians, established his base of operations at Reynosa, opened a communication with the English vessels off the port of St. Andro, and directed his views towards Biscay.

General Bro-  
derick's Cor-  
respondence.

The Castillian army, conducted by Pignatelli, resumed its march upon Burgo del Osma and Logroña.

Two divisions of Andalusians under Lapeña, and the Murcian division of Llamas, advanced to Tarazona and Tudela.

Capt. Whit-  
tingham.

Col. Doyle. Palafox, with the Aragonese and St. Marc's Valencian division, operated from the side of Zaragoza towards the north.

The conde de Belvidere, a weak youth scarce twenty years of age, marched with fifteen thousand Estremadurans upon Logroña, to join Castaños, but soon received another destination.

Between these armies was neither concert nor connexion, their movements were regulated by some partial view, or the caprice of generals ignorant of each other's plans and little solicitous to combine operations. The feeble characters and inexperience of the chiefs, and their want of system, favoured intrigues and invited unqualified persons to interfere in the direction of affairs. Thus we find Doyle priding himself for persuading Palafox to detach seven thousand men to Sanguessa; and Whittingham, unknowing of Doyle's interference, earnestly dissuading the Spaniard from that enterprise. The first affirming the movement would 'turn the enemy's left flank, threaten his rear, and have the appearance of cutting off his retreat.' The second arguing that Sanguessa being seventy miles from Zaragoza, and only a few leagues from Pampeluna, the detachment would itself be cut off. Doyle said it would draw the French from Caparosa and Milagro,—expose those places to Llamas and La-Peña,—force the enemy to recall reinforcements known to be marching against Blake,—enable that general to join the Asturians, and with forty thousand men seize the Pyrenees, which would cut off the French, estimated at thirty-five thousand, and force them to fly; or Blake might move on Miranda del Ebro, and sweep Biscay and Castille. Palafox, pleased with this plan, sent Whittingham to inform Llamas and La-Peña that O'Neil with six thousand men would enter Sanguessa the 15th of September. They thought the movement dangerous, premature, and at variance with the general plan settled at Madrid; nevertheless Palafox sent O'Neil to Sanguessa, from whence he was immediately driven across the Alagon.

Whittingham's Correspondence.

This was a sample of the profound ignorance of war which characterized all their projects, yet victory was more confidently



anticipated, than if consummate skill had presided over the arrangements; and this vain-glorious feeling was by the military agents' despatches propagated in England, where the fore-boasting was nearly as loud and as absurd as in the Peninsula. The delusion was universal. Even lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, deceived by the curious consistency of the falsehoods, doubted if the French army could maintain its position, and believed the Spaniards had obtained a moral ascendancy in the field. Drunk with vanity and folly, despising the 'remnants,' such was their expression, of the French army on the Ebro, which they estimated at from thirty-five to forty thousand men, the Spanish government proposed, that the British army should go to Catalonia; and when this was declined, they withdrew ten thousand men from the Murcian division, and sent them to Lerida at the moment the French army was augmented on the upper Ebro.

Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence MS.  
Doyle's Correspondence MS.

Their innate pride and arrogance were also nourished by the timid operations of Joseph. Twenty days after the evacuation of Madrid, he had above fifty thousand fighting men, exclusive of eight thousand employed to maintain the communications, and furnish the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tolosa, Irun, St. Sebastian, and Bilbao; exclusive also of the Catalonian army, which was seventeen thousand strong, and distinct from his command. A strong reserve, assembled at Bayonne under general Drouet, supplied reinforcements, and was itself supported by drafts from the interior of France; six thousand men, organized as moveable columns, watched the openings of the Pyrenees from St. John Pied de Port to Rousillon, guarding the frontier against Spanish incursions; and a second reserve, composed of Neapolitians, Tuscans, and Piedmontese, was commenced at Belgarde, with a view of supporting Duhesme in Catalonia. How the king quelled the nascent insurrection at Bilbao, and dispersed the insurgents of the valleys in Aragon, has been related. The French army was then re-organized in three grand divisions and a reserve, but made no movement. Bessières commanded the right wing, Moneey the left, and Ney, coming from Paris, took the centre. The reserve, chiefly composed of detachments

Appendix,  
No. 6.

from the imperial guard, remained with the king; and the old republican general, Jourdan, a man whose day of glory belonged to another æra, became chief of the staff.

With such a force, nothing in Spain, turn which way he would, could resist the king's march; but the incongruity of a camp with a court produced indecision and error; the truncheon, unlike the sceptre, does not fit every hand, and the French army soon felt the inconvenience of having at its head a king who was not a warrior. Joseph remained on the defensive without understanding the force of the maxim, '*that offensive movements are the foundation of a good defence.*'

Napoleon's  
notes, Ap-  
pendix,  
Nos. 4 & 5.

He held Bilbao, and, contrary to the advice of the generals who conducted the operations on his left, abandoned Tudela to place his left at Milagro, a small town situated near the confluence of the Arga and Aragon with the Ebro. While Bessières held Burgos in force, his cavalry commanded the valley of the Duero, menaced Palencia and Valladolid, scoured the plains, and kept Blake and Cuesta in check. Instead of reinforcing that post, the king relinquished it, and placed Bessières' troops behind it, as far as Puente Lara on the Ebro; Ney's force then lined that river down to Logroño, the reserve was quartered behind Miranda; and Trevino, an obscure place, was chosen as the point of battle for the right and centre.

Journal of  
the king's  
Operations,  
MS.

In this situation Joseph remained until late in September, occupied in repairing his artillery and transport carriages, collecting magazines, remounting his cavalry, and preparing for the arrival of the host from Germany. But the front shown to the Spaniards evinced timidity. The left leaned towards the great communication with France, and seemed to refuse the support of Pampeluna, indicating a disposition to retreat; Tudela on one flank, Burgos on the other were neglected, and the king while complaining of the extreme difficulty of getting intelligence, made no forward movements to feel for his adversaries: wandering as it were in the dark, he gave a loose to his imagination, and conjuring up a phantom of Spanish strength, anxiously awaited its approach as a reality.

His errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother,

whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect, through the glare of the insurrection, all its inefficiency. He dreaded the moral effect produced by its momentary success, and was preparing to crush the rising hopes of his enemies: but despising the Spaniards as soldiers, Joseph's retreat and subsequent position displeased him, and he desired to have the exultation of the patriots rebuked by a bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him an outline, evincing his absolute mastery of the art of war.

*'It was too late,' he said, 'to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned; idle to consider if a position covering the siege of Zaragoza might not have been formed; useless to examine if the line of the Duero was not better than that of the Ebro for the French army. The line of the Ebro was taken and must be kept; to advance from that river without a fixed object would create indecision, this would bring the troops back again, and produce an injurious moral effect. But why abandon Tudela? why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note and reputation. They gave moral influence, and moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first, possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna and Madrid, commanded the canal of Zaragoza, was the capital of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, the first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to Tudela the land carriage was three days, the water carriage was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela, was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be in a state of insurrection and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was of vast importance, Milagro of none, it was an obscure place, without a bridge, commanded no communication, was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing! A river,' said this great commander, 'as large as the Vistula and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing unless there are good points of passage and a head quick to take the offensive; the Ebro is less than nothing, a mere line, Milagro is useless, the enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and gain*

Appendix  
No. 5.

*Tolosa before any preparation could be made to receive him: he might come from Soria, from Logroño, or from Zaragoza.*

*Burgos is the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army; to occupy it in force and offensively, would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary to have made war a long time to conceive this; it is necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises, to know how much the smallest event or even indication, encourages, or discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of another.'—'In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroño, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not known if he has left Madrid; it is not known what has become of the Gallician army, there is reason to suspect it may have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state, to take up, instead of a bold menacing and honourable position like Burgos, a confined shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, you have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions to go farther back; or we have chosen our ground to fight, come there without fear of being disturbed on your march. But what will the French general do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the citadel of that town be taken by six thousand insurgents? if the French have left a garrison in the castle, how can four or five hundred men retire in such a vast plain? From that time all is gone; if the enemy masters the citadel, it cannot be retaken. If, on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle, because it cannot hold out more than three days; and if we are to fight why should Bessières abandon the ground where we wish to fight.*

*'These dispositions appear badly considered; when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet with such an insult as will demoralize them, if there are only insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If fifteen thousand insurgents enter Burgos, retrench themselves in the town and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there and retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience; if, during this time the real attack is upon Logroño or Pampeluna, we shall*



*have made countermarches without use, and fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to say, we do not intend stopping, and invite the enemy to come there? It is the first time an army has quitted all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and one combinations which might take place and the distance of the enemy did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna, between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda del Ebro.'*

Then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments of military science, and in profound ignorance of numbers, positions and resources, point out the accurate mode of executing the most delicate and difficult operations of war. The rebuke of Turenne, who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass the Rhine at a particular spot, if the latter's finger were a bridge, has been lost upon such men, and the more recent opinion of Napoleon may be disregarded. 'But it is not permitted,' says that consummate general, '*it is not permitted, at the distance of three hundred leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to direct what should be done!*'

Having thus avoided the charge of presumption, the emperor recommended certain dispositions for defending the Ebro, and giving a short analysis of Dupont's campaigns, declared that '*twenty-five thousand French, in a good position, would suffice to beat all the Spanish armies united.*'—'*Let Tudela,*' he said, '*be retrenched, if possible; at all events occupied in force, and offensively towards Zaragoza. Let the general commanding there, collect provisions on all sides, secure the boats, with a view to future operations when the reinforcements shall arrive, and maintain his communication with Logroño by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the left; let his corps be considered as one of observation. If a body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or against Zaragoza; if regular troops attack him and he is forced across the Ebro, let him dispute the ground to Pampeluna until the*

*general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body: in this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take place. and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled its task.*

*‘Let marshal Bessières, with his whole corps reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood near Burgos; let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the dépôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in a condition to act, be under arms every day at three o’clock in the morning, and remain until the return of his patroles; he should also send parties to a great extent, as far as two days’ march. Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda dél Ebro and Briviesca, and the encumbrances likewise sent across the Ebro behind Vitoria; this corps should be under arms every morning, and send patroles by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be expected: it must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being to be united, should be connected as little as possible with Logroño, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having a line of operations upon Pampeluna and a separate part to act: Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on the defensive, in short, make war! that is to say, get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors, you will then be perfectly informed. The patroles should always be directed upon the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side of Aranda; they could thus form three posts of interception, and send three reports of men arrested, who should however be treated well and dismissed after they had given the information desired of them. Let the enemy then come: we can unite all our forces, hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he is meditating an offensive movement.’*

With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus wrote:—

*‘Soria is only two short marches from the position of the army, and it has constantly acted against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy Santander, it will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to Santander. It will be*

*necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and Navarre, and every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot. The manufactories of arms at Placencia should be watched, to hinder them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be armed and fortified with great activity; ovens and magazines of provisions and ammunition should be placed there, because, situated nearly half way between Madrid and Bayonne, an intermediate post for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards Galicia. The interest of the enemy is to mask his forces; by hiding the true point of attack, he operates so, that the blow he means to strike is never indicated in a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in which he makes his offensive system act to protect his defensive system.*

Navarre and Biscay being within the French line of defence, the inhabitants were, according to the civilians, *de facto* French subjects.

*'We have no accounts of what the enemy is about, it is said no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in an army, as if spies were common; they must do in Spain as they do in other places. Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the master of the post or his deputy, and above all the letters. Put these persons under arrest until they speak; question them twice each day, or keep them as hostages; charge them to send foot messengers and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and force it is easy to get intelligence. All the posts, all the letters must be intercepted; the single motive of procuring intelligence will be sufficient to authorize a detachment of four or five thousand men, who will go into a great town, take the letters from the post, seize the richest citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, &c. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines, the inhabitants are all informed of what passes, of course out of that line they know more; what then should prevent you from seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without being ill-treated. It is a fact, that when we are not in a desert but in a peopled country, if the general is not well-instructed it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the inhabitants*

*render to an enemy's general are never given from affection, nor even to get money; the truest method to obtain them is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their goods, their towns, or their monasteries!*

Joseph seems to have had no portion of his brother's martial genius. The operations recommended by the latter did not appear to the king applicable to the state of affairs; he proposed others, in discussing which, he thus defended the policy of his retreat from Madrid.

*'When the defection of twenty-two thousand men (Dupont's) caused the French to quit the capital, the disposable troops remaining were divided in three corps, namely, the king's marshal Bessières', and general Verdier's then besieging Zaragoza; but these bodies were spread over a hundred leagues of ground, and with the last the king had little or no connexion. His first movement was to unite the two former at Burgos, afterwards to enter into communication with the third, and then the line of defence on the Ebro was adopted; an operation dictated by sound reason, because when the events of Andalusia foreboded a regular and serious war, prudence did not permit three corps, the strongest of which was only eighteen thousand men, to separate to a greater distance than six days' march, in the midst of eleven millions of people in a state of hostility. But fifty thousand French could defend with success a line of sixty leagues, and could guard the two grand communications of Burgos and Tudela against enemies, who had not up to that period been able to carry to either point above twenty-five thousand men. In this mode fifteen thousand French could be united upon either of those roads.'*

Dissatisfied with Napoleon's plans, Joseph, still holding Bilbao, distributed the fifty thousand men remaining as follows. The right wing occupied Burgos, Pancorbo, and Puente Lara. The centre was posted between Haro and Logroño. The left extended from Longroño to Tudela, and the latter town was not occupied. He contended, that this arrangement, at once offensive and defensive, might be continued if the great army directed upon Spain arrived in September, since it tended to refit the troops, and menaced the enemy; but it could not be prolonged until November, because in three months the Spaniards must make



great progress, and would be in a state to take the offensive with grand organized corps, obedient to a central administration formed in Madrid. Everything announced, he said, that the month of October would be a decisive epoch, giving the party who knew how to profit, the priority of movements and a success the progress of which it was difficult to calculate.

In this view of affairs, the merits of six projects were to be discussed.

‘1°. To remain in the actual position. This was unsustainable. The enemy could attack the left with forty thousand, the centre with forty thousand, the right with as many. Tudela and Navarre, as far as Logroño, required twenty-five thousand men. Burgos could only be defended by an army able to resist the united forces of Blake and Cuesta, eighty thousand men; it was doubtful if the twenty thousand bayonets opposed to them could completely beat them; if not, the French would be harassed by the insurgents of Biscay, Navarre, and Guipuscoa, who would interpose between the left wing and France.

‘2°. To carry the centre and reserve, by Tudela towards Zaragoza or Albazan. United with the left they would amount to thirty thousand men, who might seek and defeat the enemy on that side. Meantime, the right wing, leaving garrisons in the citadel of Burgos and the fort of Pancorbo, could occupy the enemy and watch the Montaña de Santander, and the disembarkations which might take place. But this task was difficult, because Pancorbo was not the only defile accessible to artillery; three leagues from thence, another road led upon Miranda, and there was a third passage over the point of the chain which stretched between Haro and Miranda.

‘3°. Leave the defence of Navarre to the left wing. Carry the centre, the reserve, and right wing to Burgos, and beat the enemy before he could unite; an easy task as the French would be thirty thousand strong. Meanwhile Moncey would check the Spaniards near Tudela, or, failing to do so, could march up the Ebro, by Longroño and Briviesca, and join the main body: the communication with France would be lost, but the army might maintain itself until the arrival of the emperor. As a modification of this project, Moncey, retiring

to the entrenched camp of Pampeluna, could there await either the arrival of the emperor, or the result of the operations towards Burgos.

‘4°. Pass the Ebro in retreat, and tempt the enemy to fight in the plain between that river and Vitoria.

‘5°. Retire, supporting the left upon Pampeluna the right upon Montdragon.

‘6°. Leave garrisons, with the means of a six weeks’ defence, in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos. Unite the rest of the army, attack the enemy wherever he was found, and then wait near Madrid, or in that country where the pursuit of the Spaniards or the facility of living should draw the army. This plan relinquished the communications with France, but the grand army would re-open them; and the troops already in Spain would defy the enemy’s efforts, and wait in a noble attitude the general impulse to be given by the arrival of the emperor.’

Of these projects, the king recommended the last as of the most likelihood; Ney and Jourdan also approved of it; but Napoleon had too little confidence in his brother’s military talent to entrust so great a matter to his guidance.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Some sympathy of genius is necessary where one man executes another’s conceptions in war; without such harmony of thought, accidental events will embarrass the executor; while, aiming to reconcile the plan with his own view, he will generally reel in his course and fail. The reason seems to be that inveterate attention must be fixed on leading principles to enable a general to disregard crosses which would otherwise break down his self-possession. Joseph could not comprehend Napoleon.

2°. The king’s original memoir upon his six projects is too much interlined and blotted to be taken as a matured production; but the pervading errors are, the adopting of conjectural data, without any information as to the Spanish forces, views, or interior policy. He assumed that the central junta was able and provident, the Spaniards united, the armies

strong and well guided: none of this was true. He estimated Blake and Cuesta's armies united at eighty thousand: but they never were united, and could not have mustered sixty thousand. The bold plan of throwing himself into the interior came too late, he should have thought of it before quitting Madrid, or at least before a central government was established.

3°. Any of Joseph's proposed plans might have succeeded against the miserable Spanish armies; yet they were all faulty. The first wanted those offensive combinations discussed by the emperor, it was timid and incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered. For taking the king's estimate, the Spaniards might have opposed thirty thousand men on each flank to the heads of his advancing columns, and yet unite sixty thousand in the centre at Logroño, with which to pass the Ebro, excite insurrection in Navarre and Biscay, and seizing Tolosa and Miranda del Ebro, cut the French army in two parts and intercept its communications. The third was not better. Burgos, as an offensive post protecting the line of defence was valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but if the Spaniards refused battle with their left while the centre and right operated by Logroño and Sanguessa, what would have been the result? the French right must then, without a definite object, have continued to advance, or remain stationary without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those positions which it had just quitted. The fourth depended entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not suitable to the real state of affairs. The king's force had become the advanced guard of the great army under Napoleon. To make an independent decisive movement with it, would be to make the advanced guard determine the operations of the main body, and trust to accident instead of design. It is curious that Joseph proposed this irruption into Spain, when the Spaniards and the military agents of Great Britain were trembling, lest he should escape their power by a precipitate flight. *'War is not a conjectural art!'*

## CHAPTER V.

JOSEPH'S offensive project being overruled by his brother, he distributed his centre and right wing in a better manner, but still neglected to occupy Tudela, and kept his left behind the Aragon. On the 18th of September the French were disposed as follows:—

	Under Arms.	
Right wing, Marshal Bessières	15,595	{ Three divisions of infantry in front of Pancorbo, at Briviesca, Santa Maria, and Cuba; light cavalry behind Burgos.
Centre, Marshal Ney . . .	13,756	Logrono, Nalda, and Najera.
Left wing, Marshal Moncey	16,636	{ Milagro, Lodosa, Caparosa, and Alfaro. The garrison of Pampeluna was also under Moncey's command.
Reserve of the king.		
General Saligny . . .	5,413	
Imperial guard.		
General Dorsenne . . .	2,423	
Total ———	7,833	{ Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara.
Garrisons . . . . .	6,004	Pampeluna.
General Monthion . . . .	1,500	Bilbao.
General La Grange . . . .	6,979	{ Composed of small garrisons and moveable columns, guarding the communications of Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa.
Grand reserve.		
Moveable columns . . .	1,984	
Stationary . . . . .	20,005	
Total, commanded by }	21,989	{ Bayonne, and watching the valleys of the Pyrenees opening into Navarre.
General Drouet . . . }		

Total 90,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in Catalonia; and when the communications were secured, the fortresses garrisoned, and the fort of Pancorbo armed, there remained above fifty thousand sabres and bayonets disposable on a line of battle extending from Bilbao to Alfaro.



To oppose this force the Spanish troops were divided into three principal masses, denominated the armies of the right, centre, and left.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.	First Line.	
The first, composed of the divisions of St. Marc and O'Neil, numbered about . . . . .	17,500	500	24	Men. 75,400	Guns 86
The second, composed of the divisions of La-Peña, Llamas, and Caro . . . . .	26,000	1,300	36		
The third, consisting entirely of Gallicians, about . . . . .	30,000	100	26		
Second Line.					
In the second line the Castillians were at Segovia . . . . .	12,000	—	—	57,000	
The Estremadurans at Talavera . . . . .	13,000	—	—		
Two Andalusian divisions were in La Mancha . . . . .	14,000	—	—		
The Asturians posted at Llanes were called . . . . .	18,000	—	—		

This estimate, founded upon a number of contemporary returns and other documents, proves the monstrous exaggerations put forth at the time to deceive the Spanish people and the English government. It was pretended that one hundred and forty thousand enthusiastie well provided soldiers were threatening the French positions on the Ebro, whereas less than seventy-six thousand were in line, ill-armed and provided. The right, under Palafox, was between Zaragoza and Sangüessa on the Aragon river; the centre, under Castaños, occupied Borja, Tarazona, and Agreda; the left, under Blake, was posted at Reynosa near the sources of the Ebro. These positions were with reference to the enemy very disadvantageous. From the right to the left of their line, that is, from Reynosa to Zaragoza, was twice the distance between Bayonne and Vitoria, and the roads more difficult; the reserve under Drouet was consequently in closer military communication with Joseph than the Spanish wings were with each other; and the latter were acting, without concert, upon double external lines, against an enemy superior in numbers and every military qualification. The French base rested on three great fortresses,—Bayonne, St Sebastian, and Pampe-luna; in three days Joseph could concentrate his centre and reserves on either flank, thus uniting thirty thousand men

without drawing from his garrisons. The Spaniards had only one fortress, Zaragoza. They were under different generals having equal authority, could make no combined efforts with rapidity, nor concentrate more than forty thousand in any case at a given point.

Blake having six divisions, each five thousand strong, advanced the 17th. One division menaced Burgos to cover the main body, which threading the valley of Villarcayo turned Bessières' right and reached the Ebro, occupying Traspaderma, Frias, and Oña, Medina and Erran, and one division was left at Villarcayo to preserve the communication with Reynosa. On the left of this army general Acevedo advanced to Santander with eight thousand Asturians. General Broderiek now reached Blake's camp, and was instantly importuned for money; when supplied he was treated with coldness and was denied all information as to the military operations. English vessels still hovered off the coast to supply arms and ammunition for the Biscayans, and Blake thinking to revive the insurrection and extend it to Guipuscoa, detached the marquis of Portazgo with a division and five guns to attack general Monthion at Bilbao. The king ordered a brigade to fall on Portazgo's flank by the valley of Orduña, sent Merlin by the valley of Durango, to reinforce Bilbao, and ordered Bessières to make a demonstration on the side of Frias. He was too late. Portazgo entered Bilbao. Monthion retired, and Bessières after injuring the defences of Burgos, fell back to Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara, on the Ebro.

Then the king took post at Vitoria, and Ney marched with his whole corps upon Bilbao, arriving there the 26th. Merle's division executed a combined movement at the same time from Miranda del Ebro upon Osma and Barbaeña. Portazgo thus menaced, occupied the heights above Bilbao until night-fall and then retreated to Valmaeada, where he found the third division: for Blake now occupied Frias with his right, Quineoes with his centre, and Valmaeada with his left: thus the second effort to raise Biscay failed.

Correspondence of captain Carrol. Ibid.

General Broderiek.

Correspondence of general Leith.

Journal of the king's Operations, MS.

Correspondence of general Leith.

Meantime O'Neil, who had been beaten from Sanguessa with loss of two guns, took post in the mountains facing that city, and the Castilian army approached the Ebro by the Soria roads; La-Peña occupied Logroño, Nalda, and Najera; Llamas and Caro were in Corella Cascante and Calahorra. The armed peasantry of the valleys assembled, the country between Zaragoza and the Aragon river appeared to be crowded with troops, and Moncey withdrawing from the Ebro, placed his left at the pass of Sanguessa, his centre at Falces, his right at Estella. Ney left Merlin with three thousand men at Bilbao and returned to the Ebro, but finding Logroño strongly occupied by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia in observation. The king and Bessières had on the 4th led two divisions by Osma to feel for Blake towards Frias and Medina, but he was then at Valmaceda, and Joseph believing he was moving against Bilbao pushed to Lodio, designing to attack him in march. At Lodio he discovered his error, and being uneasy for Moncey returned to Murquía, left Merle there to cover the rear of the troops in Bilbao, and then continued his march to Miranda. The 12th, Blake, leaving a division at Orduña attacked Bilbao with eighteen thousand men, and Merlin retired fighting up the valley of Durango as far as Zornosa where he was joined by Verdier with six battalions and checked the pursuit. But the leading columns of the great French army had now passed the frontier. Laval's division entered Durango, Sebastiani having six thousand men relieved Merle at Murquía, the latter repaired to Miranda, Verdier returned to Vitoria, and Lefebvre, duke of Dantzic, assumed command at Durango.

Journal of  
the king's  
Operations,  
MS.

Journal of  
the king's  
Operations,  
MS.

On the Spanish side Romana's troops had disembarked at Santander, and the infantry, eight thousand, were slowly approaching Blake's camp; the Asturians remained in Villarcayo, but the conde de Belvedere was advancing with the Estremadurans, the Castillians had arrived on the Ebro, two more Andalusian divisions were coming through La Mancha, and Castaños reached Tudela. The crisis was approaching, yet so apathetic was the supreme junta, so entirely deficient.

that all the best friends of the cause wished for a defeat to excite the national energy; and many even thought that sharp remedy would be insufficient. Momentary excitation was indeed caused by the intercepted letter to Jourdan before spoken of, the troops in the second line were then ordered to proceed to the Ebro by forced marches, letters were written to press the advance of the British army, and Castaños was *enjoined* to drive the enemy without delay beyond the frontier. But this sudden fury of action ended with those orders. Baird's corps was detained in the transports at Cornña waiting for permission to land; no assistance was afforded to Moore; and though the subsidies already paid by England amounted to ten millions of dollars, though Madrid was rich and willing to contribute to the exigencies of the moment, the central junta, while complaining of the want of money, would not be at the trouble of collecting patriotic gifts, and left the armies to all the horrors of famine, nakedness, and misery. The natural consequence ensued, the people ceased to be enthusiastic, the soldiers deserted in crowds.

Parliamentary Papers.

Vindication of Castaños.


General Broderick's Letter. Parl. Pap.

Birch's Letters to Leith, MS.

Nor were the generals less absurd. Blake had commenced the campaign without magazines, or plan, save that of raising the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa. With blind confidence he pressed forward, ignorant of the force or situation of his adversaries, never dreaming of defeat, and so little acquainted with the detail of command, that he calculated upon the quantity of provisions which could be spared from an English frigate, then cruising off the coast, as a resource for his army, if the country should fail to supply him with subsistence. His artillery had only seventy rounds a gun, his men were without great-coats, many without shoes, and the snow was beginning to fall in the mountains. That he was able to make any impression shows how little Joseph possessed of military talent. The French, from their habitude of war, were indeed able to baffle Blake without difficulty, but the strategic importance of the valley of Orduña they did not appreciate or he would have been destroyed: the







lesson given by Napoleon, when he defeated Wurmser in the valley of the Brenta, might have been repeated under more favourable circumstances at Orduña and Durango. Genius was asleep with the French, dead with the Spaniards. While Blake remained between Frias and Valmaceda he was tolerably secure, because the Montaña of Santander is exceedingly rugged and a retreat by Villarcayo open; but he was ill placed for offensive movements, the only operations he thought of. Instead of occupying Burgos and repairing the citadel, he descended on Bilbao, where several great valleys met, the upper parts being possessed by the French; he was exposed to attack also from Orduña, and his line of retreat was in Bessières' power. To meet these defects of position, he detached largely, weakened his main body, and made slow movements and feeble attacks, displaying temerity without decision or enterprise.

On the Spanish centre and right affairs were not better conducted. Castaños arrived at Tudela the 17th, and the 20th conferred with Palafox at Zaragoza. Their forces did not exceed forty-five thousand men, two to three thousand were cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery followed the divisions, which were posted in the following manner:—

Appendix,  
No. 27.

ARMY OF THE CENTRE 27,000.—Ten thousand Castillian infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and fourteen guns were at Logroño, under Pignatelli. Five thousand Andalusians under Grimarest were at Lodosa. La-Peña had five thousand at Calahorra. The parc of artillery was guarded by four thousand at Centruenigo, the remainder were at Tudela.

ARMY OF ARAGON 18,000.—O'Neil held Sor, Lumbar, and Sanguessa, with seven thousand five hundred men; St. Marc occupied Exca, thirty miles in rear of O'Neil, with five thousand five hundred. Palafox remained in Zaragoza with five thousand.

Between the armies rolled the Ebro, and they occupied two sides of an irregular triangle, Tudela being the apex, Sanguessa and Logroño the extreme points of the base. The Ebro and the Aragon, meeting at Milagro, formed by their double course an arc, the convex being opposed to the Spaniards. The Ega,

the Arga, and the Zidasco, descending from the Pyrenees in parallel streams cut the chord of this arc at nearly equal distances, falling, the two first into the Ebro, the last into the Aragon, and all the roads leading from Pampeluna to the Ebro followed the course of those torrents. Monecy's right was at Estella on the Ega; his centre at Falces and Tafalla, on the Arga and the Zidasco; his left in front of Sanguessa on the Aragon; the bridges of Olite and Peralta were secured by detachments in advance; but Caparosa, where there was another bridge, was occupied in force. He could thus operate between the torrents, commanded the roads leading to the Ebro, and could from Caparosa attack the Spanish centre. From Tudela to Sanguessa is fifty miles, from Tudela to Logroño sixty miles, but from Tudela to Caparosa only twelve miles of good road; wherefore the extremities of the Spanish line were above one hundred miles, or six days' march from each other, while a single day would have sufficed to unite the French within two hours' march of the centre.

If Palafox, crossing the Aragon at Sanguessa, advanced towards Pampeluna, Monecy menaced his left flank and rear; if he turned against Monecy the garrison of Pampeluna menaced his right. If Castaños, to favour Palafox, crossed the Ebro at Logroño, Ney, posted at Guardia, could take him in flank; if the two wings endeavoured to unite, their line of march could be intercepted at Tudela by Monecy, and Castaños could be attacked in rear by Ney passing the Ebro at Logroño or Lodosa. If they remained stationary they might be beaten in detail.

Castaños and Palafox, ignorant and tranquil, were arranging offensive operations singularly absurd. The former, leaving a division at Lodosa and Calahorra, was by a flank march to place his army on the Aragon, the left at Tudela the right at Sanguessa; thus occupying with twenty thousand men fifty miles of country close to a concentrated enemy. Palafox, crossing the Aragon at Sanguessa, was to take an oblique line towards Roncesvalles, covering the valleys of Talay, Escay, and Roncal with his centre, and augmenting his force with insurgent peasants.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.  
Colonel Gra-  
ham's Corre-  
spondence.

Ibid.  
Colonel  
Doyle's Cor-  
respondence.



Blake was invited to co-operate by Guipuseoa, to pass in rear of the French, unite with Palafox, and cut off all retreat to France! This grand movement was to commence the 27th; but on the 21st Grimarest had pushed detachments over the Ebro to Mendavia, Andosilla, Sesma, and Carcur, and over the Ega to the Lerim,—the Castilian outposts were at Viana on the left of the Ebro,—the Aragonese closing on Sanguessa, and the peasants crowding up to get arms and ammunition. Moneey, deceived by such a concourse, estimated the force in Sanguessa at twenty thousand regulars when there were only eight thousand; and his report, coupled with the simultaneous movements at both extremities, made the king apprehend a triple attack from Logroño, Lodosa, and Sanguessa.

He immediately reinforced Ney, directing him to clear the left bank of the Ebro while Bonnet descended the right bank from Haro to Briones. A division, stationed at Estella, received orders to follow the course of the Ega and second Ney's operations, and a part of the garrison of Pampeluna made a demonstration against Sanguessa.

Journal of  
the king's  
Operations,  
MS.

When Castaños reached Logroño these operations were in full activity; Ney had driven back all the outposts and was on the heights opposite that town the 25th, cannonading the Spaniards; next day he renewed his fire, and Castaños giving Pignatelli orders to defend his post unless turned by the right bank of the Ebro, proceeded to Lodosa and Calahorra. Meanwhile the French from Estella, drove the Spanish parties out of Mendavia, Andosilla, Carcur, and Sesma; and Grimarest retired from Lodosa to La Torre with such precipitation, that he left colonel Cruz, a valuable officer, with a light battalion and some volunteers at Lerim, where they were taken after a creditable

Whitting-  
ham's Corre-  
spondence,  
MS.

resistance. Pignatelli, regardless of Castaños' orders, retired from Logroño, abandoned his guns at the foot of the Sierra de Nalda, only a few miles from the enemy, crossed the mountains, and reached Centruenigo in such disorder that his men continued to arrive for twenty-four hours consecutively. On the right, O'Neil skirmishing with the garrison of Pampeluna lost six men killed

Colonel Gra-  
ham's Corre-  
spondence,  
MS.

Colonel Gra-  
ham's Corre-  
spondence,  
MS.

and eight wounded, but announced, that after a hard action of many hours the enemy was completely overthrown. Castaños dismissed Pignatelli, incorporated his troops with the Andalusian divisions, and sent fifteen hundred men back to Nalda under Urbina, conde de Cartoajal, who recovered the lost guns and brought them safe to Centruenigo.

Disensions followed these reverses. Palafox arrogantly censured Castaños, and a cabal, of which Coupigny appears the principal mover, was formed against the latter. The central junta, angry that Castaños had not driven the enemy beyond the frontier, encouraged his traducers and circulated slanderous accusations, as if his inaction alone had enabled the French to remain in Spain. They sent Francisco Palafox, brother of the captain-general and a member of the supreme junta, to head-quarters, avowedly to facilitate, really to control the military operations. He arrived at Alfaro the 29th accompanied by Coupigny and the conde de Montijo, the last a turbulent factious man, shallow, vain, designing and unprincipled. Castaños immediately waited on him, the other Palafox also came up from Zaragoza, and a council of war was held at Tudela when, the recent checks being disregarded, the project of surrounding the French was again adopted, though it was known sixty thousand fresh men had joined the latter. Deeming it, however, fitting that Blake should act the first, it was resolved to await his time, and as an intermediate operation, the army of the centre, leaving six thousand men at Calahorra and a garrison at Tudela, was to cross the Ebro and attack Caparosa. French parties had however pushed to Valtierra, and in the skirmishes which ensued the conduct of the Castillian battalions was discreditable: Joseph Palafox then returned to Zaragoza and the deputy separated himself from Castaños.

Castaños'  
Vindication.

Colonel Gra-  
ham's Corre-  
spondence,  
MS.

Whitting-  
ham's Corre-  
spondence,  
MS.

Much loss had been sustained by desertion and in the combats, but some Murcian levies and a part of the first and third Andalusian divisions had joined the army of the centre, which now mustered twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and fifty or sixty pieces of artillery. The positions

extended from Calahorra by Haro to Tudela. La-Peña held the first with five thousand men; Grimarest and Caro commanded eight thousand at the second; Castaños remained with thirteen thousand five hundred in the last; Cartoajal held the Sierra de Nalda with eleven hundred, and a battalion was at Ansejo. From these points, in pursuance of the plan arranged, the troops were actually in movement to cross the Ebro, when despatches from Blake announced a disaster, the extent of which he did not communicate. This arrested the attack, and the preposterous transactions which ensued resembled the freaks of Caligula more than real war.

The army was to abandon Tudela and form two lines, the first between Calahorra and Amedo, the second between Alfaro and Fitero; and Francisco Palafox ordered O'Niel to occupy the latter place: he refused to stir without orders from Joseph Palafox, and next day the plan was changed. Francisco Palafox proposed that O'Niel should descend the right of the Aragon and attack Caparosa in rear, while a force from Tudela assailed it in front, and other troops made a demonstration of passing the Ebro in boats at Milagro. Castaños who was at Centruenigo assented, and the troops were in motion against Caparosa, when the whimsical deputy ordered them to march on Lodosa, forty miles higher up the Ebro, and attack the bridge there; Grimarest being at the same time directed to cross in boats at Calahorra, ascend the left bank and take Lodosa in reverse. The Spanish generals of division, confounded by this change, wrote to Castaños, and this was the first intimation he, lying sick at Centruenigo, received of the changes made. He directed his lieutenant to obey, but, provoked beyond endurance, wrote to the junta to know who was to command. And after all this insolence and vapouring, no operation took place. The deputy declaring he only designed a demonstration, ordered the troops to their former quarters, and without assigning a reason gave La-Peña's division to Cartoajal.

Graham's  
Correspondence, MS.

Castaños'  
Vindication.

Graham's  
Correspondence, MS.

It was at this time sir John Moore's letter reached Castaños, but, no longer master of his own operations, he could ill concert a plan of campaign with the general of another army;

he could not even tell what troops were to be at his nominal disposal; for the Estremaduran force had been directed by the junta upon Burgos, and part of his first and third divisions detained in Madrid. His enemies, especially Montijo, were active in spreading reports to his disadvantage, the deserters scattering over the country said all the generals were traitors; and the people excited by false rumours, respected neither justice nor government, and committed the most scandalous excesses. Nor was Blake's situation more prosperous.


From Bayonne to Vitoria the road was encumbered with the advancing columns of the great French army. An imperial decree, issued in September, incorporated the troops already in Spain with those coming from Germany. The united forces were to compose eight divisions, called '*Corps d'Armée*,' an institution analogous to the Roman legion; because each corps, adapted to act as a component part of a large army, was also provided with light cavalry, a parc, and train of artillery, engineers, sappers and miners, and a complete civil administration to enable it to take the field as an independent force. The imperial guards had a constitution of their own; and at this time all the heavy cavalry and reserve artillery formed one large mass. As the troops arrived, they were disposed conformably to the following organization:—

Marshal Victor, duke of Belluno . . .	First Corps.
Marshal Bessières, duke of Istria . . .	Second Corps.
Marshal Moncey, duke of Cornegliano . .	Third Corps.
Marshal Lefebvre, duke of Dantzic . . .	Fourth Corps.
Marshal Mortier, duke of Treviso . . .	Fifth Corps.
Marshal Ney, duke of Elchingen . . .	Sixth Corps.
General St. Cyr . . . . .	Seventh Corps.
General Junot, duke of Abrantes . . .	Eighth Corps.

The seventh corps was entirely appropriated to Catalonia; the other corps were in the latter end of October assembled or assembling in Navarre and Biscay. General Merlin, holding Zornosa with a division, observed Blake; two divisions of the fourth corps occupied Durango and the neighbouring villages; one division and the light cavalry of the first corps were at







Vitoria; a second division of the same corps guarded the bridge at Murguia on the river Bayas, commanding the entrance to the valley of Orduña. Haro, Puente Lara, Miranda and Paneorbo, were

S.  
Journal of  
the king's  
Operations,  
MS.

held by the king's body guard and the second corps, the light cavalry of the latter covering the plains up to Briviesca; the reinforcements were crowding up to Vitoria, but the king, restricted by the emperor to a rigorous defence, left Blake in quiet possession of Bilbao. The latter mistook this inactivity for timidity. He knew that reinforcements in number equal to his whole army had joined the enemy, yet with wonderful rashness resolved to attempt the junction with Palafox in rear of the French position.

Romana's infantry were now approaching Bilbao, and the Estremadurans were in march for Burgos; but the country was nearly exhausted of provisions, both armies felt the scarcity, desertion prevailed among the Spaniards, and the Biscayans, twice abandoned, were fearful of a third insurrection. Prudence dictated a retreat towards Burgos, but Blake, posting Aeevedo with the Asturians and the second division at Orduña, and a battalion at Miravelles to preserve the communication with Bilbao, marched on the 24th with seventeen thousand fighting men to attack Zornosa. His right ascended the valley of Durango by Galdacano; his centre by Larabezua; his left by Rigoytia. Aeevedo penetrated from Orduña through the mountains of Gorbea, by Ozoeo and Villaro, with a view to seize Manares and St. Antonia d'Urquitiola, designing to interpose between Miranda del Ebro and Durango, to intercept Ney's retreat and force him to surrender. Blake imagined he had only to deal with two corps, one under the king at Durango and Mont Dragon, the other under Ney at Miranda, whereas Ney was then beating Pignatelli at Logroño.

Carrol's Cor-  
respondence.

When Blake approached Zornosa Merlin abandoned it for some heights in rear, and further operations were stopped by bad weather and want of provisions until the evening of the 25th, when the division at Rigoytia attempted to turn the right flank of the French, and at the same time Blake marched against the centre and left, whereupon Merlin fell back to

s. Durango. The duke of Dantzic, alarmed by  
 Journal of these movements, concentrated Sebastiani's and  
 the king's Laval's divisions and a Dutch brigade of infantry  
 Operations, at Durango; his third division was not come up,  
 MS. but the king reinforced him with Villatte's division of the first  
 corps, and ordered the men of Merlin's force, which was com-  
 posed of detachments, to join their respective regiments.

At daybreak\* the 31st, the Spaniards presented a checquered  
 Ibid. order of battle across the Durango road, five  
 miles beyond Zornosa and close to the French  
 position. The duke of Dantzic, apprised by the previous  
 movements that he was going to be attacked, became impatient;  
 and though a dark atmosphere hid the Spanish order of march  
 and force, he, knowing that fifty thousand men might be united,  
 concluded they were before him, and resolved to anticipate  
 the attack. In truth, the Spanish generals knew so little of  
 war, that before their incapacity was understood, their errors,  
 too gross for belief, contributed to their safety. Blake had  
 commenced this great movement, intending to beat the troops  
 in his front and capture Ney's corps of sixteen thousand men;  
 yet in six days, although unopposed, he advanced less than  
 fifteen miles, and with thirty-six thousand men  
 Carrol's Cor- he only presented seventeen thousand without  
 respondence. artillery, to an adversary who was now descending  
 the mountain with twenty-five thousand of all arms.

#### COMBAT AT DURANGO.

A thick fog covered the mountain and filled the valley, and  
 only a few random shots indicated the presence of hostile  
 armies, when suddenly Villatte's division, coming close to the  
 Spanish vanguard, with a brisk onset forced it back upon the  
 third division, Sebastiani's and Laval's followed in succession;  
 a fire of artillery, to which Blake could make no reply, opened  
 along the road, the day cleared, and the Spanish army, heaped  
 in confused masses, was, notwithstanding the personal courage  
 of Blake and the natural strength of the country, driven from  
 one position to another. At mid-day it was beyond Zornosa,  
 and at three o'clock in full flight for Bilbao, where it arrived



in great confusion during the night. Twelve vessels laden with English stores in the river escaped, and the next day Blake crossing the Salcedon took a position at Nava. Lefebvre pursued as far as Gueñes, and then leaving seven thousand men under Villatte to observe the Spaniards, returned to Bilbao.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.  
Leith's Cor-  
respondence,  
MS.

Joseph, displeased with this precipitate attack, ordered a division of the first corps, stationed at Murguia, to descend the valley of Orduña as far as Amurio; at the same time Mouton's division was detached from the second corps towards Barbareña, from whence it was, according to circumstances, either to join the troops in the valley of Orduña, or to watch Medina and Quincoes and press Blake if he retired by Villareayo. The French knew nothing of Acevedo's Asturias, who were at Villaro during the action, and were now striving to rejoin Blake by Valmaceda; they reached Miravalles the 3rd, just as the French coming from Murguia appeared, and the latter thinking it was Blake's army retired to Orduña. Acevedo then pushed for the Salcedon, but Villatte getting notice of his march, posted his troops at Orantia on the road leading from Miravelles to Nava, and on the road to Valmaceda, thus intercepting the line of retreat. Blake hearing of Acevedo's danger, promptly repassed the bridge of Nava in the night, meaning to clear that road; and the French aware of his march threw a force into the Gordujuela defile to cover Bilbao and rejoined Villatte on the Valmaceda road. Five Gallician divisions, reinforced by some of Romana's troops, were now at Orantia. Blake left two in reserve, detached one against the Gordujuela defile, and drove Villatte across the Salcedon; the action was renewed on the left bank, but just then Acevedo appeared, and sending two battalions to gain the French rear joined in the fight. Villatte broke through those battalions and reached Gueñes, yet with loss of men, one gun, and part of his baggage. This terminated the operations.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.  
Captain  
Carrol.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Marshal Lefebvre's hasty attack at Durango, founded on false data, was inconsistent with the general plan of campaign, ill-combined, and feebly followed up. It was a fault to leave Villatte without support close to an army which was five times his strength. The Murguia division was too easily checked at Miravalles, and for five days Acevedo wandered with eight thousand men unmolested in the midst of the French columns, and finally escaped without any extraordinary effort.

2°. From the 24th October to the 4th November Blake omitted no error possible to commit, with exception of his night march across the bridge of Nava, and then as if ashamed of that judicious movement he did not profit by it. When part of Romana's infantry had arrived and the remainder were in the vicinity of Nava, the whole Spanish army was, contrary to all reasonable expectation, concentrated to the number of thirty thousand fighting men, harassed, but not much discouraged; and the *eonde de Belvedere* was, with twelve thousand infantry twelve hundred cavalry and thirty pieces of artillery close to Burgos. If Blake had understood war he would, after defeating Villatte, have marched by Espinosa and Villarcayo to the upper Ebro; from thence he could have gained Burgos, brought up his artillery from Reynosa, and uniting Belvedere's troops to his own, have opened a communication with the English army. In that position, having a plentiful country behind him, his retreat open, and being well provided with horse, he might have commenced a regular system of warfare; but with incredible obstinacy and want of judgment, he now determined to attack Bilbao again, and renew the ridiculous attempt to surround the French army and unite with Palafox at the foot of the Pyrenees.

Such were the commanders, the armies, the rulers, upon whose exertions the British cabinet relied for the security of sir John Moore's troops during their double march from Lisbon and Coruña! It was in such a state of affairs that the English ministers, anticipating the speedy destruction of the French in Spain, were sounding the trumpet for an invasion

of France! Of France, defended by a million of veteran soldiers and governed by the mightiest genius of two thousand years! As if the vast military power of that warlike nation had suddenly become extinct, as if Baylen were a second Zama and Hannibal flying to Adrumetum instead of passing the Iberus! But Napoleon, with an execution more rapid than other men's thoughts, was already at Vitoria, and his hovering eagles cast a gloomy shadow over Spain.

Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence. Appendix, No. 13, § 8.

## BOOK THE FOURTH.

## CHAPTER I.

NAPOLÉON reached Bayonne the 3rd of November. He wished to augment the Spaniards' presumption by a strict defensive system, until he could strike with all his force; hence the attack at Zornosa displeased him; nor was he satisfied with the

s. subsequent operations, thinking Mouton's division  
Journal of the king's  
Operations, MS. endangered between Blake and Belvedere. To  
obviate this, he directed Bessières upon Burgos,  
Victor by Amurio on Valmaceda, and ordered  
Lefebvre to renew his attack on the side of Bilbao. Thus  
while Blake was leading his harassed starving troops back  
to Bilbao, fifty thousand French were in full march to meet  
him, while Bessières had already turned his right flank and  
was on his rear.

Captain Car- Thinking only fifteen hundred men were in  
rol's Corre- Gueñes, Blake on the 7th had directed two divi-  
spondence. sions by the roads of Abellana and Sopoerte to  
gain the bridge of Sodupe, in rear of Gueñes, while two other  
divisions attacked in front; the remainder of the army fol-  
lowed; but the whole advanced guard of the 4th French corps  
was in Gueñes, and the Spaniards, after an action of two hours,  
were only saved by night from a total rout. The same day one  
of their flanking divisions was beaten near Sopoerte, and the  
other, intercepted on the side of Abellana, was  
General Leith's Cor- forced to make for Portugalete on the sea-coast,  
respondence. and from thence to St. Andero. Blake was now  
alarmed and resolved to retire upon Espinosa de los Monteros,  
a mountain position two marches distant, where he designed to  
rest his troops and draw supplies from his magazines at



Reynosa. Falling back to Valmaceda in the night he gained Espinosa the 9th, and as the last of Romana's troops joined him on the march, his whole army, the men cut off at Abellana excepted, was concentrated at the intersection of the roads from St. Andero, Villarcayo, and Reynosa.

Napoleon, accompanied by Soult and Lasnes, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th and reached Vitoria in the evening. He was met by the civil and military chiefs at the gates of the town, but refusing their reception, jumped off his horse, entered the first small inn he saw, called for his maps, and proceeded to arrange the plan of campaign.

The first and fourth corps had met at Valmaceda but separated again at Nava on the 9th, Victor was therefore pursuing the track of Blake, and Lefebvre was marching upon Villarcayo by Medina. The second corps was concentrating at Briviesca. The third corps occupied Tafalla, Peraltes, Caparosa, and Estella. The sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve, were distributed from Vitoria to Miranda del Ebro, La Grange's division was at Guardia, connecting the positions of the third and sixth corps. The fifth corps was still behind the frontier. The eighth, composed of the troops removed from Portugal by the convention of Cintra, was marching from the French sea-ports where it had disembarked. On the Spanish side, Belvedere was at Burgos, and Castaños and Palafox were still planning to cut off the French army; Blake was flying to Espinosa, and the English army was scattered from Coruña to Talavera de la Reyna. On these facts, the emperor in two hours arranged his plans.

Moncey was to leave a division near Pampeluna, in observation of the Spaniards on the Aragon, to concentrate the remainder of the third corps at Lodosa and remain on the defensive until further orders. La Grange, reinforced by Colbert's light cavalry from the sixth corps, was directed upon Logroño. The first and fourth corps were to press Blake without intermission. The sixth to march towards Arando de Duero. Soult was to take command of the 2nd corps and fall headlong upon Belvedere, and the emperor followed this movement with the imperial guards and the reserve.

s.  
Marshal  
Soult's Jour-  
nal of Opera-  
tions.

These instructions being issued the enormous mass was put in motion with a celerity that marked the vigour of Napoleon's command. Soult, departing on the instant for Briviesca, arrived at day-break on the 9th, received the second corps from Bessières, and in a few hours was in full march for the terrace of Monasterio which overlooks the plains of Burgos; he remained there during the night, but sent Franceschi's light cavalry by Zaldueño to Arlanzon, with orders to cross the river of that name, descend the left bank, cut the communication with Madrid, and prevent the Spaniards rallying at the convent of the Chartreuse, if defeated near Burgos.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 10th, Soult was again in march from Monasterio, and at six o'clock Lassalle's cavalry reached Villa Fria. Belvedere was at Gamonal, and with four thousand infantry eight guns and the whole of his cavalry fell upon Lassalle; the latter following his orders retired slowly to Rio Bena; but at eight o'clock the French infantry, which had advanced by two roads, was reunited at this town and immediately pushed forward on Villa Fria: Belvedere was thus driven back upon Gamonal, and his army was discovered in line of battle. The right was in a wood, leaving a space unoccupied between it and the river Arlanzon; the left in the walled park of Vellimer. Thirty pieces of artillery covered the front, and seven or eight thousand armed peasants were on the heights behind the regular troops; the latter, more than eleven thousand infantry and eleven hundred cavalry, were the best troops then in Spain, comprising the Walloon and Spanish guards, the regiments of Majorca, Zafra, and Valencia de Alcantara, the hussars of Valentia, the royal carbineers, and some volunteers of good families. They were completely equipped and armed, principally from English stores, yet their resistance was even more feeble than that made by the half-famished peasants of Blake's force.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

#### BATTLE OF GAMONAL.

Lassalle, leading down from the French left, filled the plain between the river and the wood, and the Spanish artillery immediately opened along the whole line; but Mouton's

infantry, all old soldiers, broke into the wood so rapidly, that Bonnett's division, though following closely, had not time to fire a shot before the Spanish right fled in disorder; their left followed this example without being attacked, and the whole mass, victors and vanquished, rushed into Burgos with tumultuous violence. Bessières, who retained the command of the heavy cavalry, now passed at full gallop towards the Madrid road where it crosses the Arlanzon, sabring the fugitives and taking the guns which had escaped Mouton, while, on the other side of the river, Franceschi was seen to cut in pieces some Catalonian light troops stationed there, and thus barred all hopes of flight. Never was defeat more instantaneous. Two thousand five hundred Spaniards were said to be killed; twenty guns, thirty ammunition waggons, six pair of colours, and nine hundred men were taken on the field; four thousand muskets were found unbroken, and the fugitives dispersed. Belvedere reached Lerma in flight, where meeting some volunteer battalions coming to join his army, he marched them in the night to Aranda de Duero, but first wrote a despatch, saying the French, repulsed in two desperate attacks, had after thirteen hours' hard fighting succeeded.

Appendix,  
No. 15.

All the Spanish stores were captured in Burgos, and Soult, still riding the post-horse he had taken at Briviesca, pursued his victory. He had come from Bayonne gained a decisive battle and taken Burgos within fifty hours; and now without a halt sent one column towards Lerma, another towards Palencia, and marched with a third upon Reynosa, where he hoped to intercept Blake. That general, as we have seen, reached Espinosa the 9th with six divisions and six guns; his artillery parc guarded by two thousand infantry was still at Aguilar del Campo behind Reynosa, and desertion and losses had reduced his force below twenty-five thousand. His position was strong. His left composed of Asturians and his own first division occupied heights covering the Santander road; his centre composed of a division and the reserve was formed across the Reynosa road which led through Espinosa directly in his rear. One division occupied a commanding height a little to the right of Espinosa, and Romana's troops

Carrol's Correspondence.

were in a wood two miles in advance: his guns and one division were in reserve behind the centre. In this position he thought to rest a few days, but the 10th Victor came up and commenced

Carrol's Correspondence.

#### THE BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.

At two o'clock a French column drove back Romana's troops and seized the wood; they were reinforced from the centre and renewed the fight, but a second French column then attacked the centre thus weakened, and some light troops ascending the height on the Spanish left menaced that flank. On the right the contest was vigorous; the Spaniards supported by the fire of their six guns had even gained ground when night put an end to the combat, leaving the French in possession of the wood and a ridge parallel to, and half cannon shot from Blake's centre. The Spanish generals San Roman and Riquielmé were mortally wounded.

Victor relieved his left with fresh troops in the night, and at daylight general Maison throwing a crowd of skirmishers upon the Spanish centre and left attacked the Asturians. Blake detached a column of grenadiers to their aid, and in person sought with three regiments to take Maison in flank; he was too late; three Asturian generals fell at the first fire, their troops fled, and were followed by Blake's first division which was next them. Maison continuing his movement intercepted the Santander and Espinosa roads. Meantime, the French posted on the parallel ridge had fallen on the Spanish centre, those in the wood also advanced, and Blake's whole army gave way in terrible confusion. Crowding heavily towards the river Trueba, which swept with a bend round the rear, the men endeavoured to escape, some by the fords, some by the town, some by the hills on the right; but the weather was bad, the road steep, the overthrow fatal: those whom the sword missed, dispersed to carry dismay into the remotest parts of Galicia, Leon, Castille, and the Asturias. Blake reached Reynosa the 12th, but could only rally seven thousand fugitives, without artillery, without arms, without spirit, and without hope.



It has been said, Romana's soldiers died Spartan-like, to a man, in their ranks; yet in 1812, captain Hill of the royal navy, being at Cronstadt to receive Spaniards taken by the Russians during Napoleon's retreat, found the greater portion were Romana's men captured at Espinosa: they had served Napoleon for four years, passed the ordeal of the Moscow retreat, and were still above four thousand strong!

A retreat to Aguilar del Campo, where the artillery remained, being still open to Blake, he thought to reorganize his troops at Reynosa and retire upon Baird's troops, the head of which was then near Astorga. His ignorance again misled him. He looked only to the side of Espinosa for enemies, and already Soult's cavalry was upon his line of retreat, and Lefebre's was advancing on Reynosa by Villarcayo. On the 13th he was assailed by Soult's vanguard, and being now utterly confounded, fled with five thousand men through the valley of Caburniega to Arnedo, in the heart of the Asturian mountains.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

Lefebre halted a few days, and then took the road to Valladolid. Soult seized Santander, captured the English supplies there, and spreading his columns over the Montaña, filled all places with alarm. Everything military being thus driven over the snowy barrier of the Asturian hills, a French detachment occupied San Vincente de Barqueira.

Ibid.

Soult took the town of Potes, scoured the banks of the Deba, and overrun Leon with his cavalry as far as Sahagun and Saldanha. Victor quitting Espinosa, joined the emperor who was at Burgos.

These battles of Espinosa and Gamonal and the subsequent operations laid the north of Spain prostrate; the coast from St. Sebastian to the frontier of the Asturias was won, and soon small garrisons and moveable columns fettered the provinces of Guipuscoa, Navarre, Biscay, the Montaña and the Baston de Laredo, and protected the communication with France; the wide plains of Old Castille and Leon were thus thrown open to the French, and forbidden to the separated divisions of the British army. These great advantages, the result of Napoleon's admirable combinations, obtained so easily yet so decisive of the fate of the campaign, exposed

the foolish system of the Spanish and British governments, if that can be called a system where no one general knew what another had done, was doing, or intended to do.

Burgos, instead of Vitoria, was now become the pivot of French operations, and the emperor prepared to change his front and bear down with similar impetuosity against Castaños and Palafox; but it was necessary first to ascertain the exact situation of the British force. Napoleon believed it to be concentrated at Valladolid, and detached three divisions of cavalry with twenty-four pieces of artillery by Lerma and Palencia, to cross the Duero, turn the flank of the English, threaten their communications with Portugal, and force them to retire. It was however soon discovered that the heads of their columns had not penetrated beyond Salamanca and Astorga, and that many days must elapse ere they could act offensively. Then the emperor let loose his three divisions of cavalry, and eight thousand horsemen swept over the plains of Leon and Castille; the captain-general Pignatelli, shamefully fled, all the authorities shrunk from the tempest, the people displayed no enthusiasm, were disconcerted by the rapid movements of the French, and spread a thousand confused and contradictory reports. These incursions extended to the neighbourhood of Astorga, to Benevente, Zamora, Toro, Tordesilla, and even to the vicinity of Salamanca; Sir John Moore's thirty dragoons were sufficient to raise contributions at the gates of the largest towns before the overthrow of Espinosa was known; after that, ten troopers could safely traverse the country in any direction.

Napoleon's front being now changed, Soult, hitherto leading the attack, was left in observation to cover the right flank and protect Burgos. Victor's troops the guards and part of the reserve were at Burgos. Ney was at Aranda de Duero; he had marched from the Ebro to intercept the Estremadurans on the side of Madrid, their destruction at Gamonal rendered this unnecessary, yet he was equally well placed to cut Castaños off from the capital. Lagrange was at Logroño, Moncey with three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry at Lodosa, and thus Castaños was turned, menaced, and excised from Madrid before he was aware that the campaign had commenced.

In passing the mountains near Tolosa, Lasnes duke of Montebello fell from his horse and was left at Vitoria; his hurts were dangerous, but a rapid and interesting cure was effected by wrapping him in the skin of a sheep newly slain, and the emperor directed him to take Lagrange's division and Colbert's cavalry, join Moncey at Lodosa, and fall upon Castaños. Ney was ordered to ascend the Duero with his light cavalry and two divisions of the sixth corps, to connect his left with the right of Lasnes, and to gain Agreda by the road of Osma and Soria, from whence he could intercept the retreat of Castaños. To support this operation, Victor's corps and Latour Maubourg's division of heavy cavalry, drawn from the reserve, proceeded by Lerma and Aranda, and from thence slowly followed the direction of Ney's march. The emperor continued at Burgos, where the citadel was repaired and armed and arrangements made to render it the great depôt of the army; all the reinforcements coming from France were directed upon this town, and proclamations were issued, assuring the country people of protection if they would be tranquil and remain in their houses.

Baron  
Larrey's  
Surgical  
Campaigns.

Ten days had now elapsed since Napoleon breaking forth from Vitoria had deluged the country with his troops, and each day was marked by some advantage gained; yet these misfortunes were still unknown at Tudela and disregarded at the capital. The remnants of Belvedere's army had rallied, part in the pass of the Somosierra, part on the side of the Segovia; the troops which had been detained in Madrid from Castaños were forwarded to the Somosierra; those left behind from Cuesta's levies were sent to Segovia. General St. Juan, an officer of reputation, took command at the former place, Heredia at the latter; detachments formed an intermediate camp at Sepulveda; and the junta announced that a great army protected Madrid and if the French left was still unbroken on the Ebro it was the fault of Castaños: wherefore his command was given to Romana. It was impossible for Romana to reach the army he was to command, but the junta wanted a battle and were still confident of victory.

Mr. Stuart.  
Lord W. Bentinck, MSS.

Mr. Stuart.  
Lord W. Bentinck, MSS.

At Tudela, however, the madness of the generals and the

folly of the deputy had increased rather than abated. The freaks of Francisco Palafox and their ridiculous termination have been already related; schemes equally absurd and more dangerous were adopted as the crisis approached, and this time Castaños took the lead. He knew upon the 10th that Belvedere was at Burgos and the French marching on that town; from that moment, despairing of the junction of Castaños' the British army, and likewise of his own first Vindication. and third divisions which had been left in Madrid, he sent orders to Belvedere to unite himself with Blake, but the count was defeated before they were written. Castaños then feeling his dangerous position, conceived a plan difficult to credit upon any authority but his own. He proposed to carry his army, reduced in numbers and ill-disciplined, by the Concha de Haro and Soria towards Burgos to fall upon the emperor's rear guard; and as a preliminary step to beat the army in his front; but Palafox had also a plan for attacking Moncey on the side of Sanguessa, and the first thing was to combine these double operations. It was agreed therefore that Caparosa should be garrisoned by four thousand infantry, the bridge head at that place fortified, and O'Neil reinforced at Sanguessa by detachments from the centre up to nineteen thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. He was then to break the bridge, place guards at the passages on the Aragon, come down to Caparosa, cross the river and threaten Peraltes and Olite on the 17th; but on the 18th, he was to turn suddenly to the left and get in rear of Lodosa, while La-Peña and Coupigny, marching from Centruenigo, should attack Moncey in front.

Colonel  
Graham's  
Correspond-  
ence, MSS.

This movement was openly talked of at the head-quarters for several days before its execution; and these extraordinary commanders, ignorant of Blake's disasters, announced their intention of afterwards marching towards Vitoria to lighten the pressure on that officer, if he should be in difficulty; if successful, as his despatches of the 5th assured them, to join in a general pursuit. Castaños however concealed his project of moving by the Concha de Haro towards Burgos. Boats to lay a bridge over the Ebro at Alfaro could not be obtained, and O'Neil's reinforcements had to move by Tudela and lost



three or four days; however, on the 14th O'Neil arrived at Caparosa after breaking the bridge of Sanguessa, and on the 15th the reinforcements joined him. The 17th, Castaños knew of his own dismissal, yet persevered in his project. La-Peña and Coupigny were put in motion to pass the bridges of Logroño and Lodosa and the fords between them; but O'Neil first refused to stir without an order from Joseph Palafox who was at Zaragoza, and then changing his plea complained that he was without bread. Castaños besought him to move upon the 18th, urging the danger of delay; but the deputy Palafox, who had hitherto approved of the project, suddenly went to Caparosa, and in concert with O'Neil demanded a further reinforcement of six thousand infantry and more cavalry from the central army, without which, they affirmed, it would be dangerous to pass the Aragon. Castaños invited the deputy to return to the right bank of the Ebro, and opposed the demand for more troops; but now Joseph Palafox, agreeing with neither side, proposed a new plan, and it is difficult to say how long these strange disputes would have continued if an umpire had not interposed, whose award was too strongly enforced to be disregarded.

Castaños' Vindication

Castaños was present with the divisions of Coupigny and La-Peña at the town of Calahorra on the 19th, when he first received information that a French corps was advancing upon Logroño. This was Lasnes, with Lagrange's and Colbert's troops, yet the Spaniard concluded it to be Ney, for he was ignorant of the changes which had taken place since the 8th of the month. It was likewise reported, that Moncey, whose force he estimated at twelve thousand when it was really above twenty thousand, had concentrated at Lodosa; and the bishop of Osma announced that Dessolles was marching from the side of Aranda de Duero with twelve thousand men. On the 21st, it was known Dessolles had passed Almazan, and Moncey's movement was confirmed. Castaños then relinquishing

Castaños' Account of the Battle of Tudela.

his offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it was full time; for Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, had passed Almazan on the 20th, dispersed several small bands of insurgents and entered Soria on the 21st; hence when Castaños determined

to fall back, his flank was already turned and his retreat upon Madrid in the enemy's power. In the night of the 21st he retired to some heights extending from Tudela to Cascante and Tarazona, leaving his artillery at Centruenigo, and a large detachment with O'Neil. Next morning Lasnes was descried in march upon Calahorra, and at this time the first supply of money the junta had yet transmitted reached Tudela.

O'Neil refused to stir without Joseph Palafox's order; but the latter arrived at Tudela, and agreed with Castaños to draw the Aragonese over the Ebro and occupy the heights above the town, while the rest of the troops extended on the left to Tarazona. Nevertheless, in defiance of orders, entreaties, and reasoning, O'Neil remained in an olive-wood on the right bank of the river during the night of the 22nd, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy.

A council of war being held, the discussion was turbulent. Palafox insisted on the defence of Aragon, he wanted the whole army to pass the Ebro and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza,—a proposal demonstrating his incapacity. Castaños opposed this absurdity, important moments passed in useless disputation, and the generals came to no conclusion. Lasnes, bringing with him Maurice Mathieu's division of the sixth corps, just arrived from France, had meanwhile concentrated thirty thousand infantry, four or five thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery, and, marching by Alfaro, appeared at eight o'clock in the morning of the 23rd in front of Tudela, just as the Aragonese were passing the bridge to ascend the position.

#### BATTLE OF TUDELA.

Forty-five thousand Spaniards were in line, with fifty guns. They occupied an easy range of hills, extending from Tudela by Cascante to Tarazona, more than ten miles. The Aragonese held the right, Castaños occupied Cascante with one division, Tarazona with three. No other divisions were between Cascante and Tudela, and these masses were uncon-

nected, when Lasnes hastened to attack. Morlot's division assailed the heights of Tudela; Maurice Mathieu, supported by Lefebre Desnouettes' cavalry, fell on the divisions between the right and Cascante, and that place was attacked by Lagrange. The Aragonese pushed Morlot back with vigour; but Maurice Mathieu gaining an olive-wood and small ridge leading to the position on their left, pierced the line, and then Lefebre breaking in with his horsemen, wheeled on the Spanish right, put it to flight, and followed the fugitives to the bridge of Tudela. La-Peña descending from Cascante drove in Lagrange's cavalry; but when encountered at a charging pace by the infantry was beaten even to Tarazona, where three divisions remained passive during the battle. Palafox had gone back to Zaragoza the night before, and O'Neil fled with the right and two divisions of the centre to that city, sixty miles, with such speed that some fugitives arrived there the same evening.

When La-Peña reached Tarazona the Spanish left commenced an orderly retreat towards Borja; but some of Ney's cavalry coming from the side of Soria put it in disorder, a magazine exploded, cries of treason arose, the column dissolved, and the road to Borja was crowded with a disorganized mob. Thus ended the battle of Tudela, in which forty-five thousand men were dispersed by an attack neither very vigorous nor well sustained, and therefore demonstrating the utter incapacity of Spanish generals and the very great unsteadiness of their soldiers. Several thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of artillery, with all the ammunition and baggage, rewarded the victors, and the loss of men was about nine thousand. Fifteen thousand however escaped to Zaragoza, and a detachment of two thousand, under Cartoajal and Lilli in the mountains of Nalda, were isolated, hence but two divisions, increased by fugitives from the others, were rallied the 25th at Calatayud and they were starving and mutinous. There Castaños received two despatches from the central junta, virtually restoring him to the command, for the first empowered him to unite the Aragonese army with his own, and the second desired him to co-operate with St. Juan in the Somosierra to protect the

Eleventh  
Bulletin.  
Victoires et  
Conquêtes.

capital: the battle of Tudela had disposed of the first despatch, the second induced him to march by Siguenza upon Madrid.

Napoleon had before this recalled the greatest part of his cavalry from the open country of Castille, placed seven or eight thousand men in Burgos, and fixed his head-quarters at Aranda de Duero the 23rd. Intelligence of the victory at Tudela only reached him the 26th, and he was exceedingly discontented that Castaños had escaped Ney, who had been ordered to reach Soria the 21st and remain there until Lasnes should have beaten the Spaniards; then by Agreda he was to intercept the retreat of the latter. At dusk on the 21st Jomini and D'Esmenard, officers of Ney's staff, arrived with eighty cavalry at Soria, the ancient Numantia. This town standing on a rocky height, with a suburb below, was occupied by Cartoajal then escaping from the Nalda mountains, and the magistrates coming to the suburb treacherously invited the French up; but their suspicions being excited the plan failed, Cartoajal marched in the night and next day the sixth corps arrived.

Jomini urged Ney to continue his march upon Calatayud without any rest; but offended with the heat of his manner, or some other cause, Ney refused and halted the 23rd and 24th, merely sending out light cavalry on the side of Medina Celi and Agreda. The 25th he marched, and the 26th, passing through Cascante, crossed the field of battle; the 27th he arrived with one division at Mallen between Tudela and Zaragoza, his advanced guard being at Arlazon on the Xalon: to the erroneous direction and dilatory nature of these movements Castaños owed the safety of the troops he had re-assembled at Calatayud. Ney must have known of the battle the 25th, yet he kept the road towards Agreda when one march by Medina Celi would have brought him upon the line of retreat from Calatayud. Some writers have attributed this to his jealousy of Lasnes; others say the plunder of Soria detained him. The falsehood of the latter charge is great. There was a requisition for some shoes and great-coats; but no contribution was exacted, and there was no pillage. As to the jealousy, a better explanation may be found in the peculiar



disposition of this extraordinary man, who was careless and unlearned in the abstract science of war, and seemed apathetic until some imminent danger aroused the marvellous energy and fortitude of his nature.

Tudela fell short of Napoleon's expectation, yet sufficed to break the Spanish strength and lay open Aragon, Navarre, and New Castille, as the northern parts had been by Espinosa. From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed; Madrid, Zaragoza, and the British army, lifted their heads indeed a little way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an efficient barrier against the flood which still poured on with unabated fury. The divided state of the British troops led the emperor to conclude sir John Moore would instantly retire into Portugal, wherefore he ordered Lasnes to pursue Palafox—to seize the important position of Monte Torrero—to summon Zaragoza, and offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was the rallying point of the broken Spanish and his own pursuing divisions, the centre of all interests, a height from whence a beneficial stream of political benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour down to extinguish the fire of insurrection.

## CHAPTER II.

ON the 21st, French patrols sent towards the Somosierra ascertained that six thousand men were entrenching themselves in the gorge of that defile; that the camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon, resolving to force the Somosierra and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue him without intermission, and directed Lefebre to continue his march by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, and Segovia. This movement merits attention. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people—overawing the flat country of Leon and Castille—protecting the right flank of the army—menacing Galicia and Salamanea—keeping the heads of Moore's and Baird's columns from advancing, and rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction—threatening the line of Hope's march from the Tagus to the Guadarama—dispersing Heredia's corps, and finally turning the pass of Somosierra without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric movement of the great army upon Madrid.

The time lost in transmitting intelligence of the victory at Tudela was productive of serious consequences.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

The officer despatched with the return instructions, found Ney and Monecy, Lasnes was now sick at Tudela, each advanced two days' march in the wrong direction. The first was at Mallen preparing to attack Zaragoza; the second at Almunio pursuing Castaños. They had to countermarch, and the people of Zaragoza, recovering from the consternation caused by the fugitives, then made arrangements for a vigorous defence. Castaños also escaped to Sigüenza without further loss, save in a slight action at Burviceja where Maurice Mathieu's division came up

with his rear-guard. The 28th the emperor quitted Aranda with the guards, the first corps, and the reserve, marching towards the Somosierra. A detachment sent to attack the camp at Sepulveda was beaten with a loss of fifty or sixty men, but the Spaniards, struck with panic after the action, fled in disorder towards Segovia. The 30th the French advanced guard reached the foot of the Somosierra, where St. Juan, whose force now amounted to ten or twelve thousand men, was judiciously posted. Sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep; the infantry were placed on the right and left in lines one above another, and entrenchments on the more open parts strengthened every part of the position.

#### PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA.

At day-break three French battalions attacked St. Juan's right, three more assailed his left; as many marched along the causeway in the centre supported by six guns. The French wings spreading over the mountain side commenced a skirmishing fire, which was well returned, while the frowning battery at the top of the causeway was held in readiness to crush the central column when it should come within range. At that moment Napoleon rode into the mouth of the pass, his infantry were making no progress and a thick fog mixed with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he ordered the Polish cavalry of his guard to charge up the causeway and seize the Spanish battery. The foremost ranks were levelled by the fire of the guns, and the remainder thrown into confusion; but general Krazinski rallied them, and covered by the smoke and the morning vapour led them sword in hand up the mountain; as they passed, the Spanish infantry on each side fired and fled towards the summit of the causeway, then the Poles took the battery and the Spaniards abandoning arms ammunition and baggage fled in strange disorder.

This exploit, so glorious to one party so disgraceful to the other, can hardly be matched from the records of war. It is almost incredible that a position nearly impregnable, and

defended by twelve thousand men, should from a deliberate sense of danger be abandoned to the wild charge of a few squadrons which two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped: yet some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here had been victorious at Baylen a few months before, and St. Juan's dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding's at the former battle! The charge viewed as a simple military operation was extravagantly rash; but as evincing Napoleon's sagacious estimate of Spanish troops, and his promptitude in seizing the advantage offered by the smoke and fog which clung to the side of the mountain, it was a felicitous example of intuitive genius. The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French cavalry. St. Juan broke through the French on the side of Sepulveda and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia; but then the cavalry of the fourth corps approached, and the two generals, crossing the Guadarama, rallied some of the fugitives from Somosierra on the Madrid side of the mountains, and were about to enter that capital, when the appearance of a French patrol terrified the vile cowards who followed them. Once

Colonel  
Graham's  
Correspond-  
ence.

more they fled to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable villany by murdering their unfortunate general and fixing his mangled body to a tree, after which they dispersed to carry their fear into the other provinces.

Now the imperial army came down from the mountains—the sixth corps hastened on from the side of Alcala and Guadalaxara—the central junta fled from Aranjuez,—Castaños, intercepted on the side of Madrid and pressed by Ney, turned towards the Tagus. The junta flying with indecent haste spread a thousand false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity endeavoured to deceive the people and the English general; a task in which they were strongly aided by the credulous weakness of Mr. Frere, the British plenipotentiary, who fled with them towards Badajos. Mr. Stuart with greater discretion and firmness remained at Madrid until the enemy actually appeared at the gates.

After the combat of Burvieca Castaños continued his retreat unmolested by Ney, who never recovered the time lost



by his false movement upon Mallen. The Spanish numbers however daily diminished, insubordination kept pace with privations, and at Alcazar del Rey Castaños resigned the command to La-Peña, and proceeded to Truxillo with an escort of thirty infantry and fifteen dragoons; a number scarcely sufficient to protect his life from the ferocity of the peasants, who were stirred up and prepared by the falsehoods of the central junta and the villany of the deserters to murder him. Madrid was in a state of anarchy. A local and military junta were formed to conduct the defence, the inhabitants took arms, a multitude of peasants came in, and the regular forces under the marquis of Castellar amounted to six thousand men with a train of sixteen guns; the pavement was taken up, the streets barricadoed, the houses pierced, and the Retiro, a weak irregular work which commanded the city, was occupied in strength. Morla and the prince of Castelfranco were the chief men in authority; the people demanded ammunition, and when they received it, discovered or said that it was mixed with sand; some person accused the marquis of Perales a respectable old general of the deed, a mob rushed to his house murdered him and dragged his body about the streets. Many others of inferior note fell victims to this fury, for no man was safe, none dared assume authority to control, none dared give honest advice; the houses were thrown open, the bells of the convent and churches rung incessantly, and a band of ferocious armed men traversed the streets in all the madness of popular insurrection. Eight days had now elapsed since the first preparations for defence were made, and each day the public effervescence increased, the dominion of the mob became more decisive, their violence more uncontrollable; the hubbub was extreme, when, on the morning of the 2nd of December three heavy divisions of French cavalry suddenly appeared on the high ground to the north-west, and like a dark cloud overhung the troubled city.

At twelve o'clock the emperor arrived and summoned the town. The officer employed would have been massacred by the volunteers, but the Spanish soldiers ashamed of such conduct rescued him. And, notwithstanding the great fierceness displayed at the gates, this resistance

Castaños'  
Vindication.

Fourteenth  
Bulletin.

was unpalatable to many of the householders, numbers of whom escaped from different quarters; deserters also came over, and Napoleon, while waiting for his infantry, examined all the weak points of the city. It was incapable of defence. There were no bulwarks, the houses, although well built, were not like those of many Spanish towns fire proof; there were no out-works, the Retiro the Palace and the heights occupied by the French cavalry commanded the city; the open country round enabled the horsemen to discover and cut off all convoys, and no subsistence had been provided for the hundred and fifty thousand people contained within the circuit of the place. The desire of the central junta, that Madrid should when they had left it risk the horrors of a storm, was equally silly and barbarous; their criminal apathy had deprived Madrid of the power of defence, and there was no analogy between it and Zaragoza. Napoleon knew this, and would not plunge into

Appendix,  
No. 3.

the streets amongst an armed and excited population; he knew that address in negotiation, patience, and a judicious employment of artillery, would

soon reduce the most outrageous to submission, and he had no wish to destroy the capital of his brother's kingdom.

In the evening the infantry and artillery arrived, and men were posted at the most favourable points; the night was clear and bright, the French camp silent and watchful;

Fourteenth  
Bulletin.

but a tumultuous noise was heard from every quarter of the city, as if some mighty beast was

struggling and howling in the toils. At midnight a second summons being sent through the medium of a prisoner Castellar attempted to gain time by an equivocal reply, but the French light troops stormed the nearest houses, and one battery of thirty guns opened against the Retiro, while another threw shells from the opposite quarter to distract the attention of the inhabitants. The Retiro, situated on a rising ground, was connected with a range of buildings erected on the same side of the Prado or public walk, into which some of the principal streets opened, and in the morning a practicable breach being made at the Retiro, Villatte's division broke in, routed the garrison, and seized all the public buildings connected with it; then crossing the Prado, gained the barriers erected at the

entrance of the streets; and took possession of the immense palace of Medina Celi, which was in itself a key to the city on that side.

This vigorous commencement created great terror, the town was summoned for the third time, and in the afternoon Morla and another officer came out to demand a suspension of arms, necessary, they said, to persuade the people to surrender. The emperor addressed Morla in terms of great severity, reproaching him for his scandalous conduct towards Dupont's army. 'Injustice and bad faith,' he exclaimed, 'always rest upon those who are guilty of either.' A saying well applied to that Spaniard, and Napoleon himself confirmed its philosophic truth in after times. 'The Spanish ulcer destroyed me!' was an expression of deep anguish which escaped from him in his hour of misfortune. Morla returned to the town, his story was soon told, before six o'clock the next morning Madrid must surrender or perish! Dissensions arose. The violence of the populace was abated, but the armed peasantry and the poorest inhabitants still demanded to be led against the enemy, a constant fire came from the houses near the Prado, the French general Maison was wounded, and general Bruyeres killed. Nevertheless the disposition to fight became each moment weaker, Morla and Castelfranco prepared a capitulation, but Castellar refused to sign it; and as the town was only invested on one side, he effected his escape with the regular troops during the night, carrying with him sixteen guns. The people then became quiescent, and at eight o'clock in the morning of the 4th, Madrid surrendered.

Morla was a traitor, and his personal cowardice was excessive; but Castelfranco, also accused of treason, appears rather weak than treacherous; the surrender of Madrid was no proof of guilt, it was inevitable. The boasting uproar of a multitude permitted to domineer for a few days is not enthusiasm; the retreat of Castellar with the troops of the line during the progress of the negotiation was the wisest course to pursue. That the people neither could nor would defend the city is evident; Morla and Castelfranco could never have effected a capitulation in so short a period if the generals, the troops, the armed peasantry, and the inhabitants, had been all, or even

a part of them, determined to resist. Napoleon carefully provided against any sudden reaction, and preserved the strictest discipline, a soldier of the imperial guard was shot for having a plundered watch in his possession; the infantry were placed in barraeks and convents, the cavalry were ready to scour the streets, and the Spaniards were all disarmed. The emperor fixed his own quarters at Chamartin, a house four miles from Madrid, and in a few days the shops were opened, the public amusements recommenced, and the theatres were frequented. The inhabitants of capital cities are easily moved, easily calmed; self-interest and sensual indulgence unfit them for noble, sustained efforts; they can be violent, ferocious, cruel, seldom constant and firm.

During the operations against Madrid, La-Peña, after escaping from the sixth corps, arrived at Guadalaxara with five thousand men; on the 2nd, the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque joined him from the capital; on the 4th, Venegas came up with two thousand men. Napoleon being apprised of their vicinity, directed Bessières upon Guadalaxara with sixteen squadrons, supporting him with Ruffin's division; but the Spaniards retired through the hills by Sanetoreaz towards Aranjuez, and their guns crossed the Tagus at Sacedon. Ruffin also changed his line, and cut them off from La Mancha by the line of Ocaña. La-Peña was then forced to resign, Infantado was chosen in his place, the Tagus was crossed at several points, and after some slight actions with the French cavalry this miserable body of men finally saved themselves at Cuenca, where many deserters and fugitives, and the brigades of Cartoajal and Lilli, also arrived, and the duke proceeded to organize another army.

On the French side, the fourth corps reached Segovia, passed the Guadarama, dispersed some armed peasants assembled at the Escorial, and then marched towards Almaraz to attack Galluzzo, who had assembled five or six thousand men to defend the left bank of the Tagus, and occupied a line of forty miles. The first French corps entered La Mancha, Toledo immediately shut its gates; and the junta of that town publicly proclaimed their resolution to bury themselves under the ruins of the city, but



at the approach of a French division discovered contemptible cowardice. Six weeks had sufficed to dissipate the boasts and the armies of Spain, the glittering bubble had bursted, and a terrible reality remained. From St. Sebastian to the Asturias, from the Asturias to Talavera de la Reyna, from Talavera to the gates of the noble city of Zaragoza, all was submission; and beyond that boundary all was apathy or dread. ten thousand French could have marched from one extremity of Spain to the other.

After the fall of Madrid Joseph remained at Burgos, issuing proclamations and carrying on a sort of underplot through the medium of his native ministers. The views of the latter naturally turned towards the Spanish interests as distinct from the French, and a source of infinite mischief to Joseph's cause was thus opened; for that monarch, anxious to please and conciliate his subjects, ceased to be a Frenchman without becoming a Spaniard. However, Napoleon exercised all the rights of conquest, and the tenour of his speeches proclamations and decrees indicated some ulterior project, in which the king's personal interests were not concerned. It appeared as if he wished the nation to offer the crown to himself a second time, that he might obtain a plausible excuse for adopting a new policy, by which to attract the people, or at least soften their pride which was now the main obstacle to his success. An assemblage of the nobles, the clergy the corporations, and the tribunals of Madrid, waited upon him at Chamartin, and presented an address, in which they expressed their desire to have Joseph among them again. The emperor's reply was an exposition of the principles upon which Spain was to be governed, and it forces reflection upon the passionate violence with which men resist positive good to seek danger misery and death rather than resign their prejudices.

'I accept,' said he, 'the sentiments of the town of Madrid. I regret the misfortunes that have befallen it, and I hold it as a particular good fortune that I am enabled, under the circumstances of the moment, to spare that city and to save it from yet greater misfortunes. I have hastened to take measures fit to tranquillize all classes of citizens, knowing well that to all people and to all men uncertainty is intolerable. I have

preserved the religious orders, but I have restrained the number of monks; no sane person can doubt that they are too numerous. Those who are truly called to this vocation by the grace of God will remain in their convents; those who have lightly or from worldly motives adopted it, will have their existence secured among the secular ecclesiasties from the surplus of the convents. I have provided for the wants of the most interesting and useful of the clergy, the parish priests; and I have abolished that tribunal, the inquisition, against which Europe and the age alike exclaimed. Priests ought to guide consciences, but they should not exercise any exterior or corporal jurisdiction over men.

‘I have taken the satisfaction which was due to myself and to my nation, and the part of vengeance is completed. Ten of the principal criminals bend their heads before her; but for all others there is absolute and entire pardon. I have suppressed the rights usurped by the nobles during civil wars, when the kings have been too often obliged to abandon their own rights to purchase tranquillity and the repose of their people. I have suppressed the feudal rights, and every person can now establish inns, mills, ovens, weirs, and fisheries, and give free play to their industry; only observing the laws and customs of the place. The self-love, the riches, and the prosperity of a small number of men was more hurtful to your agriculture than the heats of the dog-days. As there is but one God there should be in one state but one justice. Wherefore, all the particular jurisdictions having been usurped, and being contrary to the national rights, I have destroyed them. I have also made known to all persons that which each can have to fear, and that which they may hope for.

‘The English armies I will drive from the Peninsula. Zaragoza, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced either by persuasion or by the force of arms. There is no obstacle capable of retarding for any length of time the execution of my will. But that which is above my power is to constitute the Spaniards a nation under the orders of the king, if they continue to be imbued with the principle of division, and of hatred towards France, such as the English partizans and the enemies of the continent have instilled into them. I cannot establish a

nation, a king, and Spanish independence, if that king is not sure of the affection and fidelity of his subjects. The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe. The divisions in the royal family were concerted by the English; it was not king Charles or his favourite, but the duke of Infantado, the instrument of England, that was upon the point of overturning the throne. The papers recently found in his house prove this; it was the preponderance of England that they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which would have produced a land war without end, and caused torrents of blood to be shed.

‘No power influenced by England can exist upon the continent; if any desire it their desire is folly and sooner or later will ruin them; I shall be obliged to govern Spain, and it will be easy for me to do it by establishing a viceroy in each province. However, I will not refuse to concede my rights of conquest to the king, nor to establish him in Madrid, when the thirty thousand citizens assemble in the churches, take on the holy sacrament not with the mouth alone, but with the heart and without any jesuitical restriction an oath, “to be true to the king, to love and to support him.” Let the priests from the pulpit and in the confessional, the tradesmen in their correspondence and their discourses, inculcate these sentiments in the people; then I will relinquish my rights of conquest, then I will place the king upon the throne, and I will take a pleasure in showing myself the faithful friend of the Spaniards. The present generation may differ in opinions; too many passions have been excited; but your descendants will bless me as the regenerator of the nation: they will mark my sojourn among you as memorable days, and from those days they will date the prosperity of Spain. These are my sentiments. Go, consult your fellow citizens, choose your part, but do it frankly, and exhibit only true colours.’

The ten criminals were the dukes of Infantado, of Híjar, Medini Celi, and Ossuna; the marquis of Santa Cruz; counts Fernan, Miñez, and Altamira; the prince of Castello Franco, Pedro Cevallos, and the bishop of Santander. They were proscribed, body and goods, as traitors to France and Spain.

Napoleon now made dispositions indicating a vast plan of operations. Apparently he designed to invade Gallicia, Anda-

lusia, and Valencia by his lieutenants, and carry his arms to Lisbon in person. Upon the 20th December, the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve, were assembled under his own immediate control. The first corps was stationed at Toledo, and the light cavalry attached to it, scoured the roads leading to Andalusia even to the foot of the Sierra Morena. The fourth corps was at Talavera, on the march towards the frontier of Portugal. The second corps was on the Carrion river, preparing to advance against Galicia. The eighth corps was broken up; the divisions composing it were ordered to join the second, and Junot repaired to the third corps, to supply the place of Moncey, who was called to Madrid for a particular service,—doubtless an expedition against Valencia. The fifth corps, which had arrived at Vitoria, was directed to reinforce the third, then employed against Zaragoza. The seventh was always in Catalonia.

Vast as this plan appears, it was not beyond the emperor's means; for there were on his muster rolls more than three hundred and thirty thousand fighting men, and sixty thousand horses; two hundred pieces of field artillery followed the corps to battle, and as many more remained in reserve.

Appendix, No. 28. Of this monstrous army, two hundred and fifty-five thousand men and fifty thousand horses were actually under arms with the eagles; thirty-two thousand were detached or in garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the rear and guarding the communications of the active force; the remainder were in hospital; and so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, that only nineteen hundred prisoners were to be deducted. Two hundred and thirteen thousand were native Frenchmen, the residue were Poles, Germans, and Italians; thirty-five thousand men and five thousand horses were appropriated to Catalonia; one hundred and eighty thousand men with forty thousand horses were available for fresh enterprise, without taking a single man from the service of the lines of communication. What was there to oppose this fearful array? What consistency or vigour in the councils? What numbers? What discipline and spirit in the armies of Spain? What enthusiasm among the people? What was the disposition, the means, what the activity of the allies of that country? The



answers demonstrate that the deliverance of the Peninsula was due to other causes than the courage, the patriotism, or the constancy of the Spaniards.

With regard to their armies. Infantado resided with, rather than commanded a few thousand wretched fugitives at Cuenca, destitute and mutinous. At Valencia there was no army; the troops of the province were shut up in Zaragoza, and dissensions had arisen between Palafox and the local junta in consequence. In the Sierra Morena were five thousand raw levies, hastily made by the junta of Seville after the defeat of St. Juan. Galluzzo was with six thousand timid ill-armed soldiers in flight, having been suddenly defeated at Almaraz by a detachment of the fourth corps. Romana was near Leon with eighteen thousand runaways, collected after the dispersion at Reynosa; only five thousand were armed, none were subordinate, or capable of being disciplined: when checked for misconduct they deserted. In Galicia there was no army. In the Asturias the local government were so corrupt, so faithless, so oppressive, that patriotism was reduced to a name.

Infantado's  
Letters.  
Narrative  
of Moore's  
Campaign.

Stuart's  
and Frere's  
Letters.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 5.

At first the central junta made for Badajos, but getting terrified on the road fled to Seville; their inactivity, more conspicuous in this season of adversity than before, contrasted strangely with the inflated language of their public papers; their incapacity was glaring, their plans ridiculous, abortive; and the junta of Seville, still actuated by their own ambitious views, now openly reassumed their former authority. Spain was broken in strength and spirit except at a few places. Napoleon was in the centre of the country; he held the capital, the fortresses on the side of France, the command of the great lines of communication between the provinces; and on the military horizon no cloud was seen, save the heroic city of Zaragoza on the one side and a feeble British army on the other. Sooner or later he knew the former must fall, it was an affair of artillery calculation. The latter he supposed in full retreat for Portugal;

Stuart.

but as the fourth corps was nearer to Lisbon than the British general, a hurried retreat alone could bring the latter in time to that capital; and no preparations for defence could be made, sufficient to arrest the sixty thousand Frenchmen which he could carry there at the same moment. The subjugation of Spain appeared inevitable, but the genius and vigour of sir J. Moore frustrated Napoleon's plans, the Austrian war drew the master spirit from the scene of contention, and then England put forth her vast resources under the fortunate direction of a general equal to the task of delivering the Peninsula, and it was delivered. But through what changes of fortune, by what unexpected helps, by what unlooked-for and extraordinary events, under what difficulties, by whose perseverance, and in despite of whose errors, let posterity judge, for in that judgment only will impartiality and justice be found.

## CHAPTER III.

## OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

WHILE at Madrid, Napoleon heard that sir John Moore had suddenly relinquished his communication with Lisbon to menace the French line of operations on the side of Burgos; this compelled him to suspend his designs against the South of Spain and Portugal. The reasons which induced Moore to divide his army have been related. So likewise have been the arrangements which brought Baird to Coruña, without permission to land, and without money to equip his troops, when suffered to disembark. Their after operations are now to be described.

On the 8th of November Moore was at Almeida, his artillery at Truxillo, Baird at Coruña. Blake, pursued by fifty thousand enemies, was that day flying from Nava to Espinosa; Castaños and Palafox were quarrelling at Tudela; Belvedere was at Burgos with thirteen thousand bad troops; Napoleon was at Vitoria with one hundred and seventy thousand good troops.

At this time the letters of lord William Bentinck and colonel Graham, exposing the folly of the Spanish generals, disquieted Moore. He foresaw the junction of his army might be impeded by the result of an action which the Spaniards seemed courting; but as no misfortune had yet befallen them, he continued his march, hoping 'all the bad which might happen would not happen.'

The 11th he crossed the frontier of Spain, marching to Ciudad Rodrigo. On that day Blake was discomfited at Espinosa, and the Estremaduran army, beaten the day before at Gamonal, was utterly ruined and dispersed.

The 13th the head of the British columns entered Salamanca. That day Blake's force was finally disorganized at

Reynosa, leaving the first, second, and fourth French corps, seventy thousand men, free to act against any quarter.

Sir John Moore participated at first in the universal belief that the nation was enthusiastic; and when he detected the exaggerations of the military agents and the incapacity of the Spanish generals and rulers, he still trusted the spirit of the

people would compensate for all. Great was his  
 Appendix,  
 No. 14. surprise to find the defeat of Belvedere, which

laid Castille open to the incursions of the enemy uncovered the march of the British and compromised their safety, created no sensation among the people; the authorities spread no alarm, took no precautions, delivered out no arms although many thousands were stored in the principal towns, and neither encouraged the inhabitants by proclamations, nor enrolled any of them for defence! He was not even informed of this important occurrence until a week after it happened, and then only through a single official channel!

Valladolid, where the enemy's cavalry were, was but three marches from Salamanca; only four thousand British infantry had come up, and if the French advanced in force this weak division must fall back towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Nevertheless, assembling the local authorities, the general explained the nature of their position, strove to excite their ardour, and resolved not to retire unless forced back by superior numbers; he even hastened up his rear divisions, but sent orders to Hope and Baird to concentrate their troops and be prepared for a retreat. He produced no effect on junta or people; the former were stupified and timid, the latter though avowing their hatred of the invaders, would not stir in defence, the first feeling of indignation was exhausted and there was nothing to supply its place; the fugitives from the armies passed daily without shame, and unreprieved. In this state matters remained until the 18th, the troops were fast closing up, and the French cavalry withdrew from Valladolid to Palencia; but then news of Blake's defeat reached Salamanca, not by rumour or by any direct communication from the

Mr. Frere's  
 Letter to  
 the Junta.

Montaña de Santander, but by a letter from Mr Stuart, dated eight days subsequent to the action; for the central junta had not informed Mr. Frere



of it until thirty hours after having received official intelligence of it themselves.

Want of transport and supplies had caused the British to march in small and successive divisions, and it was the 23rd of November before the centre, consisting of twelve thousand infantry and a battery of six guns, was concentrated at Salamanca. On that day Castaños and Palafox were defeated at Tudela, their armies scattered without a chance of rallying, and the third and sixth French corps became disposable. The emperor also, victorious on both flanks and with a fresh base of operations fixed at Burgos, was then free to move with the guards and the reserve, either against Madrid or in the direction of Salamanca: detachments of his army were already in possession of Valladolid, the very town which, a few days before, the Spanish government had indicated for the base of Moore's operations and the formation of his magazines!

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.

The 26th the head of Baird's column was in Astorga, but the rear extended beyond Lugo, while the head of Hope's division was at the Eseurial, and the rear at Talavera. The second French corps was then on the Deba, threatening Leon and the Asturias; the cavalry covered the plains; the fourth corps was descending by Carrion and Valladolid to seize the pass of the Guadarama; the emperor himself was preparing to force the Somosierra.

This summary of contemporary events shows, that sir John Moore, though he had organized equipped and supplied his army, and marched four hundred miles in the space of six weeks, was too late in the field; the campaign was decided before the British entered Spain as an army. And if the troops, instead of being at Salamanca Eseurial and Astorga on the 23rd, had been united at Burgos the 8th, such was the weakness of the Spaniards, the strength of the enemy, and the skill of Napoleon, that a difficult retreat was the utmost favour to be expected from Fortune by the English. Sir John Moore had reached Salamanca without a plan of operations, or data upon which to found one; his instructions merely directed him to open communication with the Spanish authorities for the purpose of 'framing the plan of campaign.'

Castaños, with whom he was desired to correspond, was superseded immediately afterwards. His successor, Romana, was rallying the remains of Blake's force in the Asturias; two hundred miles from the only army with which any plan of co-operation could be formed, and of whose proceedings he knew as little as Moore, to whom no channel of intelligence had been pointed out, and as yet a stranger in the country and without money, he could not establish any certain one for himself.

It was the will of the people of England and the orders of the government that he should push forward to the assistance of the Spaniards; he had done so, without magazines and without money to form them, trusting to the official assurance of the minister that above a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers covered his march, that the people were enthusiastic and ready for any exertion to secure their own deliverance. He found them so supine and unprepared, that the French cavalry, in parties as weak as twelve men, traversed

the country and raised contributions without difficulty or opposition. This was the state of Castille. Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck exposed the selfishness, and apathy of the supreme government at Aranjuez. Graham painted the confusion of affairs on the Ebro, the jealousy, the discord of the generals, the worse than childish folly of the deputy Palafox and his creatures. Baird had found the Gallicians as inert as in Castille and Leon, and the authorities more absurd and interested. Hope expressed a like opinion as to the ineptitude of the central junta; and even the military agents, hitherto so sanguine, now lowered their tone of exultation in a remarkable manner.

Napoleon's enormous force was unknown to Moore; but he knew it could not be less than eighty thousand fighting men, and that thirty thousand more were momentarily expected, and might have arrived. He knew that Blake and Belvedere were totally defeated, and Castaños must inevitably be so if he hesitated to retreat. The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts was, that the Spaniards were unable or unwilling to resist the enemy, and the British would have to

Appendix,  
No. 13,  
§§ 1 & 4.

Appendix,  
No. 13,  
§§ 5 & 6.

support the contest alone, unless they could form a junction with Castaños before the latter was entirely discomfited and destroyed: there was no time for such an operation, and the first object was to unite the parcelled divisions of the English army.

Salamanca was five marches from Astorga, six from the Escorial; five days were required to bring the rear up to Salamanca, six to enable Hope to concentrate at the Escorial, sixteen to enable Baird to assemble at Astorga. Hence the English army could not under twenty days act in a body, and to advance in parcels would have been absurd. A retreat, though consonant to rule and to the minister's instructions which forbade any serious operation before the army was united, would, while Castaños kept the field, have appeared ungenerous. Moore's high spirit rejected such a remedy for the false position his government had placed him in, and he adopted an enterprise, such as none but great minds are capable of. He designed, if he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, throw himself into the heart of Spain, rally Castaños' army, if it yet existed, upon his own, defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.

Appendix.  
No. 14.

But the question was not purely military; the cause was not one to be decided by the marches of a few auxiliary troops; its fate depended on the vigour of the rulers, the concert of the generals, the unity of exertion, the fixed resolution of the people to suffer all privations and die rather than submit. To Moore it appeared doubtful that such a spirit, or the means of creating it, existed; more doubtful that there was capacity to execute or direct it when aroused; no men of talent had yet appeared, and good-will was in itself nothing if improperly treated. In this crisis he turned to the plenipotentiary, Frere. To communicate with him upon all important points, and receive with deference his opinion and advice was the order of his government, and the occasion was peculiarly fitting. Mr. Frere, fresh from England, was acquainted with the minister's views, and in a suitable position to ascertain the elasticity of the Spanish cause. The decision

of the question belonged as much to him as to the general, because it involved the whole policy of the English cabinet with respect to Spain; and it was the more proper to consult him, because, as a simple operation of war the proposed movement was rash; all the military and many political reasons called for a retreat upon Portugal. That would take the army to its own resources, ensure its concentration, increase its strength, protect British interests, and leave it free either to return to Spain if a favourable opportunity should occur, or to pass by sea to Andalusia and recommence the campaign in the south.

Such were the reflections that induced sir John Moore to solicit Mr. Frere's opinion upon the general policy of the proposed operation; but in so doing he never designed to consult him upon the mode of executing the military part, of which he conceived himself to be the best judge. While awaiting the reply, he directed Baird, if the enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push the troops on to Salamanca as fast as they should arrive at Astorga. Sir David was proceeding to do so, when Blake advised him that a considerable French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Ampudia, with a view of interrupting his march; this arrested the movement, he was even preparing to fall back when he was stopped by Moore, whose information led him to believe that Blake's report was false. Valuable time was thus lost, but it was the march of the fourth corps, then traversing the line from Carrion to the Guadarama, that gave rise to this contradictory intelligence; for the various changes in the French positions and the circulation of their light cavalry through the plains, bewildered the spies and the peasants. The force of the enemy on different points also confused the higher agents, who, believing the greatest amount of the invading army to be from a hundred to a hundred and twenty thousand men, could never reconcile the reports with this standard, and therefore concluded that Napoleon exaggerated his real numbers to create terror.

Moore wrote to Mr. Frere the 27th of November. On the 1st of December Baird was to march by Benevente, Hope by Tordesillas, the troops at Salamanca by Zamora and Toro;



and all the arrangements for the projected movement were completed, when, in the night of the 28th, a despatch from Mr. Stuart made known the disaster at Tudela. This totally changed the aspect of affairs, and the question proposed to Mr. Frere was decided. The project had been founded upon *the chance of rallying the Spanish armies behind the Tagus*, a hazardous and daring experiment when first conceived, but when Castaños had no longer an army, when the strength of Spain was utterly broken, to have persisted would have been insanity: the French could be over the Tagus before the British, and there were no Spanish armies to rally.

Appendix,  
No. 14.

Castaños' defeat at Tudela happened the 23rd of November; Baird's brigades could not be united at Astorga before the 4th of December; and to concentrate the whole army at Salamanca required a flank march of several days over an open plain: an operation not to be thought of, within a few marches of a skilful enemy who possessed such an overwhelming force of artillery and cavalry. While Castaños and Palafox kept the field the French at Burgos would not make any serious attempt on the side of Astorga; but that check being removed, an unmilitary flank march would naturally draw their attention and bring them down upon the parcelled divisions of the English troops. The object of succouring the Spaniards called for great, not for useless sacrifices. The English general was prepared to confront any danger, to execute any enterprise with a chance of utility, but he remembered that the best blood of England was committed to his charge, that not an English army, but the very heart, the pith of the military power of his country was entrusted to his prudence, and his patriotism spurned the idea of merely seeking personal renown.

There was now no room for hesitation in any mind capable of reasoning, and sir John Moore resolved to fall back on Portugal. Baird was to regain Coruña or Vigo and go by sea to Lisbon; but he was to show a bold front and attract the enemy's attention for a few days to favour Hope's junction. The negligence, the false intelligence, the frauds, the opposition approaching to hostility, experienced during

the march from Coruña, had so reduced Baird's hopes that he prepared to retreat without reluctance; and though he was in direct communication with Romana, the intercourse had rather confirmed than weakened the impression that it was impossible to depend upon the promises, the information, or the judgment of any Spanish general. In the mean time Napoleon forced the Somosierra and summoned Madrid, the supreme junta fled towards Badajos, St. Juan was murdered at Talavera, the remnant of Castaños' army was driven towards the Tagus, the fourth corps approached Segovia, and Hope's situation became critical.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 5.

His column had been compelled, from the want of money and supplies, to move in six divisions, each a day's march behind the other. At Almaraz he endeavoured to discover a way across the mountains to Ciudad Rodrigo, and a road did exist, but the peasants and muleteers declared it to be impracticable for carriages, and consequently unfit for the convoy.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.  
Hope's  
Letters.

The truth of their assertions was much doubted, but Hope was daily losing horses from the glanders, and with a number only sufficient to drag his guns and convoy along a good road, he feared to explore a difficult passage over the Sierras. When his leading division reached Talavera, Morla, then secretary at war, was anxious to have the troops still more minutely

Lord W.  
Bentinck's  
Letters.

divided, and proposed that the regiments should march through Madrid in ten divisions on as many successive days, the first to reach the capital the 22nd of November, which would exactly have brought the convoy into the jaws of the French army. Hope repaired to

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 6.

Madrid, held a conference with Morla, and quickly satisfied himself that everything was in confusion; that the Spanish government had neither arranged a general plan, nor was capable of conducting one. He therefore paid no attention to Morla, and carried his troops at once by the road of Naval Carnero to the Escorial, where he halted to close up the rear, and to obtain bullocks to assist in dragging the park over the Guadarama.

On the 28th he crossed the mountain, and entered the flat

country; that day and the next the infantry and guns were at Villa Castin and St. Antonia, the parc was at Espinar, the cavalry advanced on the road to Arevalo. Hcredia was then at Segovia, but the fourth corps was at Valladolid and Placentia, and its patroles were heard of at Coca, only a few miles from Arevalo. In the course of the day a despatch from Mr. Stuart announced the catastrophe at Tudela, and the dispersion of the camp at Sepulveda; at the same time the outposts of cavalry in the front reported that four hundred French horse were at Olmedo, only twelve miles from Arevalo; four thousand others were in the neighbourhood, and the cavalry scouts at St. Garcia on the right also tracked the French again at Añaya near Segovia. This state of affairs was embarrassing. To fall back on the Guadarama would leave the troops at Salamanca without artillery or ammunition; to advance was to make a flank movement of three days with a heavy convoy, over a flat country, and within a few hours of march of a powerful cavalry. To delay even for a few hours was to let the French from Segovia get between the convoy and the Guadarama; and then, attacked in flank and rear, it must be abandoned to save the troops in the mountains of Avila.

General  
Hope's  
Reports, MS.

A man of less intrepidity than Hope would have been ruined, but he, as resolute as he was prudent, without hesitation ordered his cavalry to throw out parties cautiously towards the French, and maintain a confident front; then moving the infantry and guns from Villacastin, and the convoy from Espinosa by cross roads to Avila, he continued his march day and night until he reached Peneranda. The cavalry covering this movement closed gradually to the left and finally occupied Fontiveros on the 2nd of December. The infantry and the draught animals were greatly fatigued, but the danger was not over; the patroles reported that ten thousand French infantry, two thousand cavalry, and forty guns, were still in Olmedo: this was the eternal fourth corps, which thus traversing the country continually crossed the heads of the English columns, and seemed to multiply the forces of the French at all points. Hope drew his infantry and cavalry up in position, but made the artillery and convoy proceed without

rest to Alba de Tormes, where a detachment from Salamanca covered their movement to that town. This vigorous and skilful march was thus concluded. The troops collected their stragglers at Peneranda, and pushed outposts to Medino del Campo, Madrigal, and Torecilla while the fourth corps unwittingly pursued its march to the Guadarama.

Moore's resolution to retreat upon Portugal created a great sensation at Madrid and at Aranjuez. The junta feared with reason, that such a proof of their incapacity would endanger their authority and perhaps their lives; they were on the point of flying to Badajos themselves, but were anxious others should rush headlong into danger. Morla, and those who like him were prepared to abandon the cause of their country, felt mortified at losing an opportunity of commemorating their defection by a signal act of perfidy. Mr. Frere was surprised and indignant that a general of experience and reputation should think for himself, and decide upon a military operation without a reference to his opinion. He was a person of mere scholastic attainment, very ill qualified for the duties of his situation which at this moment required temper, sagacity, and judgment. Overrating his own talents for public affairs, he had come out to Spain impressed with false notions of what was passing in that country, and tenaciously clinging to the pictures of his imagination, resented the intrusion of reason and petulantly spurned at facts. The defeat of Gamonal, which broke the centre of the Spanish line, uncovered the flank and rear of Castaños' army, opened a way to Madrid, and rendered the concentration of the British divisions unsafe if not impossible, he curiously called the 'unlucky affair of the 10th at Burgos.' After the battle of Tudela he estimated the whole French army on the side of Burgos and Valladolid at eleven thousand men, when they were above one hundred thousand; yet, with information so absurdly defective, he was prompt to interfere with, and eager to control the military combinations of the general, which were founded upon the true and acknowledged principles of the art of war.

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

Narrative  
of Moore's  
Campaigns.

Moore, while anxiously watching the dangerous progress of Hope, was suddenly assailed by the representations and remon-



stances of all these offended, mortified, and disappointed persons. The question of retiring being by the defeat of Tudela rendered so purely military, and the necessity so palpable, the general, although anticipating some expressions of discontent from the Spanish government, was totally unprepared for the torrent of puerile impertinencies with which he was overwhelmed. Morla, a subtle man, endeavoured first to deceive Mr. Stuart by treating the defeat of Castaños lightly, officially stating that he had saved the greatest part of his army at Sigüenza, and was on the march to join St. Juan at the Somosierra. To this he added, that there were only small bodies of French cavalry in the flat country of Castille and Leon, and no force on that side capable of preventing the junction of Moore's army. This was on the evening of the 30th, the emperor had forced the pass of the Somosierra that morning, and the duke of Dantzic was at Valladolid!

Moore's  
Papers.  
Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence.

The same day, Mr. Frere, writing from Aranjuez in answer to the general's former communication, and before he was acquainted with his intention to fall back, deprecated a retreat upon Portugal, and asserted that the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was unbounded, except in Castille and Leon where he admitted they were more passive than they should be. He even stated, that twenty thousand men were actually assembled in the vicinity of the capital, that Castaños was falling back upon them, that reinforcements were arriving daily from the southern provinces, and the addition of the British army would form a force greatly superior to any the French could bring against that quarter. It was certain, he said, the latter were very weak, and would be afraid to advance while the whole country from the Pyrenees to the capital was in arms upon their left flank. There were rumours that the conscription had been resisted, the more probable, because every great effort made by France was accompanied by weakness and internal disturbance, and a pastoral letter of the bishop of Carcassonne seemed to imply that it was so at that time. 'Good policy, therefore required, that the French should be attacked before their reinforcements joined them, as any success obtained at

Moore's  
Papers.  
Frere's Correspondence.

that moment would render a conscription for a third attempt infinitely difficult, if not impracticable. But if, on the other hand,' said this inconsiderate person, 'the French are allowed, with their present forces to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of their conscription, they will pour into Spain with a number of troops which will give them immediate possession of the capital and the central provinces.' Two days after the date of this letter the emperor was actually at the capital, and Mr. Frere was, with the junta, flying in all haste, France remaining meanwhile strong, and free from internal dissension.

This rambling epistle, though written, was not despatched before the intention to fall back upon Portugal was made known to Mr. Frere, but he thought it so well calculated to prevent a retreat that he forwarded it, accompanied by a short explanatory note, which was offensive in style, and indicative of a petulant disposition. At the same time, Augustin Bueno and Ventura Escalante, two generals deputed by the junta to remonstrate against the retreat, arrived at head-quarters, and they justified the choice of their employers, being in folly and presumptuous ignorance the very types of the government they represented. Asserting that St. Juan had twenty thousand men, that reinforcements were daily joining him, and that the Somosierra was impregvably fortified, they were proceeding to create immense Spanish armies, when the general stopped their garrulity by introducing Graham, who had witnessed the dispersion of Castaños' army, and had just left the unfortunate St. Juan at Talavera, surrounded by the villanous runagates who murdered him the next day. It may be easily supposed that such representations could have no weight, the necessity of retreating was rendered even more imperious by these glaring proofs, that the junta and the English plenipotentiary were totally ignorant of of what was passing around them.

But Napoleon was now in full career. He had raised a hurricane of war, and directing its fury as he pleased his adversaries were obliged to conform their movements to his, the circumstances varied from hour to hour, and the determination of one moment was rendered useless in the next. The

appearance of the French cavalry in the plains of Madrid had sent the junta and Mr. Frere headlong towards Badajos; but the people of Madrid, as we have seen, shut their gates, and displayed the outward signs of a resolution to imitate Zaragoza. Infantado was one of the junta of defence, yet Morla designing a final effort to involve the British army in the destruction of his own country, persuaded him to quit Madrid for the army of the centre. The traitor thus became sole master, for only the duke and himself had influence with the mob who had murdered Perales and filled the city with tumult.

When Napoleon summoned the city, Morla, in concert with the prince of Castel Franco, addressed a paper to sir John Moore, in which they stated that 'twenty-five thousand men under Castaños, and ten thousand from the Somosierra, were marching in all haste to the capital, where forty thousand others were in arms. Nevertheless, apprehending an increase of force on the enemy's side, the junta hoped the English army would either march to the assistance of Madrid, or take a direction to fall upon the rear of the French; and not doubting that the English general had already formed a junction with Blake's army,' which they well knew had been dispersed, 'they hoped he would be quick in his operations.' This paper was sent by a government messenger to Salamanca, but ere he could reach that place, Morla, who had commenced negotiations before the despatch was written, capitulated, and Napoleon was in Madrid. This communication would not have sufficed to arrest Moore's retrograde movement, for he knew then how Spanish armies were created on paper; but Mr. Stuart also expressed a belief that Madrid would make a vigorous resistance; and the tide of false information having set in with a strong current, every moment brought fresh assurances that a great spirit had arisen.

On the day Morla's communication arrived, there appeared at head-quarters one Charmilly a French adventurer. This man, since denounced in the British parliament as an organizer of assassination in St. Domingo and a fraudulent bankrupt in London, came as the confidential agent of Mr. Frere. He had been in Madrid during the night of the 1st, and left it the next morning, after having held a conference with Morla.

Taking the road to Talavera he met with Mr. Frere, and painted the spirit and enthusiasm of Madrid in such colours that the envoy imparted his own views in return, and not only entrusted this stranger with letters to sir John Moore, but actually gave him a mission to obstruct the retreat. Charmilly hastened to Salamanca and presented Mr. Frere's first missive, in which, after alluding to former representations and to the information of which Charmilly was the bearer, viz. the enthusiasm in the capital, he made a formal remonstrance to the effect, that propriety and policy demanded an immediate advance of the British to support this generous effort. Charmilly also demanded a personal interview, which was granted, yet Moore, having some suspicion of the man whom he had seen before, listened to his tales with a coldness which baffled the penetration of the adventurer, and he retired thinking retreat certain.

For many years so much ridicule had been attached to the name of an English expedition, that weak-headed men claimed a sort of prescriptive right to censure without regard to subordination the conduct of their generals. It had been so in Egypt, where a cabal was formed to deprive lord Hutchinson of the command; it had been so at Buenos Ayres, at Ferrol, and in Portugal; it was so at this time in Moore's army; and it will be found in the course of his work, that the superlative talents, vigour, and success of Wellington, could not, even at a late period of the war secure him from such vexatious folly. The three generals who commanded the separate divisions of the army, and who were in consequence acquainted with all the circumstances of the moment, were agreed as to the propriety of a retreat, but in other quarters indecent murmurs were so prevalent among officers of rank as to call for rebuke. Charmilly, ignorant of the decided character of the general-in-chief, thought this temper favourable to the object of his mission, and presented a second letter, which Mr. Frere had charged him to deliver, should the first fail of effect. The purport was to desire, if sir John Moore still persisted in his intention of retreating, '*the bearer might be previously examined before a council of war;*' in other words, that Mr. Frere, convinced of the general's incapacity and want of zeal, was determined to



control his proceedings even by force. And this to a British officer of long experience and confirmed reputation, and by the hands of a foreign adventurer! The indignation of a high spirit at such a foolish wanton insult broke forth. He drove Charmilly from his presence, and ordered him instantly to quit the cantonments of the British army. But anger soon subsided. Quarrels among the servants of the public could only prove detrimental to his country, and he put his personal feelings aside. The information brought by Charmilly, separated from the indecorum of his mission, was in itself important: it confirmed the essential facts that Madrid was actually resisting, and the spirit and energy of the country awaking.

Hitherto Moore had doubted if the people would make any effectual effort; all around himself was apathetic and incapable; his correspondents, with the exception of Mr. Frere, nay even the intercepted letters of French officers, agreed in describing the country as subsiding into indifference, and to use his own words, ‘*Spain was without armies, generals, or a government.*’ But now the fire essential to the salvation of the nation seemed to be kindling, and he hailed the appearance of an enthusiasm which promised success to a just cause, and a brilliant career of glory to himself. That the metropolis should thus abide the fury of the conqueror was a great event and full of promise, and the situation of the army was likewise improved; Hope’s junction was accomplished, and as the attention of the French was turned towards Madrid, there was no reason to doubt that Baird’s junction could likewise be effected. On the other hand, there was no certainty that the capital would remain firm when danger pressed, none that it would be able to resist, none that the example would spread; yet without it did so, nothing was gained, because it was only by an union of heart and hand throughout the whole country that the great power of the French could be successfully resisted.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 7.

Appendix,  
No. 14.

In a matter so balanced, Moore, as might be expected from an enterprising general, adopted the boldest and most generous side. He ordered Baird, who, after destroying some stores, had fallen back to Villa Franca, to concentrate his troops at

Astorga, and he himself prepared for an advance; but as he remained without information as to the fate of Madrid, he sent Graham to obtain intelligence of what was passing, and carry his answer to Morla. This resolution being taken, he wrote to Mr. Frere, calmly explaining the reasons for his past conduct, and those which actuated him in forming a fresh plan of operation. 'I wish anxiously,' said this noble-minded man in conclusion, 'I wish anxiously, as the king's minister, to continue upon the most confidential footing with you, and I hope as we have but one interest, the public welfare, though we occasionally see it in different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony which should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these sentiments I shall abstain from any remarks upon the two letters from you, delivered to me last night and this morning by colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. I certainly at first did feel and expressed much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be created towards you again.'

Military operations now occupied his mind. The Somosierra and Guadarama were in the enemy's hands, wherefore no direct movement on Madrid could be made, nor indeed any operation on that side before the 12th, when Baird's rear would be closed up to Astorga. Moore knew Zaragoza was ready to stand a second siege, and he had in the first a guarantee for its obstinacy. The junta of Toledo had formally assured him that they would die on the ruins of the city, but never submit; and from several quarters he was told of new levies crowding up from the south. Romana also now declared himself able to aid with twenty thousand men. Upon these circumstances he conceived a daring enterprise stamped with the seal of genius, political and military.

He judged the French emperor more anxious to strike a blow against the English, than to overrun any particular province or get possession of any town in the Peninsula. He resolved therefore to throw himself upon the communications of the French army, hoping, if fortune was favourable, to inflict a severe loss upon the troops guarding them before aid

could arrive. If Napoleon suspending operations against the south should detach largely, Madrid would thereby be succoured; if he did not detach largely the British could hold their ground. Moore knew well that great commander would most likely fall with his whole force upon those who menaced his line of communication; but to relieve Spain at a critical moment, and give time for the south to organize its defence and recover courage, he was willing to draw the enemy's whole power on himself. He saw the peril for his own army, knew that it must glide along the edge of a precipice, cross a gulf on a rotten plank; but he also knew the martial qualities of his soldiers, felt the pulsations of his own genius, and the object being worth the deed he dared essay it even against Napoleon.

Appendix,  
No. 14.

Graham returned on the 9th, bringing intelligence that Madrid had capitulated. He had only reached Talavera, where two fugitive members of the supreme junta told him twenty thousand French were in the Retiro, but the people retained their arms and La-Peña had thirty thousand at Guadalaxara; that fourteen thousand of St. Juan's and Heredia's forces were assembled at Almaraz; that Romana, with whom they anxiously desired the English should unite, had an army of thirty thousand fighting men; finally, that the most energetic measures were in activity wherever the enemy's presence did not control the patriots.

Mortifying as it was to find Madrid after so much boasting hold out but one day, the event itself did not destroy the ground of Moore's resolution to advance. It was so much lost, it diminished the hope of arousing the nation, and it increased the danger of the British army by letting loose a greater number of the enemy's troops; but as a diversion for the south it might still succeed, and as long as there was any hope the resolution of the English general was fixed to prove, that he would not abandon the cause even when the Spaniards were abandoning it themselves.

## CHAPTER IV.

ON the 11th of December the movement was commenced, but preparations for a retreat on Portugal were also continued, and Baird was ordered to form magazines at Benevente, Astorga, Villa Franca, and Lugo, by which two lines of operation and greater freedom of action were obtained. Moore's first design was to march on Valladolid to cover the arrival of his stores and ensure his junction with Baird, whose rear was still behind Astorga. In this view head-quarters were at Alaejos. The 13th, two brigades of infantry and Lord Paget's cavalry were at Toro, Hope was at Torrecilla, and Charles Stewart's horsemen were at Rueda, having the night before surprised there fifty infantry and thirty dragoons. The prisoners said the French believed the English army was retreating on Portugal, and an intercepted despatch from Berthier, disclosing the emperor's views, changed the direction of the march. It was addressed to Soult, and said Madrid was tranquil, the shops open, the public amusements going on as in profound peace. The fourth corps was at Talavera on the way to Badajos, and this movement would force the English to retire on Portugal, if, contrary to the emperor's belief, they had not already done so. The fifth corps was on the march to Zaragoza, the eighth to Burgos. Soult was therefore directed to drive the Spaniards into Galicia, to occupy Leon, Benevente, and Zamora, and keep the flat country in subjection; for which purpose his two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry brigades of Franceschi and Debelle, were considered sufficient.

It is remarkable that this, the first correct information of the capitulation of Madrid, should have been thus acquired from the enemy, ten days after the event had taken place. Nor is it less curious, that while Mr. Frere's letters were filled with vivid descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm, Napoleon



should have been so convinced of their passiveness, as to send this important despatch by an officer, who rode post without an escort, and in safety until his abusive language to the post-master at Valdestillos created a tumult in which he lost his life. Captain Waters, an English officer sent to obtain intelligence, happening to arrive in that place, heard of the murder, and immediately purchased the despatch for twenty dollars; and this accidental information was the more valuable, as neither money nor patriotism had hitherto induced the Spaniards to bring any intelligence of the enemy's situation: each step the army had made was in the dark. It was now certain that Burgos was or would be strongly protected, and that Baird's line of march was unsafe if Soult, following these instructions, advanced. On the other hand, as the French were ignorant of the British movements, there was a chance to surprise and beat Soult before Napoleon could come to his succour. Wherefore Hope was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas and direct his march upon Villapando; head-quarters were removed to Toro; and Valderas was given for the junction of Baird's division, the head of which was now at Benevente.

On the 16th Mr. Stuart arrived at Toro, accompanied by F. X. Caro, a member of the Spanish government, who brought two letters, the one from the junta the other from Mr. Frere. That from the junta complained, that when Romana proposed to unite fourteen thousand picked men to the British army with a view to make a forward movement, his offer had been disregarded and a retreat determined upon in despite of his earnest remonstrances; a retreat uncalled for, and highly impolitic, 'as the enemy was never so near his ruin as in that moment.' If the Spanish and British armies should unite, they said, it would give liberty to the Peninsula. Romana, with his fourteen thousand select men, was still ready to join sir John Moore and thirty thousand fresh levies would in a month be added to the ranks of the allied force.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 4.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers, MSS.

This tissue of falsehoods, for Romana had approved of the intention to retreat and never had above six thousand men armed, was addressed to Mr. Frere, and by him transmitted

to the general, together with one from himself, which, in allusion to the retreat upon Portugal, contained the following extraordinary passages: 'I mean the immense responsibility with which you charge yourself by adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, a measure which must be followed by immediate, if not final ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are entrusted.' 'I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, which with such an interest at stake I should feel unwilling to excite; but this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose.'

These letters came from Truxillo, for the junta, thinking Badajos unsafe, had proceeded so far on their way to Seville, the French continued to advance, the remnants of the Spanish armies to fly, and everything bore the most gloomy appearance. Mr. Frere knew this. In a subsequent letter he acknowledged that enthusiasm was extinct, and a general panic commencing when he was penning those offensive passages. Ignorant of the numbers, the situation, and the resources of the enemy, he formed hypotheses, insulted sir John Moore, and endangered the interests of his country. The British general, while struggling with unavoidable difficulties, was thus harassed by remonstrances and representations, in which common sense, truth, and decency were alike disregarded; but he did not fail to show how little personal feelings weighed with him in opposition to the public welfare. He had reason to suppose Mr. Frere received his letter relative to Charmilly's mission before this last insult was offered; yet, as it was not acknowledged, he availed himself of the omission, and with singular propriety and dignity thus noticed the plenipotentiary's second insulting communication:—*'As to your letter delivered to me at Toro by Mr. Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style of the two which were brought by colonel Charmilly, and consequently was answered by my letter*

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 7.

*of the 6th, of which I send you a duplicate; that subject is I hope at rest!*

At Toro it was ascertained that Romana, although knowing of the British advance and pledged to support, was retiring to Galicia; nominally generalissimo, he had only a few thousand miserable soldiers, for the junta with great ingenuity contrived to have no general when they had an army, and no army when they had a general. After the dispersion at Reynosa, Romana had rallied five thousand men at Renedo, in the valley of Cabernuigo, designing to hold on to the Asturias, but the vile conduct of the Asturian junta, joined to the terror created by the French victories, had completely subdued the spirit of the peasantry, and ruined the resources of that province. He complained that his men when checked for misconduct quitted their standards, and that any should have remained with the colours is to be admired; for among the sores of Spain there were none more cankered, more disgusting, than the venality, the injustice, the profligate corruption of the Asturian authorities. They openly divided the English subsidies, and defrauded not only the soldiers of their pay and equipments but the miserable peasants of their hire for work, doubling the wretchedness of poverty, and deriding the misery they occasioned by pompous declarations of their own virtue.

From the Asturias Romana led this remnant to Leon, about the period of Moore's arrival at Salamanca; like others he had been deceived as to the real state of the country, and repented of coming to Spain. He had quickness and general knowledge, yet was disqualified by nature for military command; a lively principle of error pervaded all his notions of war; no man ever bore the title of general less capable of directing an army. Nor was he exempt from the prevailing weakness of his countrymen; at this moment, when he had not strength to stand upright, his letters were teeming with gigantic offensive projects. He had before approved of a retreat, he was now as ready to urge a forward movement, promising to co-operate with twenty thousand soldiers when he could not muster a third of that number, and

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.  
Colonel  
Syme's Cor-  
respondence.

General  
Leith.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 5.

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 7.

those but half armed and scarcely knowing their own standards. At the time he made this promise he was retiring into Galicia, not meaning to deceive for he was as ready to advance as to retreat, but this species of boasting is inherent in his nation. It has been asserted that Caro offered the chief command of the Spanish armies to sir John Moore, and the latter refused it. This is not true. Caro had no power to do so, there were no armies to command, and he professed to be satisfied of the soundness of the English general's views, and ashamed of the folly of the junta.

Head-quarters were at Castro Nuevo the 18th, and Moore informed Romana of his design against Soult, desiring his co-operation, and requesting he would, according to his own plan given to the British minister in London, reserve the Asturias for his line of communication and leave Galicia to the British. The latter were now in full march. Baird was at Benevente, Hope at Villepando, and the cavalry, scouring the country on the side of Valladolid had several successful skirmishes, the most remarkable being fought by major Otway of the 18th hussars, who captured colonel Antignac and brought off more prisoners than his own party amounted to: the French could therefore be no longer ignorant of the movement, and the English general brought forward his columns rapidly. On the 20th the army was united, the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo, the infantry at Mayorga, both as much concentrated as the necessity of obtaining cover in a country devoid of fuel and deep with snow would permit. The weather was very severe, the marches long, but the men were robust, their discipline admirable, there were few stragglers, and the experience of one or two campaigns only was wanting to perfection. The number was small, nominally thirty-five thousand; but four regiments were still in Portugal, and three had been left by Baird at Lugo and Astorga; one thousand six hundred and eighty-seven

Appendix,  
No. 25.

were detached, four thousand were in hospital: the actual number present under arms on the 19th of December, was only nineteen thousand and fifty-three infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight cavalry, one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight gunners; forming a total of twenty-three thousand five hundred and



eighty-three men, with sixty pieces of artillery. They were organized in three divisions and a reserve of infantry, and there were two independent brigades of light troops. The cavalry was in one division, four batteries were attached to the infantry, two to the horsemen, and one was kept in reserve. Romana, who had been able to bring forward very few men, promised to march in two columns by Almanzer and Guarda, and sent some information of the enemy's position; but Moore thought little of his intelligence, when he found him even so late as the 19th, upon the faith of information from the junta, representing Madrid as still holding out; and when the advanced posts were already engaged at Sahagun, proposing an interview at Benevente to arrange the plan of operations.

On the French side, Soult was concentrating his force on the Carrion. After his rapid and brilliant opening of the campaign, his corps remained on the defensive until the movements against Tudela and Madrid were completed; the order to recommence offensive operations was intercepted on the 12th, but on the 16th he heard of the English army. At that period Bonnet's division occupied Barquera de San Vincente and Potes on the Deba, watching some thousand Asturians whom Ballesteros had collected near Llanes; Merle's and Mermet's divisions were on the Carrion; Franceschi's dragoons at Valladolid, Debelle's at Sahagun. The whole furnished sixteen or seventeen thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry present under arms, of which only eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry could be opposed to the British without uncovering the important post of Santander. Alarmed at this disparity of force, Soult required Mathieu Dumas, commandant at Burgos, to direct all the divisions and detachments passing through that town upon the Carrion, whatever might be their original destination. This was assented to by Dumas and approved by the emperor.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

On the 21st, Bonnet's division was still on the Deba, Mermet's was in the town of Carrion, Merle's at Saldaña. Franceschi's cavalry had retired from Valladolid to Riberos de

la Cuesca, but general Lorge, coming from Burgos, reached Palencia with thirteen hundred dragoons, and Debelle continued at Sahagun, where the tenth and fifteenth British hussars under Lord Paget surprised him before daylight on the 21st. The tenth marched straight to the town, the fifteenth turned it by the right and endeavoured to cut off the enemy, a patrol gave the alarm, and when four hundred of the fifteenth had reached the rear of the village, they found a line of six hundred French dragoons. The tenth were not in sight, but lord Paget charging with the fifteenth, broke the French and pursued them for some distance. Twenty killed, two lieutenant-colonels, and eleven other officers, with a hundred and fifty-four men prisoners, were the result of this vigorous affair. Debelle then retired to Santerbas, the English infantry occupied Sahagun, and head-quarters were established there. During these events Romana remained at Mancilla, and no assistance could be expected from him. Ashamed of exposing the weakness and misery of his troops he kept away, for after all his promises he could not produce six thousand fighting men. His letters were as usual extremely encouraging. *The French force in Spain was exceedingly weak; Palafox had not been defeated at Tudela; Soult, including Bonnet's division, had scarcely nine thousand men of all arms; it was an object to surround and destroy him before he could be succoured;*—with other follies of this nature.

The English troops having outmarched their supplies halted the 22nd and 23rd, and Soult hastened the march of his reinforcements from the side of Burgos. Fearing for his communication with Placentia, he abandoned Saldaña on the 23rd, and concentrated the infantry to his left at Carrion. Debelle's cavalry again advanced to Villatilla and Villacuenta, Franceschi remained at Riberos, Lorge occupied Paredes. Dumas hurried forward the divisions of the eighth corps, Laborde was already at Palencia, Loison and Heudelet followed at the distance of two days' march but they were weak. Moore designed to move during the night of the 23rd, so as to arrive at Carrion by daylight on the 24th, to force the bridge, and then ascending the river fall upon the main body, which his information led him

to believe was still at Saldaña. This attack was however a secondary object, his attention was constantly directed towards Madrid. To beat the troops in his front would be a victory of little value beyond the honour, because the third and fourth corps were so near; the pith of the operation was to tempt the emperor from Madrid, and his march from that capital was to be the signal for a retreat which sooner or later was inevitable. In fine, to draw Napoleon from the south was the design, and it behoved the man to be alert who interposed between the lion and his prey.

On the 23rd Romana gave notice the French were in motion from the side of Madrid, and in the night of the 23rd, the troops being actually in march towards Carrion, this intelligence was confirmed by the general's own spies; all of whose reports said the whole French army was in movement to crush the English. The fourth corps had been halted at Talavera, the fifth at Vitoria, the eighth was closing up to reinforce the second, and the emperor in person was marching towards the Guadarama. The principal object was thus attained. The siege of Zaragoza was delayed, the southern provinces allowed to breathe, and it only remained to prove, by a timely retreat, that this hazardous offensive operation was not the result of improvident rashness, but the hardy enterprise of a great commander acting under peculiar circumstances. As a mere military measure his judgment condemned it; as a political one he thought it of doubtful advantage, because Spain was really passive; but he desired to give the Spaniards an opportunity of making one more struggle for independence. That was done. If they could not or would not profit of the occasion, if their hearts were faint or their hands feeble the shame and the loss were their own; the British general had done enough, enough for honour, enough for utility, more than enough for prudence: the madness of the times required it. His army was already on the verge of destruction, the enemy's force was hourly increasing in his front, the first symptoms of a retreat would bring it headlong on, the emperor threatened the line of communication with Galicia, and by the rapidity of his march left no time for consideration.

After the first burst, by which he swept the northern pro-

vinces and planted his standard on the banks of the Tagus, that monarch had put all the resources of his subtle genius into activity, endeavouring to soften the public mind, and by engrafting benefits on the terror his victories had created to gain over the people. But he likewise gathered in his extended wings for a new flight, designed to carry him over all the southern kingdoms of the Peninsula, and give him the rocks of Lisbon as a resting-place for his eagles. Madrid was tranquil; Toledo, notwithstanding her heroic promises had never even shut her gates; one division of the first corps occupied that town, another was at Ocaña, and the light cavalry scoured the whole of La Mancha to the borders of Andalusia. The fourth corps, with Milhaud's and Lasalle's horsemen, were at Talavera preparing to march to Badajos; and sixty thousand men with one hundred and fifty guns and fifteen days' provisions in carts, were reviewed at the gates of Madrid upon the 19th: three days afterwards they were in full march to intercept the line of sir John Moore's march.

Napoleon was informed of that general's advance on the 21st, and in an instant the Spaniards their juntas and their armies were dismissed from his thoughts; his corps were arrested in their different movements, ten thousand men were left to control the capital, and on the evening of the 22nd fifty thousand men were at the foot of the Guadarama. A deep snow choked the passes, and twelve hours of ineffectual toil left the advanced guards still on the wrong side; the general commanding reported that the road was impracticable, but Napoleon placing himself at the head of the column, on foot and amidst storms of hail and drifting snow, led his soldiers over the mountain. Many men and animals died during the passage, which lasted two days, but the emperor, personally urging on the troops with unceasing vehemence, reached Villacastin, fifty miles from Madrid on the 24th. The 26th he was at Tordesillas with the guards and the divisions of Lapisse and Dessoles; the dragoons of La Houssaye entered Valladolid the same day, and Ney with the sixth corps was at Rio Seco.

From Tordesillas Napoleon wrote to Soult, concluding his despatch thus: '*Our cavalry scouts are already at Benevente.*



*If the English pass to-day in their position they are lost: if they attack you with all their force, retire one day's march; the farther they proceed the better for us. If they retreat pursue them closely.'*

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

Then, full of hope, he hastened himself to Valderas, but had the mortification to learn he was twelve hours too late. He had made a wonderful march, resting neither day nor night, but the British were across the Esla! In fact Soult was in full pursuit when this letter was written, for Moore, well aware of his own situation, had given orders to retreat the moment the intelligence of Napoleon's march from Madrid reached him, and the heavy baggage was immediately moved to the rear, while the reserve, the light brigades, and the cavalry remained at Sahagun, the latter pushing patrols up to the enemy's lines, and skirmishing to hide the retrograde march.

On the 24th, Hope, having two divisions, retired by the road of Mayorga; Baird with another, by that of Valencia de San Juan, where there was a ferry-boat to cross the Esla river; the marquis of Romana undertook to guard the bridge of Mansilla. Lorge's dragoons arrived the same day at Frechilla, and the division of Laborde entered Paredes. The 25th Moore with the reserve and light brigades, followed Hope's column to Valderas; the 26th Baird passed the Esla at Valencia and took post on the other side, yet with some difficulty, for the boat was small the fords deep and the river rising. The commander-in-chief approached the bridge of Castro Gonzalo early in the morning of the 26th, but the stores were a long time passing, a dense fog interecepted the view, and so nicely timed was the march, that the scouts of the imperial horsemen were already infesting the flank of the column, and even carried off some of the baggage.

The left bank of the river commanded the bridge, and general Robert Crawford remained with a brigade of infantry and two guns to protect the passage; for the cavalry was still watching Soult, who was now pressing forward in pursuit. Lord Paget, after passing Mayorga, had been interecepted by a strong body of horse belonging to the emperor's army. It was embattled on a swelling ground close to the road, the soil was deep and soaked with snow and rain, yet two squadrons

of the tenth rode stiffly up to the summit, and notwithstanding the enemy's advantage of numbers and position, killed twenty and captured one hundred. This was a hardy action; but the English cavalry had been engaged more or less for twelve successive days, with such fortune and bravery that above five hundred prisoners had already fallen into their hands, and their leaders being excellent their confidence was unbounded. From Mayorga Paget proceeded to Benevente, and Soult, with great judgment, pushed for Astorga by the road of Mancilla, where upon Romana, leaving three thousand men and two guns to defend the bridge at the latter place, fell back to Leon. Thus Moore recovered by a critical march his communications with Galicia, and so far baffled the emperor: yet his position was neither safe nor tenable.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

Benevente, a rich open place, remarkable for a small but curious Moorish castle containing a collection of ancient armour, is situated in a plain which extending from the Gallician mountains to the neighbourhood of Burgos appears to be boundless. The river Esla winded through it about four miles in front of Benevente, and the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was the key to the town; the right bank of the Esla was however entirely commanded from the further side and there were many fords. Eighteen miles higher up, at Valencia de San Juan, a shorter road from Mayorga to Astorga crossed the river by the ferry-boat; and at Mancilla, the passage being only defended by Spaniards was in a manner open to Soult, for Romana had not destroyed the arches of the bridge. Beyond Mancilla, under the hills skirting this great plain, stood the town of Leon, which was inclosed with walls and capable of resisting a sudden assault.

Moore knowing the line of the Esla could not be maintained, resolved to remain no longer than was necessary to clear out his magazines at Benevente, and cover the march of his stores. But the road to Astorga by Leon was much shorter than that through Benevente, and as Romana was inclined to retreat to Galicia, sir John requested him to maintain Leon as long as possible, and leave Galicia open for the English army. Romana assented to both requests,

and as he had a great rabble, and a number of citizens and volunteers were willing and even eager to fight, the town might have made resistance. Moore hoped it would, and gave orders to break down the bridge at Castro Gonzalo in his own front, the moment the stragglers and baggage should have passed. Meantime the bad example of murmuring given by men of high rank had descended lower, many regimental officers neglected their duty, and what with dislike to a retreat, the severity of the weather, and the inexperience of the army, the previous fine discipline of the troops was broken down: disgraceful excesses had been committed at Valderas, and the general severely reproached the army for its evil deeds, appealing to the honour of the soldiers for amendment.

On the night of the 26th, the light cavalry of the imperial guard, riding close up to the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, captured some women and baggage, and endeavoured to surprise the post, which gave rise to a remarkable display of courage and discipline. John Walton and Richard Jackson, private soldiers of the forty-third, were posted beyond the bridge, with orders that one should stand firm, the other fire and run back to the brow and give notice whether there were many enemies or few. Jackson fired but was overtaken and received twelve or fourteen sabre cuts in an instant; nevertheless, he came staggering on and gave the signal, while Walton, with equal resolution, stood his ground and wounded several of the assailants, who retired leaving him unhurt, but with his cap, knapsack, belts, and musket cut in above twenty places, his bayonet bent double, bloody to the hilt, and notched like a saw.

On the 27th, the cavalry and the stragglers being all over the river, Crawford commenced destroying the bridge amidst torrents of rain and snow; half the troops worked, the other half kept the enemy at bay from the heights on the left bank, for the cavalry scouts of the imperial guard were spread over the plain. At ten o'clock at night a large party, following some waggons again endeavoured to pass the piquets and gallop down to the bridge; that failing, a few dismounted, and extending to the right and left commenced a skirmishing

fire, while others remained ready to charge if the position of the troops, which they expected to ascertain by this scheme, should offer an opportunity. They failed, and this anxiety to interrupt the work induced Crawford to destroy two arches instead of one, and blow up the connecting buttress; the masonry was so solid, that it was not until twelve o'clock in the night of the 28th that all preparations were completed, when the troops descended the heights on the left bank, and passing very silently by single files and over planks laid across the broken arches, gained the other side without loss: an instance of singular good fortune, for the night was dark and tempestuous, the river rising rapidly with a roaring noise, and the enemy close at hand. To have resisted an attack would have been impossible, but the retreat was undiscovered and the mine sprung with good effect.

Crawford marched to Benevente where the cavalry and the reserve still remained. Here several thousand infantry slept in the upper part of an immense convent built round a square, and a frightful catastrophe was impending; for the lower galleries were thickly stowed with cavalry horses, there was but one entrance, and two officers of the forty-third coming from the bridge perceived on entering the convent, that a large window-shutter was on fire, that in a few moments the straw under the horses would ignite and six thousand men and animals must inevitably perish in the flames. One of them, captain Lloyd, a man of great strength and activity, and of a presence of mind which never failed, made a sign of silence to his companion, and springing on to the nearest horse, run along the backs of the others until he reached the blazing shutter, which he tore off its hinges and cast out of the window; then awakening a few men, he cleared the passage without any alarm, which in such a case would have been as destructive as the fire.

Two days' rest had been gained at Benevente, but little could be done to remove the stores, and the greatest part were destroyed. The army was and had been from the first without sufficient means of transport, the general had no money to procure it, and the ill-will and shuffling conduct of the juntas added infinitely to the difficulties. Hope and Fraser march-



ing by Labaneza reached Astorga the 29th, where Baird joined them from Valencia de San Juan; on the same day the reserve and Crawford's brigade quitted Benevente, but the cavalry remained in that town, having guards at the fords of the Esla. In this state of affairs general Lefebre Desnouettes, leading the French advanced guard came up to Castro Gonsalo and seeing only a few cavalry posts on the great plain, hastily concluded there was nothing to support them; wherefore crossing the river at daybreak by a ford above the bridge, he advanced with six hundred horsemen of the imperial guard into the plain. The piquets under Loftus Otway retired fighting until joined by a part of the third German hussars, when the whole charged the leading French squadrons with some effect; C. Stewart then took the command, and the ground was obstinately disputed, yet the enemy advanced. At this moment the plain was covered with stragglers baggage-mules and followers of the army, the town was filled with tumult, the distant piquets and videttes were seen galloping in from the right and left, the French were pressing forward boldly, and every appearance indicated that the enemy's whole army was come up and passing the river.

Lord Paget ordered the tenth hussars to mount and form under the cover of some houses at the edge of the town, for he desired to draw the French, whose real situation he had detected at once, well into the plain before he attacked. In half an hour, he was ready and gave the signal; the tenth hussars galloped forward, the piquets already engaged closed together, and the whole charged. Quickly then the scene changed. The French fled at full speed towards the river, the British followed sabring the hindmost until the French squadrons, without breaking their ranks, plunged into the stream and gained the opposite heights: there like experienced soldiers they wheeled, and seemed inclined to come forward a second time, but when two guns opened upon them they retired. During the pursuit in the plain, an officer was observed to separate from the main body and make towards another part of the river, he was followed by two men and refusing to stop was wounded and brought in a prisoner. It was Lefebre Desnouettes.

Although the imperial guards were outnumbered in the end, they were very superior at the commencement of this action, which was stiffly fought on both sides; for the British lost fifty men, and the French left fifty-five killed and wounded on the field, and seventy prisoners besides their general and other officers. Baron Larrey's Surgical Campaign. Larrey says, seventy of those who recrossed the river were also wounded, making a total loss of two hundred excellent soldiers. Lord Paget maintained his posts on the Esla under an occasional cannonade until the evening, and then withdrew to La Baneza. Napoleon had now reached Valderas, Ney was at Villaton, Lapisse at Toro, and though the French troops were worn down with fatigue the emperor still urged them on; the duke of Dalmatia, he said, would intercept the English at Astorga and their labours would be finally rewarded. Nevertheless, the destruction of the Castro Gonzalo bridge was so well accomplished that twenty-four hours were required to repair it, the fords were now impassable, and it was the 30th before Bessières could cross the river; but on that day he passed through Benc-  
Bulletin. vente with nine thousand cavalry, and bent his course towards La Baneza. Franceschi had meanwhile carried the bridge of Mansilla de las Mulas with a single charge of his light horsemen, and captured all the artillery and one half of the Spanish division left to protect it; Romana immediately abandoned Leon with many stores, and the 31st Soult entered that town without firing a shot, while Bessières entered La Baneza and pushed posts forward to the Puente d'Orvigo on one side, and the Puente de Valembre on the other: the rear of the English army was still in Astorga, the head-quarters having arrived there only the day before.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations.  
MS.

In the preceding month large stores had been gradually brought up to this town by Baird, and orders were given to destroy them after supplying the immediate wants of the army; but Romana, who would neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promises, pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army, and when the English divisions marched in, such a tumult and confusion arose, that no distri-

bution could be made nor the destruction of the stores effected. This unexpected disorder was very detrimental to discipline, which the unwearied efforts of the general had partly restored; the resources which he had depended on for the support of his soldiers thus became mischievous, and disorganized instead of nourishing them. He had the further vexation to hear Romana, the principal cause of this misfortune, proposing, with troops unable to resist a thousand light infantry, to recommence offensive operations on a plan in comparison with which the visions of Don Quixote were wisdom.

On the 31st the flank brigades separated from the army at Bonillas, and bent their course by cross roads towards Orense and Vigo, being detached to lessen the pressure on the commissariat, and to cover the flanks of the army. Fraser's and Hope's divisions entered Villa Franca, and Baird's division was at Bembibre. The reserve and head-quarters halted at Cambarros, a village six miles from Astorga, until the cavalry fell back in the night to the same place, and then the reserve marched to Bembibre. Romana left his infantry to wander as they pleased, and retired with his cavalry and some guns to the valley of the Minho; the rest of his artillery got mixed with the British army, and most of it was captured before reaching Lugo.

Napoleon entered Astorga the 1st of January 1809. Seventy thousand French infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of artillery, were after many days of incessant marching there united. The congregation of this mighty force, while it evinced the power and energy of the French monarch attested also the genius of the English general, who had found means to arrest the course of the conqueror, and draw him with the flower of his army to this remote and unimportant part of the Peninsula when its fairest provinces were prostrate beneath the strength of his hand. That Moore succoured Spain in her extremity and in her hour of weakness intercepted the blow descending to crush her, no man of candour can deny. For what troops, what preparations, what courage, what capacity was there in the south to have resisted even for an instant, the progress of a man, who, in ten days, and in the depth of winter crossing the snowy ridge of the Carpen-

tinos, had traversed two hundred miles of hostile country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga in a shorter time than a Spanish courier would have taken to travel the same distance!

This stupendous march was rendered fruitless by the quickness of his adversary; but Napoleon, though he had failed to destroy the English army, resolved, nevertheless, to cast it forth of the Peninsula. Being himself recalled to France by tidings that the Austrian storm was ready to burst, he fixed upon Soult to continue the pursuit. For this purpose three divisions of cavalry and three of infantry were added to that marshal's former command; yet of these last, the two commanded by Loison and Heudelet were several marches in the rear, and Bouuet's remained always in the Montaña de St. Ander. Hence the whole number immediately led to the pursuit was about twenty-five thousand men, of which four thousand two hundred were cavalry, composing the divisions of Lorges, La Houssaye, and Franceschi; fifty-four guns were with the columns, and Loison's and Heudelet's divisions followed by forced marches. But Soult was supported by Ney with the sixth corps, wanting its third division, yet mustering above sixteen thousand men under arms, the flower of the French army, and having thirty-seven pieces of artillery. Thus, including Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison's division, nearly sixty thousand men and ninety-one guns were put on the track of the English army. The emperor returned to Valladolid, where he received the addresses of the notables and deputies from Madrid and other great towns and strove by promises and other means to win the good opinion of the public. Appointing Joseph his lieutenant-general, he allotted separate provinces for each 'corps d'armée,' the imperial guard was to return to France, and himself departing on horseback with scarcely any escort, frustrated some designs, which the Spaniards had it is said formed against his person, by the astonishing speed of his journey.

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.



## CHAPTER V.

SOULT nowise inferior to any of his nation, if the emperor be excepted, followed Moore with a vigour indicating his desire to finish the campaign in a manner suitable to its opening at Gamonal. His main body followed the route of Foneevadon and Ponteferrada; a column took the road of Cambarros and Bembibre, and Francesehi entered the valley of the Syl, intending to move up that river and turn the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo. Thus Moore, after having twice baffled the emperor's combinations, was still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase every moment. The separation of his light brigades, reluctantly adopted on the bad counsel of his quarter-master-general Murray, had weakened the army by three thousand men. He however still possessed nineteen thousand of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong to march although shaken in discipline by the disorders at Valderas and Astorga; for his exertions to restore order and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some with scandalous levity disregarded. There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with which the emperor had brought up his overbearing numbers and thrust the English army into Gallicia, had rendered the natural strength of that country unavailing; the resources were few even for an army in winter quarters, and for a campaign in that season there were none at all. All the draught cattle that could be procured would scarcely have transported ammunition for two battles, whereas the French, sweeping the rich plains of Castille with their powerful cavalry, might have formed magazines at Astorga and Leon, and been supplied in abundance while the English were starving.

Before he advanced from Salamanca, Moore, foreseeing his

S.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent officers to examine the roads of Galicia, and the harbours which offered the greatest advantages for embarkation. By the reports of those officers, which arrived from day to day, and by the state of the magazines which he had directed to be formed, his measures were constantly regulated. The stores at Astorga, Benevente, and Labaneza, had by untoward circumstances and the deficiency of transport been rendered of no avail beyond the momentary supply; and part of their contents falling into the enemy's hands, gave him some cause of triumph: those at Villa Franca and Lugo contained fourteen days' consumption, and there were smaller magazines formed on the line of Orense and Vigo.

More than this could not have been accomplished. It was now only the fifteenth day since he had left Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, was foaming among the rocks of Galicia. Nineteen thousand British troops posted in strong ground might have offered battle to very superior numbers; yet where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain? Nothing could be gained, but he might by a quick retreat reach his ships unmolested, and carry his army from that narrow corner to the southern provinces, and renew the war under more favourable circumstances. It was by this combination of a fleet and army the greatest assistance could be given to Spain, and the strength of England become most formidable; a few days' sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz; six weeks' constant marching would not bring the French from Galicia to that neighbourhood. The northern provinces were broken, subdued in spirit, and possessed few resources; the southern provinces, rich and fertile, had scarcely seen an enemy, and there was the seat of government. Moore, reasoning thus, resolved to fall down to the coast and embark with as little delay as might be; but Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol were the principal harbours, and their relative advantages could only be determined by the reports of the engineers not yet received; and as those reports came in from day to day the line of retreat became subject to change.

Appendix,  
No. 13,  
§§ 2 & 8.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.  
MSS.

Appendix,  
No. 28, § 3.

When Soult took the command of the pursuing army Hope's and Fraser's divisions were at Villa Franca, Baird's at Bembibre, the reserve and cavalry at Cambarros, six miles from Astorga. Behind Cambarros the mountains of Galicia rose abruptly, yet there was no position, because, after the first rise at the village of Rodrigatos, the ground continually descended to Calcabellos a small town four miles from Villa Franca; and the old road of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, which turned the whole of this line, was choked with the advancing columns of the enemy. The reserve and the cavalry therefore marched during the night to Bembibre, and on their arrival Baird's division proceeded to Calcabellos; but in the immense wine-vaults of Bembibre hundreds of men remained inebriated, the followers of the army crowded the houses, and many of Romana's disbanded men were mixed with this heterogeneous mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children: the weather was dreadful, and despite the utmost exertions of the general-in-chief, when the reserve marched the next morning, the number of those unfortunate wretches was not diminished. Moore leaving a small guard with them proceeded to Calcabellos, but scarcely had the reserve marched out when some French cavalry appeared and in a moment the road was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after the troops, some with shrieks of distress and wild gestures, others with brutal exclamations. Some overcome with fear threw away their arms, others too stupidly intoxicated to fire reeled to and fro alike insensible to danger and disgrace, and the horsemen bearing at a gallop through the disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, rode so close to the retiring column that it was forced to halt and check their audacity.

Appendix,  
No. 12, § 2.  
Colonel  
Carmichael  
Smith's  
Report.

At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position, Baird marched to Herrerias, and Moore went on to Villa Franca; but in that town also great excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions; the magazines were plundered, the bakers driven from the ovens, the wine-stores forced, the commissaries prevented making the regular distributions; the doors of the houses were broken, and a scandalous insubordination then

showed a discreditable relaxation of discipline by the officers. Moore arrested this disorder, caused one man taken in the act of plundering a magazine to be hanged in the market-place, and then issuing severe orders returned to Calcabellos.

A small but at this season of the year a deep stream, called the Guia, run through that town, and was crossed by a stone bridge. On the Villa Franca side a lofty ridge, rough with vineyards and stone walls, was occupied by two thousand five hundred infantry, with a battery of six guns; four hundred riflemen, and a like number of cavalry, were posted on a hill two miles beyond the river, to watch the roads of Bembibre and Foncevadon. In this situation, on the 3rd of January, a little after noon, the French general Colbert approached with six or eight squadrons, but observing the ground behind Calcabellos so strongly occupied demanded reinforcements. Soult believing the English did not mean to stand, ordered Colbert to charge without delay, and the latter, stung by the message, obeyed with precipitate fury. From one of those errors so frequent in war, the British cavalry, thinking a greater force was riding against them, retired at speed to Calcabellos, and the riflemen who had withdrawn when the French first came in sight, were just passing the bridge, when a crowd of staff-officers, the cavalry, and the enemy, came in upon them in one mass: thirty or forty men were taken, and Colbert crossing the river charged on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen had however thrown themselves into the vineyards, and when the enemy approached within a few yards, opened such a deadly fire, that the greatest number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot, and among the rest Colbert. His fine martial figure his voice his gestures and his great valour, had excited the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was predominant when the gallant soldier fell. Some French voltigeurs now crossed the river, and a few of the 52nd regiment descended from the upper part of the ridge to the assistance of the riflemen, whereupon a sharp skirmish commenced, in which two or three hundred men of both sides were killed or wounded. Towards the termination Merle's infantry appeared on the hills and made a demonstration of crossing opposite to the left



of the English position, but a battery checked this, night came on, and the combat ceased.

As the road from Villa Franca to Lugo led through a rugged country, the cavalry were sent on to the latter town, and during the night the French patrols breaking in upon the rifle piquets, wounded some men, yet were beaten back without being able to discover that the English had abandoned the position. This however was the case, and the reserve reached Herrerias, a distance of eighteen miles, on the morning of the 4th, Baird's division being then at Nogales, Hope's and Fraser's near Lugo.

At Herrerias, Moore, who constantly directed the movements of the rear-guard, received the first reports of the engineers relative to the harbours. Vigo, besides its greater distance, offered no position to cover the embarkation, but Coruña and Betanzos did. The march to Vigo was therefore abandoned, the ships were directed round to Coruña, and the general, who now deeply regretted the separation of his light brigades, sent forward instructions for the leading division to halt at Lugo, where he designed to rally the army and give battle if the enemy would accept it. These important orders were carried to Baird by captain George Napier, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, yet sir David forwarded them by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the despatch; this blameable irregularity was ruinous to Fraser's troops, for in lieu of resting two days at Lugo, that general, unwitting of the order, pursued his toilsome journey towards St. Jago de Compostella, and returning without food or rest lost more than four hundred stragglers.

On the 5th, the reserve, having by a forced march of thirty-six miles gained twelve hours' start of the enemy, reached Nogales, and there met a large convoy of English clothing, shoes, and ammunition, intended for Romana's army, yet moving towards the enemy,—a circumstance characteristic of Spain. There was a bridge at Nogales which the engineers failed to destroy, and it was of little consequence, for the river was fordable above and below, and the general was unwilling, unless for some palpable advantage which seldom presented itself, to injure the communications of a country he was unable

to serve: the bridges also were commonly very solidly constructed, and the arches having little span, could be rendered passable again in a shorter time than they could be destroyed. Moreover, the road was covered with baggage, sick men, women, and plunderers, all of whom would have been thus sacrificed; the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the enemy, and fearing both sides alike carried their effects into the mountains, yet even there the villanous marauders followed them, and in some cases were killed,—a just punishment for quitting their colours. Under the most favourable circumstances, the tail of a retreating force exhibits terrible scenes of distress, and on the road near Nogales the followers of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers, barefooted, harassed, and weakened by their excesses at Bem-bibre and Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds, while broken carts, dead animals, and the piteous spectacle of women and children, struggling or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a picture of war, which, like Janus, has a double face.

Franceschi, after turning Villa Franca scoured the valley of the Syl, captured many Spanish prisoners and baggage, and now regained the line of march at Becerea. The French army, also, recovering their lost ground, passed Nogales towards evening, galling the rear-guard with a continual skirmish. Here it was that dollars to the amount of twenty-five thousand pounds were abandoned. This small sum was kept near head-quarters to answer sudden emergencies, and the bullocks drawing it being tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of the mountain, where part of it was afterwards gathered by the enemy, part by the Gallician peasants. The returns laid before parliament in 1809 made the sum 60,000*l.*, and the whole loss during the campaign nearly 77,000*l.*; but it is easier to make an entry of one sum for a treasury return than to state the details accurately; the money-agents like the military-agents, acted independently, and all deficiencies went down under the head of abandoned treasure. Officers actually present agree, that the only treasure *abandoned* by the army

s.  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MS.

was that at Nogales, and the sum was 25,000*l*. When it was ordered to be rolled over the brink of the hill two guns and a battalion of infantry were actually engaged with the enemy for its protection, and some person in whose charge the treasure was, exclaiming, 'It is money!' the general replied, 'So are shot and shells.' Accidents also will happen in war. An officer of the guards had charge of the cars drawing this treasure, an officer of the line seeing the bullocks exhausted, pointed out where fresh and strong animals were to be found; but the escorting officer, either ignorant of or indifferent to his duty, took no notice of this recommendation, and continued his march with the exhausted cattle which occasioned the loss of the treasure.

Towards evening the reserve approached Constantino, the French were close upon the rear, and a hill within pistol-shot of the bridge offered them so much advantage there was little hope to effect the passage without great loss. Moore posted the riflemen and the artillery on the hill, so as to mask the retreat of the reserve, and the enemy, ignorant of the vicinity of a river, were cautious until they saw the guns go off at a trot and the riflemen follow at full speed; then they pursued briskly, but when they reached the bridge the British were over, and a good line of battle was formed on the other side. A fight commenced, and the assailants were continually reinforced as their columns of march arrived; general E. Paget however maintained the post with two regiments until nightfall, and then retired to Lugo in front of which the whole army was now assembled. A few of the French cavalry showed themselves on the 6th, but the infantry did not appear, and the 7th, Moore gave a severe yet just rebuke to the officers and soldiers for their previous want of discipline, at the same time announcing his intention to offer battle. It has been well said, that a British army may be gleaned in a retreat but cannot be reaped; whatever may be their misery the soldiers will always be found clean at review and ready at a fight: scarcely was this order issued, when the line of battle, so attenuated before, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence and valour. Fifteen hundred had previously fallen in action or dropped to the rear, but as three fresh battalions,

left by Baird when he first advanced from Astorga, had rejoined the army between Villa Franca and Lugo, nineteen thousand combatants were still under arms.

On the right the English ground was comparatively flat and partially protected by a bend of the Minho; the centre was amongst vineyards with low stone walls. The left, somewhat withheld, rested on the mountain supported and covered by the cavalry; for it was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right and centre before he closed with his left wing, in which he had posted the flower of his troops: he thought thus to bring on a decisive battle, and trusted to the men's valour so to handle the enemy that he would be glad to let the army retreat unmolested. Other hope to re-embark the troops without loss there was none, save by stratagem; Soult, commanding soldiers habituated to war, might be tempted but could never be forced to engage in a decisive battle amongst those rugged mountains, where whole days might pass in skirmishing without any progress being made towards crippling an adversary.

It was mid-day before the French marshal arrived in person at the head of ten or twelve thousand men, and the remainder of his power followed in some disarray; for the marches had not been so easy but that many even of the oldest soldiers had dropped behind. As the columns came up, they formed in order of battle along a strong mountain ridge fronting the English. The latter were partly hidden by inequalities of the ground, Soult doubted if they were all before him, and taking four guns, and some squadrons commanded by colonel Lallemande, he advanced towards the centre and opened a fire, which was immediately silenced by a reply from fifteen pieces: the marshal thus convinced that something more than a rear-guard was in his front retired. About an hour after he made a feint on the right, and at the same time sent a column of infantry and five guns against the left. On that side the three regiments which had lately joined were drawn up, and the French pushing the outposts hard, were gaining the advantage, when Moore arrived, rallied the light troops, broke the adverse column, and treated it very roughly in the pursuit. The estimated loss of the French was between three and four hundred men.



It was now evident the British meant to give battle, and Soult hastening the march of Laborde's division which was still in the rear, requested Ney, then at Villa Franca, to detach a division of the sixth corps by the Val des Orres to Orense. Ney however, merely sent some troops into the valley of the Syl, and pushed his advanced posts in front as far as Nogales, Poyo, and Dancos. At daybreak on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the French side, seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery were in line, yet Soult deferred the attack until the 9th. On the English part, sixteen thousand infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery, impatiently awaited the assault, and blamed their adversary for delaying a contest which they ardently desired; but darkness fell without a shot being fired, and with it fell the English general's hope to engage his enemy on equal terms. What was to be done? Assail the French position, remain another day in expectation of an attack, or secretly gaining a march embark, or at least obtain time to secure a good covering position for the embarkation. The first operation was warranted neither by present nor future advantages, for how could an inferior army expect to cripple a superior one, posted as the French were on a strong mountain, with an overbearing cavalry to protect their infantry should the latter be beaten, and having twenty thousand fresh troops at the distance of two short marches in the rear. The British army was not provided to fight above one battle; there were no draught cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines, no hospitals, no second line, no provisions: a defeat would have been ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair, two battles in such circumstances, though both should be victories, would have been destruction; but why fight after the army had been rallied and the disasters of the march from Astorga remedied? What, if beating first Soult and then Ney, the British had arrived once more above Astorga, with perhaps ten thousand infantry, and half as many hundred cavalry; from the mountains of Gallieia their general might have cast his eyes as far as the Morena without being cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army, none existed to

S.  
Journal of  
Operations.  
MS.

aid him, none to whom he might give aid: even Mr. Frere acknowledged that at this period, six thousand ill-armed men collected at Despeñas Peros, formed the only barrier between the French and Seville. Sir John Moore had been sent out, not to waste English blood in fruitless battles, but to assist the universal Spanish nation!

The second operation was decided by the state of the magazines; there was not bread for another day's consumption remaining in the stores at Lugo; the soldiers were in heart for fighting, but distressed by fatigue and bad weather; and each moment of delay increased privations that would soon have rendered them inefficient for a campaign in the south, the only point where their services could be effectual. For two whole days battle had been offered, this was sufficient to rally the troops, restore order, and preserve the reputation of the army. About Lugo there was strong ground, yet it did not cover Coruña, being turned by the road leading from Orense to St. Jago de Compostella, which there was no reason to suppose the French would neglect: Soult pressed Ney to follow it. It was then impossible to remain, useless if it had been possible. The general adopted the third plan, and prepared to decamp in the night. He ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the troops to make a great exertion which he trusted would be the last required of them.

Immediately in rear of the position, the ground was intersected by stone walls, and a number of intricate lanes; precautions were therefore taken to mark the right tracks by placing bundles of straw at certain distances; officers were appointed to guide the columns, and at ten o'clock the regiments silently quitted their ground, and retired in excellent order. But a moody fortune pursued Moore throughout this campaign, baffling his prudence and thwarting his views, as if to prove the unyielding firmness of his mind. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position, the marks were destroyed, the guides lost the true direction, only one of the divisions gained the main road, the other two were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were still near to Lugo. The

Sir John  
Moore's  
Papers.

fatigue, the depression of mind occasioned by this misfortune, and the want of shoes, broke the order of the march, stragglers became numerous, and unfortunately Baird, thinking to relieve the men during a halt which took place in the night, desired the leading division to take refuge from the weather in some houses a little way off the road. Complete disorganization followed this imprudent act. From that moment it became impossible to make the soldiers keep their ranks, plunder succeeded, the example was infectious; and what with real suffering, and evil propensity encouraged by this error, the main body of the army, after having bivouacked for six hours in the rain, arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th, in a state very discreditable to its discipline.

The commander-in-chief, who covered this march with the reserve and cavalry, ordered several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success in every attempt. Fortunately, the enemy did not come up with the rear before the evening, and then only with their cavalry, otherwise many prisoners must have fallen into their hands; for stragglers uncovered by the passage of the reserve were so numerous, that when pressed, they united under sergeant Newman, of the 43rd regiment in force sufficient to repulse the French cavalry: a signal proof that the disorder was occasioned as much by insubordination as by fatigue. The reserve, commanded by Edward Paget, a man of firmness, ability, and ardent zeal, remained in position during the night, a few miles from Betanzos; the rest of the army was quartered in that town, and as the enemy could not gather in strength on the 10th, the commander-in-chief halted that day, and the cavalry passed from the rear-guard to the head of the column. The 11th, the French interrupted those employed to destroy the bridge of Betanzos, but from some mismanagement, although the twenty-eighth regiment repulsed the first skirmishers, the wooden bridge was only partially destroyed.

Mr. James  
Moore's  
Narrative.

Sir John now assembled the army in one solid mass. The loss in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been greater than that in all the former part of the retreat, added to all the losses in the advance and in the different actions. Fourteen or fifteen thousand infantry were

Appendix,  
No. 27.

however still in column, and by an orderly march to Coruña, demonstrated, that inattention and the want of experience in the officers was the true cause of the disorders, which had afflicted the army far more than the sword of the enemy or the rigour of the elements.

As the troops approached Coruña, the general's looks were earnestly directed towards the harbour, but an open expanse of water painfully convinced him, that to Fortune at least he was in no way beholden; contrary winds still detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last consuming exertion made by the army was rendered fruitless! The men were put into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events. The bridge of El Burgo was now destroyed, and so was that of Cambria, situated a few miles up the Mero river, but the engineer employed, mortified at the former failures, was so anxious, that he remained too near the latter, and was killed by the explosion. Meanwhile three divisions occupied the town and suburbs of Coruña, and the reserve was posted between the village of El Burgo and the road of St. Jago de Compostella. For twelve days these hardy soldiers had covered the retreat, during which time they traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times engaged, and now took the outposts having fewer men missing from the ranks, including those who had fallen in battle, than any other division in the army: an admirable instance of the value of good discipline, and a manifest proof of the malignant injustice with which Moore has been accused of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength.

Coruña, although sufficiently strong to compel an enemy to break ground before it, was weakly fortified, and to the southward commanded by heights close to the walls. Moore caused the land front to be strengthened, and occupied the citadel; but he disarmed the sea face of the works, and the inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joined in the labour, although they were aware the army would finally embark, and they would incur the enemy's anger by taking part in the military operations. Such flashes of light from the dark cloud at this moment covering Spain may startle the reader, and make him



doubt if the Spaniards could have been so insufficient to their own defence as represented. Yet the facts were as told, and it was such paradoxical indications of character that deceived the world at the time, and induced men to believe the reckless, daring defiance of the power of France, so loudly proclaimed by the patriots, would be strenuously supported. Of proverbially vivid imagination and quick resentments, the Spaniards feel and act individually rather than nationally, and during this war, what appeared constancy of purpose, was but a repetition of momentary fury generated like electric sparks by constant collision with the French, yet daily becoming fainter as custom reconciled the sufferers to those injuries and insults which are commonly the attendants of war. Procrastination and improvidence are their besetting sins. At this moment large magazines of arms and ammunition, which had been sent in the early part of the preceding year from England, were still in Coruña, unappropriated by a nation infested with three hundred thousand enemies, and having a hundred thousand soldiers unclothed and without weapons!

Three miles from the town were piled four thousand barrels of powder in a magazine built upon a hill, and a smaller quantity was collected in another storehouse some distance from the first. Both were fired on the 13th. The inferior one exploded with a terrible noise shaking all the houses in the town; and when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like the bursting forth of a volcano. The earth trembled for miles, the rocks were torn from their bases, the agitated waters of the harbour rolled the vessels as in a storm, a vast column of smoke and dust, with flames and sparks shooting out from its dark flanks, arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, where it burst, and then a shower of stones and fragments of all kinds descending with a roaring sound, killed many persons who had remained too near the spot: stillness, slightly interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore succeeded, and the business of the war went on.

Now a painful measure was adopted; the ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, the horses were generally foundered, it was impossible to embark them all in the

face of an enemy, and a great number were reluctantly ordered to be shot; worn down and foot-broken, they would otherwise have been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draught cattle until death relieved them from procrastinated suffering. But the very fact of their being so foundered was one of the results of inexperience; the cavalry had come out to Coruña without proper equipments, the horses were ruined, not for want of shoes, but want of hammers and nails to put them on!

Soon the French gathered on the Mero, and Moore sought a position of battle. A chain of rocky elevations, commencing on the sea-coast north-west of Coruña and ending on the Mero behind the village of El Burgo, offered a good line, which, covered by a branch of the Mero, would have forced the enemy to advance by the road of Compostella. But it was too extensive, and if not wholly occupied, the French could turn the right and move along a succession of hills to the very gates of Coruña: the English general was thus reduced to occupy an inferior range, enclosed as it were, and commanded by the first within cannon shot. Soult's army, exhausted by continual toil, could not concentrate before the 12th, but on that day the infantry took post opposite El Burgo, while La Houssaye's heavy cavalry lined the river as far as the ocean; Franceschi, crossing at the bridge of Celas, seven miles higher up, intercepted some stores coming from St. Jago and made a few prisoners. The 14th, the bridges at El Burgo being rendered practicable for artillery, two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry passed the river, and to cover their march some guns opened on the English posts but were soon silenced by a superior fire. In the evening the transports from Vigo hove in sight; they entered the harbour in the night, and the dismounted cavalry, the sick, the best horses, and fifty pieces of artillery were embarked, six British and three Spanish guns worked by English gunners only, being kept on shore for action. On the 15th, Laborde's division arrived. Soult then occupied the greater ridge enclosing the British position, placing his right on the intersection of the roads leading to St. Jago and Betanzos, his left on a rocky eminence over-

Noble's Expedition de Gallice.







looking both armies: his cavalry extended along the heights to their own left, and a slight skirmish took place in the valley below. The English piquets opposite the right of the French also engaged, and being galled by the fire of two guns, colonel M'Kenzie of the fifth regiment, pushed out with some companies to seize the battery, whereupon a line of infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, immediately arose, killed the colonel and drove his men back with loss.

In the night, Soult with great difficulty dragged eleven heavy guns to the rocks which closed the left of his line, and in the morning he formed his order of battle. Laborde's division was posted on the right, one half being on the high ground, the other on the descent towards the river. Merle's division was in the centre. Mermet's division formed the left. The position was covered on the right by the villages of Palavia Abaxo and Portosa, and in the centre by a wood. The left, secured by the rocks where the great battery was established, was twelve hundred yards from the right of the British line, and midway the little village of Elvina was held by the piquets of the fiftieth British regiment.

The late arrival of the transports, the increasing force of the enemy, and the disadvantageous nature of the position, augmented the difficulty of embarking so much, that some generals now advised a negotiation for leave to regain the ships. There was little chance of this being granted, and there was no reason to try; the army had suffered, but not from defeat; its situation was perilous, yet far from desperate. Moore would not consent to remove the stamp of prudence and energy from his retreat, by a proposal which would have given an appearance of timidity to his previous operations, as opposite to their real character as light is to darkness; his high spirit and clear judgment revolted at the idea, and he rejected the degrading advice without hesitation.

Sir John  
Moore's  
Letter to  
lord Castle-  
reagh.

All the encumbrances being shipped on the morning of the 16th, it was intended to embark the fighting men in the coming night, and this difficult operation would probably have been happily effected; but a glorious event was destined to give a more graceful though melancholy termination to

the campaign. About two o'clock a general movement of the French line gave notice of an approaching battle, and the British infantry, fourteen thousand five hundred strong, occupied their position. Baird's division on the right, and governed by the oblique direction of the ridge approached the enemy; Hope's division, forming the centre and left, although on strong ground abutting on the Mero, was of necessity withheld, so that the French battery on the rocks raked the whole line of battle. One of Baird's brigades was in column behind the right, and one of Hope's behind the left; Paget's reserve posted at the village of Airis, behind the centre, looked down the valley separating the right of the position from the hills occupied by the French cavalry. A battalion detached from the reserve kept these horsemen in check, and was itself connected with the main body by a chain of skirmishers extended across the valley. Fraser's division held the heights immediately before the gates of Coruña, watching the coast road, but it was also ready to succour any point.

These dispositions were dictated by the ground, which was very favourable to the enemy; for Franceschi's cavalry reached nearly to the village of San Cristoval, a mile beyond Baird's right, and hence Moore was forced to weaken his front and keep Fraser's division in reserve until Soult's attack should be completely unfolded. There was however one advantage on the British side; many thousand new English muskets, found in the Spanish stores, were given to the troops in lieu of their rusty battered arms, and as their ammunition was also fresh, their fire was far better sustained than that of the enemy.

#### BATTLE OF CORUÑA.

When Laborde's division arrived, the French force was not less than twenty thousand men, and the duke of Dalmatia made no idle evolutions of display. Distributing his lighter guns along the front of his position, he opened a fire from the heavy battery on his left, and instantly descended the mountain with three columns covered by clouds of skirmishers. The British piquets were driven back in disorder, and the village of Elvina

was carried by the first French column, which then divided and attempted to turn Baird's right by the valley, and break his front at the same time. The second column made against the English centre, and the third attacked Hope's left at the village of Palavia Abaxo. Soult's heavier guns overmatched the English six-pounders, and swept the position to the centre; but Moore observing that the enemy, according to his expectations, did not show any body of infantry beyond that moving up the valley to outflank Baird's right, ordered Paget to carry the whole of the reserve to where the detached regiment was posted, and, as he had before arranged with him, turn the left of the French columns and menace the great battery. Fraser he ordered to support Paget, and then throwing back the fourth regiment, which formed the right of Baird's division, opened a heavy fire upon the flank of the troops penetrating up the valley, while the fiftieth and forty-second regiments met those breaking through Elvina. The ground about that village was intersected by stone walls and hollow roads, a severe scrambling fight ensued, the French were forced back with great loss, and the fiftieth regiment entering the village with the retiring mass, drove it, after a second struggle in the street, quite beyond the houses. Seeing this, the general ordered up a battalion of the guards to fill the void in the line made by the advance of those regiments, whereupon the forty-second, mistaking his intention, retired, with exception of the grenadiers, and at that moment the enemy, being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village. Major Napier,\* commanding the fiftieth, was wounded and taken prisoner, and

---

\* The author's eldest brother; he was said to be slain. When the French renewed the attack on Elvina, he was somewhat in advance of that village, and alone, for the troops were scattered by the nature of the ground. Being hurt in the leg, he endeavoured to retire, but was overtaken, and thrown to the ground with five wounds; a French drummer rescued him, and when a soldier with whom he had been struggling made a second attempt to kill him, the drummer once more interfered. The morning after the battle marshal Soult sent his own surgeon to major Napier, and, with a kindness and consideration very uncommon, wrote to Napoleon, desiring that his prisoner might not be sent to France, which from the system of refusing exchanges would have ruined his professional prospects; the drummer also received the cross of the legion of honour. When the second corps quitted Coruña, marshal Soult recom-

Elvina then became the scene of another contest, which being observed by the commander-in-chief, he addressed a few animating words to the forty-second, and caused it to return to the attack. Paget had now descended into the valley, and the line of the skirmishers being thus supported vigorously checked the advance of the enemy's troops in that quarter, while the fourth regiment galled their flank; at the same time the centre and left of the army also became engaged, Baird was severely wounded, and a furious action ensued along the line, in the valley, and on the hills.

Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence; yet he rose again in a sitting posture, his countenance unchanged, and his steadfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his front, no sigh betraying a sensation of pain. In a few moments, when he saw the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the rear. Then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt. The shoulder was shattered to pieces, the arm hanging by a piece of skin, the ribs over the heart broken, and bared of flesh, the muscles of the breast torn into long stripes, interlaced by their recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in a blanket his sword got entangled and the hilt entered the wound; captain Hardinge, a staff officer, attempted to take it off, but the dying man

---

mended his prisoner to the attention of marshal Ney. The latter, treating him rather with the kindness of a friend than the civility of an enemy, lodged him with the French consul, supplied him with money, gave him a general invitation to his house, and not only refrained from sending him to France, but when by a flag of truce he knew that major Napier's mother was mourning for him as dead, he permitted him, and with him the few soldiers taken in the action, to go at once to England, merely exacting a promise that none should serve until exchanged. I would not have touched at all upon these private adventures, were it not that gratitude demands a public acknowledgment of such generosity, and that demand is rendered more imperative by the after misfortunes of marshal Ney. That brave and noble-minded man's fate is but too well known! He who had fought five hundred battles for France, not one against her, was shot as a traitor! Could the bitterest enemy of the Bourbons have more strongly marked the difference between their interests and those of the nation!



stopped him, saying, '*It is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me;*' and in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the fight.

Mr. James  
Moore's  
Narrative.  
Hardinge's  
Letter.

Notwithstanding this great disaster the troops gained ground. The reserve overthrowing everything in the valley, forced La Houssaye's dismounted dragoons to retire, and thus turning the enemy, approached the eminence upon which the great battery was posted. On the left, colonel Nicholls, at the head of some companies of the fourteenth, carried Palavia Abaxo, which general Foy defended but feebly. In the centre, the obstinate dispute for Elvina terminated in favour of the British; and when the night set in, their line was considerably advanced beyond the original position of the morning, while the French were falling back in confusion. If Fraser's division had been brought into action along with the reserve, the enemy could hardly have escaped a signal overthrow; for the little ammunition Soult had been able to bring up was nearly exhausted, the river Mero was in full tide behind him, and the difficult communication by the bridge of El Burgo was alone open for a retreat. On the other hand, to fight in the dark was to tempt fortune; the French were still the most numerous, their ground strong, and their disorder facilitated the original plan of embarking during the night. Hope, upon whom the command had devolved, resolved therefore to ship the army, and so complete were the arrangements, that no confusion or difficulty occurred; the piquets kindled fires to cover the retreat, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak to embark under the protection of Hill's brigade, which was in position under the ramparts of Coruña.

When morning dawned, the French, seeing the British position abandoned, pushed some battalions to the heights of San Lucia, and about midday opened a battery on the shipping in the harbour. This caused great confusion amongst the transports, several masters cut their cables, and four vessels went on shore, but the troops were rescued by the men of war's boats, the stranded vessels burned, and the fleet got out of harbour. Hill then embarked at the citadel, which was maintained by a rearguard under Beresford until the 18th,

when the wounded being all on board, the troops likewise embarked, the inhabitants faithfully maintained the town meanwhile, and the fleet sailed for England. The loss of the British, never officially published, was estimated at eight hundred; of the French at three thousand. The latter is probably an exaggeration, yet it must have been great, for the English muskets were all new, the ammunition fresh; and whether from the peculiar construction of the muskets, the physical strength and coolness of the men, or all combined, the English fire is the most destructive known. The nature of the ground also barred artillery movements, and the French columns were exposed to grape, which they could not return because of the distance of their batteries.

Thus ended the retreat to Coruña, a transaction which has called forth as much of falsehood and malignity as servile and interested writers could offer to the unprincipled leaders of a base faction, but which posterity will regard as a genuine example of ability and patriotism. From the spot where he fell, the general was carried to the town by his soldiers; his blood flowed fast and the torture of the wound was great; yet the unshaken firmness of his mind made those about him, seeing the resolution of his countenance, express a hope of his recovery: he looked steadfastly at the injury for a moment,

Captain  
Hardinge's  
Letter. and said, '*No, I feel that to be impossible.*' Several times he caused his attendants to stop and turn

round, that he might behold the field of battle; and when the firing indicated the advance of the British, he discovered his satisfaction and permitted the bearers to proceed. When brought to his lodgings the surgeons examined his wound, there was no hope, the pain increased, he spoke with difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and addressing his old friend, colonel Anderson,

Mr. James  
Moore's  
Narrative. said, '*You know I always wished to die this way.*'

Again he asked if the enemy were defeated, and being told they were, said, '*It is a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French.*' His countenance continued firm, his thoughts clear, once only when he spoke of his mother he became agitated; but he often inquired after the safety of his friends and the officers of his staff, and

he did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit had given them claims to promotion. When life was just extinct, with an unsubdued spirit, as if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he exclaimed, *‘I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice!’* In a few minutes afterwards he died, and his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña. The guns of the enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult with a noble feeling of respect for his valour raised a monument to his memory on the field of battle.

Thus ended the career of sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth, indicated a noble disposition and a refined understanding. The lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his mind, were adorned by a subtle playful wit, which gave him in conversation an ascendancy he always preserved by the decisive vigour of his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering upon fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern enemy to vice, a steadfast friend to merit, a just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest feared him. For while he lived he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, and with characteristic propriety they spurned at him when he was dead.

A soldier from his earliest youth, Moore thirsted for the honours of his profession. He knew himself worthy to lead a British army, and hailed the fortune which placed him at the head of the troops destined for Spain. As the stream of time passed the inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austerer glory of suffering remained, and with a firm heart he accepted that gift of a severe fate. Confident in the strength of his genius, he disregarded the clamours of presumptuous ignorance. Opposing sound military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon him by the ambassador, he

conducted his long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude ; no insult disturbed, no falsehood deceived him, no remonstrance shook his determination ; fortune frowned without subduing his constancy ; death struck, but the spirit of the man remained unbroken when his shattered body scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just towards others, he remembered what was due to himself. Neither the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which, conscious of merit, he at the last moment asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he had served so truly.

If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!



## CHAPTER VI.

## OBSERVATIONS.

## GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

MR. CANNING, in an official communication to the Spanish deputies in London, observed, that ‘the conduct of the campaign in Portugal was unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the brilliant successes with which it opened.’ In the relation of that campaign, it has been shown how little the activity and foresight of the cabinet contributed to those successes; and the following short analysis will prove, that with respect to the campaign in Spain also, the proceedings of the ministers were marked alike by tardiness and incapacity.

Joseph abandoned Madrid the 3rd of August, and the 11th, French troops, coming from the most distant parts of Europe, were in motion to remedy the disasters in the Peninsula.

On the 1st of September a double conscription, furnishing one hundred and sixty thousand men, was called out to replace the troops withdrawn from Poland and Germany. The 4th of September the emperor announced to the senate, that ‘he was resolved to push the affairs of the Peninsula with the greatest activity, and to destroy the armies which the English had disembarked in that country.’ The 11th, the advanced guard of the army coming from Germany reached Paris, and was there publicly harangued by the emperor. The 8th of November that monarch broke into Spain at the head of three hundred thousand men. The 5th of December, not a vestige of the Spanish armies remaining, he took possession of Madrid.

Now the Asturian deputies arrived in London the 6th of June, and on the 20th of August, the battle of Vimiero being then unfought and consequently the fate of the campaign in

Portugal uncertain, the English ministers invited sir Hew Dalrymple to discuss three plans of operations in Spain, each founded upon data utterly false, and all objectional in detail. Sir Arthur Wellesley was required to go to the Asturias to ascertain what facilities that country offered for the disembarkation of an English army; and the whole number of troops disposable for the campaign, exclusive of those already in Portugal, were stated to be twenty thousand, of which one half was in England and the other in Sicily. It was acknowledged that no information had enabled the cabinet to decide as to the application of the forces at home, or the ulterior use to be made of those in Portugal. Yet with singular rashness, the whole of the southern provinces, containing the richest cities, finest harbours, and most numerous armies, were discarded from consideration; and sir Hew Dalrymple, who was well acquainted with that part of Spain, and in close and friendly correspondence with the chiefs, was directed to confine his attention entirely to the northern provinces, of which he knew nothing.

Junot's defeat in Portugal and the discomfiture of Joseph on the Ebro, were regarded as certain events, and the views of the ministers were directed, not to the best mode of attack, but to the choice of a line of march which would ensure the utter destruction or captivity of the whole French army. And so elated was the cabinet with this extravagant hope, so strangely contemptuous of Napoleon's power, that lord William Bentinck was instructed to urge the central junta to an invasion of France, as soon as the army on the Ebro should be annihilated! The English ministers were therefore either profoundly ignorant of the real state of affairs, or with a force scattered in England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they expected in one campaign to subdue twenty-six thousand French under Junot, to destroy eighty thousand under Joseph, and to invade France!

When the battle of Vimiero happened, sir Arthur Wellesley naturally declined the Asturian mission as more suitable to a staff captain than a victorious commander. But before sir Hew's answer, exposing the false calculations of the ministers' plans, could be received in England, a despatch, dated the 2nd

of September, announced the resolution of the government to employ an army in the northern provinces of Spain; and twenty thousand men were to be held in readiness to unite with other forces to be sent from England. This project also was so crude, that no intimation was given how the junction was to be effected, whether by sea or land; nor had the minister even ascertained that the Spaniards would permit English troops to enter Spain. Three weeks later, lord William Bentinck, writing from Madrid, says, 'I had an interview with Florida Blanca, he expressed his surprise there should be a doubt of the Spaniards wishing for the assistance of the English army.' Such also was the confusion at home, that lord Castlereagh repeatedly expressed his fears lest the embarkation of Junot's troops should have absorbed all the means of transport in the Tagus, when a simple reference to the transport office in London would have satisfied him, that although the English army should also be embarked, there would still remain a surplus of twelve thousand tons.

When the popular cry rose against the convention of Cintra, the generals-in-chief were recalled in succession as rapidly as they had been appointed; the despatches addressed to one general fell into the hands of his successor; but the plans of the ministers became at last mature, and on the 6th of October sir John Moore was finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain. At this period the head of the grand French army was already in the passes of the Pyrenees, the hostile troops on the Ebro were coming to blows, the Spaniards were weak and divided, the English forty marches from the scene of action: yet said the minister to sir John Moore, 'there will be full time to concert your plan of operations with the Spanish generals before the equipment of your army can be completed.' Was this the way to oppose Napoleon? Could such proceedings lead to aught but disaster? It has been said that Dalrymple's negligence was the cause of this delay, that he should have had the troops in readiness. That general could not prudently incur the expense of equipping for a march, an army that was likely to be embarked; he could not divine the plans of the ministers before they were formed, and it is evident that the error attaches entirely to the government.

The glaring fatal incapacity of the Spanish generals has been sufficiently exposed. The energy and rapidity of the French emperor demand careful examination. His operations were not, as it has been said, a pompous display of power to create an appearance of conquest; not a mere violent irruption with a multitude of men, but a series of skilful and scientific movements worthy of so great a general and politician. His force was immense and the Spaniards but contemptible soldiers, yet he never neglected the lessons of experience, nor deviated from the strictest rules of art. With astonishing activity, and when we consider the state of his political relations on the continent, with astonishing boldness, he collected ample means to attain his object. Deceiving his enemies with regard to his numbers position and intentions, choosing his time with admirable judgment, he broke through the weak part of their line, and seized Burgos, a central point which enabled him to envelope and destroy the left wing of the Spaniards before their right could hear of his attack; the latter being itself turned by the same movement and exposed to a like fate. His first position enabled him to menace the capital, keep the English army in check, and cover the formation of those magazines and stores which were necessary to render Burgos the base and pivot of further operations.

Napoleon's forces were numerous enough to have attacked Castaños and Palafox while Blake was being pursued by the first and fourth corps; but trusting nothing to chance, he waited for twelve days, until the position of the English army was ascertained, the strength of the northern provinces quite broken, and a secure place of arms established. Then leaving the second corps to cover his communication, and sending the fourth corps into the flat country, to coast as it were the heads of the English columns, and turn the passes of the Carpentino mountains, he caused the Spanish right wing to be destroyed, and approached the capital, when no vestige of a national army was left, when he had good reason to think the English in full retreat, when the whole of his corps were close at hand, and consequently when the greatest moral effect could be produced, and the greatest physical power concentrated at the same time to take advantage of it. Napoleon's dispositions



were indeed surprisingly skilful; for though Lefebvre's precipitation at Zornosa, by prolonging Blake's agony, lost six days of promise, it is certain that even reverses in battle could neither have checked the emperor nor helped the Spaniards.

If Soult had been beaten at Gamonal, Napoleon was at hand to support the second corps, and the sixth corps would have fallen upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards.

If the first corps had been defeated at Espinosa, the second and fourth corps, and the emperor's troops, would have taken Blake in flank and rear.

If Lasnes had been defeated at Tudela, he could have fallen back on Pampeluna, the fifth and eighth corps were marching to support him, and the sixth corps would have taken the Spaniards in flank.

If the emperor had been repulsed at the Somosierra, the sixth corps would have turned that position by Guadalaxara, and the fourth corps by Guadarama.

If Moore had retreated on Portugal, the fourth corps was nearer to Lisbon than he was, and if he had overthrown Soult, the fifth and eighth corps were ready to sustain that marshal, while Napoleon with fifty thousand men was prepared to cut the British line of retreat into Galicia. No possible event could have divided the emperor's forces, and he constantly preserved a central position which enabled him to unite his masses in sufficient time to repair any momentary disaster. By a judicious mixture of force and policy, he made Madrid surrender in two days, and thus prevented the enthusiasm which would doubtless have arisen if that capital had been defended for any time, and the heart-burnings if it had been stormed: the second sweep he was preparing to make when Moore's march called off his attention from the south, would undoubtedly have put him in possession of the remaining great cities of the Peninsula. Then the civil benefits promised in his decrees and speeches would have produced their full effect, and the result may be judged of by the fact, that in 1811 and 12, Aragon, Valencia, and Andalusia were, under the administration of Soult and Suchet, as submissive as any department of France. Both generals raised Spanish battalions, and employed them not only to preserve the public peace, but

to chase and put down the guerillas of the neighbouring provinces.

Moore's talents saved the Peninsula at this crisis; and here only a military error of Napoleon's may be detected. Forgetting his own maxim that war is not a conjectural art, he took for granted the English army was falling back to Portugal, and without ascertaining that it was so, acted upon the supposition. This apparent negligence, so unlike his usual circumspection, leads to the notion, that through Morla he might have become acquainted with the peculiar opinions and rash temper of Mr. Frere, and hoped the treacherous arts of the Spaniard, in conjunction with the presumptuous disposition of the plenipotentiary, would so mislead the English general as to induce him to carry his army to Madrid, and thus deliver it up entire and bound. It was a mistake; but Napoleon could be deceived or negligent only for a moment. With what vigour he recovered himself, and hastened to remedy his error! How instantaneously he relinquished his intentions against the south, turned his face from the glittering prize, and bent his whole force against the only man among his adversaries who had discovered talent and decision! Let those who have seen the preparations necessary to enable a small army to act, even on a pre-conceived plan, say what uncontrollable energy that man possessed, who suddenly interrupted in such great designs, could in the course of a few hours put fifty thousand men in movement on a totally new line of operations, and in the midst of winter execute a march of two hundred miles with a rapidity hardly to be equalled under the most favourable circumstances. Nor is Soult's indefatigable vigour to be overlooked, as contributing to the success. It is remarkable how he and the emperor, advancing from different bases, should have so combined their movements, that after marching, the one above a hundred and the other above two hundred miles through a hostile country, they effected their junction at a given point and at a given hour without failure: nor is it less remarkable, that such well-conducted operations should have been baffled by a general at the head of an inexperienced army.

When Sylla, after all his victories, styled himself a happy

rather than a great general, he discovered his profound knowledge of the military art. Experience taught him that the speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the obstinacy, the ignorance, or the treachery of a subordinate officer, was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan—that the intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch, or any apparently trivial accident, might determine the fate of a whole army. It taught him that the vicissitudes of war are so many, disappointment will attend the wisest combinations; that a ruinous defeat, the work of chance, often closes the career of the boldest and most sagacious of generals; and that to judge of a commander's conduct by the event alone is equally unjust and unphilosophical, a refuge for vanity and ignorance.

These reflections seem to be peculiarly applicable to sir John Moore's campaign, which has by sundry writers been so unfairly discussed. Many of the subsequent disasters of the French can now be distinctly traced to the operations of the British army at this period; it can be demonstrated that the reputation of that excellent general was basely sacrificed at the period of his death; and the virulent censures since passed upon his conduct have been as inconsiderate as they are unmerited and cruel. The nature of his commands in the years 1807-8-9 forced him into a series of embarrassments from which few men could have extricated themselves. After refusing the charge of the absurd expedition to Egypt in 1806, which ended as he judged it must do, unfavourably, he succeeded to the command of the troops in Sicily; a situation which immediately involved him in unpleasant discussions with the queen of Naples and the British envoy Drummond, the friend of Mr. Canning; discussions to which the subsequent well-known enmity of the cabinet of that day may be traced. By his frank conduct, clear judgment, and firm spirit, he soon obtained an influence over the wretched court of Palermo which promised the happiest results. The queen's repugnance to a reform was overcome, the ministers were awed, the miserable intrigues of the day abated, the Sicilian army re-organized, and a good military system was commenced under the advice of the British general.

This promising state of affairs lasted but a short time; the Russian fleet put into the Tagus, the French threatened Portugal, and Sicily was no longer considered! Moore was ordered to quit that island, and assemble a large force at Gibraltar for a special service; but the troops to be gathered were dispersed in the Mediterranean from Egypt to the straits; and their junction could not be effected at all, unless

Sir John  
Moore's  
Journal,  
MS.

the English ambassador at Constantinople should succeed in bringing a negotiation, then pending between the Turks and Russians, to a happy issue.

Now this special service in question had two objects, 1°. to aid sir Sydney Smith in carrying off the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils; 2°. to take possession of Madeira; yet neither were made known to the general before his arrival at Gibraltar, which was not until after Junot had taken possession of Lisbon. Moore then, following his instructions, proceeded home, and thus English interests in Sicily were again abandoned to the vices and intrigues of the court of Palermo. On the passage he crossed Spencer going with a force against Ceuta, and soon after reached England, whence he was despatched to Sweden, without any specific object, and with such vague instructions that an immediate collision with the unfortunate Gustavus was the consequence.

Having with much dexterity and judgment withdrawn himself and his army from the capricious violence of that monarch, sir John was superseded, and sent to Portugal with the third rank in an army which at that time no man had such good claims to command as himself. The mode of doing this was also offensive, and it was evident the ministers desired to drive him into private life. Their efforts were powerless against his pure and elevated patriotism. In a personal conference with lord Castlereagh, he expressed his indignation at the insults offered to him, and then repaired to his station at Portsmouth. An official letter followed him, the purport being that his remonstrance was disrespectful, would be referred to the king for reprehension, and measures taken to remove him from what appeared to be a disagreeable situation: in other words that his resignation was demanded. Without a moment's hesitation, he replied to this menace, in a letter which breathed



the very spirit of manly dignity and patriotism. ‘I am,’ he wrote, ‘this moment honoured with your lordship’s letter (by messenger) of yesterday’s date. As I have already had the honour to express my sentiments to your lordship fully at my last interview, it is, I think, unnecessary to trouble you with a repetition of them now. I am about to proceed on the service on which I have been ordered, and it shall be my endeavour to acquit myself with the same zeal by which I have ever been actuated when employed in the service of my country. The communication which it has been thought proper to make to his majesty cannot fail to give me pleasure; I have the most perfect reliance on his majesty’s justice, and shall never feel greater security than when my conduct, my character, and my honour are under his majesty’s protection.’ The king saw this letter and Moore heard no more on that subject.

The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this period, when her armics and fleets were thus bandied about, and a blind chance governed the councils at home. For first a force collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to the Baltic, at a time when an expedition composed of troops which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic, was sailing from England to the Mediterranean. An army intended to conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the moment when an unexpected event called for its services in Portugal. A division destined to attack the Spaniards at Ceuta, arrived at Gibraltar at the instant when the insurrection of Andalusia fortunately prevented it from making an attempt that would have materially aided Napoleon’s schemes against the Peninsula. Again, three days after Moore had withdrawn his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it in carrying off the Spanish troops under Romana,—an operation for which it was not required, and which would have retarded if not entirely frustrated the campaign in Portugal; but the ministers were resolved at any cost to prevent Moore from commanding the army destined for Portugal. Nor was it the least part of England’s fortune that in such long-continued voyages in bad seasons, no disaster befel the huge fleets thus bearing her strength from one extremity of Europe to the other.

After the convention of Cintra, Moore was again placed at the head of an army, an appointment unexpected by him, for the frank and bold manner in which he expressed himself to the ministers left him little to hope; but the personal goodwill of the king and his own towering reputation crushed all opposition: in a few months after he quitted Sweden he was, despite of the ministers' ill-will, at the head of an army in the heart of Spain. This army did not exceed twenty-four thousand men, and he was opposed by Napoleon, who had passed the Pyrenees at the head of three hundred and thirty thousand, and could readily bring two hundred and thirty thousand to bear against the British general: a vast disproportion of numbers, and a sufficient answer to all the idle censures passed upon the retreat to Coruña.

The most plausible grounds of accusation against his conduct rest on three alleged errors:—

- 1°. He divided his forces;
- 2°. He advanced against Soult;
- 3°. He made a precipitate and unnecessary retreat.

When a general, aware of the strength of his adversary and of the resources to be placed at his own disposal, arranges a plan of campaign, he may be strictly judged by the rules of art; but if, as in the case of sir John Moore, he is suddenly appointed to conduct important operations without a plan being arranged, or the means given to arrange one, his capacity or incapacity must be judged of by the energy he displays, the comprehensive view he takes of affairs, and the rapidity with which he accommodates his measures to events, which the original vice of his appointment will not permit him to control. Sir Walter Scott, in his *Life of Napoleon*, with that intrepidity of error which characterizes the work, has asserted, 'That Moore sent ten thousand men under sir D. Baird by sea to Coruña,—that the general science of war upon the most extended scale, seems to have been so little understood or practised by the English generals at this time, that instead of the country being carefully reconnoitred by officers of skill, the march of the army was arranged by such hasty and inaccurate information as could be collected from the peasants; by whose reports sir John Moore was induced to divide his army.

The second of these assertions is devoid of reason, and both are contrary to fact. Sir David Baird was never at Lisbon, he was sent with his troops, by the ministers, direct from England to Coruña. The 'general science of war upon the most extended scale,' is an inflated and unmeaning expression. The most contracted operation requires that good information should be obtained; and as to the fact, Moore employed his own staff officers to examine the roads, sought information equally from noble and peasant, and like all great commanders, regulated his proceedings by the general result of his inquiries. The first dividing of the army was therefore the act of the ministers, who sent Baird to Coruña. The after separation of the artillery was sir John Moore's, the reasons for which have been already stated; but it is worth while to examine what the effect of that measure was, and what it might have been. Here it may be observed, although a brigade of light six-pounders did accompany the troops to Almeida, the road in a military sense was *not practicable*, for the guns were in some places let down the rocks by ropes, in others carried by human strength over the difficult places, a practicable affair with one brigade; but how could the great train of guns and ammunition-waggons which accompanied Hope have passed such places, without a loss of time that would have proved more injurious to the operations than the separation of the artillery?

Appendix,  
No. 13, § 2.

Three contingencies guided the advance, any one of which arising would have immediately influenced the operations:—  
 1°. Blake on the left, or Castaños and Palafox upon the right, might have beaten the French and advanced to the Pyrenees.  
 2°. They might have maintained their position on the Ebro.  
 3°. The arrival of reinforcements from France might have forced the Spaniards to fall back upon the upper Duero on one side, and the Guadalaxara on the other. In the first case there was no risk of marching by divisions towards Burgos, which was the point of concentration given both by the British and Spanish ministers. In the second case the army could safely unite at Valladolid. In the third case, if the division of sir David Baird reached Toro early in November, and this it was reasonable to expect because that general arrived at


Coruña the 13th of October, the retrograde movement of the Spanish armies would probably have drawn the English to the Guadarama, as a safe and central point between the retiring Spanish wings.

Now the artillery marching from the Alentejo by the roads of Talavera and Naval Carnero to Burgos, would pass over one hundred and two Spanish leagues; to Aranda de Duero eighty-nine leagues; to Valladolid, ninety-two leagues; while the columns that marched by Almeida and Salamanca would pass over one hundred and sixteen leagues to Burgos, and ninety-eight to Valladolid. Wherefore, supposing the Spaniards successful, or even holding their own, the separation of the artillery was an advantage, and if the Spaniards were driven back their natural line of retreat would have been towards Madrid, Blake by Aranda to the Somosierra, and Castaños and Palafox by Sigüenza and Tarazona to cover the capital and maintain an interior communication between the Somosierra and the Henares river. The British artillery would then have halted at Espinar after a march of only eighty leagues, and Baird and Moore's corps, uniting at Salamanca early in November, might by a flank march to Arevalo have insured the concentration of the whole army.

Thus in the three anticipated cases, the separation of the artillery was prudent and promised to be advantageous. There was indeed a fourth case, that which really happened. All the Spanish armies were dispersed in an instant! utterly effaced! But Moore could not have divined such a catastrophe while his ears were ringing with the universal clamour about the numbers and enthusiasm of the patriots; if he had foreseen even a part of their disasters he would never have advanced from Portugal. With the plans of the Spanish government he was unacquainted, but he was officially informed that one hundred and forty thousand Spanish soldiers were between him and a feeble dispirited enemy; the intercepted letter from the governor of Bayonne stated, that the reinforcements would only arrive between the 18th of October and the 18th of November; it was therefore reasonable to suppose the French would not commence offensive operations before the latter period, and that ample time would







be afforded to concentrate the English troops under the protection of the Spanish armies.

If Moore could have suspected the delusion under which the British government acted; if he could have divined the incredible folly of the central junta and the Spanish generals, or the inaccuracy of the military agents; if he could have supposed the Spanish armies were weak in numbers, weaker in spirit, destitute of food and clothing, or, that the Spanish authorities while pressing him to advance, would wantonly detain Baird's troops seventeen days on board the transports; if he could have imagined all this, undoubtedly his arrangements ought and would have been different; his army would have been kept together, and the road to Salamanca through Coria, however difficult, would have been preferred to a divided march.

The absurd position of the Spanish armies, and the remote situation of the British troops in October, may be explained by the annexed diagram. Lisbon being taken as a centre, and the distance *A* between Lisbon and Coruña, being the radius, let a circle passing through Madrid be described, and let the tangential line *c* be drawn perpendicular to the radius *A*, meeting the secant *B* at Sanguessa. The extreme right of the Spaniards being posted at Sanguessa, and Castaños at Calahorra while Blake was near Durango and the main body of the French at Vitoria, the latter not only divided the Spaniards, but was twenty-five miles nearer to Burgos and Valladolid, the points of concentration for Moore and Baird's corps, than either Castaños or Blake; seventy-five miles nearer than Palafox. On the 10th Napoleon defeated Belvedere and seized Burgos; Baird did not quit Coruña until the 12th, and did not bring up the whole of his troops to Astorga before the 4th of December; hence it is clear, that whatever road the artillery had taken the British army could not have averted the ruin of the Spaniards.

Suppose the troops assembled at Salamanca on the 13th of November. They must have advanced either to Valladolid or to Madrid. If to Valladolid, the emperor was at Burgos with the imperial guards, ten or twelve thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; the first corps was within a day's

march, the second and fourth corps within three marches, and the sixth corps within two marches. Above a hundred thousand French soldiers could therefore have been concentrated in three days; and it is to be observed that Moore never had twenty-five thousand in the field. It is said, he might have gone to Madrid. In that case the separation of the artillery would have been advantageous, and the separation of Baird's corps, which was not the general's arrangement, the error. But the army could not have reached Madrid in less than seven days, and twenty-four thousand British soldiers could not have been collected in the capital before the 21st November. Meantime the fourth French corps which reached Segovia the 1st of December, would have cut the communication with Portugal, while the emperor with forty thousand men would have been at Aranda de Duero. Castaños, who had been defeated on the 23rd of November, was indeed with the remnant of an army at Guadalaxara about the 1st of December, but the sixth corps was close in pursuit.

Moore must then have done one of three things. Advanced to the succour of Castaños, joined St. Juan at the Somosierra, or retreated across the Tagus. In the first case, the emperor would, as he did, force the Somosierra, and uniting with the fourth corps, have placed sixty thousand men upon the English rear. In the second case, the sixth and fourth corps, turning the allies' flank on each side, would have effected a junction behind the Somosierra, and cut them off from Madrid and from Portugal, while Napoleon with forty thousand men assailed them in front. The third case was to adopt the southern provinces for a new base of operations, and might have been useful if the Spaniards would have rallied round him with enthusiasm and courage; but would they have done so when the emperor was advancing with his enormous force? After-experience proves they would not. Soult in 1810, with an army very inferior to that under Napoleon reached the gates of Cadiz without a serious blow being struck to oppose him; and at this time the people of the south were reckless of the opportunity procured for them by Moore's march on Sahagun.



It has however been said, that twenty-four thousand British troops acting vigorously, could have checked the emperor and raised the courage of the Spaniards. To such an observation may be opposed a fact. In 1815, Napoleon crossed the Sambre with one hundred and fifteen thousand men, and the two hundred and ten thousand regular troops in his front, among which were more than thirty thousand English, could with difficulty stop his progress after four days' fighting, in three of which he was successful. If sir John Moore was, at a subsequent period, willing to make a movement on the capital, it was because he was misinformed of the French strength, and the Spaniards were falsely represented as numerous and confident; he was also unacquainted with the defeat at Tudela. His object was, by assisting Castaños, to arouse the spirit of the patriots, and nothing more strongly evinces his hardihood and prompt judgment. For in his letter to Mr. Frere he distinctly stated the danger to be incurred, and carefully separating the military from the political reasons, only proposed to venture the army, if the envoy was satisfied the Spanish government and people would answer the appeal, and the British cabinet be willing to incur the risk for such an object. He did not act upon his own proposal, because he had meanwhile discovered that Castaños' army was not simply defeated but destroyed;—because the Somosierra had been forced by a charge of cavalry;—because the passes of the Guadarama, lying on this line of march to Madrid, were seized by the enemy before his own army could be concentrated.

Why then did he not retreat into Portugal? Because Napoleon having marched against Madrid, the British army was enabled to concentrate;—because Madrid had shut her gates;—because Mr. Frere and the Spanish authorities wilfully deceived him with false information;—because the solemn declaration of the junta of Toledo, that they would bury themselves under the ruins of that town rather than surrender, joined to the fact that Zaragoza was fighting heroically, seemed to guarantee the constancy and vigour of that patriotic spirit which was apparently once more excited;—because the question was again become political, and it was necessary to satisfy England, that nothing was left undone to aid a cause she had

so much at heart ;—because the peculiar position of the French army at the moment, afforded the means of creating a powerful diversion in favour of the southern provinces. These are the unanswerable reasons for the advance towards Sahagun. The details of execution may be liable to some trifling objections ; perhaps it would have been better to have carried the army on the 21st at once to Carrion, neglecting Sahagun and Saldanha ; but in its strategic and political character it was well conceived and well timed, hardy and successful.

All the irritating interference Moore was called upon to repel, the treachery, and the folly equal in its effects to treachery, he was compelled to guard against, have been sufficiently dwelt upon ; yet before discussing the retreat from Astorga, it may be of some military interest to show that the line of Portugal, although the natural one for the British army to retire upon, was not at this period necessarily either safe or useful : greater evils than those incurred by a retreat through Galicia would probably have attended a retrograde march upon Lisbon.

The rugged frontier of Portugal, lying between the Douro and the Tagus, is vulnerable in many points to an invading army of superior force. It may be penetrated between the Douro and Pinhel, and between Pinhel and Guarda ; between Guarda and Sabugal by roads leading into the valleys of the Zezere and the Mondego. Between the Sierra de Estrella and the Sierra de Gata, there is the road from Alfayates to Sabugal and Penamacor, and that by Guarda. From Coria it may be pierced between the Sierra de Gata and the Tagus by Idanha Velha, Castello Branco, and Sobreira Formosa ; and from the Tagus to the Guadiana, a distance of twenty leagues, the Alemtejo presents an open country without any strong fortress save La-Lippe, which may be disregarded and passed without danger. Moore commenced his forward movement from Salamanca the 12th of December, and the fourth corps being then at Talavera de la Reyna, was much nearer to Lisbon than the British army ; the emperor was preparing to follow with the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve. He could, as the duke of Berwick did, penetrate by both sides of the Tagus ; and what was to prevent him from reaching Lisbon before the British force if the latter had retreated from Salamanca ? He

marched on a shorter line and a better road, and he could supply his troops by requisitions; but Moore with a scanty military chest must have purchased his supplies from a suspicious peasantry rendered more distrustful by the retreat.

In Lisbon there were indeed six thousand British infantry and two hundred and sixty cavalry under sir John Craddock; but the Portuguese provisional government had only organized a few ill-composed battalions, and were so inactive that it was the 11th of December before even a proclamation calling on the people to arm was issued. In the arsenal there were scarcely muskets and equipments for eight thousand men, and the new levies were only required to assemble when the country should be actually invaded. Sir Robert Wilson had organized two thousand of the Lusitanian legion, and marched in the middle of December from Oporto toward Almeida, and this was all that could be opposed to an army more numerous, more favourably situated for invasion, and incomparably better commanded than that with which Massena invaded the country in 1810. Thus it may be affirmed, that if a retreat upon Lisbon was advisable before Napoleon took Madrid, it was not a safe operation after that event, and Moore neither lightly nor injudiciously adopted the line of Galicia.

Those who deny the necessity of falling back even behind the Esla, are scarcely worth notice; a simple reference to the numbers under the emperor, and the direction of his march, is sufficient to expose their futility; but the necessity of the continued, and as it has been unjustly called, the precipitate retreat to Coruña may not be quite so obvious. The advance to Sahagun was intended to create a diversion which should give the Spaniards an opportunity to gather head in the south. It succeeded in drawing away the enemy, yet the Spaniards did not make any head, the central junta displayed no energy or wisdom, and a few slight demonstrations by Palacios on the side of the Sierra Morena, and Infantado on the side of Cuenca, scarcely disturbed the first corps which remained in La Mancha. Ten thousand men were sufficient to maintain Madrid in perfect tranquillity, and a part of the fourth corps even marched from Talavera by Placentia on Salamanca. Mr. Stuart, and the spies, informed Moore of

all these disheartening circumstances, but the intelligence arrived slowly and at intervals; and he, always hoping the Spaniards would finally make an effort, announced his intention to hold the Gallicias. Mr. Stuart's continued correspondence deprived him of that hope, and the presence of the emperor, the great amount of his force, and the vehemence with which he pressed forward, confirmed the unhappy truth that nothing could be expected from the south. He could not with twenty-three thousand men maintain himself against the whole French army, and until he reached Astorga his flanks were always exposed. From thence he retreated in comparative security; but the strength of the country between that town and Coruña misled persons of shallow judgment, who have since inconsiderately advanced many vague accusations; such as that passes where a hundred men could stop an army were lightly abandoned, that the retreat was a flight, and the general's judgment clouded by the danger of his situation. There might be some foundation for such observations if military commanders were like prize-fighters, bound to strike always at the front; but as long as armies are dependent for their subsistence and ammunition upon lines of communication, the safety of their flanks and rear must be considered as of consequence. Moore knew he could repel any attack in some of the positions on the road to Coruña; yet, unless for a permanent defence, such battles would have been worse than useless, and that was impossible, for there were none but temporary magazines nearer than Coruña, and he had no means of transport or money. A severe winter had just set in, the people were disinclined to aid, and as the province was poor few resources could be drawn from the vicinity.

Nor was there a single position that could be maintained for more than a few days against a superior force. That of Rodrigatos could be turned by the old road leading to Villa Franca; Villa Franca itself by the valley of the Syl; and from thence the whole line to Coruña might be turned by the road of Orense, which also led directly to Vigo; and until he reached Nogales, Moore's intention was to retire to Vigo. The French could have marched through the richest



part of Galicia to St. Jago and Coruña on the left, or from the Asturias, by the way of Mondonedo, on the right. If it be asked, why they did not do so? the answer is prompt, the emperor having quitted the army, the jealousies and misunderstandings usual between generals of equal rank impeded the operations. A coolness subsisted between Ney and Soult, and without entering into the grounds of their difference, it is clear the judgment of the latter was the soundest. The former committed a great error by remaining at Villa Franca instead of pushing his corps, or a part of it, as recommended by Soult, along the valley of Orense to St. Jago de Compostella; the British army would have been lost if the sixth corps had reached Coruña before it; and what would have been the chances in the battle if three additional French divisions had been engaged? Granting therefore that the troops could have been nourished during the winter, Villa Franca, Nogales, Constantino and Lugo, were not permanently defensible by an army whose base was at Coruña, and hence Moore resolved to embark and renew the war in the south: Hannibal could have done no more.

It has been asked, why he did not throw himself into Ferrol? The general answer is that it would have involved a siege. He could not before an enemy abandon the great naval arsenal of Spain, and to have cooped the army of England up in a corner would have reduced her moral and political position as low as the French emperor or the Spanish juntas could have desired. The circumstances of the moment were however adverse to it. Sir John Moore had, some years before, been sent by Mr. Pitt to examine Ferrol and its vicinity with a view to an attack, and his impression was that ships working down the Ferrol river would be exposed to an enemy's fire; this and the reports of the engineers despatched to ascertain the facilities for embarking at Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol, and to examine Betanzos and the positions on the river there, which he thought might be advantageously occupied, induced him to adopt the shortest and most secure line of march which was on Coruña. The needless march of Frazer's division to St. Jago and back—the slow progress in getting off the Lugo position occasioned by the boisterous

weather—the careless ill-managed halt of Baird's division, which commenced the disgraceful scene of straggling, because the men were suffered to spread to the right and left of the road and take shelter in barns and isolated houses, rendered it difficult to check the enemy effectively at Betanzos and make that stand Moore had designed. Wherefore knowing he had gained two marches on the French, and expecting to see his ships in the harbour of Coruña, he marched at once to that place. It is such varying influences, always affecting military operations, that make the greatest generals worship fortune. She was not favourable to Moore, but his retreat was firmly and ably conducted despite of her frowns. 'Honourable retreats,' says lord Bacon, 'are no ways inferior to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline, and as much of valour.' That is an honourable retreat in which the retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains every charge without being broken, and finally, after a severe action, re-embarks his army in the face of a superior enemy without being seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before a foe only formidable from numbers; it is infinitely more creditable, when the commander, while struggling with bad weather and worse fortune, has to oppose veterans with inexperienced troops, and contends against an antagonist of eminent ability who scarcely lets a single advantage escape him during a long and vigorous pursuit: all this Moore did, and finished his work by a death as firm and glorious as any that antiquity can boast of.

Put to lord Bacon's test, in what shall the retreat to Coruña be found deficient? something in discipline perhaps, but that fault does not attach to the general. Those commanders who have been celebrated for making fine retreats were in most instances well acquainted with their armies. Hannibal, speaking of the elder Scipio, derided him, although a brave and skilful man, for that being unknown to his own soldiers, he should presume to oppose himself to a general who could call to each man under his command by name; thus inculcating, that troops must be trained in the peculiar method of a commander, if the latter is to achieve anything great. Moore had a young army suddenly placed under his

guidance, and it was scarcely united when the superior numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement under very harassing circumstances; he had not time therefore to establish a system of discipline, and it is in the leading events not the minor details that the just criterion of his merits is to be sought for.

Was the retreat uncalled for? Was it unnecessarily precipitate? Was any opportunity of crippling the enemy lost? Was any weakness to be discovered in the personal character of the general? These are the questions that sensible men will ask. The first has been already examined; the second is a matter of simple calculation. The rear-guard quitted Astorga on the 1st of January; on the 3rd it repulsed the enemy in a sharp skirmish at Calcabelos; the 6th it rejoined the main body at Lugo, having three times checked the pursuers during the march; it was unbroken, had lost no gun, suffered no misfortune. The whole army offered battle at Lugo for two successive days, it was not accepted, and the retreat recommencing, the troops reached Betanzos on the morning of the 10th, Coruña on the 11th; thus in eleven days, three of which were days of rest, a small army passed over a hundred and fifty miles of good road. Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, left Madrid the 22nd of December, the 28th he was at Villapando, having performed a march on bad roads of a hundred and sixty-four miles in seven days. The retreat to Coruña was consequently not precipitate, unless it can be shown that it was unnecessary to retreat at all beyond Villa Franca; neither can it be asserted that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. The cavalry twice defeated the pursuing French between Sahagun and the Esla; two days the army remained behind that river, and on its banks again defeated the French cavalry and took a general. On the banks of the little river Calcavellos the British again halted and slew another general with many men. At Nogales they checked the pursuers, and repulsed them at Constantino with great loss. At Lugo they halted, and offered battle for two days, and in one of them repulsed an attack with great slaughter. At Betanzos they checked them again, and at Coruña defeated them. This summary shows how firmly and vigorously this

able retreat was effected. But to fight a battle was the game of the French marshal, and he may be censured for delaying to attack at Lugo. Victorious or beaten it would have increased the embarrassments of his adversary, who must have continued his retreat encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been abandoned without succour in the midst of winter.

At Coruña the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle. That it was honourable to the British troops is clear, they embarked without loss after the action. That it was absolutely necessary to embark notwithstanding the success, is a certain proof how little advantage could have been derived from any battle fought farther inland, and of Moore's prudence in declining an action the moment he had rallied his army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous movements had shaken. But notwithstanding the clamour with which this campaign has been assailed, as if no army had ever yet suffered such misfortunes, the nominal loss was small, the real loss smaller, sinking to nothing when compared with the

Appendix,  
No. 26.

advantages gained. An army which, after marching in advance or retreat above five hundred miles before an enemy of superior force, has only lost, including those killed in battle, four thousand men or a sixth part of its numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely; nor would the loss have been so great but for the intervention of the accidental occurrences mentioned in the narrative. Night marches are seldom happy, that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army in stragglers more than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations. Nevertheless, the reserve in that as in all the other movements suffered little; and the light brigades detached by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, slept under cover, and were well supplied, left in proportion to their strength as many men behind as any other part of the army. Thus accumulates proof upon proof that inexperience was the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great, yet many circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering and disorganization which was not real.

Sir John Moore's intention was to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order before he sailed for England,



instead of which the fleet steered home directly from Coruña, and a terrible storm scattered it; many ships were wrecked, and the remainder driving up the Channel were glad to put into any port. The soldiers thus thrown on shore were spread from the Land's End to Dover. Their haggard appearance, ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade with surprise. The usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils and distresses, were increased by the uncertainty in which all were as to the fate of their comrades. A deadly fever, the result of anxiety and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and soldiers, and thus the miserable state of sir John Moore's army became the topic of every letter, and the theme for every country newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game; and judging of the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was disposed to believe the calumnies of interested men, eager to cast a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment, but Moore's last appeal to his country for justice will be successful. Posterity, revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of his odious calumniators as are not too contemptible to be remembered, with a just and severe retribution; for thus it is that time freshens the beauty of virtue and withers the efforts of baseness. And if authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly, future historians will not fail to remark, that the man whose talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier.

'Sir John Moore,' says the first, 'took every advantage that the country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance, and he finished by dying in a combat that must do credit to his memory.'

Appendix,  
No. 14.

Napoleon more than once affirmed, that if he committed a few trifling errors, they were to be attributed to his peculiar situation; for his talents and firmness alone had saved the English army from destruction.

Vivian's  
Conversations  
at Elba.  
Voice from  
St. Helena.

‘In sir John Moore’s campaign,’ said the duke of Wellington, ‘I can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade. But this opinion I have formed after long experience of war, and especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have been seen to be understood; finally, it is an opinion formed after the event.’

## BOOK THE FIFTH.

## CHAPTER I.

IN England, sir John Moore's campaign was not justly considered. The public, trained to party politics, and without real power to rebuke the folly of the government, regarded disasters and triumphs with factious rather than national feelings; it was alike easy to draw attention from weighty matters and to fix it upon things of little moment. To drag the duke of York's private frailties before the world was thought essential for the welfare of the nation, while the ministerial incapacity which caused England and Spain to mourn was left unprobed. An insular people, protected from the worst evils of war, may be thus deluded; but if a disastrous campaign brought a devastating enemy into the heart of the country, the honour of a fallen general and the military policy of the cabinet, would not be considered mere subjects for a vile sophist's scoffs and misrepresentations.

Parliamentary orators expatiated indeed with great warmth upon the campaign, but their speeches were only specimens of astute eloquence without accurate knowledge of facts. The opposition speakers, eager to criminate the government, exaggerated the disasters. Compreheuding neither the motives, nor the movements of sir John Moore, they urged untenable charges against the ministers, who, disunited by personal feeling, did not adopt the same ground of defence. Lord Castlereagh and lord Liverpool, silent on the cabinet errors which at the outset gave the general only a choice of difficulties, asserted, truly, that the political advantages of the advance on Sahagun more than compensated the military losses in the subsequent retreat, and they made honourable

mention of the commander. Mr. Canning, unscrupulously resolute to screen Mr. Frere, assented to the erroneous statements of the opposition, and with malignant dexterity converted them into charges against the fallen hero. Sir John Moore was, he said, wholly answerable for the campaign; glorious or distressing, admired or deplored, it was his own: he had kept the government in ignorance of his proceedings. Being closely pressed on this point by Mr. C. Hutchinson and Mr. Whitbread, he deliberately repeated the assertion, yet not long afterwards, Moore's letters to the ministers, written almost daily, and furnishing exact and copious information were laid before the house!

While the vital national interests were thus treated, the public ardour somewhat abated; but the war, rightful in itself, remained popular, and a treaty was concluded with the supreme junta, the contracting powers being bound to make common cause against France. But the ministers, while professing unbounded enthusiasm, really considered the Peninsula struggle as a secondary object. The warlike preparations of Austria, and the reputation of the archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon's, had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions, and it was more agreeable to the English cabinet to have the French defeated by a monarch in Germany, than by a plebeian insurrection in Spain. Some obscure intrigues of the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on the continent, emanating as they did from patrician sources, excited the sympathy of the ministers, engaged their attention, and nourished those distempered feelings which made them see only weakness and disaffection in France, when throughout that mighty empire few desired, and none dared to oppose the emperor's wishes; when even secret discontent was confined to some royalist chiefs and splenetic republicans, whose influence was never felt until Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses.

Unable to measure the grandeur of that monarch's genius, the ministers attributed his success to chance, his victories to treason, to corruption, to anything but that admirable skill with which he wielded the most powerful military force that



ever obeyed the orders of a single chief. Thus self deluded and misjudging difficulties, they adopted idle projects and squandered their resources without effect. While negotiating for the occupation of Cadiz, they were planning an expedition against Italy; and while asserting their resolution to defend Portugal, reserved their principal force for a sudden blow in Holland, their preparations being however marked by a pomp and publicity totally unsuited to war. With what a mortal calamity that pageant closed shall be noticed hereafter; at present it is fitting to trace the progress of the operations in Spain coincident with the retreat of sir John Moore.

When Madrid surrendered, Napoleon refused to let his brother return there, unless the public bodies and heads of families would demand his restoration, and swear fealty, without mental reservation. Registers were opened, and twenty-eight thousand six hundred heads of families inscribed their names, voluntarily making oath of their sincere desire to receive Joseph. Deputations Azanza and  
O'Farril. also, from the councils, from the junta of commerce and money, the hall of the Alcaldes, and the corporation, waited on the emperor at Valladolid, where, joined with the municipality of that town, the deputies from Astorga, Leon, and other places, they proffered their oaths and desired Joseph might be king: thus entreated, he was permitted again to assume the royal functions.

Napoleon's victories and policy had now in the capital and other great towns, rendered the multitude as well as the notables submissive; and if his course had not been interrupted by extraneous circumstances, the example would have been generally followed, in preference to the more glorious, though ineffectual resistance, offered by those cities whose fortitude and calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful admiration. The cause of Spain was at this time lost, if any cause depending on war which is but a succession of violent changes can be called so; the government was bewildered, the people dismayed, the armies dispersed, the cry of resistance was hushed, and the stern voice of Napoleon, answered by the tramp of three hundred thousand veterans, was heard throughout the land: but when the hostility of Austria arrested

the conqueror's career, Spanish energy revived at the abrupt cessation of his terrific warfare.

Joseph, escorted by his six thousand French guards, entered Madrid the 23rd of January. He was however without revenues, and would have been without the semblance of power, if he had not been nominated the emperor's lieutenant, which gave him the command of the French army. This offended the marshals,

Joseph's cap-  
tured corre-  
spondence,  
MSS.

who would have thwarted him, even if he had kept within the limits prescribed by his brother; but when he issued orders through his Spanish ministers, they were repelled as coming from men despised for their want of military knowledge, and suspected, as favouring interests opposed to those of the army. Napoleon's iron grasp compressing the ambitious jealousy of the marshals being thus relaxed, the passions which had ruined the Spaniards began to affect their enemies, producing indeed less fatal effects because more circumscribed, yet sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of conquest. The French army heretofore terrible, alike from massive and flexible strength, became a collection of independent bands, each formidable, but slow to combine for great objects; and, by irregularities and insubordination, showing that the troops knew the difference between a warrior chief and a voluptuous monarch. These evils however appeared later, and the distribution of the army when Napoleon quitted Spain still bore the impress of his genius.

The first corps was quartered in La Mancha, having its second division, under general Lapisse, detached to Salamanca, where it was joined by Maupetit's brigade of cavalry. The second corps was to invade Portugal, but its fifth division under general Bonnet, was detached to the Montaña de Santander. The third and fifth corps besieged Zaragoza. The fourth corps remained in the valley of the Tagus. The sixth corps was to hold Galicia, its third division, under general Dessolles, remaining in Madrid. The seventh corps warred in Catalonia. The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, Latour Maubourg's division joined the first corps, Lorge and La Houssaye were attached to the second corps, Lassalle went to the fourth corps, and two brigades reinforced the sixth corps. Milhaud's division remained at Madrid, Kellerman's guarded

the lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia. The imperial guards halted at Vitoria to protect the great communication with France until Zaragoza should fall, and were yet ready for the Austrian war, because through France they could move by post.

This arrangement, Madrid being still the pivot of operations, enabled the French, by a concentric movement on that capital, to crush any insurrection within the circle of their position, and the great masses, being on the principal roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula, intercepted the communications between the provinces; while the second corps, thrust beyond the circumference and designed to sweep round from point to point, would find a supporting corps, and new line of retreat on every great road leading from Madrid to the unsubdued parts of the Peninsula. The communication with France, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, and by divisions posted at Santander, Bilbao, Burgos, and Vitoria, was also supported by a reserve at Bayonne. The northern provinces were parcelled as military governments, whose commanders corresponded with each other and repressed petty insurrections by moveable columns. The third and fifth corps, based on Pampeluna and besieging Zaragoza, aided also to cover the communications with France, and were exposed to no flank attack, except from Cuenca, where Infantado's troops were gathered but were themselves watched by Victor's corps.

All the lines of correspondence with France, and those between the different corps, were secured by fortified posts, having greater or lesser garrisons according to their importance. Between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven military stations; between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra, eight; eleven protected the more circuitous route to the capital by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama. Between Valladolid and Zaragoza there were fifteen forts; between Valladolid and Santander eight; between Valladolid and Villa Franca del Bierzo nine, including Benevente and Astorga, and two connected Benevente with Leon. The army, exclusive of Joseph's French guards,

strong, thirty-nine thousand being cavalry. Fifty-eight thousand were in hospital, and the depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence, prisoners, and battalions of march, composed of stragglers, absorbed twenty-five thousand. Of the remaining two hundred and forty thousand, fifty thousand guarded the communication with France in positions strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four fortified posts, showing how carefully Napoleon, who has been called a reckless general, made war.

#### OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA.

Galluzzo's defeat on the Tagus has been incidentally noticed. The duke of Dantzic seeing him occupy a river line of forty miles with six thousand men, made a feint of crossing at Arzobispo on the 24th December, but suddenly descended to Almaraz and forced a passage, killing many and taking four guns; so complete was the overthrow that for a long time afterwards Estremadura had not a man in arms.

Appendix,  
No. 31.

The French cavalry were still in pursuit when Moore's advance to Sahagun became known, and the duke of Dantzic who had left eight hundred men at Segovia, recrossed the Tagus and took post between Talavera and Placentia. He was soon afterwards recalled to France and Sebastiani succeeded him. Meanwhile marshal Victor entered Toledo and pushed outposts towards Cuenca and the Sierra Morena.

During these events, the central junta reached Seville, and being urged by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere to make some effort, ordered Palafox and Infantado to advance, the one towards Tudela, the other towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios who had been recalled from Catalonia, and was at the head of five or six thousand levies in the Morena, was also ordered to move into La Mancha. Galluzzo, Castaños, Cuesta, and other officers were now prisoners of state, and were dragged from place to place by their infamous government. Cuesta was however popular in Estremadura, and the central junta, though fearing and detesting him, were forced to give him the command of Galluzzo's fugitives, who had rallied behind the



Guadiana, and being joined by fresh levies were taking the form rather than the consistence of an army. This appointment degraded the government by exposing its fears and weakness, and it was pernicious because Cuesta was physically and mentally incapable. Stricken in years, obstinate, jealous, heedless of time, circumstances, and fitness; to punish barbarously and rush headlong to battle constituted with him all the functions of a general.

Florida Blanca, eighty-one years of age, now died at Seville, and the marquis of Astorga succeeded him as president, yet the character of the junta did not amend. Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez; but a large remittance of silver from South America arriving at Cadiz, absorbed the attention of the members, and the public weal was blotted from their remembrance: even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce in the justness of sir John Moore's estimate of the value of Spanish co-operation.

It had been decreed that five hundred thousand men should be enrolled. Scarcely one-third had joined their colours, but large bodies were assembling at different points, because the peasantry, especially in the south, although dismayed were obedient, and the local juntas at a distance from the warfare vigorously forwarded recruits, hoping to keep the enemy from their provinces, or to have the excuse of being without fighting men to plead for submission. The fugitives also, readily collected again, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed their defeats to treachery, and being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the government, with ready vanity believed the enemy had suffered enormous losses. In fine, men were to be had in abundance, yet beyond assembling them and appointing some incapable person to command nothing was done for defence. The officers were not deceived, but had no confidence either in their own troops or in the government, nor were they respected by their men; the latter starved, misused, ill-handed, possessed neither the compact strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such a system the peasantry

could not become energetic soldiers, nor were they active supporters of the cause; yet with a wonderful constancy they endured fatigue, sickness, nakedness, and famine, displaying always a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy, rendered nugatory by the vices and follies of the juntas and leading men, hallowed the people's efforts, and the flagitious violence of the invasion almost justified their ferocity.

Palacios now advanced with five thousand men to Vilharta in La Mancha; Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already in motion from Cuença; and his army, reinforced by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli and by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the French horsemen, he had, a few days after Napoleon left Madrid, detached Senra and Venegas with eight thousand infantry and all the horse, to scour the country round Tarancon and Aranjuez. The former entered Horcajada; the latter endeavoured to cut off a detachment but was himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force. Victor was alarmed; he withdrew his advanced posts, concentrated Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions of infantry and Latour Maubourg's cavalry at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of Toledo, and left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. With the Spanish generals mutual recriminations followed their defeat; Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to repress their disputes, and in this state of affairs, having received the orders of the junta, he projected a movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, to break down the bridges, and maintain the line of the Tagus. The 10th he quitted Cuença with ten thousand men, intending to join Venegas, who with the rest of the army was at Tarancon; but the 13th he met a crowd of fugitives near Carascosa, and heard with equal surprise and consternation, that Venegas was beaten and the pursuers close at hand.

#### ROUT OF UCLES.

Victor had moved on the 10th from Toledo to Ocaña, whereupon Venegas took post at Ueles. On the 12th the French advanced in two columns; one under Ruffin lost its

way and arrived at Alcazar; the other led by Victor himself unexpectedly encountered the Spaniards early on the 13th and without hesitation fell on. The Spaniards fled towards Alcazar where they met Ruffin and were totally discomfited. Several thousands were taken; one body retreating towards Ocaña fell in with the French parc of artillery and was scattered by a heavy discharge of grape; and of the whole force only a weak division under general Giron forced a passage by the road of Carascosa and rejoined Infantado, who effected his own retreat to Cuença because the French cavalry were too fatigued to pursue. From Cuença he sent his guns towards Valencia by Tortola, but marched with his troops first to Tobarra on the frontiers of Murcia, and finally to Santa Cruz de Mudela near the defiles of the Sierra Morena; he arrived there the beginning of February, after a circuitous retreat of more than two hundred miles in a bad season; his guns had been captured at Tortola, and his troops were worn out with fatigue and misery.

Victor after scouring the Cuença district endeavoured to surprise Palacios at Vilharta, but he had joined Infantado and the French returned to Toledo; the prisoners of Ucles had been sent to Madrid, and those unable to march were, following Rocca's memoirs, cruelly shot by Victor because the Spaniards had hanged some French prisoners. If so it was a barbarous and shameful retaliation unworthy of a soldier; for what justice or propriety is shown in revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another?

When the French retired, Infantado and Palacios proceeded to re-organize their forces, as the Carolina army; new levies from Grenada and other parts came up, and the duke of Albuquerque, leading the Spanish cavalry, endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora, but it escaped, with little loss, and Albuquerque fell back to Consuegra, where he was attacked next day and got off with difficulty. The junta now displaced Infantado; his successor, Cartoajal, was a good officer, and restored discipline. He took post on the upper Guadiana, and opened a communication with Cuesta, who had when Moore's advance drew off the fourth corps, retaken the line of the Tagus with sixteen thousand infantry and three

thousand cavalry; for the Spaniards suffered most in flight, and their horsemen, escaping with less hurt, were more easily rallied than the infantry. The French had fortified an old tower to hold the bridge of Arzobispo, and Cuesta, extending his force along the mountains to the Puerto de Mirabete, broke the bridge of Almaraz, a magnificent Roman structure the centre arch of which was nearly one hundred and sixty feet high. This terminated the Spanish exertions to lighten the pressure on the British army; two French divisions of infantry and as many brigades of cavalry had sufficed to baffle them, and thus made it manifest that the south was saved by **sir John Moore's** diversion in the north.



## CHAPTER II.

## CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.

FROM the battle of Tudela all O'Neil's and great part of Castaños' army fled to Zaragoza. With them escaped many carriages and the military chests; for the roads were excellent and the pursuit slack. The city and neighbourhood were astounded, they had believed in the boasting promises of the chiefs, and never doubted that speedy destruction would overwhelm the French. When their hopes were thus blasted, when the troops came pouring back with all the tumult of panic; when the population of the country through which they had fled rushed into the city along with the multitude of scared soldiers and camp-followers, every heart sunk, and Zaragoza's glory would have ended with the first siege, if the French had followed up their victory.

Napoleon foreseeing this confusion and terror, had provided means, and given directions for such an attack as would inevitably have overthrown this bulwark of the eastern provinces. But the sickness of Lasnes, the difficulty of communication, the false movements of Monecy and Ney; in fine, fortune, omnipotent in war, baffled the emperor's long-sighted calculations. The Spanish leaders had time to restore order, provide stores, complete the defensive works; and with ferocious exercise of power they insured implicit obedience: the danger of resisting the enemy appeared light when a suspicious word or even gesture was instantly punished by death.

Monecy's corps having missed the propitious moment, and being reduced by losses and detachments to seventeen thousand of all arms halted on the Xalon, while a battering train of sixty guns well furnished, which had been previously formed by Napoleon at Pam-

Appendix,  
No. 5.

Imperial  
Muster roll,  
MSS.

peluna, embarked on the canal of Tudela. Mortier was to have joined in the siege, but he also had been arrested by sir John Moore's advance towards the Carrion, so widely did that general's skilful and daring march affect the French operations. When Napoleon's counter-movement commenced, Mortier resumed his march, joined Moncey, and their united forces, thirty-five thousand of all arms, advanced against Zaragoza. But then fear had passed, the defence was arranged, and the obstacles were no longer trifling as in the first siege; the plain, the river, the strong houses, and the numerous convents remained the same, but instructed by experience and inspired by their heroic resolution, neither the rules of art, nor the resources of genius were neglected by the defenders.

Zaragoza presented four irregular fronts on the right bank of the Ebro. The first, reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to a convent of bare-footed Carmelites, being about three hundred yards wide. The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the Carmelite to a bridge over the Huerba. The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls. The fourth, on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the Ebro.

On the first front, an ancient wall, flanked by the guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened by new batteries and ramparts, and by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the Castle of the Inquisition. This was a square fort beyond the ramparts, but connected by loopholed walls; it had a bastion and tower at each corner, and a stone ditch. The second front was a double rampart, the exterior one faced with sun-dried bricks, and covered by a ditch with perpendicular sides fifteen feet deep and twenty wide. It was flanked by the Carmelite convent, a circular battery in the centre, a Capuchin convent called the Trinity, and some earth works at the bridge of the Huerba. The third front was covered by the Huerba, which run close to the rampart.

Behind the river a double entrenchment extended two hundred yards from the bridge to the projecting convent of Santa Engracia, which was very strongly fortified. From thence the line was prolonged to the oil manufactory by an ancient

Moorish wall, with terraced batteries sweeping the space between the ramparts and the Huerba. These batteries and the guns of Santa Engracia also overlooked the walls of a second bridge some way below the first.

Upon the right of the Huerba, below the second bridge, stood the isolated convent of San Joseph, protected by a deep ditch with covered way and palisade. Well placed as an out-work to impede the approaches and facilitate sallies on that side of the river, it was open in rear to the fire from the second bridge, from the terraced batteries, and San Engracia. The fourth front, covered by the Huerba, was a continuation of the old city wall, strengthened by new batteries, entrenchments, convents, and large houses.

Beyond the walls, the Monte Torrero, commanding all the plain of Zaragoza, was crowned with a large ill-constructed fort, raised at the distance of eighteen hundred yards from the convent of San Joseph: it was covered by the royal canal, the sluices being defended by field-works open to the fire of the fort itself. On the left of the Ebro, in a low marshy plain, stood the suburb, protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses. Some gun-boats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal of Carthagena, completed the circuit of defence, but the artillery of the place was of too small a calibre: there were only sixty guns carrying more than twelve-pound balls, and but eight large mortars: there was however no want of small arms, and colonel Doyle had furnished many English muskets. Cavallero.

Most of these defences were constructed at the time; but the first siege had taught the people not to trust the ordinary resources of art, and with a singular genius and resolution they had prepared an internal defence more efficacious. The houses of Zaragoza were fireproof, and generally of two stories; but in every quarter massive convents and churches rose like castles above the low buildings; and the greater streets, running into the Broadway called the Cosso, divided the city into districts unequal in size yet all containing one or more large structure. The citizens gave up their goods, their houses, and their bodies to the war, and mingling with the peasants and soldiers, formed one mighty garrison suited to

the vast fortress they had formed. For doors and windows were built up, house fronts loop-holed, internal communications opened, streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building was a separate fortification: there was no weak point, there could be none in a city which was all fortress, where the space covered by houses was the measure of the ramparts.

Nor were the leaders unmindful of moral force. The people, cheered by continual references to the first siege, contemplated with confidence the vast works executed, and were reminded that the coming wet season would spread disease amongst the enemy and frustrate his efforts. Neither was superstition neglected. Processions imposed upon the sight, false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men whose habits and situation rendered them peculiarly susceptible: and the leaders were so prompt and terrible in punishment, that the greatest cowards showed the boldest bearing to escape suspicion. With a view to avoid any great explosions powder was made as occasion required; Zaragoza contained a royal depôt and refinery for saltpetre; and there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood which furnished workmen familiar with the process. The trees beyond the walls were cut down, the houses were carried piecemeal into the town, the public magazines contained six months' provisions, the convents were well stocked, and the inhabitants had their own stores. Doyle also sent a convoy from the side of Catalonia; and there was abundance of money, because the military chest of Castaños' army, filled the night before the battle of Tudela, had been carried to Zaragoza. To attend the hospitals and carry ammunition to the combatants, some companies of women were enrolled under the countess of Burita, a lady of heroic mind, who displayed a noble character in both sieges.

Doyle's Correspondence,  
MS.

There were thirteen engineers, eight hundred sappers and miners composed of excavators formerly employed on the canal, and about two thousand cannoners. The regular troops, fugitives from Tudela, reinforced by two small divisions from Sanguessa and Caparosa, amounted to thirty thousand,







forming with the citizens and peasants a mass of fifty thousand combatants, who, with passions excited almost to frenzy, awaited an assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where every house was a fort and every family a garrison. To besiege with only thirty-five thousand men a city so prepared, was truly a hardy enterprise.

#### SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

Mortier and Moncey, having formed their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, advanced the 20th December against Zaragoza. The infantry Rogniat of the third corps moved on the right bank of the canal, Suchet's division of the fifth corps marched between the canal and the Ebro, Gazan's infantry crossed the Ebro at Tauste, and moved to the Gallego river. The two first columns arrived before the place that evening, and Suchet, driving back the Spanish posts, halted one league from the Trinity convent; the fifth corps taking ground on both sides of the Huerba, seized the aqueduct conveying the canal over that river, and proceeded to raise batteries against the Monte Torrero: Gazan reached the Gallego without meeting an enemy.

At day-break on the 21st, the French attacked Monte Torrero, defended by five thousand men under general St. Marc. The attention of the Spaniards was attracted by one column, while a second crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and penetrating between the city and the fort entered the latter by the rear. A third column stormed the works at the grand sluice; and these sudden attacks, with the loss of Cavallero. the fort, caused the Spaniards to retreat hastily, which so enraged the plebeian leaders that St. Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox.

Gazan assaulted the suburb simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero. He drove back the Aragonese, cut off a body of Spanish Swiss too much advanced, and killed or took three or four hundred; but he did not fall on Rogniat. the suburb itself until the Monte Torrero attack terminated, and then without previous examination; hence the besieged, recovering from the first alarm, beat him off with a

loss of four hundred men. This restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a critical moment, and exchanged the feverish impulse of victory for the chilling process of the engineer.

Zaragoza was completely invested the 24th. On the left of the Ebro, Gazan held the bridge over the Gallego, and covered his front with cuts and inundations in the marshy plain. On the right bank Suchet occupied the space between the upper Ebro and the Huerba;—Morlot encamped in the broken hollow bed of the Huerba;—Meusnier crowned the Torrero;—Grandjean, continuing the circuit to the lower Ebro, communicated across that river with Gazan;—a boat bridge on the upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, and several Spanish foraging detachments were thus cut off and never regained the town. General Lacoste directed the siege as chief engineer. He instituted one false and two real attacks on the right of the Ebro, and notwithstanding Gazan's failure hoped to take the suburb by a sudden assault. His trenches were opened in the night of the 29th, and the 30th the place was summoned. The terms before offered by Napoleon being repeated, and the example of Madrid cited, Palafox replied: '*If Madrid has surrendered Madrid has been sold. Zaragoza will neither be sold nor surrender.*' On receipt of this haughty reply three attacks commenced: on the right against the San Joseph, in the centre against the upper bridge of the Huerba, on the left a false one against the Aljaferia.

On the 31st the besieged sallied against these attacks and were repulsed in all with loss, yet some of their cavalry gliding between the parallel and the Ebro surprised a post of infantry. This trifling success exalted their enthusiasm, and Palafox gratified his personal vanity by manifestoes, some bearing indeed the stamp of genius, the greater part ridiculous.

On the 1st of January the second parallels of the true  
 1809. attacks being commenced, Palafox amused the French on the right bank of the Ebro with skirmishes, but sallied in force against Gazan on the left bank. He was repulsed with loss, yet his skirmishers obtained some success on the other side.

Moncey was now called to Madrid. Junot succeeded him in the third corps, and Mortier was directed to take post with



Suchet's division at Calatayud, to protect the communication with Madrid. The gap in the investment was stopped by extending Morlot's division, and a line of contravallation supplied the want of numbers. The besieged, expecting each day the usual fall of rain, continued the defence briskly and made counter approaches, but an anomalous dry season baffled their hopes, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the French workmen from observation and from sallies. On the 10th the city was bombarded, and thirty-two pieces battered the San Joseph and the works of the second bridge over the Huerba. The convent was broken, and the Spaniards withdrew their guns, and two hundred men making a vigorous though unsuccessful sally at midnight, lost half their number.

On the 11th, the batteries had opened a practicable breach in the San Joseph, and the assault was ordered. The chief defence was a ditch eighteen feet deep with a covered way falling back on both flanks to the Huerba, and extending some distance along the bank; it was occupied strongly, but when the French guns raked it from the right, the Spaniards crossed the river and took refuge in the city: the convent itself was immediately assaulted, and some chosen companies finding a small bridge, entered by the rear while the front was being stormed. The French lost few men, lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart along the river, and commenced batteries against the body of the place and the works at the upper bridge, from whence, and from the town, the Spanish guns searched the convent.

All the bridge works in front of Santa Engracia were carried with the loss of only three men on the 15th, and the Spaniards cutting the bridge itself sprung a mine, but it did no mischief. The third parallels were then completed, the trenches of both attacks united, and the besieged confined to the city defences, from whence they could no more sally on the right bank of the Huerba. The passage of that stream was then effected, and breaching and counter-batteries, mounting fifty pieces, were constructed against the body of the place; their fire also reached the bridge over the Ebro and interrupted the intercourse between the city and the suburbs.

Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders

forged intelligence of the defeat of the emperor, and with the sound of music, amidst the shouts of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been killed; they asserted also, that the marquis of Lazan, brother to Palafox, was already wasting France; and this extravagance met with implicit credence; for throughout this war, the imaginations of the chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the credulity of their followers. The confidence of the besieged augmented as the danger increased, and victory seemed realized when the night-fires of a succouring force were discerned, blazing on the hills behind Gazan's troops. Difficulties were indeed augmenting on the French side, for while enclosing Zaragoza they were encircled by insurrections, and so straitened that famine was in the camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished the vigour of the operations, the bonds of discipline were relaxed, the ardour of the soldiers relaxed, and they reasoned openly upon the chances of success, which in time of danger is but one degree above mutiny.

Exceedingly favourable also for the Spaniards was the country about Zaragoza; for the plain was hedged in by mountains, and on the south Mequinenza and Lerida offered places of arms for troops coming from Valencia and Catalonia. The French drew their supplies from Pampeluna, and their line of communication, running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was harassed by insurgents; Alagon was menaced from Epila and the Sierra de Muela; Tudela from the hills of Soria. Lazan, anxious for his brother, had brought five thousand Catalonians to the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, and drew round him all the armed peasants of the valleys as high as Sanguessa; his line which extended from Villa Franca on the Ebro to Zuera on the Gallego, hemmed in Gazan; and his detachments harassed the convoys from Pampeluna as far as Caparosa. In this state of affairs the French placed two or three thousand men in Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla; some also in Alagon and Montalbarra, and between the latter town and the army six hundred cavalry were disposed; a like force was posted at Santa Fé to watch the passes of the Sierra de Muela. Finally

sixteen hundred cavalry and twelve hundred infantry under general Wathier, being pushed south, dispersed five thousand insurgents at Belchite, took Alcanitz and remained there in observation during the siege. Lazan however still held the Alcubierre.

On the 22nd, Lasnes having recovered from his long illness arrived, and his influence was immediately perceptible. He recalled Suchet from Calatayud and sent him across the Ebro; he ordered Mortier to attack Lazan, and directed a detachment against the insurgents in Zuera; Rogniat. meanwhile, repressing all disputes, he restored discipline and pressed the siege vigorously. At Zuera the insurgents were beaten, and the French took possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego. Mortier pushed the Spanish advanced guard from Perdeguera to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body gave battle but was defeated with the loss of four guns. The French spreading then on a half circle from Huesca to Pina on the Ebro, awed the country between those places and Zaragoza; measures which gave the besiegers greater freedom.

Previous to Lasnes' arrival, the besieged had been galled by a mortar battery behind the second parallel of the centre attack, and one Mariano Galindo undertook to silence it. Leading eighty volunteers, he surprised the guard of the trenches and entered the battery, but the guards rallied, the reserve came up, and Galindo while fighting bravely was wounded and taken, and all his comrades perished with as much glory as simple soldiers can attain. After this noble action, the armed vessels fired on the batteries raised against the Aljaferia but were forced to retire, and the besiegers' works being carried over the Huerba, the third parallels of the true attacks were completed in the night of the 26th. The oil manufactory and other posts, were then incorporated with the approaches and the second parallel of the false attack was commenced.

These operations had been interrupted by sallies, in which one French post was burned and two guns spiked, but the city walls were broken and two practicable breaches opened by the San Joseph batteries. A third was begun in the Santa Augustino,

a broad way was made into Santa Engracia, and the 29th at 12 o'clock four chosen columns rushing from the trenches leaped upon the ruined walls of Zaragoza. On the right, the French twice stormed a stone house defending the breach of Saint Augustino, and twice they were beaten off; in the centre, regardless of two small mines exploded at the foot of the walls, they carried the breach fronting the oil manufactory, and tried to break into the town; but a heavy fire from the inner retrenchments made them content to keep their first lodgment and connect it with the trenches. The third column won the breach and the houses behind also, as far as the first large cross street; beyond that line it could not pass, yet it was established within the walls, and opened a communication with the trenches.

The fourth column, composed of Poles from the Vistula, stormed the San Engracia and the convent adjoining it, and then, unchecked by the fire from the houses and undaunted by the explosion of six small mines planted on its path, swept the ramparts to the left as far as the first bridge on the Huerba. The guards of the trenches, excited by this success, rushed forward tumultuously, mounted the walls, bayoneted the artillery men at the guns in the Capuchin, and continuing their career, endeavoured, some to reach the semicircular battery and the Misericordia, others to break into the city. This wild assault was soon abated by grape from two guns planted behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from the houses, and they were driven back into the Capuchin. The Spaniards were even breaking into that convent, when two battalions detached by Morlot from the false attack secured possession; but the Spaniards could not have held it, because the guns of San Engracia saw it in reverse. The French lost six hundred men, and La Coste, abandoning the false attack, fortified the Capuchin and a house standing where an angle of the wall abutted on the bridge over the Huerba; then joining them with his trenches he made the rampart the front line of the besiegers.

Thus the walls of Zaragoza went to the ground, but Zaragoza remained erect, and as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city the besiegers started at her naked strength. The



regular defences had crumbled, but the popular resistance was instantly called with all its terrors into action; and as if fortune had resolved to mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously slain. The French general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid, skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier. The Spanish colonel, San Genis, died, with the honour of a soldier and the glory of a patriot: falling in the noblest cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised for the protection of his native place.

## CHAPTER III.

Now raged the war in the streets of Zaragoza, the alarm-bell was heard in every quarter, the people crowded the houses nearest to the lodgments of the enemy, additional barricades were constructed across the principal thoroughfares, mines were prepared in the more open spaces, and the internal communications from house to house were multiplied until they formed a vast labyrinth, the intricate windings of which were only to be traced by the weapons and the dead bodies of the defenders. The junta, become more powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, urged the defence with redoubled energy, yet increased the horrors of the siege by a ferocity pushed to the verge of frenzy. Every person suspected by these furious men, or those about them, was put to death; and amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a horrid array of gibbets<sup>s</sup> was seen, on which crowds of wretches were each night suspended, because their courage sunk under accumulating dangers; or that some doubtful expression, some gesture of distress, had been misconstrued by their barbarous chiefs.

From the height of the walls he had won, Lasnes contemplated this terrific scene, and judging that men so passionate and so prepared could not be prudently encountered in open battle, resolved to proceed by the slow but certain process of the mattock and the mine. This also was in unison with the emperor's instructions, and hence, until the 2nd of February, the efforts of the French were entirely directed to the enlargement of their lodgments on the ramparts, an object only to be effected by severe fighting, by explosions, and by working through the nearest houses; and they sustained many counter-assaults, of which the fiercest was made by a friar on the Capuchin convent.

It has been said the large streets divided the town into small districts, or islands of houses. To win these they not only mined but fought for each house; and to cross the great intersecting streets they had to construct traverses above ground, or to work underground; for a Spanish battery raked each street, and each house was defended by a garrison which had only the option of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the gibbet erected behind. While the Spaniards held the convents and churches the houses were of little advantage to the French: the strong garrisons in the greater buildings enabled the defenders, not only to make successful sallies but to countermine their enemies, whose skill was often frustrated by the persevering energy of the besieged. To remedy this, the batteries breached the convents of Augustin and Santa Monica, and the latter was taken the 31st of January; for while the attack was hot in front, the wall in another part was broken by a petard, and the besiegers thus taking the main breach in rear cleared the convent. The besieged immediately pushed a gallery from the Augustins under Santa Monica, but the French stifled the miners, and next day openly menacing the breach in the Augustins, they sprung a mine which had been secretly pushed from Santa Monica, and entered by the opening. The besieged taken by surprise then lost the convent, yet rallying in a few hours attempted to retake it; the French repulsed them, and breaking through the houses reached the junction of the Quemada-street with the Cosso, where the Spaniards turned and finally drove their enemies back to the convent with a loss of two hundred. During this fight a more severe action happened at San Engracia; for though the neighbouring houses had been destroyed, with many men, by two powerful explosions, the defenders fought hard for the ruins, and the Polish troops could scarcely effect a lodgment.

A change in the mode of working now took place. Hitherto the French mines had brought down the buildings so as to leave the soldiers exposed to the Spanish fire: the engineers therefore reduced the quantity of powder, with a view to destroy the interior only and leave the walls unbroken. The Spaniards, with ready ingenuity, then saturated the timbers of

the houses with rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could not be maintained, interposed a burning barrier which often delayed the assailants for two days; and always prevented them from pushing their successes during the confusion produced by the mines. Incessant now was the fighting, a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts and the continued echo of musketry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and dust clouding the atmosphere, lowered continually over the heads of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French with a terrible perseverance pushed towards the heart of the miserable but glorious city. Their efforts were chiefly directed from two points; San Engracia which may be denominated the left attack; Saint Augustin which constituted the right attack. At San Engracia they laboured perpendicularly to the Cosso, being separated from it by a large convent, and by the hospital for madmen, the ruins of which were entrenched after the first siege. This attack was protected on the left by the Capuchin, which La Coste had fortified to repel the counter-assaults of the Spaniards; the attack from the Augustin was more diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features to determine the direction of the approaches. The French mounted a number of light six-inch mortars on peculiar carriages, and drew them from street to street, as occasion offered; the Spaniards plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced a surprising effect. In this manner the never-ceasing combat was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by dint of alternate mines and assaults, worked their perilous way at both attacks to the Cosso, not without changes of fortune, and loss; and they were unable to obtain a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed every house with undiminished resolution.

Lasnes having opened trenches against the suburbs, battered the isolated Convent of Jesus on that side, and the 7th of February stormed it so easily, that the French, thinking the Spaniards panic-stricken, penetrated the suburb itself, and though beaten back, made good their lodgment in the convent.



On the city side the besiegers vainly strove for three days to pass the Cosso. They then extended their right to reach the quay and so connect their attack with that on the suburb; and their left to win the great convent of Francisco, which they effected after exploding an immense mine and making two assaults. At the right attack mines were also sprung the 11th and 12th under the university on the Spanish side of the Cosso, but they did not open the walls well and the stormers failed with loss. Nevertheless the French passed the Cosso by means of traverses, on the 17th, and prepared fresh mines under the university, but deferred the explosion until a simultaneous effort could be combined on the side of the suburb. At the left attack a number of houses bordering on the Cosso were gained, and a battery established which raked that great thoroughfare above ground, while under it, six galleries were driven, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment. But the spirit of the French army was now exhausted. They had laboured and fought without intermission for fifty days; they had crumbled the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their mines, carried the breaches with their bayonets; fighting above and beneath the surface of the earth they had spared neither fire nor sword; their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a subterranean warfare, famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still unconquered!

‘Before this siege,’ they exclaimed, ‘was it ever known, that twenty thousand men should besiege fifty thousand? Scarcely a fourth of the town is won, and we are already exhausted. We must wait for reinforcements or we shall all perish among these cursed ruins, which will become our own tombs before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens.’

Rogniat

Lasnes, obstinate to conquer, endeavoured to raise the soldiers’ hopes. He told them the losses of the besieged far exceeded their own, the Spaniards’ strength would soon be exhausted and their courage sink; the fierceness of the defence was already abating, and if contrary to expectation they should renew the example of Numantia, their utter destruction would be effected by the united evils of battle pestilence and misery:

his exhortations were successful, and the 18th of February, all the combinations being complete, a general assault took place.

On the right of the French, a party-wall being opened by an explosion, the besiegers made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and without a check won the island of houses leading down to the quay, with the exception of two buildings; the Spaniards thus taken in rear, abandoned all the external fortifications between Saint Augustin and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. During this assault the mines under the university, containing three thousand pounds of powder, were sprung, the walls tumbled with a terrific crash, a column of the besiegers entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgment. Meanwhile fifty pieces of artillery thundered upon the suburb, ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by midday opened a practicable breach in the convent of Saint Lazar, the principal defence on that side. Lasnes ordered an assault there also, by which Saint Lazar was taken, the passage of the bridge intercepted, the baron Versage killed, and his troops destroyed, with exception of three hundred, who, braving the fire on the bridge, got back into the city. Gazan immediately occupied the Spanish works, and thus cut off and forced to surrender two thousand men posted on the Ebro above the suburb.

This success, followed on the 19th by another fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, shook the constancy of the besieged. An aide-de-camp of Palafox came forth to demand, in addition to certain terms before offered by the marshal, that the garrison should be allowed to join the Spanish armies, with a fixed number of covered carriages. Lasnes rejected these proposals and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come! Fifty pieces of artillery from the left bank of the Ebro laid the houses on the quay in ruins; the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was nearly effaced by the bombardment; and six mines under the Cosso, loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for a simultaneous explosion, which would

have laid a quarter of the remaining houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured.

The bombardment, unceasing from the 10th of January, had forced the women and children to take refuge in vaults with which the city abounded; there the constant combustion of oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and restlessness of mind, combined to produce a pestilence which soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it alike; and such was the predisposition to disease, that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the beginning of February the daily deaths were from four to five hundred; the living were unable to bury the dead; and thousands of carcases, scattered about the streets and court-yards or piled in heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their own corruption or be licked up by the flames of burning houses as the defence became contracted. The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and one-fourth of the houses were in the hands of the French; sixteen thousand shells thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five thousand pounds of powder in the mines had shaken the city to its foundations; and the bones of more than forty thousand persons of every age and sex bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the besieged.

Cavallero.  
Rogniat.  
Suchet.

Palafox was sick, the curate of St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, the Tios, Jorge and Marin, had been slain in battle or swept away by the pestilence, and the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was abated; a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation waited upon Lasnes the 20th of February to negotiate a capitulation. They proposed, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and the peasantry were not to be considered prisoners; and, at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded to have the full church revenues guaranteed and punctually paid! This last article was rejected with indignation, and according to French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lasnes granted certain terms

drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name of Ferdinand the VIIth being purposely omitted in the instrument, which in substance run thus:—The garrison to march out with the honours of war, to be constituted prisoners, and sent to France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks. Persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in his ranks; the peasants to be sent to their homes; property and religion to be guaranteed.

With this understanding the deputies returned to the city, where fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for protracting the defence were least numerous, but most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the Ebro, fearing that Palafox and other suspected persons would quit the town; they were menacing and powerful, and the deputies not daring to pass through the streets retired outside to the castle of Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their proceedings. The dissentient party would have fallen upon the others next day, if the junta had not taken prompt measures to enforce the surrender, by directing the officer commanding the walls near the castle to give up his post to the French. Farther resistance was then impossible, and on the 21st of February from twelve to fifteen thousand sickly beings, having laid down those arms which they could now scarcely handle, this cruel and memorable siege terminated.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. When the other events of the Spanish war shall be lost in the obscurity of time, or only traced by disconnected fragments, the story of Zaragoza like some ancient triumphal pillar standing amidst ruins will tell a tale of past glory: and already men point to the heroic city calling her Spain, as if her spirit were common to the whole nation: yet it was not so, nor was the defence of Zaragoza the effect of unalloyed virtue. It was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude, nor a system of terror, but all combined under peculiar circumstances that upheld the work. This combination and how it was brought about should be well considered;



for it is not so much by catching leading resemblances, as by studying the differences of great affairs, that the exploits of one age can be made to serve as models for another.

2°. The siege may be examined under two points of view; as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, it proved that neither the Spanish people nor the government partook of the Zaragozan energy. It was impossible that in the midst of eleven millions animated by an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand men could for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their works, houses and bodies mingled in one terrible ruin, by less than thirty-five thousand adversaries, without one effort being made to save them! Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, and it shows thus. Thirty-five thousand French, in the midst of insurrections, and despite of circumstances peculiarly favourable to the defence, reduced fifty thousand of the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. The latter suffered nobly, but was their example imitated? Gerona indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, perhaps more than rivalled the glory of Zaragoza; elsewhere, her fate spoke, not trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice that carried dismay to the heart of the nation.

3°. As an isolated transaction the siege of Zaragoza is very remarkable; yet it would be a great error to suppose, that any town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be as well defended. Fortune and bravery will do much, but the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity: there are no miracles in war! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city.

4°. The advantages offered by the peculiar structure of the houses and the number of convents and churches, were ably seized by the Spaniards; and though Rogniat, Lacoste's successor, treats his opponents' skill in fortification with contempt, colonel San Genis' talents are not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few outworks at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and ferocious mob: he knew how to adapt his system of defence to the circumstances of the

moment, and no stronger proof of real genius can be given. 'Do not consult me about a capitulation,' was his common expression. '*I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can make no further defence.*' But neither the talents of San Genis, nor the construction of the houses, would have availed if the people within had not been of adequate temper. They did not however display active bravery, for they were twice the number of the besieged, and yet never made a serious impression by sallies, nor defended the breaches. In large masses the standard of disciplined courage may be inferior to fanatic excitement, but the latter is neither lasting nor equable, because men are of different susceptibilities following their organizations; and hence terror has always been the resource of leaders who in great enterprises could not find discipline: enthusiasm stalked in front, but punishment brought up the rear. Zaragoza was no exception.

5°. It may be said the majority of the besieged not being animated by any peculiar fury, terror could not be carried to any great length; but a close examination explains this seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct parties,—the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, and the citizens; the last having most to lose, were naturally the fiercest, and amongst them the system of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as all ignorant men under no regular control will do, the soldiers meddled little with the interior arrangements, and the division of the town into islands of posts, rendered it feasible for violent persons possessed of authority to follow the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the garrison of each island kept those in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the longer staved off from themselves.

6°. Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza; the laurels gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows. But those laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood; the energy of the real chiefs and the cause in which that energy was exerted may be admired; the acts perpetrated were atrocious, and Palafox, although unable to arrest their savage proceedings, can claim little credit for his own conduct. For more than a month preceding the surrender, he never came

forth of a vaulted building impervious to shells, where he and some others of both sexes lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them.

7°. Before the arrival of Lasnes, the French operations were conducted with little vigour; the want of unity as to time, in the double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant error unredeemed by any subsequent activity. After his arrival the siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and firmness. Rogniat disapproves of Suchet's division having been sent to Calatayud, but it seems to have been a judicious measure.—1°. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid. 2°. To have a corps at hand, lest Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet at Calatayud fulfilled these objects, without losing the power of succouring Tudela, or of intercepting Infantado if he attempted to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but when the Spanish army at Cuença was directed to Ucles, and Lazan was gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, Lasnes was right to recal him.

8°. Infantado's errors were made manifest by this siege. Instead of courting defeat at Ucles he should have marched to the Ebro, established dépôts at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined Lazan's troops to his own. He might have formed an entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and carried on a methodical war with at least twenty-five thousand regular troops. The insurrections on the French flanks and line of communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable; and Infantado, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind him, might with activity and prudence have raised the siege.

9°. From a review of all the circumstances, we may conclude that fortune was favourable to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and did not lose above four thousand men; but their success, partly resulting from the errors of their opponents, was principally due to the destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for of the

Rogniat. multitude, said to have fallen, six thousand only were slain in battle, and although thirteen convents and churches had been taken when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced!

Such were the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. The contemporary events in Catalonia shall now be related.



## CHAPTER IV.

## OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

WHEN the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1809, Duhesme returned to Barcelona, Reille to Figueras, and both remained on the defensive. Napoleon aided them promptly. While the siege was yet in progress, he assembled troops at Perpignan sufficient with those already in Catalonia to form the seventh corps, forty thousand strong, under Gouvion St. Cyr, to whom he gave this emphatic order. '*Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 men.*'

St. Cyr's troops were mostly raw conscripts; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss, mixed with a few old regiments, and the preparations for the grand army had absorbed the attention of the French administration. St. Cyr was so straitened for means that his young soldiers, suffering privations, were depressed in spirit and inclined to desert. Napoleon's orders however prescribed immediate action, and his general crossing the frontier established himself at Figueras the 5th of November.

But in Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity and abuses had succeeded enthusiasm and withered the energy of the people; the local junta issued abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the supreme junta and the English commanders in the Mediterranean and Portugal, all charged to demand arms, ammunition, and money. The supreme junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities answered them generously; lord Collingwood instantly lent the assistance of his fleet; arms were sent from Malta and Sicily, and sir Hew Dalrymple completely equipped the Spanish regiments released by the convention of

Cintra, and despatched them to Catalonia in British transports. It may however be doubted if the central junta on this occasion were not the wisest, for the local government established at Tarragona was so neglectful and corrupt, that the arms supplied were sold to foreign merchants!

Lord Collingwood's Correspondence.

Military affairs were as ill conducted. Caldagues, after relieving Gerona, had resumed the line of the Cabanes.

Llobregat; and when fifteen hundred men, drawn from the garrison of Carthagera, had reached Tarragona, Palacios, accompanied by the junta, quitted the latter town and fixed his quarters at Villa Franca within twenty miles of Caldagues; the latter then disposed his troops, five thousand, on different points between Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles along the left bank of the river. However, Duhesme, who had rested but a few days, marched in the night from Barcelona with six thousand men, and at daybreak the 2nd of September, attacked Caldagues' line at several places, but principally at San Boy and Molino del Rey: the former post was carried, and the Spaniards pursued to Vegas, a distance of seven or eight miles, but at Molino del Rey the French were repulsed and Duhesme returned to Barcelona.

It was designed by the British ministers, that an auxiliary force should sail from Sicily about this time to aid the Catalans; and it would have been a wise and timely effort, but Napoleon's foresight prevented the execution. He directed Murat to menace Sicily; and that prince, feigning to collect forces in Calabria, spread reports of armaments in preparation, and sent general Lamarque against Capræ, where sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing in a few days an island which, without pretension to fame, might have been defended for as many years. Murat's demonstrations imposed upon sir John Stuart; ten or twelve thousand British troops were paralyzed at a critical period; and such will always be the result of a policy undefined and unstable: when statesmen do not see their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with vigour.

During September the Catalan forces increased; the tercios of migueletes were augmented, and a regiment of hussars,

hitherto kept in Majorca, arrived at Taragona. Palacios remained at Villa Franca, Caldagues on the Llobregat; Mariano Alvarez commanded the advanced guard, near Figueras, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and Rosas, the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizan chiefs. Francisco Milans, and Milans de Bosch, kept the mountains northward and eastward of Barcelona; the latter hemming in the French right; the former covering the district of El Vallés, and watching, like a bird of prey, the enemy's foragers in the plain of Barcelona. The little port of Filieu de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was filled with privateers, and English frigates, besides aiding the Spanish enterprises, carried on a littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons. Many petty skirmishes happened, but on the 10th of October Duhesme attacked Milans de Bosch at St. Gerony beyond the Bcsos and dispersed his corps. The 11th, colonel Devaux, with two thousand men, entered Granollers, which the Spaniards deserted although it was their chief depôt, and Devaux returned to Mollet. Here a column of equal strength had been stationed for his support, but now it proceeded under Millossewitz to forage El Vallés. Caldagues who had drawn together three thousand infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and six guns, marched by the back of the hills towards Moncada, to intercept the French on their return to Barcelona: Millossewitz and he met unexpectedly at San Culgat, and in a confused action the French were beaten, and retreated across the mountains to Barcelona, while Caldagues, justly proud of his soldier-like movement, returned to his camp on the Llobregat.

Lafaille,  
Campagne de  
Catalonia.

On the 28th of October, Palacios took the command of the levies collecting in the Sierra Morena; Vives succeeded him in Catalonia, and received more infantry from Majorca; the Spanish troops, released by the convention of Cintra, also arrived at Villa Franca, and seven or eight thousand Grenadan levies were brought up to Taragona by Reding; at the same time six thousand men, drafted from the army of Aragon, reached Lerida under the command of Lazan. This accumulated force was organized in six divisions, one being formed of the troops in the Ampurdan, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and Rosas. This '*army of the right*,' as it

was called, amounted to thirty-six thousand, of which twenty-two thousand foot and twelve hundred horse were about Barcelona. Vives having such a power, and possession of the hills and rivers around Barcelona, resolved to storm it, and all things seemed favourable. The inhabitants were ready to rise, a battalion of Walloon guards, which had remained in a kind of neutrality, plotted to seize one of the gates, and Duhesme was inclined to abandon the town and hold only the citadel and the Montjuick; but from that he was diverted by the remonstrances of the chief engineer Lafaille. In this state, Vives made a general attack on the French outposts, but was repulsed at every point and returned to the mountains. The Walloon guards were then disarmed, the inhabitants awed, the defences of the town increased; and from that period to the raising of the blockade, the Spanish general's warfare was contemptible, although disputes amongst his adversaries had arisen to such a height, that Duhesme was advised to send Lecchi a prisoner to France.

Catalonia was now a prey to disorder. Vives had been the friend of Godoy and was not popular; he had, when commanding in the islands, retained the troops there with such tenacity as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause; yet the

supreme junta, while privately expressing their suspicions and requesting lord Collingwood to force him to an avowal of his true sentiments,

wrote publicly to Vives in the most flattering terms, and finally appointed him captain-general of Catalonia. By the people he and others were vehemently suspected; and as the mob governed throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude than anxious to molest the enemy: hence, although Catalonia was full of strong places, they were neither armed nor provisioned, and all persons were confident the French only thought of retreating.

This was the state of the province when Napoleon, then ready to break into the northern parts of Spain, ordered St. Cyr to commence operations. His force, including a

German division of six thousand men not yet arrived at Perpignan, exceeded thirty thousand men ill-composed and badly provided, and St.

Lord Collingwood's Correspondence.

Imperial Muster rolls, MSS.







Cyr himself was extremely discontented. The emperor had given him discretionary powers, only remembering the importance of relieving Barcelona; but Berthier neglected the equipment of the troops, and Duhesme declared his magazines would not hold out longer than December. To march directly to Barcelona was neither easy nor advantageous; that city could only be provisioned from France, and before the road was cleared by the taking of Gerona and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass by land; it was essential therefore to obtain Rosas as an intermediate port for French vessels passing with supplies to Barcelona; and to deprive the English of a secure harbour, whence the Spaniards could in concert with their allies intercept the communications of the French army and even blockade Figueras, which could not be provisioned at this period. These considerations determined St. Cyr to commence the siege. Reille conducted the operations and having driven the Spaniards into the place invested it the 7th November.

#### SIEGE OF ROSAS.

This town was a narrow slip of houses built along the shore. The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, was on the left flank; an old redoubt, built at the foot of the rocky mountains which skirt the swampy flat of the Ampurdan, was on the right; and an entrenchment half a mile long covered the houses and connected those works. The roadstead permitted ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot, and a star fort called the Trinity, on the right coming up the gulf, crowned a rugged hill a mile and a quarter from the citadel, the communication being by a narrow road between the hills and the water's edge. The garrison, three thousand strong, was reinforced by captain West with some seamen and marines from the Excellent seventy-four and two bomb vessels, which were anchored close to the town. The damages of an old siege were only partially repaired; and the Trinity was commanded at the distance of pistol-shot by a rocky point called the Puig Rom; both it and the citadel were also ill-found in stores and guns.

Reille's troops, consisting of his own and Pino's Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison, but heavy rain

rendered the roads of the Ampurdan impassable for artillery, and delayed the opening of the trenches. Souham's division covered the siege on the side of Gerona, and

St. Cyr.

Chabot's Italian brigade was stationed at Rabos and Espollas to keep off the somatenes; Reille had previously detached a battalion to that quarter, and reinforced it with three more, but too late, the somatenes cut off two companies; but this enraged the Italians and checked desertion; and St. Cyr, unwilling to burn villages, seized an equal number of villagers and sent them to France. During these events the people of Rosas embarked or took refuge in the citadel, leaving their houses and covering entrenchments to

Capt. West's  
Despatch.

the French, yet the fire of the English ships prevented a lodgment; and in a few days a mixed body of soldiers and townsmen re-established the post. On the 8th captain West and the garrison made a joint sally but were repulsed, and next day several yards of the citadel rampart crumbled away. The French did not discover this, and in the night it was repaired; on the 15th an obstinate assault on the Trinity was repulsed, principally by the English seamen. Next day the roads permitted the French battering-train to move, the road leading up the Puig Rom was repaired, and two battalions were established there with three guns on the 19th, overlooking the Trinity. Trenches were then opened against the citadel, and the ships of war were driven farther off by mortars.

Souham was meanwhile harassed by the migueletes, the French cavalry unable to forage, went back to France, and

St. Cyr.

Napoleon, disquieted, by Duhesme's anxious reports, for Barcelona, ordered the seventh corps to reach that city by the 26th. St. Cyr refused to abandon the siege without a positive order. On the Spanish side captain West was accused of seeking to possess himself of Rosas, under pretence of defending it; and the junta wrote angry letters to the governor, Pedro O'Daly, about this silly charge, yet took no measures to raise the siege. Pending this correspondence, captain West sailed, and was succeeded by the captain of the *Fame*, who endeavoured but ineffectually to take the battery on the Puig Rom.



On the 27th, the French stormed the mixed post in the deserted town, a hundred and fifty Spaniards were taken, fifty escaped to the citadel, and the rest were killed. Breaching batteries were then commenced amongst the ruined houses; and communication with the ships was rendered so unsafe, that Lazan, who had come from Lerida to Gerona, with six thousand men, and collected supplies at the mouth of the Fluvia to throw into Rosas by sea, abandoned his design. Reille again summoned the citadel, but O'Daly was firm, and the breach in the Trinity being judged practicable, an assault was ordered for the 30th. An Italian officer, who had formerly served in the place, being to lead, said the breach was a false one, yet he was unheeded, and indeed the marines of the *Fame* had been withdrawn, the fort being considered untenable. But at that moment lord Cochrane, a man of surpassing courage and enterprise, arrived and threw himself with eighty seamen into the fort. He found the breach practicable in itself, yet false as the Italian said, being only broken into an old gallery; this he filled with earth and hammocks; the unfortunate Italian could do nothing, and fell with all his followers, save two who got back, and two others, spared by the seamen and drawn up with ropes; a second assault a few days later was also repulsed.

Doyle, MS.

While this passed at the Trinity, the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false attack was commenced on the opposite side; next night the garrison made a sally with some success; but the walls were completely broken by the French fire, and the 5th of December O'Daly, hopeless of relief, surrendered with two thousand four hundred men: Lord Cochrane then abandoned the Trinity.

St. Cyr says the garrison might have been carried off at night by the British shipping. To embark two thousand five hundred men in the boats of two ships, under fire, is not easy, yet the preparation might have been previously made. With exception of lord Cochrane's exploit the defence was not brilliant, yet it resisted thirty days; and if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards outside, the loss of the garrison would have been amply repaid. Vives, wholly occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas;

a fruitless attack on Souham's posts made by Mariano Alvarez, was the only effort; Lazan could not rely upon more than three thousand of his forces, and his applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.

St. Cyr now prepared to reconquer Barcelona. To effect this he was to turn Gerona and Hostalrich by paths impervious to carriages, consequently no guns and very little musket ammunition could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. The German division had not yet entered Spain, and Reille was therefore to remain for the protection of Rosas and Figueras; hence, less than eighteen thousand men, including the cavalry, now recalled from France, remained disposable. On the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were twenty-five thousand in camp before Barcelona, ten thousand under Lazan and Alvarez at Gerona, but all ill organized; two-thirds of the migueletes carried only pikes, many had no arms, the military system was unsound, the generals indolent, ignorant, and despised by their own people.

St. Cyr having concentrated his troops on the Fluviá, passed that river the 9th, drove the Catalans over the Ter, and halted ten miles from Gerona. He desired to give Lazan a blow first, lest he should harass his rear on the march, but the latter would not fight, and St. Cyr made a show of investing Gerona to mislead Vives, and render him slow in breaking up before Barcelona. This succeeded, the Spaniard remained in his camp irresolute and helpless, while the French rapidly passed the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos.

The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been described, the only carriage roads by which St. Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, one leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had been broken up by Lord Cochrane in August; to use the second, it was necessary to take the two fortresses, or turn them by marching for three days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the last plan, trusting to separate Lazan and Alvarez from Vives and defeat them all in succession. On the 11th he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal. There he left the last of his carriages, delivered out

four days' biscuit and fifty rounds of ammunition; and with this provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of only ten rounds of ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march, making for Palamos.

Having beaten the migueletes with Juan Claros, he had to pass under fire of the English ships near Palamos; but he had gained the first step, and on the 13th quitting the coast he reached Vidreras and Llagostera by a forced march, thus placing himself between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not passed the heights of Casa de Selva. The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas. His rear had been slightly harassed by Lazan and Claros, yet he was well content to find the strong banks of the Tordera undefended by Vives. Lazan and Claros had, however, the one on the 11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement, and the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be encountered on one of the many strong positions in front; the Gerona force was close on his rear; the somatenes were gathering on the hills on his flanks, Hostalrich was in front, and his men had only sixteen rounds of ammunition. His design was to turn Hostalrich and gain the main road behind it; the smugglers of Perpignan told him there was no pathway; a shepherd assured him there was a track, and when the staff failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, but nearly fell into the hands of the somatenes in the search. Next day he gained the road by this path and repulsed a sally of the garri-son against his rear; the somatenes, however, emboldened by the French aversion to wasting their ammunition, became very troublesome, and near St. Celoni the head of the column encountered some migueletes under Francisco Milans. Not being aware of St. Cyr's approach they were easily dislodged and fell back, part to the pass of Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Cordera; the French thus gained the mouth of the dangerous defile called the Trentapasos, and being exhausted with fatigue desired to halt; St. Cyr compelled them to clear the defile, and they reached the plains beyond at ten o'clock that night; Lazan was not felt in the rear, but in front the fires of Vives' army were descried on the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas.

That general knew of St. Cyr's march the 11th, and could have been on the Tordera before the French passed it; but  
 Cabanes. news of the battle at Tudela, and the renewed  
 Doyle, MS. siege of Zaragoza arrived at the same moment,  
 and Vives vacillated between Barcelona and St. Cyr. He had on the 9th sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and a thousand infantry to command in the Ampurdam, and he had reached Granollers when Lazan's report arrived, but then Vives sent him more reinforcements and fresh orders to move on Cardadeu. The 14th he directed Francisco Milans by Mattaro and Arenas de Mar to look for the French on the coast road, and if it was clear to join Reding. The 15th, Milans was beaten at St. Celoni, yet rallied his people in the night on the heights of Cordera, thus flanking the French line of march.

On the 13th Caldagues had proposed that four thousand migueletes should watch Duhesme, while the army marched to fight St. Cyr; but Vives, loth to abandon the siege, left Caldagues with the right wing, and carried the centre and left by Granollers to the heights of Cardadeu, where he united in the night of the 15th eight thousand regulars, exclusive of Milan's division and some thousand somatenes. Duhesme immediately took the ground abandoned by Vives, and separated him from Caldagues; but St. Cyr would have been very unsafe on the morning of the 16th before any other than Spanish generals. Vives and his lieutenants were, however, not deficient of boasts, they called the French in derision '*the succour*,' and, alluding to Baylen, announced a  
 St. Cyr. second '*bull-fight*' in which Reding would again be '*matador*.' They had not to deal with a Dupont; St. Cyr formed his troops in one mass at day-break and marched against the Spanish centre, telling the column to go headlong on without firing.

#### BATTLE OF CARDADEU.

Vives' position was high and wooded. He took the left, Reding the right, and the somatenes clustered on a ridge separated from the latter by the little river Mogent; the Llinas road led through the centre, and a branch road, running be-



tween the Mogent and the Spanish right went to Mattaro. General Pino leading the attack against Reding, being galled in flank by the somatenes, halted, extended to his left and sent for fresh instructions; St. Cyr reiterated his first order, but Reding had already engaged the extended troops, and a fire was commenced without ammunition to maintain it. St. Cyr instantly sent forward Pino's right which was still in column, and employing two companies to menace the Spanish left, led Souham's division by the branch road against Reding's extreme right. In a moment the Spaniards were broken on the right and centre, and being charged by the cavalry dispersed, leaving all their artillery and ammunition and two thousand prisoners. Vives escaped on foot to Mattaro, where he got on board an English ship; Reding fled by the main road, and the next day, rallying some fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Cugat to Molino del Rey. The French lost six hundred men, and the battle was so decisive, that St. Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona without seeking Milans or Lazan, and hoping Duhesme, who had been informed the 7th of the intended march and could hear the sound of the artillery, would turn back the flying troops. Scarcely was the battle won when Milans arrived, but seeing the rout retired to Arenas de Mar and gave notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. Cyr's rear was now clear, but Duhesme instead of intercepting the beaten troops, sent Lecchi against Caldagues, who repulsed him, and retired behind the Llobregat, leaving behind some artillery and the magazines collected by Vives. St. Cyr reached Barcelona without meeting Duhesme's troops, and describes that general as astonishingly negligent, regardless alike of the enemy and of his friends, treating the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving at gross malversations. These accusations are to be received with doubt,—Duhesme has not wanted defenders.

Reflecting now upon the facility of beating the Catalans, and how difficult it was to overtake them, St. Cyr resolved to rest at Barcelona, thinking they would re-assemble on the Llobregat, where he might strike them so hard they would be unable to interrupt a siege he was meditating. He was not deceived. Reding joined Caldagues, and collected from twelve to fifteen

thousand men behind the Llobregat; Vives relanded at Sitjes, and ordered Milans and Lazan to join him by the way of Vallés. The French general got intelligence of these dispositions, yet thinking Milans' arrival uncertain, judged it better to attack Reding at once; wherefore upon the 20th having united Chabran's division to his own, he advanced against St. Felieu de Llobregat. The Spaniards occupied the heights, which are lofty, rugged, and with a free view of all the approaches from Barcelona. The river covered their front; their left could only be assailed from the bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched and protected by heavy guns, and Reding had a thousand cavalry and fifty pieces, most of which were at the bridge. But his right was accessible, the river was there fordable, and the royal road to Villa Franca led through his position. Vives came to the ground the 19th yet returned to Villa Franca, and when the French appeared on the 20th there was no commander. A council was held. Some were for fighting, some for retreating to Ordal, a strong post twelve miles in the rear. An officer was sent to Vives for instructions, the answer permitted Reding to retreat if he could not defend his position, and he resolved to fight though anticipating disaster, for he expected accusation, perhaps death if he retired. Snow was falling, both armies suffered; but the Spaniards had been previously defeated, the French had been victorious and were confident. In this mood the armies passed the night.

Cabanes.

#### BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY.

St. Cyr observing Reding's attention fixed on the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran to open a fire of artillery there, and then retire as if unable to sustain the heavier Spanish guns; but when he should see their centre and right assailed to return and force the passage. Reding immediately accumulated troops on his left. Meanwhile Souham fording the river several miles below ascended the right bank, and covered Pino and Chabot as they passed by a ford in front of St. Felieu on the Spanish right; the light cavalry followed Chabot's division, and the cuirassiers supported Chabran at Molino. Reding's

wings were on two flat mountains separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent, and his right being weakened, was easily driven from its ground by Pino, whereupon he formed on the other mountain perpendicularly to the river, still holding the bridge in force which was thus behind his left.

St. Cyr placed Souham on his own right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the left, and attacked this new position. Chabot sought to cut the Spaniards off from Villa Franca, Souham and Pino, crossing the ravine, assailed the front, and the light cavalry, filing between the mountain and the river, endeavoured to connect this movement with Chabran's attack. The Catalans opened a regular yet ill-directed fire, and their first line charged, yet had not courage to close, and their reserves immediately sent a volley against both parties. In this disorder Chabot, having gained the Villa Franca road, drove their right upon their centre, and both upon their left, and the whole mass was then pushed back on Molino del Rey. During the fight, part of Chabran's division had passed the river above Molino, blocking the road of Martorel, and the light cavalry now charged. The destruction of the Spaniards would have been completed if Chabran had pushed across the river, but always irresolute, that general remained passive until Souham reached the bridge, and the routed troops dispersed over the mountains.

Vives coming up at the end of the fight was forced to fly with the rest, and the French pursued in three columns. Chabran went towards Igualada; Chabot towards San Sadurni to turn Ordal; Souham to Villa Franca, where head-quarters were established the 22nd. Villa Nueva and Sitjes on the coast were occupied by Pino, while Souham pursued the fugitives to the gates of Taragona. The Catalans loss was not great, for owing to their swiftness in the hills, only twelve hundred were taken. Several superior officers fell, and Caldagues, a man seemingly pedantic and boasting, but certainly possessing courage and talent, was made prisoner. All the artillery, with vast quantities of powder, was captured, and a magazine of unused English muskets was found; yet many of the migueletes were unarmed, and the junta was unceasing in its demands for more? The history of one province is the history of all.

## CHAPTER V.

BARCELONA was now provisioned from the captured magazines for several months, there was no Catalan force in the field, and Taragona, where eight or nine thousand fugitives had taken refuge, was in terrible disorder. The mob  
Cabanes.

invaded the public stores, carried off weapons, and rushed about seeking something to vent its fury upon; the head of Vives was demanded, and Reding, who was proclaimed general, cast him into prison for protection. The regular officers were insulted, there was the usual cry for defence, and menaces against traitors, but neither arms nor powder, nor provisions, and St. Cyr might have taken the place, if, intent upon gathering subsistence and forming a battering train, he had not let the opportunity slip: Reding, beyond his own hopes, had time to rally the troops and put the works in a fighting state. Eleven thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry were reunited on the 1st of January  
Doyle, MS.

at Taragona and Reus; a Swiss regiment from Majorca, two Spanish regiments from Grenada, and three thousand four hundred men from Valencia augmented this force on the 5th; and that city also sent five thousand muskets, powder, and ten thousand pikes, all fresh from England. The British agents at Seville forwarded money, and this train of fortuitous circumstances, with St. Cyr's inactivity restored the Catalans' hopes, but their system remained unchanged, for in Spain confidence led to insubordination, not to victory.

Some of the fugitives fled to Bruch, which was considered impregnable since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz; the somatenes joined them, and elected major Green, an English military agent, general; wherefore St. Cyr, to repay those disasters, sent Chabran to take his revenge, and to encourage him directed Chabot to turn Bruch by San Sadurni and



Igualada, and render a permanent defence impossible. Green made a faint resistance, and lost eight guns and many men; the French pursued with ardour, and one detachment, without orders, took the strong rock of Montserrat; Chabot then returned to San Sadurni and Chabran to Martorel. While these events happened near Barcelona, Lazan advanced with eight thousand men towards Castellon de Ampurias in the Ampurdan, and the 1st of January drove a French battalion back to Rosas with loss; Reille with three thousand men attacked him next day on the Muga, but the action was undecided, and Lazan returned to Gerona.

Catalan fierceness was so much abated by the defeat at Molino, that Reding was able to avoid serious actions while the somatenes harassed the French; and this plan followed during January and February forced St. Cyr to employ small detachments in search of provisions, which the country people hid with care, striving hard to save their scanty stores. The district between the Llobregat and Taragona was exhausted early in February, the English ships vexed the coast, and the French lost many deserters, and many killed in the innumerable skirmishes of the marauding parties. St. Cyr, however, persevered, until the peasantry became tired, and clamoured, that Reding with a regular army should look on while the last morsel of food was torn from their starving families: the townspeople also, feeling the burthen of supporting the troops, urged the general to fight. Nor was the insubordination confined to the rude multitude. Lazan who had nine thousand men and did nothing after the skirmish on the Muga, when ordered by Reding to leave a garrison in Gerona and bring his troops to Igualada, marched with five thousand men to Zaragoza, where his operations already related were ineffectual.

Reding's army was strong; the Swiss were numerous and good, and he had the most experienced Spanish regiments. Every fifth man of the robust population had been called out, and though the peasant, averse to the regular service, did not readily come in, the army in February mustered twenty-eight thousand of all arms. The urban guards were also organized, and fifteen thousand somatenes aided the regular force. Yet was there more show than power, for Reding was incapable,

and the migueletes, ill-armed and naked, devastated the country like an enemy. The somatenes would only fight at the times and places they liked, they refused advice, reviled those who differed from them and caused many officers to be removed; they never gave the generals good information, but the Spanish plans were always known to the French; for at Reding's quarters, as at Castaños' before the battle of Tudela, all projects were ostentatiously discussed. Reding had no military talent, his activity was physical not mental; but he was brave and honourable and popular; for being without design, or arrangement, and easy of nature, he crossed no man's humour and floated gently in the troubled waters until their sudden reflux left him on the rocks.

Four independent Catalan corps were in activity. Alvarez held Gerona and the Ampurdam with four thousand men. Lazan was near Zaragoza with five thousand. Juan Castro, accused by the Spaniards of treachery and who did afterwards join Joseph, commanded sixteen thousand men, extended from Olesa on the upper Llobregat, to San Cristina near Taragona. Reding's line, running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above sixty miles, and he kept twelve thousand men at Taragona, Reus, and the vicinity. His troops were fed from Valencia and Aragon, the convoys from the former coming by sea; but the field magazines, accumulated on one or two points without judgment, fettered him and regulated the movements of his able adversary, whose only difficulty was the obtaining subsistence.

St. Cyr's communications were much vexed by the somatenes and the English ships, and early in February having exhausted the country around his army, he concentrated his divisions at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Martorel.

The German division and some conscripts having joined him, he had forty-one thousand men under arms, but only twenty-three thousand fighting men were with himself. His line was not more than thirty miles, and he had a royal road for retreat on Barcelona, while the Spanish line, sixty miles long, was on a half circle around him, and with communications more rugged. Nevertheless by avoiding serious fights, the Catalans might have forced

the French to abandon the country west of the Llobregat; famine and the drain of mountain warfare would have effected that; and St. Cyr could strike no formidable blow because all the important places were fortified. The never-failing arrogance of the Spanish character, and the unstable mind of Reding, abolished these advantages. The concentration of the French troops and some successful skirmishes were magnified, the last into victories, the first into preparation for flight: the clamour for fighting thus augmented, and some hopes were conceived of regaining Barcelona by a conspiracy within the walls. Indeed long before this some absurd proposals had been made to general Lecchi for betraying the city to the patriots, and nothing more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the Spaniards in this war, than their frequent attempts to corrupt the French commanders. As late as 1810 Martin Carrera, having two thousand ragged half-armed peasants encamped under the protection of the English outposts, offered marshal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo, rank and honours if he would desert!

Reding, driven by the popular cry to attack, ordered Castro to fall by Llacuna and Igualada on the French right and rear, and to send a detachment to the pass of Ordal to intercept their retreat on Barcelona. Reding in person was to move with eight thousand men by Vendril and St. Cristina against the front, and the somatenes and migueletes between Gerona and the Besos were to aid; the object being as usual to surround the enemy! The plan being made public, St. Cyr's destruction was confidently anticipated, but that general had his troops well in hand and struck the first blow. The Catalans were in motion the 14th, and St. Cyr, leaving Souham at Vendril to keep Reding in check, marched the 16th from Villa Franca with Pino's division and overthrew Castro's posts at Llacuna and St. Quinti: the Catalan centre was thus pierced, the wings separated and Castro's right thrown back on Capellades.

On the 17th St. Cyr reached Capellades, where Chabot and Chabran were to meet him, the one from Sadurni the other from Martorel; he thus skilfully avoided the pass of Bruch and concentrated three divisions on Castro's left centre, and

close to his magazines at Igualada. Chabot arrived first and being unsupported was beaten back with loss, but then the other French came up and the Spaniards fled. They rallied again at Pobla de Claramunt, between Capellades and Igualada, to St. Cyr's content, because he had sent Mazzuchelli's brigade from Llacuna direct upon Igualada, and if Chabot had not been pressed, the action at Capellades was to have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got into the rear; but when that last named general was descried, Castro, who was at Igualada with his reserves, recalled the troops from Pobla de Claramunt. The French were close, and the whole passed through Igualada fighting, after which the Catalans threw away their arms and fled by the three routes of Cervera, Calaf, and Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, yet the French returned the next day with few prisoners, because, says St. Cyr, '*the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees.*'

Having thus broken through the centre, defeated a part of the left wing and taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted Chabot and Chabran at Igualada to keep the beaten troops in check, while himself, with Pino's division, marched on the 18th to fight Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. Magi. Souham also had been instructed, when by preconcerted signals he should know the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to force the pass of Cristina, and meet St. Cyr at Villa Radoña. St. Magi was carried on the evening of the 18th, but it was impossible to find a guide for the next day's march to the abbey of Santa Creus; in this perplexity, a wounded captain, who was prisoner, demanded leave to go to Taragona, St. Cyr assented, offering to carry him to Santa Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a guide to his enemies. The march was long and difficult, and it was late ere they reached the abbey, a strong post and occupied in force by the troops beaten from San Magi the evening before; wherefore the French, after a fruitless demonstration of assaulting it, took a position for the night. Meanwhile Reding, hearing of Castro's defeat, made a draft of men and guns from the right wing and was marching by Pla and the pass of Cabra, intending to rally his left wing; his road run



just behind Santa Creus, and he was passing at the moment when the French appeared before that place; but neither general was aware of the other's presence, and both continued their particular movements. The 20th St. Cyr crossed the Gaya river under a fire from the abbey, and marched upon Villa Radoña, near which he dispersed a small corps; Souham was not come up, and an officer, escorted by a battalion, was sent to him, for his non-arrival gave reason to believe the staff-officers and spies previously sent had been intercepted. One day and a half was thus lost, which might have sufficed to crush Reding's right wing, surprised as it would have been without a chief, in the plain of Taragona.

While the French rested at Villa Radoña, Reding pursued his march to St. Coloma de Querault, where he rallied many of Castro's fugitives, and the aspect of affairs was suddenly changed; for Souham, after forcing the pass of San Cristina, reached Villa Radoña the 21st, and at the same time, the weakly men left at Villa Franca also arrived. Hence more than two-thirds of the French army were concentrated at Villa Radoña at the moment when the Spanish commander, being joined by the detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the troops from the abbey of Creus, had also rallied the greatest part of his forces at St. Coloma de Querault. Each general could now by a rapid march overwhelm his adversary's right wing, but the troops left by Reding in the plain of Taragona, could retire upon that fortress, while those left by St. Cyr at Igualada were without support; wherefore, when the latter, continuing his movement on Taragona, reached Valls the 22nd, and heard of Reding's march, he immediately returned with Pino's division to Pla, resolved, if the Spanish general should advance towards Igualada, to follow him with a sharp spur. Souham halted at Valls on the 23rd to watch the Catalans in the plain of Taragona, Pino was then at Pla, whence he detached men towards Santa Creus and Santa Coloma to feel for Reding, and in the evening they returned with some prisoners, who said the abbey was abandoned and Reding gone back to Taragona by Sarreal and Momblanch. St. Cyr then retained Pino at Pla, but pushed posts on his right to the abbey, and in front to the defile of Cabra, designing to

meet the Spaniards if they returned by those roads, and he ordered Souham to post his left on the Francoli, his right towards Pla, with an advanced guard at Pixa Moxons watching the Momblanch road.

On the 24th Reding being at Santa Coloma, held a council, at which Doyle assisted. One party was for fighting, another for retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran at Igualada, a fourth for regaining the plain of Taragona. There were many opinions, but neither wisdom nor resolution, and finally, Reding, leaving Wimpfen with four thousand men at San Coloma, decided to regain Taragona and took the route of Momblanch: with ten thousand of his best troops, following the Spanish accounts, but St. Cyr says with fifteen thousand. The Catalan general knew Valls was occupied and his line of march intercepted; yet he imagined the French to be only five or six thousand, and the situation and strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom troubled Spanish commanders.

#### BATTLE OF VALLS.

At day-break on the 25th February, while in full march without any scouts, the head of Reding's column was suddenly fired upon at Pixa Moxons by Souham's detachment; however the French were immediately driven in upon the main body, and the attack being vigorously followed the whole division gave way. Under cover of this fight the baggage and artillery passed the Francoli river, the road to Taragona was opened, and Reding might have effected his retreat without difficulty; yet he continued to press Souham until St. Cyr, who had early intelligence of what was passing, came down from Pla upon his left flank. When the French dragoons, preceding their infantry, appeared in Souham's line, Reding re-crossed the Francoli and took a position behind that river, intending to retreat from thence in the evening, but his able opponent made him fight, and at three o'clock the action recommenced. The banks of the Francoli were steep and rugged, the position beyond strong and difficult of access, yet St. Cyr wishing, as he states, to increase the moral ascendancy of his soldiers,

forbad the artillery to play on Reding's battalions, lest they should fly before the infantry could reach them!

Under this curious arrangement the battle was begun by the light troops. The French, or rather Italian infantry, were superior in number to the Spaniards; covered by their skirmishers they passed the river with alacrity, and ascended the heights under a very regular fire, which was continued until the attacking troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; then both Swiss and Catalans wavered, and ere the infantry could close with them they broke and were charged by the French cavalry. Reding received several sabre wounds yet saved himself at Taragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took refuge, the remainder fled towards Tortosa and Lerida. The count of Castel d'Orius and many other superior officers were taken, together with all the artillery and baggage, and four thousand were killed or wounded. During these movements Reding received no assistance from the somatenes, and it may be received as an axiom in war, that armed peasants are only formidable to stragglers and small detachments; when the regular forces engage, the poor countryman sensible of his own weakness wisely quits the field. St. Cyr lost only a thousand men, and on the 26th Souham entered the rich town of Reus, where, contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants remained. Pino then occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls, detachments were sent to Salou and Villa Seca on the sea-coast west of Taragona, and Chabot, recalled from Igualada, was posted at the Santa Creus to watch Wimpfen who still remained at Santa Coloma de Querault.

This battle finished the regular warfare in Catalonia for the time. Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off from the main body of the army, joined the somatenes, and acting as partizans troubled the communications of the French; but St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field, and Tortosa, being in a defenceless condition, without provisions, must have fallen if any attempt had been made against it. Lazan indeed, after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa, and declared himself independent of Reding's command; but the battle and the fall of Zaragoza struck terror far and wide, the neighbouring pro-

vinces acting each for its own safety, had no regard to any general plan, and the confusion was universal. The fugitives from Valls and the troops already in Taragona, crowded the latter place, an infectious disorder broke out, and St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword, begirt the city with a resolution to hold his positions while food could be procured. In this policy he remained steadfast until the middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca; and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos and the Llobregat, cut his communication with Barcelona, and in conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that city. His plan appears injudicious. The sickness in Taragona did not cause it to surrender, and the subjugation of Catalonia was certainly retarded by the cessation of offensive operations; he should have seized some strong place, Tortosa, Taragona, Gerona, or Lerida, while the terror of defeat was fresh; his inactivity after Molino del Rey and at this period, enabled the Catalonians to put those towns in a state of defence, and he gained only a barren glory.

Towards the middle of March, the country being exhausted, he determined to abandon the plains of Taragona, and take some position where he could feed his troops, cover the projected siege of Gerona, and yet be at hand to relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich offered all these advantages, but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino del Rey, Chabran was ordered to drive them back first, that the sick and wounded men might be transferred from Valls to Barcelona. Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of artillery, the migueletes thinking it the advanced guard of a greater force abandoned the post, yet soon returned, beat the battalion and took the gun. Chabran received orders to fall on with his whole division; he reached the bridge, but returned without daring to attack; St. Cyr repeated his orders, and then the troops, apparently ashamed of their general's irresolution, carried the bridge and occupied the heights on both sides of the river.

It was now found that Duhesme, pressed by the migueletes



without, was also extremely fearful of conspiracies within the walls; and his fears, and the villanous conduct of his police, had really excited the inhabitants to attempt what was so much dreaded. An insurrection was planned in concert with the migueletes and the English squadron, and the latter coming close in cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting Wimpfen, the Milans, and Claros to have assaulted the gates, which was the signal for insurrection. The inhabitants were sanguine, because there were above two thousand Spanish prisoners in the city, and outside the walls two tercios secretly recruited and maintained by the citizens; and these last being without uniforms, constantly passed in and out of the town, yet Duhesme was never able to discover or to prevent them! but in all matters of surprise and stratagem Spaniards are unrivalled. This project against the city was baffled by Chabran's actions at Molino del Rey, which occupied the partizan corps outside the walls; and the British squadron, exposed to a heavy gale and disappointed in the co-operation from the land-side, sailed away the 11th.

St. Cyr designed to retire the 18th, but the 17th a cannonade was heard on the side of Momblanch, which proceeded from a detachment of six hundred men, with two guns, under the command of colonel Briche, who had been sent by Mortier to open the communication after the fall of Zaragoza, and had forced a way through the Spanish partizans. To favour his return the army halted two days, yet, after a trial, he found it too dangerous and attached himself to the 7th corps. Now however St. Cyr's inactivity and Chabran's timidity had depressed the spirit of the troops; they contemplated the retreat with uncasiness, and many officers advised the general to hide his movements. To check this alarm St. Cyr gave the Spaniards formal notice of his design, desiring Reding to send officers to take charge of the hospitals at Valls which contained the Spanish wounded and some French. Then he repassed the Llobregat, followed at a distance by some feeble Spanish detachments, and sent Pino immediately against Wimpfen, who had rallied the migueletes of Juan Claros and the Milans at Tarasa. Pino defeated him, foraged the country, and brought back sufficient to feed the army without drawing on Barcelona.

Reding died at this time of his wounds in Taragona, where the English consul had saved him from the mob, which always attributed defeat to the general's treachery. His military conduct was condemned by his own officers, his knowledge of war was slight, his courage and honesty unquestionable, and he was conspicuous for humanity. At this unhappy period, when prisoners in every part of Spain were tortured with savage cruelty, and when to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, Reding not only repressed all barbarities, but concluded a convention with St. Cyr, under which wounded men on both sides received decent treatment, and were exchanged as soon as their hurts were cured. In his last moments he said he had been ill-served as a general, that the somatenes had not supported him, that his orders were neglected, and his plans disclosed to the enemy while he could never get true intelligence: complaints which the experience of Moore, Baird, Cradock, Murray, and Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, at every period of the war. Coupigny succeeded Reding, yet was soon superseded by Blake, who was appointed captain-general of the Coronilla, or little crown, a title given to the union of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. The Catalan warfare was thus intimately connected with Aragon, and a short account of what was passing there is necessary.

When Zaragoza fell, Lasnes returned to France, and Mortier sent detachments against Monzon, Jaca, Mequinenza and Lerida. Monzon, commanding a passage over the Cinca river, was abandoned by the Spaniards, Jaca surrendered, and thus an important line of communication was opened with France; but the demonstration against Mequinenza failed, and the summons to Lerida was fruitless. Mortier then quartered his troops on both sides of the Ebro from Barbastro to Alcanitz, and sent colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open a communication with the seventh corps. This was in March. In April Mortier marched the fifth corps to Castille, leaving Junot with the third corps to hold Aragon; but that officer soon returned to France and was replaced by Suchet. The third corps was now much reduced. One brigade was employed to protect the communication with

Navarre, another to escort prisoners from Zaragoza to Bayonne; many artillery-men and non-commissioned officers were withdrawn to serve in Germany, and the number of disposable troops did not exceed twelve thousand men under arms. This weakness gave the new general uneasiness, which was not allayed when he found men and officers discontented and dispirited. Suchet was however no ordinary man. He immediately commenced a system of discipline and order in his government which carried him from one success to another until he obtained the rank of marshal for himself, and for his troops the honour of being the only French corps that never suffered a signal reverse in Spain. He hoped St. Cyr's victories would give him time to re-organize his force in tranquillity, but that quickly fled. The Aragonese peasants, detecting his weakness, were ready for insurrection, and the migueletes and somatenes about Lerida and Mequinenza were already in activity under the colonels Pereña and Baget. Blake also, drawing troops from Valencia and Taragona had joined Lazan, and fixed his quarters at Morella on the frontier of Aragon, designing to operate in that province.

His first effort was to kindle the fire of insurrection, nor was fortune adverse. Part of the garrison of Monzon having made a marauding excursion beyond the Cinca, the citizens overpowered those who remained, and Pereña entered the place: this happened while Junot still commanded and he sent a strong force to recover it, but Baget having reinforced Pereña the French were repulsed; the Cinca rose behind them, and though the cavalry escaped by swimming, the infantry six hundred, after three days' marching and skirmishing surrendered and were sent to Taragona, whence they were exchanged under the convention between Reding and St. Cyr.

This success excited extravagant hopes, the Spanish garrison of Mequinenza burned the French boat bridge at Caspe on the Ebro, and Blake then advanced fighting to Alcanitz, the French retiring with loss to Samper and Ixar. It was at this moment when the quarters on both sides of the Ebro were harassed and the wings separated by the loss of the Caspe bridge, that Suchet assumed the command of the third corps. It was widely spread and in danger. He abandoned

the left bank of the Ebro, and concentrated his force at Ixar with the exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza, but his soldiers were fearful and disorderly, and to raise their spirit he marched the 23rd against Blake. That officer was in front of Alcanitz, his centre was covered by a hill; a bridge over the Guadalupe was in his rear; his left rested on some pools of water; his right was exposed. He had twelve thousand men of all arms, and the French did not exceed eight thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry; yet Suchet, thinking if he could carry the hill in the centre, the Spanish wings would be cut off from the bridge and forced to surrender, made dispositions for an attack.

Suchet's  
Memoirs.

#### BATTLE OF ALCANITZ.

To draw Blake's attention to his flanks, a small column was directed against each wing, and when the skirmishers were engaged, three thousand men rapidly attacked the centre hill. The Spaniards stood firm, the French fled, and though Suchet, who was himself wounded, rallied them again in the plain, and remained there all day he dared not renew the action. In the night he retreated, but his troops were seized with panic, and at daylight poured into Samper with all the disorder of a rout. Blake however remained inactive, and the French general causing the man who first commenced the alarm to be shot, exhorted the rest to maintain their honour, rested two days in position that he might not seem to fly, and then fell back to Zaragoza. This battle was a subject of triumph all over Spain. The supreme junta gave Blake an estate, and added the kingdom of Murcia to his command; his army then rapidly augmented, he hoped to recover Zaragoza and turned all his thoughts on Aragon, neglecting Catalonia, to which province it is time to return.

St. Cyr remained until the middle of April in Barcelona, striving to remedy Duhesme's bad government; he also filled the magazines for three months, and as the prisoners were a source of danger he resolved to send them to France. Finally, transferring his sick and weak men to the garrison, and



exchanging Chabran's division for Lecchi's, he marched to Granollers, giving out that he was going to France, lest the Catalans should remove their provisions from Vich. The migueletes under Milans and Claros had however occupied both sides of the long narrow pass of the Garriga in the valley of the Congosto. Wimpfen supported them at a short distance, and the 16th when Lecchi, escorting two thousand prisoners, appeared, an action commenced. The Catalans were soon beaten, for St. Cyr knowing the pass had secretly detached Pino to attack Wimpfen, and sent Souham and Chabot by the mountains to get on the flank and rear; thus attacked on all sides the migueletes fled, the French general reached Vich the 18th, and the inhabitants went off to the hills with their effects, but left their provisions behind.

Chabot and Pino immediately occupied Centellas, St. Martin, Tona, and Col de Sespino, thus securing the entrances of the valley. Souham remained near Vich, his right at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, his out-posts at Gurp, San Sebastian, and Santa Eularia. Lecchi marched with the prisoners by Filicu de Pallerols to Besalu; he repulsed some attacks, delivered his charge to Reille and came back with the news of Napoleon's departure from Spain, and of the approaching Austrian war. At the same time a moveable column sent to Barcelona brought intelligence that admiral Cosmao's squadron, baffling lord Collingwood's vigilance, had poured supplies into the city. This terminated what may be called the irregular warfare of Catalonia, to be succeeded by a war of sieges; but those were committed to other hands: Verdier succeeded Reille in the Ampurdam, and marshal Augereau superseded St. Cyr.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. St. Cyr's marches were hardy, his battles vigorous, but his campaign was one of great efforts without corresponding advantages. He attributed this to the condition of the seventh corps, '*destitute and neglected because the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief*:' an accusation unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon wilfully destroy his armies! sacrifice forty thousand men to disgrace a general whom he was

not obliged to employ at all! St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his instructions, he observed the emperor's affliction at Dupont's disaster; yet he would have it believed, that in the midst of this regret, Napoleon, with a singular self-damaging malice, was preparing greater disasters, merely to disgrace the commander he was talking to. And why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy.

2°. That the seventh corps was not well supplied is not to be disputed in the face of facts stated by St. Cyr; but if war were a state of ease and smoothness the fame which attends successful generals would be unmerited. Napoleon selected St. Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands the seventh corps would be weak, but with St. Cyr he judged it able to overcome the Catalonians; nor was he much mistaken. Barcelona was saved, Rosas was taken; and if Taragona and Tortosa did not fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey the other after that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation for defence, moral or physical. Nor can the unexpected resistance of Gerona Zaragoza and Valencia be cited against this opinion; those cities were previously prepared, yet in the two last there were dismay and confusion, not fatal only because the besieging generals wanted the ready vigour characteristic of great captains.

3°. St. Cyr, aware that numbers and equipment are a poor measure of the strength of armies, exalts the enthusiasm and courage of the Catalans, and trembles at the danger which, owing to Napoleon's suicidal jealousy, menaced at that period the seventh corps and even the south of France! But St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men, having no artillery, and carrying only sixty rounds of musket-ammunition, to plunge into the midst of those terrible armies; to march through the mountains for whole weeks and attack the strongest positions with the bayonet alone; nay even to dispense with the use of his artillery when he did bring it into

action, lest his men should not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Raw levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and Rome. With such soldiers the battles of Cardadeu, Molino, Igualada and Valls were won, yet St. Cyr calls the migueletes the best light troops in the world! The best light troops are the best troops in the world. Had the four thousand men composing Wellington's light division been at Cardadeu, instead of fifteen thousand migueletes, St. Cyr's sixty rounds of ammunition would scarcely have carried him to Barcelona.

4°. If the injurious influence of personal feelings on the judgment were not known, it might excite wonder that so good a writer and able soldier should advance such fallacies; but St. Cyr's work bears the mark of carelessness. He affirms that Dupont's move on Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjuez; but the tumults of Aranjuez happened in the month of March, and Dupont's movement took place in May and June! Again, he says, that to make a solid conquest in the Peninsula, Napoleon should have commenced with Catalonia instead of overrunning Spain by the northern line of operations. But the progress of the seventh corps was impeded by the want of provisions not by the enemy's force. Twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but could not subsist: increasing the numbers would increase this difficulty. And in what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? While the French were thus engaged the patriots would have been organizing their armies, and England could have brought all her troops into line; two hundred thousand men placed between Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western Pyrenees while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would have shaken the solidity of St. Cyr's plan. The French emperor saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet ignorant of war and wanting the aid which England was eager to give. All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and they were fast approximating to a centre when he burst upon that country; and as the gathering of a water-spout is prevented by

the explosion of a gun, so the rising strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful assault: if the war was not then finished, it was because his lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other.

5°. St. Cyr appears to have fallen into an error prevalent among the French generals in Spain; he considered his task as a whole in itself, instead of a constituent part of a greater system. He judged well what was wanting to subjugate Catalonia, he did not see that the seventh corps should sometimes forget Catalonia to aid the general plan against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered at the moment when Napoleon, after the victories of Burgos, Espinosa, Tudela and the Somosierra, was entering Madrid as a conqueror; the battles of Cardadeu and Molino may therefore be said to have prostrated Spain, because the English army was isolated, the Spanish armies destroyed and Zaragoza invested. Was that a time to calculate the weight of powder and the number of pickaxes required for a formal siege of Taragona? The whole Peninsula was shaken, the proud heart of Spain sunk with terror, and in that great consternation to be daring was to be prudent. St. Cyr was not in a condition to besiege Taragona formally, but he might have assaulted it with less danger than he incurred by his march to Barcelona. The battle of Valls was another epoch of the same kind; the English army had then re-embarked, the rout of Ucles had taken place, Portugal was invaded, Zaragoza had fallen. That was a time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was made against Tortosa.

6°. St. Cyr justly blames Palacios and Vives for remaining before Barcelona instead of carrying their army to the Ter and the Fluvià. Yet he applauds Reding for conduct equally at variance with the true principles of war. It was his own inactivity after the battle of Molino which produced the army of Reding; and the impatient folly of that army, and of the people, produced the rout of Igualada and the battle of Valls. Instead of disseminating thirty thousand men on a line of sixty miles, Reding should have put Taragona and Tortosa into a state of defence, and leaving a small corps of observation near the former, have made Lerida the base of his opera-



tions. In that position, commanding the most fertile plain in Catalonia, he could have acted in mass on St. Cyr's flanks and rear by the lines of Cervera and Momblanch—and without danger to himself: nor could the French general have attempted aught against Taragona.

But it is not with reference to the seventh corps alone that Lerida was the proper base of the Spanish army. If the Valencians at Morella, and Infantado's force at Cuenca, had marched on Lerida, fifty thousand regular troops would have been concentrated there early in February; having the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza, Taragona, and Tortosa as covering and supporting points: the lines of operations would have been as numerous as the roads, the Seu d'Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia, would have supplied corn, and a direct communication with Valencia would have been open. From this central menacing point, such a force could have kept St. Cyr in check, and even have raised the siege of Zaragoza; nor could Victor have followed Infantado's movements without uncovering Madrid, and abandoning the system of operations against Portugal and Andalusia.

7°. St. Cyr praises Reding's project for surrounding the French, and very gravely observes, the *only method* of defeating it was by taking the offensive. Nothing can be juster. But he should have said it was a *certain method*; and until we find a great commander acting upon Reding's principles, this praise can only be taken as civility towards a brave adversary. His own movements were very different. He disliked Napoleon personally, he did not dislike his manner of making war; the celebrated campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu was not unheeded by him. For one of his proceedings, however, there is no precedent, nor is it likely it will ever be imitated; he stopped the fire of his artillery when it was doing execution, to establish the moral ascendancy of his troops! What a sarcasm on his enemies! What an answer to his complaint that Napoleon had maliciously given him a hopeless task! He could not have commanded so long without knowing *that there is in all battles a decisive moment, when every weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought to bear, is necessary to gain the victory.* Wilfully to

neglect the means of reducing the enemy's strength, previous to that critical period of an action, is a gross folly.

8°. If St. Cyr's own marches and battles did not sufficiently expose the fallacy of his opinions relative to the vigour of the Catalans, lord Collingwood's correspondence would supply the deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing at this period, says,—

‘In Catalonia, everything seems to have gone wrong since the fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears.’—‘The applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms, and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get them.’—‘In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and convoys cut off and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates, which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked the enemy with great gallantry. The somatenes range the hills in a disorderly way and fire at a distance, but retire on being approached.’—‘Multitudes of men do not make a force.’ Add the Spanish historian Cabanes' statements that the migueletes, always insubordinate, detested the service of the line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the full measure of the Catalans' resistance: it was not the Catalans, but the English, who in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege and take Taragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in safety? To lord Collingwood, who, firm as the Roman Bibulus and a far better man, perished of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,—to his keen judgment, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the Catalans was due. He it was that interdicted the coast-line to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat of the beaten armies, did that which the Spanish fleets in Cadiz and Carthagena

should have done. But the supreme junta, equally disregarding the remonstrances of Collingwood, the good of their own country, the treaty with England by which they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands of the enemy, let their fleets rot in harbour, even when money was advanced and the assistance of British seamen offered to fit them out for sea.

Having now related the principal operations in the eastern and central provinces; having shown that the Spaniards, however restless, were unable to throw off the yoke, I must turn to Portugal, where the tide of invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was first stayed and finally forced back by a counter flood of mightier strength.

---





## JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

---

No. 1.

*To the Editor of the 'Times.'*

SIR,—M. Thiers, in his 9th volume of the 'Consulate and Empire,' claims for himself the secret of the Peninsula war, having found it in certain papers to which he only has had access. That may be; but I ask if he is incapable of drawing false conclusions from secret materials to support perverse assertions? To answer with good warrant let us examine how he deals with authentic documents, not confined to his secret repertory.

Thiers.—'3,000 brisk resolute Frenchmen' opposed 15,000 English at Rorica.

Reply.—The duke of Wellington judged the French to be 6,000. Laborde, their commander, denied he had 6,000, thus tacitly admitting he had 5,000 or more.

Thiers.—The English had 400 cavalry.

Reply.—The English adjutant-general's return gives 250.

Thiers.—Laborde wounded or killed 1,200 or 1,500 English at Rorica.

Reply.—The adjutant-general's return gives 479 killed, wounded, and missing.

Thiers.—'Junot collected 9,000 some hundred men to fight at Vimiero.'

Reply.—The French order of battle found on the field gave 14,000.

Thiers.—22,000 French embarked under the Convention.

Reply.—The official French embarkation return gives nearly 26,000 men and officers.

Thiers.—'Only 26,000 men followed Junot into Portugal.'

Reply.—The Imperial muster-rolls give 29,584 effective in Portugal, 23rd of May, 1808.

Thiers.—The French army of Spain under Napoleon was 250,000 strong, of which 200,000 only were assembled there the end of October, 1808.

Reply.—The Imperial muster-rolls show, on the 25th of

October, more than 319,000 effective; on the 15th of November, more than 335,000 effective.

Thiers.—Sir John Moore's troops arrived at Salamanca, exhausted by their long march, and by privations.

Reply.—Moore's despatches say his troops were in better case than when they started from Lisbon; they suffered no privations, and their excellent condition up to Sahagun was notorious.

Thiers.—'Moore advanced to Sahagun with 29,000 English troops, and about 10,000 Spaniards.'

Reply.—The adjutant-general's return of the 19th of December gives 23,583 of all arms; Moore had no Spaniards, and Romana, who did not act in concert, had only 6,000.

M. Thiers cannot deny the authenticity of my numbers, seeing they were taken from the original Imperial muster-rolls in the French War-office; not the yellow, but the green rolls; the officers of that office will appreciate the distinction of colours.

M. Thiers cannot plead ignorance. All the documents are printed in my history, and he had access to the French originals.

So much for quantities. Let us examine him as to qualities.

Thiers.—Wellington has a 'contracted intellect;' sir John Moore was 'irresolute in council;' the English soldier is 'beaten almost to death for the least fault;' 'he is little practised to march;' 'is inanimate, feeble, when forced to move to attack;' 'he has no vivacity, no audacity, no enthusiasm, no hardihood, no enterprise;' 'to beat him he must be forced to take the initiative in attack,' &c.

Reply.—Wellington's intellect, measured by M. Thiers' imagination, must appear very contracted. Yet it is strange that with a few troops having no enterprise, no hardihood, and fearing to be beaten to death for trifling offences, he should have maintained the war for five years successfully in Spain, against enormous numbers of soldiers and officers the best and most skilful in the world, according to M. Thiers, and, finally, should carry that war into France! Strange that troops unable to march should have moved, in face of an enemy, from Lisbon to the Agueda, from the Agueda to Madrid, from the Douro to the Adour, from the Adour to the Upper Garonne. Stranger still, if to beat those troops it was only necessary to make them attack, that they should have attacked successfully at Rorica, where the French hill was five times more steep, rugged, and difficult than the English hill at Vimicro, which the French unsuccessfully attacked; that they forced the

passage of the Douro and drove Soult out of Portugal; that they attacked Massena at Redinha, at Casal Nova, at Fonte d'Aronce, at Sabugal, and drove him also out of Portugal; that they attacked and retook the key of the position at Albuera, which the Spaniards had lost; that they attacked and defeated Marmont at Salamanca—the king at Vitoria, driving him out of Spain; that in the second fight, near Pampeluna, they attacked Soult's mountain position, and drove him out of Spain; that they forced the intrenched mountain position at Vera, and his fortified mountain lines on the Nivelle, covering Bayonne; that they passed the Gave de Pau in face of the French army, and defeated that army at Orthes—that they passed the Garonne and forced the intrenched camp at Toulouse, thus terminating the war! M. Thiers is not happy in his military reveries. Brilliant phrases condemnatory of revolutions which he could neither arrest nor guide are more consonant to his genius.

Thiers.—Sir John Moore was 'irresolute in council'—'he yielded to the imperious admonitions of Mr. Frere'—'papers published by his family prove this.'

Reply.—The papers published by Moore's family prove that he repelled Mr. Frere's arrogance with calm dignity, did not follow his plans, and changed his own because fresh events called for change. His irresolution in council exists in M. Thiers' imagination,—nowhere else. Those who knew sir John Moore will laugh at such a silly assertion. M. Thiers has not been so remarkable for political resolution himself as to give him a right to censure others. In what council known to him did sir John Moore display irresolution? Those who have read that general's journals know of several held with Mr. Pitt, lord Melville, and others, wherein his ability, unhesitating vigour, and readiness to undertake what he advised, the sure sign of resolution, were signally manifested. But M. Thiers speaks afterwards of his 'prudent firmness.' Prudent firmness combined with irresolution! Indomitable resolution, both in council and in the field, was Moore's characteristic. Napoleon himself was not more decided.

One more example of unfounded censure.

'Sir John Moore said his advance served the Spanish cause by drawing Napoleon to the north, and giving the south time to rally.' This M. Thiers calls a 'presumptuous manner of presenting the affair to cover a disastrous campaign.'

The best reply to that presumptuous remark is M. Thiers' history, wherein he distinctly shows that Napoleon did turn all his forces from the south to the north in consequence of

Moore's advance to Sahagun—an advance which that general had previously declared he would make to produce such a result.

Verily, M. Thiers must amend his manner of treating known accessible facts, if he would have his authority accepted for the unknown and inaccessible.

WILLIAM NAPIER, major-general.

No. 2.

*Paris, le 26 Fevrier, 1850.*

MONSIEUR,—Je vous remercie de la communication que vous avez bien voulu me faire. Il est impossible d'écrire l'histoire sans rencontrer des critiques, mais l'opinion que tous les hommes bien informés au sujet de la guerre de la Peninsule ont depuis longtemps conçue de l'ouvrage du major-général Napier me permet de ne pas m'arrêter aux attaques qu'il dirige contre mon livre dans le *Times* du 11 de ce mois. Partout où j'ai eu à indiquer un nombre de troupes, j'ai toujours consulté avant de me prononcer la correspondance des gouvernements et celle des généraux placés à la tête de ces troupes; c'est à l'aide de ces documents contradictoires que j'ai établi les nombres que j'ai donnés. M. Napier n'a eu pour écrire son histoire aucun document Français officiel, et ce n'est qu'à des officiers du maréchal Soult qu'il a dû peut-être quelques communications sans caractère authentique.

Quant aux jugements que j'ai émis sur le duc de Wellington et sur l'armée Anglaise, ils sont exprimés dans des termes qui marquent toute mon estime et pour les troupes Anglaises et pour le grand homme de guerre qui les a commandés dans la Peninsule. Je me suis prescrit la loi d'être toujours impartial et juste; aussi de tous les écrivains de l'Europe je crois être celui qui a parlé des armées étrangères et de leurs capitaines avec la plus grande impartialité, et qui leur a rendu le plus largement justice. Je n'ai donc rien à retirer ni des chiffres qui se trouvent dans le neuvième volume de mon 'Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire,' ni des appréciations aux quelles je me suis livré à l'égard des généraux et de leurs troupes; je tiendrais en conscience mon temps pour mal employé si je consacrais une partie à refuter les assertions de certains critiques ignorants ou intéressés.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée,

A. THIERS.

A Monsieur W. Jeffs, à Londres.



## No. 3.

*To the Editor of the 'Times.'*

SIR,—Previous to noticing M. Thiers' observations which Mr. Jeffs (his bookseller) has published in your journal of this day, I offer the following consolation to the last-named gentleman:—A person wishing to purchase M. Thiers' ninth volume was told that my criticism in *The Times* had caused every copy to be sold off; there was not one remaining! I heartily wish it had done as much for my own work. My conscience not being burdened, therefore, with sin or sorrow on account of Mr. Jeffs, I can with greater ease of mind meet M. Thiers, whose work, sparkling with paste brilliants, wants that real jewel—truth. My present reply need not, however, be long or laboured. M. Thiers has himself confirmed my judgment of his infidelity to facts, and his unsound peremptory assertions.

What does the analysis of his letter to Mr. Jeffs present in answer to the long list of errors I charged him with?

1. That he has always consulted for his numbers the government correspondence and that of the generals commanding the armies.

2. That I had no official French document to guide me, but had *perhaps* some communications non-authentic from some of marshal Soult's officers.

3. That his judgments on the duke of Wellington and the British troops were expressed in terms marking his esteem for both.

It is, then, a mark of esteem for a general and his troops to deny to the first an enlarged capacity, and to the last nearly all the essential qualities of soldiers! Perhaps it is a proof also of his esteem for French generals and soldiers to tell them by implication, as M. Thiers has certainly done, that they were overcome not once and accidentally, but during a series of years by a military chief of a contracted mind, and an army incapable of doing anything better than standing still to be shot; for to that conclusion M. Thiers' history inevitably leads.

But I, an English historian, having seen what French generals and soldiers can do in the field, tell M. Thiers, the French historian, who has not, I believe, ever served, that his country's generals and soldiers are most formidable men to deal with in the field; and that the general and soldiers who face them must be fitted to encounter all that genius and the sternest hardihood can effect in war.

M. Thiers speaks of French government's and French gene-

rals' correspondence, as conclusive in support of his statement of numbers. They could not be conclusive as to the English numbers, which he has misrepresented as much as he has the French numbers. The question is, however, not what M. Thiers consulted, but what he has published. And there I am forced again to say that he must amend his treatment of known accessible facts, if he would have his authority accepted for the unknown and inaccessible.

He says I had no official documents, meaning of course, the correspondence he has consulted, to guide me—nay, that I had only some unauthentic communications from some of marshal Soult's officers. But if I show him that I also have seen most of his government's and generals' correspondence; and that my communications were with marshal Soult direct—not with his officers—he will perhaps allow some weight to my authority. Any person looking at my history will find all my obligations to French generals and officers acknowledged. But my business here is to show how M. Thiers, while thinking to dispose of me as lightly as he does of facts, entirely confirms my judgment of his reckless dogmatism, when he says I had no authentic official French documents.

1. I had direct communications from marshal Soult, who, when minister of war, sent me, through general Pelet, with whom I also had personal communication, an immense mass of official correspondence upon most of the great operations in the Peninsula.

2. I had the correspondence of king Joseph with the French marshals and generals, and with the emperor, during the greatest part of the war. This correspondence, ciphered and deciphered, was captured at Vitoria, and was lent to me by the duke of Wellington.

3. I had a direct correspondence with marshal Jourdan.

4. I had personal acquaintance with, and received information from, officers high on the staff of marshal Ney and marshal Massena; and I had copies of the official journals of military operations kept by the chief of marshal Victor's staff, and general Dupont's staff, and several others, as may be seen in my history.

From all these authentic documents I also was enabled to establish the numbers I have given. I was also enabled to compare them with the information obtained in the field by the duke of Wellington. But I did not rely, as M. Thiers seems to have done, upon an estimate obtained from a comparison of *contradictory documents*—‘*documens contradictoires*’—these are his words. I went directly to the fountain-head; I got

admission to the French '*bureau de la guerre*.' I worked there for many weeks with general Pelet, who was then engaged in seeking authority for his really sound and truly excellent history of the emperor's German campaign of 1809—a work I recommend to M. Thiers as having no false brilliants, but yet of inestimable worth. Well, then, from the emperor Napoleon's muster-rolls, made every fifteen days by marshal Berthier—not those bound in yellow, as I have before said, but those bound in green for his peculiar information—I extracted most carefully the numbers of the French armies throughout the war, and I have published them in my history.

Comparing them with the duke of Wellington's field estimates, and with statements of the generals commanding corps found in Joseph's portfolios, and with the official journals of operations, and with the emperor's plans of operations, transmitted to the king, in which he details the numbers even to a squad of a few men—for I found a correction even of such a small matter in his own hand-writing on one of these memoirs;—comparing, I say, all documents together, I found the accuracy of the muster-rolls confirmed, as indeed they were sure to be, for what general dared to make a false return of numbers to the emperor?

If, then, the correspondence of Napoleon, of Wellington, of Soult, Jourdan, and king Joseph, be official authentic French documents, I was in as good a position as M. Thiers to arrive at accuracy; and I repeat my censures upon his inaccuracy, leaving the world to judge.

M. Thiers says his time would be ill employed if he devoted a part of it to refute the assertions of ignorant or interested critics. I entirely agree with him; it would be much better to employ it in writing his own history in a manner to avoid the just censures of honest and well-informed critics.

W. NAPIER, major-general.

*March 27th, 1850.*

OBSERVATIONS ON SOME PASSAGES IN  
CHAPTERS II. & IV.

---

WITH respect to the tumult of the 2nd of May, 1808, I drew my information from officers, some French, some Italian, who were present. On the veracity of my informants I had the firmest reliance, their accounts agreed well, and the principal facts were confirmed by the result of my personal inquiries at Madrid in the year 1812. But since the first edition of this work the following notes from general Harispe have been sent to me, and I insert them in justice to the colonel of the Imperial Guard. At the same time I have to remark that my statement in respect to the latter was made upon the authority of an officer of Murat's staff.

*Bayonne, May 22, 1831.*

Au Colonel (Anglais) George Napier.

‘MONSIEUR,—J’ai lu avec un véritable intérêt les passages de l’ouvrage de monsieur votre frère, que vous m’aviez prié d’examiner. Je vous remercie de cette communication. J’ai porté en marge les rectifications nécessaires pour rétablir la vérité.—Recevez, monsieur, &c. &c.

‘Le Lieut.-Général, Comte HARISPE.’

*Marginal Notes by General Harispe.*

Chap. II., page 15. Aucun des quartiers de troupes Françaises à Madrid ne fut attaqué, mais 350 à 400 hommes environ, qui se trouvaient isolés ou occupés à des distributions de pain, furent assassinés.

Page 15. Le colonel de la Garde Impériale ne fit mettre à mort personne.

Chap. VI., page 58. Le bataillon Suisse ne fût pas pris au pont de Pajaso, mais bien le lendemain de l’attaque de los Cabrillas.\*

Page 59. L’attaque de la ville (Valencia) se termina à la nuit, sans que les Espagnols eussent fait aucune sortie.

---

\* This error has been corrected.



## APPENDIX.

---

[The following five Notes, dictated by the emperor Napoleon, and signed by general Bertrand, were found in king Joseph's portfolio, at the battle of Vitoria.]

### No. I.

#### OBSERVATIONS ADDRESSÉES AU GÉNÉRAL SAVARY SUR LES AFFAIRES D'ESPAGNE.

*Le 13 Juillet, 1808.*

*1<sup>re</sup> Observation.*—LES affaires des Français en Espagne seroient dans une excellente position si la division Gobert avait marché sur Valladolid, et si la division Frère eut occupé San Clemente, ayant une colonne mobile à trois ou quatre journées sur la route du général Dupont.

Le g<sup>al</sup> Gobert ayant été dirigé sur le général Dupont, le g<sup>al</sup> Frère étant avec le maréchal Moncey, harassé et affaibli par des marches et des contremarches, la position de l'armée Française est devenue moins belle.

*2<sup>e</sup> Observation.*—Le maréchal Bessièrès est aujourd'hui à Medina del Rio Secco avec 15 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie. Le 15 ou le 16, il attaquera Bénavente, se mettra en communication avec le Portugal, jettera les rebelles en Galice, et s'emparera de Léon. Si toutes les opérations réussissent ainsi, et d'une manière brillante, la position de l'armée Française redviendra ce qu'elle était.

Si le général Cuesta se retire de Bénavente sans combattre, il se retirait sur Zamora, Salamanque, pour venir gagner Avila et Segovia, certain qu'alors le maréchal Bessièrès ne pourrait point le poursuivre, puisque, dans cette supposition, il serait menacé par l'armée de Galice, dont l'avant garde est réunie à Léon.

Alors il faut que le général qui commande à Madrid puisse promptement réunir 6 à 7000 hommes pour marcher sur le général Cuesta. Il faut que la citadelle de Ségovie soit occupée par quelques pièces de canon, trois à 400 convalescens avec six semaines de biscuit.

C'est une grande faute de n'avoir pas occupé cette citadelle quand le major-général l'a mandé. De toutes les positions possibles, Ségovie est la plus dangereuse pour l'armée : capitale d'une province, assise entre les deux routes, elle ôterait à l'armée toutes ses communications, et l'ennemi une fois posté dans cette citadelle, l'armée Française ne pourrait plus l'en déloger. Trois ou 400 convalescens et un bon chef de bataillon, une escouade d'artillerie,

rendront le château de Ségovie imprennable pendant bien de temps, et assureront à l'armée l'importante position de Ségovie.

Si le général Cuesta se jette en Galice, sans combattre, sans éprouver de défaite, la position de l'armée devient toujours meilleure; à plus forte raison, s'il est jetté en Galice après avoir éprouvé une forte défaite.

3<sup>e</sup> Observation.—Si le maréchal Bessières, arrivé devant Bénavente, reste en présence sans attaquer le g<sup>a</sup> Cuesta, ou s'il est repoussé, son but sera toujours de couvrir Burgos, en tenant le plus possible l'ennemi en échec; il peut être renforcé de 3000 hommes de troupes de ligne, qui accompagnent le roi, mais alors il n'y a point à hésiter. Si le maréchal Bessières a fait une marche rétrograde sans bataille, il faut sur le champ lui envoyer 6000 hommes de renforts. S'il a fait son mouvement après une bataille, où il ait éprouvé de grandes pertes, il faudra faire de grandes dispositions: rappeler à marches forcées sur Madrid le g<sup>a</sup> Frère, le g<sup>a</sup> Caulaincourt, le g<sup>a</sup> Gobert, le g<sup>a</sup> Vedel, et laisser le g<sup>a</sup> Dupont sur les montagnes de la Sierra Morena, ou le rapprocher même de Madrid, en le tenant toujours, cependant, à sept ou huit marches, afin de pouvoir écraser le g<sup>a</sup> Cuesta et toute l'armée de Galice pendant que le g<sup>a</sup> Dupont servira d'avant-garde pour tenir l'armée d'Andalousie en échec.

4<sup>e</sup> Observation.—Si le général Dupont éprouvait un échec, cela serait de peu de conséquence. Il n'aurait d'autre résultat que de lui faire repasser les montagnes; mais le coup qui serait porté au maréchal Bessières serait un coup porté au cœur de l'armée, qui donnerait le *tetanos*, et qui se ferait sentir à tous les points extrêmes de l'armée. Voilà pourquoi il est très malheureux que toutes les dispositions ordonnées n'aient pas été suivies. L'armée du maréchal Bessières devrait se trouver avoir au moins huit mille hommes de plus, afin qu'il n'y eut aucune espèce de chance contre l'armée du maréchal Bessières.

La vraie manière de renforcer le général Dupont, ce n'est pas de lui envoyer des troupes, mais c'est d'envoyer des troupes au maréchal Bessières. Le général Dupont et le général Vedel sont suffisants pour se maintenir dans les positions qu'ils ont retranchées; et si le maréchal Bessières avait été renforcé, et l'armée de Galice écrasée, le général Dupont immédiatement après se trouverait dans la meilleure position, non seulement par des forces qu'on pourrait alors lui envoyer, mais encore par la situation morale des affaires. Il n'y a pas un habitant de Madrid, pas un paysan des vallées qui ne sente que toutes les affaires d'Espagne aujourd'hui sont dans l'affaire du maréchal Bessières. Combien n'est-il pas malheureux que dans cette grande affaire on se soit donné volontairement 20 chances contre soi.

5<sup>e</sup> Observation.—L'affaire de Valence n'a jamais été d'aucune considération. Le maréchal Moncey seul était suffisant. C'était une folie que de songer à le secourir. Si le m<sup>a</sup> Moncey ne pouvait pas prendre Valence, 20 mille hommes de plus ne le lui auraient pas fait prendre, parcequ'alors c'était une affaire d'artillerie, et non une affaire d'hommes: car on ne prend pas d'un coup de collier une ville de 80 ou 100 mille âmes, qui a barricadé ses rues, mis

de l'artillerie à toutes les portes et dans toutes les maisons. Or, dans cette hypothèse, le m<sup>ai</sup> Moncey était suffisant pour former une colonne mobile, faire face à l'armée de Valence, et faire sentir dans toute leur force les horreurs de la guerre.

Le g<sup>ai</sup> Frère ne pouvait donc rien pour faire prendre Valence, et le g<sup>ai</sup> Frère pouvait beaucoup posté à San Clemente, soit qu'il dût revenir à Madrid, soit qu'il dût prendre une position intermédiaire pour secourir le g<sup>ai</sup> Dupont.

C'était une autre erreur que de songer à faire aller le m<sup>ai</sup> Moncey à Valence pour ensuite le faire marcher en Murcie et sur Grenade. C'était vouloir fondre ce corps d'armée en détail et sans fruit. Comme le dit fort bien le général Dupont, il valait mieux lui envoyer directement un régiment que de lui envoyer trois dans cette direction là.

Dans les guerres civiles ce sont les points importans qu'il faut garder: il ne faut pas aller partout. Si cependant on a dirigé le m<sup>ai</sup> Moncey sur Valence, c'était à une époque où la situation des affaires n'était pas la même; c'était lorsque l'armée de Valence pouvait envoyer en Catalogne ou à Saragosse comme elle en menaçait.

6<sup>e</sup> Observation.—Le but de tous les efforts de l'armée doit être de conserver Madrid. C'est là qu'est tout. Madrid ne peut être menacé que par l'armée de Galice. Elle peut l'être aussi par l'armée de l'Andalousie, mais d'une manière beaucoup moins dangereuse, parcequ'elle est simple et directe, et que par toutes les marches que fait le g<sup>ai</sup> Dupont sur ses derrières, il se renforce. Les généraux Dupont et Vedel étaient suffisans, ayant plus de 20,000 hommes: le m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès ne l'est pas proportionnellement, vû que sa position est plus dangereuse. Un échec que recevrait le g<sup>ai</sup> Dupont serait peu de chose; un échec que recevrait le m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès serait plus considérable et se ferait sentir à l'extrémité de la ligne.

Résumé.—Faire reposer et rapprocher de Madrid le g<sup>ai</sup> Frère, le g<sup>ai</sup> Caulaincourt, le g<sup>ai</sup> Gobert, afin qu'ils puissent arriver à Madrid avant le g<sup>ai</sup> Cuesta, si celui-ci battait le m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès. Immédiatement après l'événement qui aura lieu le 15 ou le 16, prendre une part selon les événemens qui auront eu lieu, et dans le but d'écraser l'armée ennemie en Galice.

Si le maréchal Bessièrès a eu grand succès, sans éprouver de grandes pertes, tout sera bien dans la direction actuelle. S'il a un succès après avoir éprouvé beaucoup de pertes, il faut se mettre en mesure de le renforcer. S'il se tient en observation sans attaquer, il faut le renforcer. S'il a été défait et bien battu, il faut se concentrer et rassembler toutes ses troupes dans le cercle le sept ou huit journées de Madrid, et étudier les dispositions dans les différentes directions pour savoir où placer les avant-gardes, afin de profiter de l'avantage qu'on a d'être au milieu, pour écraser successivement avec toutes ses forces les divers corps de l'ennemi. Si on n'ordonne pas sur le champ au g<sup>ai</sup> Dupont de repasser les montagnes, c'est qu'on espère que malgré la faute faite, le m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès a la confiance (qu'on partage) qu'à la rigueur il est suffisant pour écraser l'ennemi. Le m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès a eu le bon esprit de tellement réunir toutes ses forces, qu'il n'a pas même

laissé un seul homme à St. Ander. Quelqu'avantage qu'il y eût à laisser là un millier d'hommes, il a senti qu'un millier d'hommes pouvait décider sa victoire.

Quant à la division du g<sup>al</sup> Verdier devant Saragosse, elle a rempli aux trois quarts son but. Elle a désorganisé tous les Arragoniens, a porté le découragement parmi eux, les a réduits à défendre les maisons de leur capitale, a soumis tous les environs, a bloqué la ville, et réuni tous les moyens pour s'en emparer sans que cela devienne trop coûteux.

Voilà l'esprit de la guerre d'Espagne.

[Dictated by the emperor Napoleon.]

## No. II.

### NOTE POUR LE ROI D'ESPAGNE.

*Bayonne, Juillet, 1808.*

L'armée d'Espagne a son quartier-général à Madrid; voici sa composition actuelle:

#### 1<sup>o</sup>. *Corps des Pyrénées Occidentales.*

Le maréchal Bessièrès commande le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales, qui est fort de 23 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie, occupe la place de St. Sébastien, les troys Biscayes, les montagnes de St. Ander, la place de Burgos, et est chargée de combattre l'armée ennemie des Asturies et de Galice.

Toutes les troupes sont en mouvement pour composer l'armée de la manière suivante.

Division du g <sup>al</sup> Mouton	1 <sup>re</sup> brigade le g <sup>al</sup> Reynaud.	{ le 4 reg <sup>t</sup> d'infanterie légère 15 <sup>e</sup> d'infanterie de ligne 1 <sup>er</sup> bat <sup>on</sup> de Paris en marche	total 3000 hom. présens sous les armes, et 6 pièces de canon, ci 3000 h <sup>es</sup> (Cette brigade marche sur Bénévente.) 2 <sup>e</sup> brigade, { 2 <sup>e</sup> reg <sup>t</sup> d'infanterie légère le g <sup>al</sup> Rey. { 12 <sup>e</sup> idem total 2100 hommes et 6 pièces de canon, ci . . . . . 2100 (Cette brigade est à Burgos avec le roi, et doit joindre sa division.)	5100 h <sup>es</sup>
Division du g <sup>al</sup> Merle.	{ Brigade d'Armagnac . . . . . 1800 Brigade Gaulois . . . . . 1800 Brigade Sabathier . . . . . 2800 Brigade Ducos . . . . . 2000	{	Total . 8400 et 16 pièces de canon.	8400 h <sup>es</sup>
A reporter				13,500 h <sup>es</sup>



	De l'autre part . . .	13,500 h <sup>es</sup>
Garde.	{ Infanterie . . .	1900 h <sup>es</sup>
	{ et 6 pièces de canon.	

(Toutes ces troupes marchent sur Bénévente.)

	{ 10 <sup>e</sup> de chasseurs . . . . .	450	
	{ 22 <sup>e</sup> id. . . . .	450	
	{ Garde . . . . .	300	
	{ (Ces troupes marchent sur		
	{ Bénévente.)		
Cavalerie.	{ Escadrons de dragons . . .	200	
	{ (Ces escadrons sont en marche		
	{ et ont dépassé la frontière.)		
	{ 26 <sup>e</sup> de chasseurs . . . . .	450	
	{ (Arrivant à Bayonne sous		
	{ peu de jours.)	—	
	{ Total de la cavalerie . . .	1950 h <sup>es</sup>	1950 h <sup>es</sup>

Les forces actives du maréchal Bessièrès sont donc de 17,000 h<sup>es</sup>. Il n'en a guères que 15,000 pour l'affaire de Bénévente.

S'il obtenait à Bénévente et à Léon un grand succès contre l'armée de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la victoire et de la terreur des premiers momens de se jeter dans la Galice. Toutefois, il devrait d'abord prendre position à Léon, en s'emparant de la plaine, jettant l'ennemi dans les montagnes, et interceptant au moins à Astorga la communication de la grande route.

Garnison de Burgos.—Il y a dans le château de Burgos une garnison de dépôt\* . . . . .

600 h<sup>es</sup>

Colonne du général Bonnet.—Il y a encore à Burgos le g<sup>al</sup> de division Bonnet, faisant partie du corps du m<sup>al</sup> Bessièrès: ce g<sup>al</sup> va avoir sous ses ordres une colonne mobile de 1200 hommes, pour maintenir la tranquillité dans la ville et ses environs. Cette colonne est composée comme il suit:

4 <sup>e</sup> bataillon du 118 <sup>e</sup> formant . . . . .	450 h <sup>es</sup>	
(Actuellement existant à Burgos.)		
3 <sup>e</sup> bataillon du dépôt g <sup>al</sup> actuellement à		
Vitoria . . . . .	450	
2 comp <sup>ies</sup> du 4 <sup>e</sup> d'infanterie légère, formant		
un petit bataillon . . . . .	400	
(En marche, ayant passé la frontière.)	—	
	1300 h <sup>es</sup>	
Escadron de dragons (en marche) . . . . .	200	
2 pièces de canon en marche	—	
	1500 h <sup>es</sup>	
A reporter . . . . .	19,450 h <sup>es</sup>	

\* Note.—These two words are added in Napoleon's own handwriting.

	De l'autre part . . .	19,450 h <sup>es</sup>
<i>Colonne d'Aranda.</i> —Cette colonne, formée du 1 <sup>er</sup>		
bataillon de marche, fort de 1000 h <sup>es</sup> et de 4		
pièces de canon, peut se réunir au besoin avec la		
colonne du g <sup>al</sup> Bonnet: elles doivent assurer la		
communication jusqu'aux montagnes en avant		
d'Aranda, ci . . . . .		1000 h <sup>es</sup>
<i>Colonne de Vitoria.</i> —Le général de brigade Monthion,		
et le colonel Barerre, occupent Vitoria avec une		
colonne composée comme il suit:		
2 compagnies du 15 <sup>e</sup> de ligne, formant un petit		
bataillon de . . . . .	300 h <sup>es</sup>	
Le 2 <sup>e</sup> bat <sup>on</sup> du 12 <sup>e</sup> d'infanterie légère . . .	600	
Le 2 <sup>e</sup> bat <sup>on</sup> du 2 <sup>e</sup> id. . . . .	600	
(Ce qui fait en infanterie) . . . . .		1500 h <sup>es</sup>
1 escadron de dragons (en marche) . . .	200	
2 pièces de canon.		
(Tous ces corps sont en marche)	1700 ci	1700 h <sup>es</sup>
<i>Garnison de St. Sébastien.</i> —Le général Thouvenot		
commande à St. Sébastien avec mille hommes de		
garnison, ci . . . . .		1000 h <sup>es</sup>
<i>Récapitulation.</i> —Le corps du m <sup>al</sup> Bessièrès est de		23,150 h <sup>es</sup>
Et 36 pièces de canon.		
Les détachemens et troisièmes bataillons des corps qui sont		
aux divisions actives du m <sup>al</sup> Bessièrès pourront sous 15 jours le		
rejoindre, vû qu'ils seront remplacés à Vitoria et à Burgos par		
d'autres corps.		
2°. Arragon.		
Jusqu'à cette heure les troupes qui sont en Arragon faisaient		
partie du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales. Mais le corps des		
Pyrénées Occidentales se portant sur la Galice, il devient indis-		
pensable d'en faire une division à part.		
Aujourd'hui, ce commandement comprend Pampelune, la Na-		
varre, et les troupes qui forment le siège de Saragosse, sous les		
ordres du général Verdier.		
Ces troupes sont divisées en quatre brigades, et sont composées		
ainsi qu'il suit:		
3 régimens d'infanterie de ligne de la Vistule, ayant		
sous les armes . . . . .	3600 h <sup>es</sup>	
Les 4 <sup>e</sup> , 6 <sup>e</sup> et 7 <sup>e</sup> bataillons de marche . . . . .	1500	
Le 3 <sup>e</sup> bataillon du 14 <sup>e</sup> provisoire . . . . .	1300	
Le 1 <sup>er</sup> regiment supplémentaire . . . . .	900	
Les 47 <sup>e</sup> , 15 <sup>e</sup> et 70 <sup>e</sup> . . . . .	1600	
Un bataillon des gardes nationales d'élite . . .	600	
Total . . .		9500 h <sup>es</sup>
A reporter . . .		9500 h <sup>es</sup>

De l'autre part . . . 9500 h<sup>es</sup>

De l'autre part : . . . 9500

La cavalerie consiste dans un régiment de  
lanciers Polonais . . . . . 700 }  
Plus un escadron de marche . . . . . 400 } 1100

*A Pampelune* le g<sup>al</sup> Dagout commande. Indépen-  
damment d'un dépôt de 800 hommes, formant (ci 800  
la garnison de la citadelle; il a une colonne  
mobile composée du 1<sup>er</sup> bataillon de marche du  
Portugal, du troisième bataillon du 118<sup>e</sup>, fort de  
650 hommes, et d'un escadron de dragons, ce qui  
forme un total de 1400 hommes disponibles pour  
se porter sur tous les points de la Navarre, et sur  
les communications de Saragosse, pour y mettre  
l'ordre: ci . . . . . 1400

Artillerie . . . . . 200

Il y a donc encernement en Arragon et en Navarre 13,000 h<sup>es</sup>

Aussitôt que Saragosse sera pris, et que le corps de l'Arragon sera constitué, il sera nécessaire de faire entrer au corps du mar<sup>al</sup> Bessièrès le bataillon du 47<sup>e</sup>, celui du 15<sup>e</sup>, et les trois bataillons de 14<sup>e</sup> provisoire; ce qui augmentera le m<sup>al</sup> Bessièrès de deux mille hommes, afin de tenir les corps réunis. Il est possible qu'on fasse partir de Bayonne les 19,300 hommes de bonnes troupes de ligne, pour se diriger sur Saragosse et enlever la prise de cette place, si toutefois elle n'est pas encore prise.

Si Saragosse était pris, le corps du m<sup>al</sup> Bessièrès pourrait être renforcé de ces trois mille hommes d'élite et de 2000 hommes du corps de Saragosse, ce qui lui ferait un corps nombreux pour la campagne de Galice.

Indépendamment de Saragosse, les rebelles occupent la ville de Jaca et plusieurs ponts dans les vallées. A tous les débouchés des vallées en France il y a un général de brigade avec une colonne mobile. On attendra la prise de Saragosse pour entrer dans ces vallées et y marcher dans les deux sens. En général l'esprit des vallées est bon; mais des troupes de contrebandiers que les chefs des rebelles ont enrégimentés les vexent.

### 3°. Catalogne.

Le général Duhesme occupe Barcelone, qui est une place qui a deux très belles forteresses, qui la dominent. C'est la plus grande ville de la monarchie.

Le général Duhesme a deux divisions, la division Chabran et la division Lechi, formant 11,000 h<sup>es</sup> d'infanterie, 1600 h<sup>es</sup> de cavalerie et 18 pièces de canon.

Le général Duhesme a eu plusieurs événemens; il a brûlé un grand nombre de villages, et maintenu en respect le pays à 15 lieues à la ronde.

La ville de Gérone, n'ayant pas été occupée, les insurgés de la Catalogne ont établis là leur Junté, d'où ils donnent le mouvement au reste de la province. 2000 insurgés assiégeaient le fort de Figueras. On y avait heureusement laissé 300 Français: ils

ont été obligés de tirer beaucoup de coups de canon et de brûler le village.

Le <sup>g</sup><sup>a</sup> de division Reille, avec deux bataillons Toscans, a marché sur Figuéras, l'a débloqué, le 6 du mois, et y a fait entrer une grande quantité de vivres, dont on manquait. Le 10, il réunissait sa division, qui arrivait de divers points de la France; il avait déjà 6000 hommes, et il doit avoir aujourd'hui 9000 h<sup>es</sup>; il doit s'assurer de Rosas et marcher sur Gérone, établir ses communications avec le général Duhesme et ensemble pacifier la Catalogne.

Les forces réunies des généraux Duhesme et

Reille s'élèvent donc à 22,000 h<sup>es</sup>.

Ainsi le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales est

fort de . . . . .	23,000
Celui d'Arragon, de . . . . .	13,000
Celui de Catalogne, de . . . . .	22,000

---

Total . 58,000 h<sup>es</sup>

---

Nous venons de faire connaître la situation de l'armée dans les provinces de la Biscaye, de St. Ander, de la Castille, de la Navarre, de l'Arragon, et de la Catalogne; c'est à dire, sur toute la frontière de France.

Voici actuellement la situation dans les autres points:

Les deux corps qui se sont rendus à Madrid sous les ordres du général Dupont et du m<sup>a</sup> Moncey portaient, et portent encore; le premier, le nom de corps d'observation de la Gironde commandé par le <sup>g</sup><sup>a</sup> Dupont; le second, le nom de corps d'observation des Côtés de l'Océan, commandé par le m<sup>a</sup> Moncey.

*Le corps d'observation de la Gironde* est composé de trois divisions: deux sont en Andalousie avec le général Dupont; la 3<sup>eme</sup>, celle du général Frère, doit être à présent, à San Clemente.

*Le corps d'observation des Côtés de l'Océan* est composé également de trois divisions. La première est avec le maréchal Moncey, sous Valence: les deux autres sont à Madrid, et disséminés en différentes colonnes, pour maintenir la communication avec le général Dupont. Les états de situation vous feront connaître la force de ces divisions: mais on peut en général les considérer les unes dans les autres comme fortes de 6000 hommes présents sous les armes.

Il y a à Madrid deux bataillons de la garde, formant 1000 hommes, et à-peu-près 900 hommes de cavalerie de la garde.

Ainsi il y a à Madrid, et du côté de Valence et de l'Andalousie, la valeur de 40,000 hommes d'infanterie, huit mille hommes de cavalerie et 80 pièces de canon attelées.

*Le général Junot* a en Portugal trois divisions, formant présents sous les armes, compris son artillerie, sa cavalerie, 23 mille hommes.\*

---

\* *Note by the Author.*—This calculation was made under the supposition that general Avril had joined Dupont.



Telle est la situation de l'armée en Espagne et en Portugal.

1<sup>re</sup> *Observation*.—Les événemens qui se passent aujourd'hui et demain amélioreront beaucoup la situation de toutes les affaires, en jettant dans la Galice le général Cuesta, en lui ôtant ses communications avec l'Estremadure, Madrid et l'Andalousie, en assurant notre communication avec le Portugal, et en assurant la soumission des provinces de Salamanque, Zamora, Toro, &<sup>3</sup>.

La manière dont ces événemens auront lieu décideront à entrer sur le champ en Galice, à soumettre les Asturies, ou à différer encore quelques jours.

2<sup>e</sup> *Observation*.—La Navarre et la Biscaye se sont maintenues tranquilles.

En Arragon le plat pays a été soumis, les rebelles ont été battus plusieurs fois; avec deux seuls bataillons, 8 à 10 mille insurgés ont été détruits ou dispersés; le découragement est au dernier point parmi eux. Ils se sont défendus dans leurs maisons à Saragosse; on les a bombardé; on leur a fait beaucoup de mal; on achève aujourd'hui de bloquer la ville en jettant un pont sur l'Ebre. Une fois cette ville soumise, il n'y a pas de doute que tout l'Arragon ne devienne tranquille. Une partie des troupes sera cependant nécessaire pour maintenir la province; une petite partie pourra aider à la soumission de la Catalogne. La partie qui est nécessaire pour le bien du service du maréchal Bessièrès ira le rejoindre. Ainsi cet événement équivaldra à un secours considérable.

3<sup>me</sup> *Observation*.—La première opération du général Reille a débloqué Figuéras: il soumet à présent tous les environs. Il ne tardera pas sans doute à s'emparer de Gérone et à établir sa communication par terre avec le général Duhesme. La réduction de Gérone entamera probablement celle de Lerida; on pourra avoir alors une colonne de deux ou trois mille hommes, qu'on dirigera par Tortose sur Valence.

4<sup>me</sup> *Observation*.—On n'a point de nouvelles de l'expédition de Valence, et le maréchal Moncey a huit mille hommes. Avec ces forces il n'a rien à craindre. Il ne peut pas prendre la ville, qui est très grande, si les paysans s'y sont renfermés et ne craignent point de la ruiner: mais le m<sup>ai</sup> Moncey se maintiendra dans le plat pays, occupera les révoltés, qu'il empêchera de se porter ailleurs, et fera porter au pays tout le poids de la guerre.

5<sup>e</sup> *Observation*.—On compte que le général Dupont a aujourd'hui près de 20,000 hommes. Si les opérations du maréchal Bessièrès réussissent bien, il n'y aura pas d'inconvénient à appuyer encore le général Dupont et à lui permettre de reprendre l'offensive. Ainsi les deux points importants, et où on fera une véritable guerre réglée, sont la Galice et l'Andalousie, parceque les troupes du camp de St. Roche, de Cadiz, des Algarves, sont près de 25 mille hommes, qu'elles ont pris parti pour la sédition de Seville en Andalousie, et que tout ce qui était à Porto a pris parti pour les rebelles de Galice.

Le point le plus important de tous est celui du m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès, comme on l'a déjà vu dans la note qu'on a envoyé. On doit tout

faire pour que ce corps n'éprouve aucun mouvement rétrograde, aucun échec; celui du général Dupont vient après.

Les affaires de Saragosse sont au 3<sup>e</sup> ordre; celles de Valence ne sont qu'au 4<sup>me</sup>.

Voilà la véritable situation des affaires militaires du royaume.

Il paraît convenable de former dans l'Arragon une division de 10 à 12 mille hommes que pourra commander le g<sup>al</sup> Verdier. Il devra correspondre directement avec l'état major du roi, avec le m<sup>ai</sup> Bessièrès (pour s'entendre), avec le g<sup>al</sup> Duhesme pour se concerter, et avec le général de la 11<sup>e</sup> division militaire, qui se tiendra à Bayonne, afin de connaître toujours la situation de cette frontière. Son commandement doit embrasser la Navarre et tout l'Arragon.

Alors l'armée sera composée du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales, de la division de l'Arragon (il est inutile d'en faire un corps), du corps de la Catalogne composé de trois divisions, y compris celle du général Rcille, et des six divisions que forment les corps d'observation de la Gironde et des Côtés de l'Océan.

Cela fera à-peu-près 12 divisions réunies, et en outre un certain nombre de petites colonnes mobiles et de garnisons.

[Dictated by the emperor Napoleon.]

### No. III.

#### NOTE SUR LA POSITION ACTUELLE DE L'ARMÉE EN ESPAGNE.

*Bayonne, ce 21 Juillet, 1808.*

1<sup>re</sup> Observation.—La bataille de Medina del Rio Seco a mis les affaires de l'armée dans la meilleure situation. Le maréchal Bessièrès ne donne plus aucune inquiétude, et toutes les sollicitudes doivent se tourner du côté du général Dupont.

2<sup>de</sup> Observation.—Dans la position actuelle des affaires, l'armée Française occupe le centre; l'ennemi, un grand nombre de points de la circonférence.

3<sup>me</sup> Observation.—Dans une guerre de cette nature, il faut du sang froid, de la patience, et du calcul, et il ne faut pas épuiser les troupes en fausses marches et contremarches; il ne faut pas croire, quand on a fait une fausse marche de trois à quatre jours, qu'on l'ait réparée par une contremarche: c'est ordinairement deux fautes au lieu d'une.

4<sup>me</sup> Observation.—Toutes les opérations de l'armée ont réussies jusqu'à cette heure, autant qu'elles devaient réussir. Le général Dupont s'est maintenu au-delà des montagnes, et dans le bassin de l'Andalousie; trois fois il a défait les insurgés. Le maréchal Moncey a défait les insurgés à Valence; il n'a pas pu prendre la ville, ce qui est une chose qui n'est pas extraordinaire. Peut-être eût-on pu désirer qu'il eût pu se camper à une journée de la ville, comme a fait le général Dupont; mais, enfin, qu'il soit à une

journée ou à cinq, comme à Saint Clément, la différence n'est pas très grande. En Arragon, on a battu sur tous les points, et dans toutes les circonstances, l'ennemi, et porté le découragement partout. Saragosse n'a pas été pris; il est aujourd'hui cerné; et une ville de 40 à 50 mille âmes, défendue par un mouvement populaire, ne se prend qu'avec du temps et de la patience. Les histoires des guerres sont pleines des catastrophes des plus considérables pour avoir brusqué et s'être enfourré dans les rues étroites des villes. L'exemple de Buenos Ayres, et des 12 milles Anglais d'élite qui y ont péri, en est une preuve.

5<sup>me</sup> *Observation.*—Ainsi la position de l'armée est bonne, le maréchal Moneey étant à Saint Clément, ou environ, et les généraux Gobert et Vedel réunis au général Dupont en Andalousie; ce serait une faute, à moins d'incidens et d'un emploi immédiat à donner à ces troupes dans un autre point, que de concentrer toutes les troupes trop près de Madrid. L'incertitude des événemens du maréchal Bessièrès, et les 25 chances qu'il avoit contre lui sur cent, pouvaient déterminer à faire arrêter la marche de toutes les troupes qui s'éloignaient de la capitale, afin que les colonnes pussent être rappelées à Madrid si le maréchal Bessièrès était battu, et pussent arriver dans cette ville avant l'ennemi; mais ce serait une faute si on eût fait rétrograder ces colonnes, et si on eût agi comme si le maréchal Bessièrès avait été battu, lorsque quelques jours avant on agissait comme si l'armée de Galice n'existait pas. 500 chevaux et 1800 hommes d'infanterie dirigés sur Valladolid étaient tous ce qu'il fallait. Si cette colonne était partie trois jours plutôt, elle y serait arrivé le 15. Le maréchal Bessièrès a été vainqueur, et avait pour être vainqueur 75 chances contre 25; mais la fatigue qu'on a donné à l'armée, et les mouvemens rétrogrades qu'on a ordonné inutilement, puisque même le maréchal Bessièrès battu, on avait 8 à 10 jours pour réunir l'armée, ont fait un mal moral et physique. Il faut espérer que la nouvelle de la victoire arrivée à temps aura mis l'état major à même d'arrêter tout mouvement sur Madrid, et que chaque colonne se trouvera plus près du point où elle doit se trouver.

6<sup>me</sup> *Observation.*—Dans la situation actuelle des affaires, le plus important de tous est le général Dupont. On doit lui envoyer le reste de la division Gobert, et employer d'autres troupes pour maintenir la communication; il faut tenir la tête de la division du maréchal Moneey sur Saint Clément, et menacer toujours la province de Valence. Si le maréchal Bessièrès a battu sans effort et avec peu de perte, l'armée de Galice, et a eu moins de huit milles hommes engagés, il n'y a pas de doute qu'avec 20 milles le général Dupont ne culbute tout ce qu'il a devant lui.

7<sup>me</sup> *Observation.*—La brigade du général Rey rend à l'armée plus qu'elle n'a perdu par le détachement qui a été fait sur Valladolid. Toutes les probabilités humaines sont que le maréchal Bessièrès n'a plus besoin d'aucun renfort, du moins pour être maître de toute la Castille et du royaume de Léon. Ce n'est que lorsqu'on aura reçu la nouvelle de ce qu'il aura fait à Bénévente et à Léon qu'on pourra décider s'il doit attaquer la Galice



8<sup>me</sup> *Observation*.—Le général Verdier, en Arragon, a cerné Saragosse: le 14<sup>eme</sup> et le 44<sup>eme</sup> de ligne partent demain pour s'y rendre. Les partis Français vont jusqu'à moitié chemin de Lerida, de Barbastro, et de Jaca. Dans dix jours toute l'artillerie sera arrivée. Cette belle et bonne brigade de troupes de ligne porte à près de quinze mille hommes l'armée du général Verdier. Il est probable que Saragosse tombera bientôt, et que les deux tiers de ces 15 mille hommes deviendront disponibles.

9<sup>me</sup> *Observation*.—Ainsi le corps du maréchal Bessièrès a pris l'offensive, il est depuis sa victoire renforcé de la brigade Lefebvre et de la brigade Gaulois; il est donc dans le cas de conserver l'offensive. Le corps du général Verdier en Arragon a battu partout les insurgés, a cerné la ville avec des forces beaucoup moindres; il vient d'être considérablement renforcé; ainsi il peut donner une nouvelle activité aux opérations du siège, et conserver son activité offensive sur les deux rives de l'Ebre. Le corps de Catalogne a joliment agi, ayant pour point d'appui Barcelonne, la jonction sera faite aujourd'hui ou demain devant Gérone, avec le gén<sup>l</sup> Reille.

10<sup>me</sup> *Observation*.—Voilà pour les trois corps d'armée situés du côté de la France. La communication de Madrid avec la France est importante sous tous les points de vue. Il faut donc que les colonnes qui viennent d'être organisées à Burgos et à Vitoria et qui seront journellement renforcées et augmentées, soient laissées dans ces stations.

Ci-joint la note de la formation de ces colonnes. Elles sont presque toutes composées de 3<sup>me</sup> bataillons et de conscrits, mais avec de bons cadres; 15 à 20 jours de stations à Burgos et à Vitoria les mettront à-peu-près à l'école de bataillon. Ce serait une très grande faute que de rappeler trop tôt ces troupes pour en renforcer les cadres principaux; il faut attendre jusqu'à ce qu'on ait pu les remplacer à Vitoria et à Burgos par de nouvelles troupes.

11<sup>me</sup> *Observation*.—Il n'y a donc rien à craindre du côté du maréchal Bessièrès, ni dans le nord de la Castille, ni dans le royaume de Léon.

Il n'y a rien à craindre en Arragon; Saragosse tombera un jour plus tôt ou un jour plus tard.

Il n'y a rien à craindre en Catalogne.

Il n'y a rien à craindre pour les communications de Burgos à Bayonne, moyennant les deux colonnes organisées dans ces deux villes, et qui seront renforcées. S'il y avait des événements en Biscaye, la force qui se réunit à Bayonne, formant une réserve, seroit suffisante pour mettre tout en ordre.

S'il arrive à Burgos quelque événement trop considérable pour que la colonne mobile qui est à Burgos puisse y mettre ordre, le maréchal Bessièrès ne sera pas assez loin pour ne pouvoir faire un détachement.

Le général Monthion a la surveillance de toutes les Biscayes. Le général Bonnet à Burgos est chargé de maintenir la communication de Vitoria avec le maréchal Bessièrès et avec Madrid. Il est nécessaire que ces deux généraux correspondent tous les



jours entr'eux et avec le général Drouet, qui est laissé en réserve à Bayonne, de même que le gén<sup>l</sup> Verdier de Saragosse et le gén<sup>l</sup> Dagoult de Pampelune doivent correspondre tous les jours avec le général Drouet à Bayonne, et avec Madrid, par le canal de Bayonne et de Vitoria; jusqu'à ce que les communications directes soient rétablies, un courrier partant de Madrid peut se rendre par Vitoria, Tolosa, Pampelune, devant Saragosse. Le seul point important donc aujourd'hui est le général Dupont. Si l'ennemi parvenait jamais à s'emparer des défilés de la Sierra Morena, il serait difficile de l'en chasser; il faut donc renforcer le gén<sup>l</sup> Dupont, de manière qu'il ait 25 mille hommes, compris ce qu'il faudra pour garder les passages des montagnes, et une partie du chemin de La Manche. Il pourra disposer les troupes de manière que le jour où il voudra attaquer, la brigade de deux à trois mille hommes, destinée à garder les montagnes, arrive au camp du gén<sup>l</sup> Dupont à marches forcées, et soit successivement remplacée par les colonnes qui seraient en arrière, de sorte que le gén<sup>l</sup> Dupont ait pour le jour de la bataille plus de 23 mille hommes à mettre en ligne.

Une fois qu'on aura bien battu l'ennemi, une partie des troupes se dissipera, et selon que la victoire sera plus ou moins décidée, on pourra faire continuer le mouvement à d'autres troupes sur le général Dupont.

12<sup>me</sup> *Observation.*—Saragosse pris, on aura des troupes disponibles, soit pour renforcer l'armée de Catalogne, soit pour marcher sur Valence de concert avec le maréchal Monecy, soit pour renforcer le maréchal Bessièrès et marcher en Galice, si après la victoire qu'il a déjà remporté, et celle qu'il remportera à Léon, il ne croit pas assez fort pour s'y porter d'abord.

13<sup>me</sup> *Observation.*—Il serait important de choisir deux points intermédiaires entre Andujar et Madrid, pour pouvoir y laisser garnison permanente, un commandant, un dépôt de cartouches, munitions, canons, magasins de biscuit, des fouds, du farine, et un hôpital, de sorte que de 3 à 400 hommes défendent le magasin et l'hôpital contre toute une insurrection. Il est difficile de croire qu'il n'y ait point quelque château ou donjon, pouvant être retranché promptement et propre à cela. C'est par ce seul moyen qu'on peut raccourcir la ligne d'opération, et être sûr d'avoir toutes les trois ou quatre grandes marches, une manutention et un point de repos.

14<sup>me</sup> *Observation.*—En résumé, le partage de l'armée paraît devoir être celui-ci:

Corps de Catalogne, tel qu'il existe à-peu-près . . .	20,000 h <sup>es</sup>
Corps d'Arragon, tel qu'il existe à-peu-près, 15 mille hommes, jusqu'à ce que Saragosse soit prit	15,000
Corps du maréchal Bessièrès, ce qu'il a à-peu-près . . . . .	17,000
Colonne de Burgos . . . . .	2,000
Colonne de Vitoria . . . . .	2,000
Garnison de St. Sébastien . . . . .	1,500
Corps d'Aranda . . . . .	1,000

Total du corps du mar <sup>l</sup> Bessièrès . . . . .	24,000 h <sup>es</sup>
--	------------------------

Après la prise de Saragosse, lorsque les affaires de Catalogne seront un peu apaisées, on pourra, selon les circonstances, ou renforcer le maréchal Bessièrès, ou renforcer le général Dupont, ou entreprendre l'opération de Valence.

Aujourd'hui, le seul point qui menace, où il faut promptement avoir un succès, c'est du côté du général Dupont, avec 25 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, et artillerie comprise: il a beaucoup plus qu'il ne faut pour avoir de grands résultats; à la rigueur, avec 21 mille hommes présens sur le champ de bataille, il peut hardiment prendre l'offensive, il ne sera pas battu, et il aura pour lui plus de 80 chances.

[Dictated by Napoleon.]

#### NO. IV.

#### NOTE SUR LES AFFAIRES D'ESPAGNE.

*St. Cloud, ce 30 Août, 1808.*

**1<sup>re</sup> Observation.**—Dans la position de l'armée d'Espagne on a à craindre d'être attaqué sur la droite par l'armée de Galice, sur le centre par l'armée venant de Madrid, sur la gauche par l'armée venant de Saragosse et Valence. Ce serait une grande faute que de laisser l'armée de Saragosse et de Valence prendre position à Tudela.

Tudela doit être occupé, parceque c'est une position honorable, et Milagro une position obscure.

Tudela est sur les communications de Pampelune, a un beau pont en pierre, et est l'aboutissant d'un canal sur Saragosse. C'est une position offensive sur Saragosse telle que l'ennemi ne peut pas la négliger; cette position seule couvre la Navarre. En gardant Tudela, on garde une grande quantité de bateaux, qui nous seront bientôt nécessaires pour le siège de Saragosse.

Si l'ennemi était maître de Tudela, toute la Navarre s'insurgerait, l'ennemi pourrait arriver à Estella, en négligeant la position de Milagro et en coupant la communication avec Pampelune.

D'Estella il serait sur Tolosa; il y serait sans donner le temps de faire les dispositions convenables; il n'est pas à craindre, au contraire, que l'ennemi fasse aucune opération sur Pampelune; tant que nous aurons Tudela, il serait lui-même coupé sur Saragosse.

Le général qui commande à Tudela peut couvrir les hauteurs de redoutes; si c'est une armée d'insurgés, s'en approcher et la battre, la tenir constamment sur la défensive par les reconnoissances et ses mouvemens sur Saragosse.

Et si, au lieu de cela, une partie de l'armée de ligne Espagnole marchait sur Tudela, le général Français repassera l'Ebre s'il y est forcé, disputera la terrein sur Pampelune, et donnera le temps au général en chef de l'armée Française de prendre ses mesures.

Ce corps d'observation remplira alors son but, et aucune opération prompte sur Tolosa ni Estella n'est à craindre.

Au lieu qu'en occupant la position de Milagro, l'ennemi sera à Estella, le même jour qu'on l'apprendra au quartier-général. Si on occupe Tudela, il faut s'y aider de redoutes, et s'y établir, n'y conserver aucune espèce d'embarras, et les tenir tous dans Pampelune. Si l'ennemi l'occupe, il faut l'en chasser, et s'y établir; car dans l'ordre défensif, ce serait une grande faute, qui entraînerait de fâcheuses conséquences.

2<sup>e</sup> *Observation.*—La position de Burgos était également importante à tenir, comme ville de haute réputation, comme centre de communication et de rapports.

De là des partis non seulement de cavalerie, mais encore de deux ou de trois mille hommes d'infanterie, et même quatre ou cinq mille hommes en échelons, peuvent poster les premières patrouilles d'hussards dans toutes les directions jusqu'à deux marches, et parfaitement informés de tout ce qui se fait, en instruire le quartier-général, de manière que si l'ennemi se présente en force sur Burgos, les différentes divisions puissent à temps s'y porter pour le soutenir et livrer la bataille, ou si cela n'est pas jugé convenable, éclairer les mouvemens de l'ennemi, lui laisser croire qu'on veut se porter sur Burgos, et pouvoir ensuite faire sa retraite pour se porter ailleurs.

Un corps de 12 à 15 mille hommes ne prend-il pas 20 positions dans la journée au seul commandement d'un adjudant-major? et nos troupes seraient-elles devenues des levées en masse, qu'il faudroit placer 15 jours d'avance dans les positions où on voudroit qu'elles se battent?

Si cela eût été jugé ainsi, le corps du maréchal Bessièrès eût pris la position de Miranda ou de Briviesca; mais lorsque l'ennemi est encore à Madrid, lorsqu'on ignore où est l'armée de Galice, et qu'on a le soupçon que les rebelles pourront employer une partie de leurs efforts contre le Portugal, prendre, au lieu d'une position menaçante, offensive, honorable, comme Burgos, une position honteuse, borgne comme Trevino, c'est dire à l'ennemi, 'Vous n'avez rien à craindre; portez vous ailleurs; nous avons fait nos dispositions pour aller plus loin, ou bien nous avons choisi un champ de bataille pour nous battre; venez ici, vous ne craignez pas d'être inquiétés.' Mais que fera le général Français, si l'on marche demain sur Burgos? laissera-t-il prendre par 6000 insurgés la citadelle de cette ville, ou si les Français ont laissés garnison dans le château (car on ignore la position et la situation de l'armée), comment une garnison de 4, 6 ou 800 hommes se tira-t-elle dans une si vaste plaine? Et dès lors c'est comme s'il n'y avoit rien: l'ennemi maître de cette citadelle, on ne la reprendra plus.

Si, au contraire, on veut garder la citadelle, on veut donc livrer bataille à l'ennemi; car cette citadelle ne peut pas tenir plus de trois jours; et si on veut livrer bataille à l'ennemi, pourquoi le ma! Bessièrès abandonne-t-il le terrain où on veut livrer bataille?

Ces dispositions paraissent mal raisonnées, et quand l'ennemi



marchera on fera essuyer à l'armée un affront qui démoralisera les troupes, n'y eût-il que des corps légers ou des insurgés qui marchassent.

En résumé, la position de Burgos devait être gardée; tous les jours à trois heures du matin on devait être sous les armes, et à une heure du matin il devait partir des reconnaissances dans toutes les directions. On devait ainsi recueillir des nouvelles à huit ou dix lieues à la ronde, pour qu'on pût prendre ensuite le parti que les circonstances indiqueraient.

C'est la première fois qu'il arrive à une armée de quitter toutes les positions offensives, pour se mettre dans de mauvaises positions défensives, d'avoir l'air de choisir des champs de bataille, lorsque l'éloignement de l'ennemi, les mille et une combinaisons différentes qui peuvent avoir lieu, ne laissent point la probabilité de prévoir si la bataille aura lieu à Tudela, entre Tudela et Pampelune, entre Soria et l'Ebre, ou entre Burgos et Miranda.

La position de Burgos, tenue en force et d'une manière offensive, menace Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, Madrid même. Il faut avoir longtemps fait la guerre pour la concevoir; il faut avoir entrepris un grand nombre d'opérations offensives pour savoir comme le moindre événement ou indice encourage ou décourage, décide une opération ou une autre.

En deux mots, si 15 mille insurgés entrent dans Burgos, se retranchent dans la ville, et occupent le château, il faut calculer une marche de plusieurs jours pour pouvoir s'y poster et reprendre la ville; ce qui ne sera pas sans quelque inconvénient; si pendant ce temps-là la véritable attaque est sur Logrono ou Pampelune, on aura fait des contremarches inutiles, qui auront fatigué l'armée; et enfin, si l'ennemi occupe Logroño, Tudela, et Burgos, l'armée Française serait dans une triste et mauvaise position.

Quand on tient à Burgos de la cavalerie sans infanterie, n'est-ce pas dire à l'ennemi qu'on ne veut pas y tenir; n'est-ce pas l'engager à y venir? Burgos a une grande influence dans le monde par son nom, dans la Castille parceque c'en est la capitale, dans les opérations parcequ'elle donne une communication directe avec St. Ander. Il n'est pas permis à 300 lieues, et n'ayant pas même un état de situation de l'armée, de prescrire ce qu'on doit faire; mais on doit dire que si aucune force majeure ne l'empêche, il faut occuper Burgos et Tudela.

Le corps détaché de Tudela a son mouvement assuré sur Pampelune, a le rôle de garder la Navarre, a ses ennemis à tenir en échec, Saragosse et tous les insurgés. Il était plus que suffisant pour surveiller Tudela, l'Ebre, et Pampelune, pour dissiper les rassemblemens s'il n'y avait que des insurgés, contenir l'ennemi, donner des renseignemens, et retarder la marche sur Pampelune. Si, au lieu des insurgés, c'est l'armée ennemie qui marche de ce côté, il suffit encore pour donner le temps à l'armée de Burgos, à celle de Miranda, de marcher réunie avec 36 mille hommes, soit pour prendre l'offensive, soit pour prendre en flanc l'ennemi qui marche sur Pampelune, soit pour se replier et rentrer dans la Navarre, si toute l'armée ennemie avait pris cette direction.



Si ces observations paraissent bonnes et qu'on les adopte, que l'ennemi n'ait encore montré aucun plan, il faut que le général qui commande le corps de Saragosse fasse construire quelques redoutes autour de Tudela, pour favoriser ses champs de bataille, réunisse des vivres de tous les côtés, et soit là dans une position offensive sur Saragosse en maintenant sa communication avec Logroño par sa droite, mais au moins par la rive gauche de l'Ebre. Il faut que le maréchal Bessières, avec tout son corps, renforcé de la cavalerie légère, soit campé dans le bois près Burgos, la citadelle bien occupée; que tous les hôpitaux, les dépôts, les embarras soient au delà de l'Ebre; qu'il soit là en position de manœuvrer, tous les jours, à trois heures du matin, sous les armes, jusqu'au retour de toutes les reconnaissances, et éclairant le pays dans la plus grande étendue; que le corps du ma<sup>i</sup> Moncey soit à Miranda et à Briviesca, tous ses embarras et hôpitaux derrière Vitoria, toujours en bataille avant le jour, et envoyant des reconnaissances sur Soria et les autres directions de l'ennemi.

Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les corps des maréchaux Bessières et Moncey devant être réunis, il faut se lier le moins possible avec Logroño, et cependant considérer le corps du général Lefebvre comme un corps détaché, qui a une ligne d'opération particulière sur Pampelune et un rôle séparé; vouloir conserver Tudela comme une partie contigue de la ligne, c'est se disséminer beaucoup. Enfin, faire la guerre, c'est à dire, avoir des nouvelles par les curés, les alcades, les chefs de couvent, les principaux propriétaires, les postes: on sera alors parfaitement informé.

Les reconnaissances qui tous les jours se dirigeront du côté de Soria, de Burgos, sur Palencia, et du côté d'Aranda, peuvent former tous les jours trois postes d'interception, trois rapports d'hommes arrêtés, qu'on traitera bien, et qu'on relâchera quand ils auront donné les renseignemens qu'on désire. On verra alors venir l'ennemi, on pourra réunir toutes ses forces, lui dérober des marches, et tomber sur ses flancs au moment où il méditera un projet offensif.

3<sup>me</sup> Observation.—L'armée Espagnole d'Andalousie était peu nombreuse. Toutes les Gazettes Anglaises, et les rapports de l'officier Anglais qui était au camp, nous le prouvent. L'inconcevable ineptie du général Dupont, sa profonde ignorance des calculs d'un général en chef, son tâtonnement, l'ont perdu: 18 mille hommes ont posé les armes, six mille seulement se sont battus, et encore ces 6000 hommes que le gen<sup>l</sup> Dupont a fait battre à la pointe du jour, après les avoir fait marcher toute la nuit, étaient un contre trois. Malgré tout cela, l'ennemi s'est si mal battu, qu'il n'a pas fait un prisonnier, pris une pièce de canon, gagné un pouce de terrain, et l'armée de Dupont est restée intacte dans sa position: ce qui sans doute a été un malheur; car il eût mieux valu que cette division eût été mise en déroute, éparpillée, et détruite, puisque les divisions Vedel et Dufour, au lieu de se rendre par la capitulation, auraient fait leur retraite. Comment ces deux divisions ont-elles été comprises dans la capitulation? c'est par la lâcheté insultante et l'imbécillité des hommes qui

ont négocié, et qui porteront sur l'échaffaud la peine de ce grand crime national.

Ce que l'on vient de dire prouve que les Espagnols ne sont pas à craindre; toutes les forces Espagnoles ne sont pas capables de culbuter 25 mille Français, dans une position raisonnable.

Depuis le 12 jusqu'au 19, le général Dupont n'a fait que des bêtises, et malgré tout cela, s'il n'avait pas fait la faute de se séparer de Vedel, et qu'il eût marché avec lui, les Espagnols auraient été battus et culbutés. A la guerre les hommes ne sont rien, c'est un homme qui est tout. Jusqu'à cette heure nous n'avons trouvé ces exemples que dans l'histoire de nos ennemis: aujourd'hui, il est fâcheux que nous puissions les trouver dans la notre.

Une rivière, fût-elle aussi large que la Vistule, aussi rapide que le Danube à son embouchure, n'est rien si on n'a des débouchés sur l'autre rive, et une tête prompte à reprendre l'offensive. Quant à l'Ebre, c'est moins que rien; on ne la regarde que comme une trace.

Dans toutes ces observations, on a parlé dans la position où se trouvait l'armée du 20 au 26, lorsqu'elle n'avait nulle part nouvelle de l'ennemi.

Si on continue à ne prendre aucune mesure pour avoir des nouvelles, on n'apprendra que l'armée de ligne Espagnole est arrivée sur Tudela et Pampelune, qu'elle est sur les communications, sur Tolosa, que lorsqu'elle y sera déjà rendue. On a fait connaître dans la note précédente comment on faisait à la guerre pour avoir des nouvelles. Si la position de Tudela est occupée par l'ennemi, on ne voit pas que l'Ebre soit tenable. Comment a-t-on évacué Tudela, lorsqu'on avait mandé dans des notes précédentes qu'il fallait garder ce point, et que l'opinion même des généraux qui venaient de Saragosse était d'occuper cette importante position?

[Dictated by Napoleon.]

No. V.

#### NOTE SUR LES AFFAIRES D'ESPAGNE.

*St. Cloud, Août, 1808.*

*1<sup>re</sup> Observation.*—Tudela est important sous plusieurs points de vue: il a un pont sur l'Ebre, et protège parfaitement la Navarre: c'est le point d'intersection du canal qui va à Saragosse.

Les convois d'artillerie et de vivres mettent pour se rendre de Pampelune à Tudela trois jours, de Tudela à Saragosse trois jours. Mais en se servant du canal, on va de Tudela à Saragosse en 14 heures. Lorsque donc les vivres, les hôpitaux, sont à Tudela, c'est comme s'ils étaient à Saragosse.

La première opération que doit faire l'armée lorsqu'elle re-

prendra son système d'offensif, et qu'elle sera forte de tous ses moyens, ce doit être d'investir et de prendre Saragosse; et si cette ville résiste comme elle l'a fait la première fois, en donner un exemple qui retentisse dans toute l'Espagne.

Une vingtaine de pièces de 12 de campagne, une vingtaine d'obusiers de six pièces de campagne, une douzaine de mortiers, et une douzaine de pièces de 16 et de 24, parfaitement approvisionnées, seront nécessaires, ainsi que des mineurs pour remplir ce but.

Il n'est aucun de ces bouches à feu qui doive consommer son approvisionnement de campagne.

Un approvisionnement extraordinaire de 80 mille coups de canon, bombes ou obus, paraît nécessaire pour prendre cette ville.

Il faudrait donc, pour ne pas retarder la marche de la grande armée, 15 jours avant qu'elle ne puisse arriver, commencer le transport de Pampelune à Tudela, et que dans les 48 heures après l'investissement de Saragosse, l'artillerie y arrivât sur des bateaux, de manière que quatre jours après on pût commencer trois attaques à la fois, et avoir cette ville en peu de jours, ce qui serait une partie des succès, en y employant 25 à 30 mille hommes, ou plus s'il était nécessaire.

On suppose que, si l'ennemi a pris position entre Madrid et Burgos, il aura été battu.

Il faut donc occuper Tudela. Ce point est tellement important qu'il serait à désirer qu'on pût employer un mois à le fortifier et à s'y retrancher, de manière qu'un millier d'hommes avec 8 à 10 pièces de canon s'y trouvassent en sûreté et à l'abri de toutes les insurrections possibles. Il ne faut pas surtout souffrir que les révoltés s'y retranchassent; ce serait deux sièges au lieu d'un; et il serait impossible de prendre Saragosse avant d'avoir Tudela, à cause du canal.

On trouvera ci-joint des observations du colonel Lacoste sur Tudela; puisque les localités empêchent de penser à le fortifier, il eût été utile de l'occuper au lieu de Milagro, qui n'aboutit à rien.

2<sup>de</sup>. Soria n'est je crois qu'à deux petites marches des positions actuelles de l'armée. Cette ville s'est constamment mal comportée. Une expédition qui se porterait sur Soria, la désarmait, en prendrait une trentaine d'hommes des plus considérables, qu'on enverrait en France pour ôtages, et qui enfin lui ferait fournir des vivres pour l'armée, serait d'un bon effet.

3<sup>me</sup>. Une troisième opération qui serait utile serait l'occupation de St. Ander. Il serait bien avantageux qu'elle pût se faire par la route directe de Bilbao à St. Ander.

4<sup>me</sup>. Il faut s'occuper de désarmer la Biscaye et la Navarre; c'est un point important; tout Espagnol pris les armes à la main doit être fusillé.

Il faut veiller sur la fabrique d'armes de Placencia, ne point laisser travailler les ouvriers pour les rebelles.

Le fort de Pancorvo doit être armé et fortifié avec la plus grande

activité. Il doit y avoir dans ce fort des fours, des magasins de bouches et de guerre. Situé presque à mi-chemin de Bayonne à Madrid, c'est un poste intermédiaire pour l'armée, et un point d'appui pour les opérations de la Galice.

Il y a dans l'armée plus de généraux qu'il n'en faut : deux seraient nécessaires au corps qui était sous Saragosse. Les généraux de division La Grange, Belliard, et Grandjean sont sans emploi, et tous trois bons généraux.

Il faut renvoyer le plus promptement possible, le régiment et le général Portugais pour joindre leurs corps à Grenoble, où il doit se former.

5<sup>me</sup>. On ne discutera pas ici si la ligne de l'Ebre est bonne, si elle a la configuration requise pour être défendue avec avantage.

On discutera encore moins si on eût pu ne pas évacuer Madrid, conserver la ligne du Duero, ou prendre une position qui eût couvert le siège de Saragosse et eût permis d'attendre que cette ville fût prise; toutes ces questions sont oiseuses.

Nous nous contenterons de dire, puisqu'on a pris la ligne de l'Ebre, que les troupes s'y dissous et s'y reposent, qu'elle a au moins l'avantage que le pays est plus sain, étant plus élevé, et qu'on peut y attendre que les chaleurs soient passées.

Il faut surtout ne point quitter cette ligne sans avoir un projet déterminé, qui ne laisse aucune incertitude dans les opérations à suivre. Ce serait un grand malheur de quitter cette ligne pour être ensuite obligé de la reprendre.

A la guerre les trois quarts sont des affaires morales; la balance des forces réelles n'est que pour un autre quart.

6<sup>me</sup>. En gardant la ligne de l'Ebre il faut que le général ait bien prévu toute ce que l'ennemi peut faire dans tous les hypothèses.

L'ennemi peut se présenter devant Burgos, partir de Soria, et marcher sur Logroño, ou, en partant de Saragosse, se porter sur Estella, et menacer ainsi Tolosa. Il faut, dans toutes ces hypothèses, qu'il n'y ait point un long temps perdu en délibérations, qu'on puisse se ployer de sa droite à sa gauche, et de sa gauche à sa droite, sans faire aucun sacrifice : car dans les manœuvres combinées, les tâtonnemens, l'irrésolution qui naissent des nouvelles contradictoires qui se succèdent rapidement, conduisent à des malheurs.

Cette diversion de Saragosse sur Tolosa est une des raisons qui a longtemps fait penser que la position de Tudela devait être gardée, soit sur la rive droite, soit avec la faculté de repasser sur la rive gauche. Elle est offensive sur Saragosse, elle prévient à temps de tous les mouvemens qui pourraient se faire de ce côté.

7<sup>me</sup>. Une observation qu'il n'est pas hors de propos de faire ici c'est, que l'ennemi, qui a intérêt de masquer ses forces, en cachant le véritable point de son attaque, opère de manière que le coup qu'il veut porter n'est jamais indiqué d'une manière positive, et le général ne peut deviner que par la connaissance bien approfondie de sa position, et la manière dont il fait entrer



son système offensif, pour protéger et garantir son système défensif.

8<sup>me</sup>. On n'a point de renseignemens sur ce que fait l'ennemi. On dit toujours qu'on ne peut pas avoir des nouvelles, eomme si cette position était extraordinaire dans une armée, comme si on trouvait ordinairement des espions. Il faut en Espagne, comme partout ailleurs, envoyer des parties qui enlèvent tantôt le curé ou l'alcalde, tantôt un chef de couvent ou le maître de poste, et surtout toutes les lettres; quelquefois le maître de la poste, aux douanes, ou celui qui en fait les fonctions; on les met aux arrêts jusqu'à ce qu'ils parlent, en les faisant interroger deux fois par jour, on les garde en ôtage, et on les charge d'envoyer des piétons, et de donner des nouvelles. Quand on saura prendre des mesures de force et de vigueur, on aura des nouvelles.

Il faut intercepter toutes les postes, toutes les lettres. Le seul motif d'avoir des nouvelles peut déterminer à faire un gros détachement de quatre à cinq mille hommes, qui se portent dans une grande ville, prennent les lettres à la poste, se saisissent des citoyens les plus aisés, de leurs lettres, papiers, gazettes, etc. Il est hors de doute que même dans la ligne des Français les habitans sont tous informés de ce qui se passe : à plus forte raison hors de la ligne. Qui empêche donc, qu'on prenne les hommes marquans, et qu'on les renvoie ensuite sans les maltraiter?

Il est donc de fait, lorsqu'on n'est point dans un désert, et qu'on est dans un pays peuplé, que si le général n'est pas instruit, c'est qu'il n'a pas su prendre les mesures convenables pour l'être.

Les services que les habitans rendent à un général ennemi, ils ne le font jamais par affection, ni même pour avoir de l'argent; les plus réels qu'on obtient c'est pour avoir des sauve-gardes, et des protections; c'est pour conserver ses biens, ses jours, sa ville, son monastère.

[The original of the following memoir is a rough draft, written by king Joseph. It has many erasures and interlineations, and was evidently composed to excuse his retreat from Madrid. The number of the French troops was undoubtedly greater than is here set down, unless the infantry alone be meant.]

## No. VI.

Lorsqu'on a quitté Madrid à la nouvelle de *la défection* d'un corps de vingt-deux mille hommes, il y avoit dans Madrid dix sept mille hommes, au corps du maréchal Bessières quinze mille cinq cent, au corps de Saragosse onze mille sept cent: l'armée se composait donc de quarante-cinq mille hommes; mais ces trois corps étaient distans entre eux de près de cent lieues. La première idée fut de réunir le corps de Madrid à celui de Léon, à Burgos, et par suite d'entrer en communication avec celui de Saragosse, avec lequel l'état major de Madrid n'avait jamais eu

aucune relation directe, et dont il ignorait absolument la situation et la composition.

Vingt jours après sa sortie de Madrid le roi s'est trouvé à la tête d'une armée de cinquante mille hommes. Le feu de la sédition n'a pas pu se communiquer sur les points parcourus par les trois corps d'armée alors réunis; les communications avec la France ont été gardées; l'insurrection de Bilbao a été éteinte dans le sang de 1200 insurgés. Peu de jours après, 20,000 d'entre eux réunis à 60 lieues delà, à Tudela, à l'autre extrémité de la ligne, ont été dispersés et poursuivis rigoureusement. Les provinces de la Biscaye, de Burgos, et le royaume de Navarre ont été contenus. Une organisation intérieure a préparé les moyens de nourrir l'armée, d'approvisionner les places de Pampelune, St. Sébastien, les forts de Pancorvo et de Burgos, en rendant le moins insupportable possible à ces provinces cette charge évidemment disproportionnée à leurs moyens.

Le matériel de l'artillerie a été réparé et mis en état d'agir, l'armée réorganisée, les hommes et les chevaux sont aujourd'hui en bon état.

C'est ainsi que s'est passé le mois d'Août et partie de Septembre. Les renforts arrivés de France ont à peine indemnisé l'armée des pertes qu'elle a éprouvées par les maladies et le siège de Saragosse.

Voici sa force, et son organisation actuelle:

Le corps de droite, commandé par m<sup>r</sup> le mar<sup>al</sup> Bessières, est forte de 18,000 hommes.

Celui de gauche, commandé par m<sup>r</sup> le mar<sup>al</sup> Moneey, est de 18,000 hommes.

Celui du centre, aux ordres de m<sup>r</sup> le mar<sup>al</sup> Ney, est de onze mille hommes.

La réserve du roi est de quatre mille hommes.\*

Le corps de droite occupe le pays depuis Burgos jusqu'à Pancorvo, et Ponte de Lara.

Le corps de gauche depuis Tudela jusqu'à Logroño.

Le corps du centre depuis Logroño jusqu'à Haro.

La réserve Miranda.

La nouvelle position prise par l'armée depuis que les événemens de l'Andalousie avaient fait présager une guerre réelle en Espagne, était évidemment commandée par les simples notions de la saine raison, qui ne pouvait permettre sa séparation à plus de dix jours de marche, de trois corps d'armée, dont le plus fort n'arrivait pas à 18,000 hommes, au milieu d'une nation de onze millions d'habitans, qui se déclarait ennemi, et se mettait universellement en état de guerre.

Cinquante mille Français ont pu se tenir avec succès sur une ligne de plus de 60 lieues, gardant les deux grandes communications de Burgos et de Tudela contre des ennemis qui n'ont pu

---

\* On ne comprend pas dans ces calculs les garnisons de Pampelune, St. Sébastien, Vitoria, Tolosa, Bilbao, &c. : il n'est pas question non plus de l'armée de Catalogne.

jusqu'ici porter sur l'un ou l'autre de ces points plus de 25,000 hommes: puisque 15,000 Français pouvaient être réuuis sur l'une ou l'autre de ces deux communications principales en 24 heures.

Si les corps d'armée dirigés sur l'Espagne devaient arriver dans le mois de Septembre, ce système défensif et offensif à la fois se continuerait avec avantage, puisqu'il tend à refaire l'armée, à attendre celle qui doit arriver, et continue à menacer l'ennemi; mais il ne saurait se prolonger jusqu'au mois de Novembre. L'ennemi n'a pu rester trois mois sans faire de grands progrès; bientôt il sera en état de prendre l'offensif avec de grands corps organisés, obéissans à une administration centrale, qui aura eu le temps de se former à Madrid. Tout nous annonce que le mois d'Octobre est une de ces époques décisives qui donne à celui qui sait s'en emparer la priorité des mouvemens et des succès dont la progression est incalculable.

Quel est le parti à prendre dans la position où se trouve l'armée, et avec l'assurance qu'elle a de voir entrer en Espagne dans le mois de Novembre deux cent mille Français?

Six manières de voir se présentent à l'esprit.

1<sup>re</sup>. D'essayer de rester encore dans l'état où l'on est.

Ce système est évidemment insoutenable. De Tudela à Burgos et à Bilbao il y a plus de 60 lieues. L'ennemi pourra attaquer la gauche de cette ligne avec quarante mille hommes, la droite avec quarante mille hommes, le centre avec des forces égales. Tudela et la Navarre jusqu'à Logroño demandent 25,000 hommes pour être défendues. Burgos ne peut être défenduc que par une armée en état de résister aux forces réunis de MM. Blake, Cuesta, qui peuvent présenter 80,000 hommes. Il est douteux que les 20,000 bayonettes qu'il serait possible de leur présenter puissent les battre complètement. Si le succès est douteux, ces 20,000 hommes seront harcelés par les insurgés, qui pourront alors soulever les trois provinces, les séparer totalement d'avec le corps de gauche et de la France.

2<sup>de</sup>. Porter le corps du centre et la réserve par Tudela au devant de l'ennemi sur la route de Saragosse, ou sur celle d'Albazan; on réunirait ainsi 30,000 hommes, on chercherait l'ennemi, et nul doute on le battrait si on le rencontrait de ce côté.

Le maréchal Bessières serait chargé d'observer la grande communication de Burgos à Miranda, laisserait garnison dans le château de Burgos, dans le fort de Pancorvo, occuperait l'ennemi, surveillerait les mouvemens des montagnes de Reynosa, les débarquemens possibles de Santander. Sa tâche serait difficile si l'on considère que le défilé de Pancorvo n'est pas le seul accessible à l'artillerie, qu'à trois lieues de là on arrive sur Miranda par une route praticable à l'artillerie, que quelques lieues plus loin l'Ebre offre un troisième passage sur le point de la chaîne qu'il traverse entre Haro et Miranda.

3<sup>me</sup>. Laisser le maréchal Moncey à la défense de la Navarre, et se porter avec le corps du centre et la réserve sur Burgos. Réuni au maréchal Bessières on pourroit chercher l'ennemi, et attaquer avec avantage, on marcherait à lui avec trente mille

hommes, et on n'attendrait pas qu'il fût réuni avec toutes ses forces. Il serait peut-être possible de donner pour instruction au maréchal Moneey, dans le cas où il serait débordé sur sa gauche, et qu'il ne verrait pas probabilité de battre l'ennemi, de faire un mouvement par sa droite, et se porter par Logroño sur Briviesca, où il se réunirait au reste de l'armée. Dans ce cas, la Navarre s'insurgerait, les communications avec la France seraient coupées, mais l'armée réunie dans la plaine serait assez forte pour attendre les corps qui arrivent de France, et qui seront assez forts pour pénétrer partout. Il serait aussi possible que, dans tous les cas, le maréchal Moneey se maintienne dans le camp retranché de Pampelune; manœuvrant autour de cette place, il y attendrait le résultat des opérations des deux corps d'armée qui auraient été au devant de l'ennemi dans la plaine de Burgos, et l'arrivée des corps de la grande armée.

4<sup>me</sup>. Passer l'Ebre, et chercher à amener l'ennemi à une bataille dans la plaine qui est entre Vitoria et l'Ebre.

5<sup>me</sup>. Se retirer, appuyant sa gauche sur Pampelune, et sa droite sur les montagnes de Mondragone.

6<sup>me</sup>. Laisser une garnison en état de se défendre pendant six semaines à Pampelune, St. Sébastien, Pancorvo, et Burgos, réunir le reste de l'armée, marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi sur l'une ou l'autre des grandes communications, le battre partout où on le trouverait, attendre, ou près de Madrid, ou dans le pays où les mouvemens de l'ennemi et la possibilité de vivre aurait porté l'armée, les troupes de France; on abandonnerait ses derrières, ses communications; mais la grande armée serait assez forte pour en ouvrir pour elle-même. Et quant à l'armée qui est en Espagne, réunie ainsi elle serait en état de braver tous les efforts, de déconcerter tous les projets de l'ennemi, et d'attendre dans une noble attitude le mouvement général qui sera imprimé par votre majesté lors de l'arrivée de toutes les troupes dans ce pays.

De tous les projets le dernier paraît préférable; il est plus noble et aussi sûr que le 5<sup>me</sup>.

Ces deux projets sont seuls absolument offensifs ou absolument défensifs. On peut les regarder, l'un et l'autre, comme propres à assurer la conservation de l'armée jusqu'à l'arrivée des renforts. Le dernier a sur l'autre l'avantage d'arrêter le progrès de l'ordre nouveau qui s'établit en Espagne; il est plus digne des troupes Françaises, et du frère de votre majesté. Il est aussi sûr que celui de la sévère et honteuse défensive proposée par l'article cinq. Je l'ai communiqué au mar<sup>al</sup> Jourdan et au mar<sup>al</sup> Ney, qui l'un et l'autre sont de cet avis. Je ne doute point que les autres maréchaux ne partagent leur opinion.

Au premier Octobre je puis avoir la réponse de V. M., et même avant, puisque je lui ai manifesté cette opinion par ma lettre du 14 Septembre.

Si V. M. approuve ce plan, il sera possible qu'elle n'ait pas de mes nouvelles jusqu'à l'arrivée des troupes; mais je suis convaincu qu'elle trouvera les affaires dans une bien meilleure situation qu'en suivant aucun des autres cinq projets.

*Miranda, le 16 Sept. 1808.*



## No. VII.

S.

EXTRAITS DES LETTRES DU MAJOR GÉNÉRAL AU  
GÉNÉRAL SAVARY, À MADRID.*Bayonne, 12 Juillet, 1808.*

*Section 1.*—J'ai rendu compte à l'empereur, général, de votre lettre du 8. S. M. trouve que vous vous êtes dégarni, de trop de monde à Madrid, que vous avez fait marcher trop de troupes au secours du g<sup>al</sup> Dupont, qu'on ne doit pas agir offensivement jusqu'à ce que les affaires de la Galice soient éclairées. De tous les points de l'armée, général, le plus important est la Galice, parceque c'est la seule province qui ait réellement conclu un traité avec l'Angleterre. La division de ligne des troupes Espagnoles qui était à Oporto s'est joint à celle qui était en Galice, et enfin par la position de cette province extrêmement près de l'Angleterre. Indépendamment de ces considérations, la position la rend encore plus intéressante; car les communications de l'armée se trouveraient compromises si le maréchal Bessièrès n'avait pas un entier succès, et il faudrait bien alors reposer toutes vos troupes, et marcher isolément au secours du maréchal Bessièrès. Encore une fois, général, vous vous êtes trop dégarni de Madrid, et si un bon régiment de cuirassiers, quelques pièces d'artillerie et 1000 à 1200 hommes d'infanterie avaient pu arriver à l'appui du maréchal Bessièrès, le 14, cela lui aurait été d'un éminent secours. *Q'importe que Valence soit soumise? Q'importe que Saragosse soit soumise?* Mais, général, le moindre succès de l'ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconvénients immenses. Instruit comme vous l'étiez des forces du général Cuesta, de la désertion des troupes d'Oporto, &<sup>a</sup>. . . . S. M. trouve que pour bien manœuvrer il aurait fallu vous arranger de manière à avoir du 12<sup>e</sup> au 15<sup>e</sup> 8000 hommes pour renforcer le maréchal Bessièrès. Une fois nos derrières débarassées, et cette armée de Galice détruite, tout le reste tombe et se soumet de soi-même, &c. &c.

S.

## EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &amp;c.

*Bayonne, 13 Juillet, 1808.*

*Section 2.*—Nous recevons vos lettres de 9 et du 10, général. L'empereur me charge de vous faire connaître que si le général Gobert était à Valladolid, le général Frère à San Clemente, ayant une colonne dans la Manche; si 300 à 400 convalescens, un bon commandant, 4 pièces de canon, une escouade d'artillerie, et vingt mille rations de biscuit étaient dans le château de Ségovie, la position de l'armée serait superbe et à l'abri de toute sollicitude. La conduite du général Frère ne paraît pas claire. Les nouvelles qu'il a eues du maréchal Moncey paraissent apocryphes. Il est possible que ses 8000 hommes et son artillerie n'aient pas été

suffisans pour enlever la ville de Valence. Cela étant, le maréchal Moncey ne l'enlèverait pas d'avantage avec 20,000 hommes, parcequ'alors c'est une affaire de canons et de mortiers, &c. &c. . . . . *Valence est comme la Catalogne et l'Arragon; ces trois points sont secondaires.* Les deux vrais points importans sont le général Dupont et particulièrement le maréchal Bessièrès, parceque le premier a devant lui le corps du camp de St. Roch et le corps de Cadiz, et le maréchal Bessièrès parcequ'il a devant lui les troupes de la Galice et celles qui étaient à Oporto. Le général Dupont a près de 20,000 hommes; il ne peut pas avoir contre lui un pareil nombre de troupes; il a déjà obtenu des succès très marquans, et au pis aller il ne peut être contraint qu'à repasser les montagnes, ce qui n'est qu'un événement de guerre. Le maréchal Bessièrès est beaucoup moins fort que le général Dupont, et les troupes Espagnoles d'Oporto et de la Galice sont plus nombreuses que celles de l'Andalousie, et les troupes de la Galice n'ont pas encore été entamées. Enfin le moindre insuccès du maréchal Bessièrès intercepte toutes les communications de l'armée et compromettrait même sa sûreté. Le général Dupont se bat pour Andujar, et le maréchal Bessièrès se bat pour les communications de l'armée et pour les opérations le plus importantes aux affaires d'Espagne, &c. &c.

## S.

## EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &amp;c. &amp;c.

*Bayonne, 18 Juillet, 1808, à dix heures du soir.*

*Section 3.*—Je reçois, général, vos lettres du 14. L'aide-de-camp du maréchal Moncey a donné à sa majesté tous les détails sur ce qui s'est passé. La conduite du maréchal a été belle. Il a bien battu les rebelles en campagne. Il est tout simple qu'il n'ait pu entrer à Valence; c'était une affaire de mortiers et de pièces de siège. Sa position à San Clémente est bonne, de là il est à même de remarcher sur Valence. Du reste, général, *l'affaire de Valence est une affaire du second ordre, même celle de Saragosse*, qui cependant est plus importante. L'affaire du maréchal Bessièrès était d'un intérêt majeur pour les affaires d'Espagne, et la première après cette affaire c'est celle du général Dupont, et c'est le moment de laisser le général Gobert suivre la route. Le maréchal Moncey se repose; le général Reille marche sur Gironne: ainsi trois colonnes pourront marcher ensemble sur Valence; le corps du général Reille, celui de Saragosse, et celui du maréchal Moncey, ce qui formera les 20,000 hommes que ce maréchal croit nécessaires. Mais l'empereur, général, trouve que vous avez tort de dire qu'il n'y a rien été fait depuis six semaines. On a battu les rassemblemens de la Galice, de St. Ander, ceux d'Arragon et de Catalogne, qui dans leur aveuglement croyaient qu'ils n'avaient qu'à marcher pour détruire les Français: le maréchal Moncey, les généraux Duhesme, Dupont, Verdier, ont fait de bonne besogne, et tous les hommes sensés en Espagne ont changé dans le fonds de leur opinion, et voient avec la plus grande peine l'insurrection. Au reste, général, les affaires d'Es-

pagne sont dans la situation la plus prospère depuis la bataille de Medina del Rio Seco, &c. &c. Le 14<sup>e</sup> et le 44<sup>e</sup> arrivent demain ; après demain ils partent pour le camp de Saragosse ; *non pas qu ses troupes puissent avancer la reddition, qui est une affaire de canon*, mais elles serviraient contre les insurgés de Valence, s'ils voulaient renforcer ceux de Saragosse. Enfin, si le général Gobert et les détachemens qui sont à moitié chemin pour rejoindre le général Dupont font juger à ce général qu'il a des forces suffisantes pour battre le général Castaños, il faut qu'elles continuent leur direction, et qu'il attaque l'ennemi, s'il croit devoir le faire, &<sup>a</sup>. &<sup>a</sup>.

(Cette lettre a été écrite le jour de la bataille de Baylen.)

#### EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &c.

*Bordeaux, 3 Août, 1808.*

*Section 4.*—Les événemens du général Dupont sont une chose sans exemple, et la rédaction de sa capitulation est de niveau avec la conduite tenue jusqu'à cette catastrophe. L'empereur pense qu'on n'a pas tenu compte du vague de la rédaction de l'acte, en permettant que les corps en échellons sur la communication entre vous et le général Dupont aient marché pour se rendre aux Anglais : car on ne doit pas présumer qu'ils aient la loyauté de laisser passer les troupes qui s'embarquent. Comme vous ne parlez pas de cela, on pense que vous avez retiré ces échellons sur Madrid. Après avoir lu attentivement la relation du général Dupont, on voit qu'il n'a capitulé que le lendemain de la bataille, et que les corps des généraux Vedel et Dufour, qui se trouvent compris pour quelque chose dans la capitulation (on ne sait pourquoi), ne se sont pas battus. Par la relation même du général Dupont, tout laisse penser que l'armée du général Castaños n'était pas à beaucoup près aussi forte qu'on le dit, et qu'il avait réuni à Baylen tout ce qu'il avait de forces. S. M. ne lui calcule pas plus de 25,000 hommes de troupes de ligne et plus de 15,000 paysans. Par la lettre du général Belliard *il paraît que l'ordre est donné de lever le siège de Saragosse*, ce qui serait prématuré ; car vous comprendrez qu'il n'est pas possible qu'on ne laisse un corps d'armée, qui couvre Pampelune, et contienne la Navarre, sans quoi l'ennemi peut cerner Pampelune, insurger la Navarre, et alors la communication de France par Tolosa serait coupée, et l'ennemi sur les derrières de l'armée. Supposant l'ennemi réuni à Pampelune, la ville bloquée, il peut se trouver en cinq à six marches sur les derrières de Burgos. L'armée qui assiège Saragosse est donc à peu près nécessaire pour contenir la Navarre, les insurgés de l'Arragon et de Valence, et pour empêcher de percer sur notre flanc gauche ; car si, comme le dit le général Belliard, le général Verdier se porte avec ses troupes à Logroño, en jetant 2000 hommes dans Pampelune, la communication de Bayonne, qu'eut sur le champ interceptée le général Verdier, serait mieux à Tudela qu'à Logroño. Si le général Castaños s'avance, et que vous puissiez lui livrer la bataille, on ne peut en

prévoir que les plus heureux résultats: mais de la manière dont il a marché vis-à-vis du général Dupont, tout donne à croire qu'il mettra la plus grande circonspection dans ses mouvemens. Si par le canal des parlementaires l'on peut établir une suspension d'armes sans que le roi y soit pour rien en apparence, cette espèce d'armistice pourrait se rompre en se prévenant de part et d'autre huit jours d'avance, donnant aux Français la ligne du Duero passant par Almazan pour joindre l'Ebre. Cette suspension d'armes, que les insurgés pourraient regarder comme avantageuse, afin de s'organiser à Madrid, ne nous serait pas défavorable, parcequ'on verrait pendant ce temps l'organisation que prendraient les parties insurgées de l'Espagne, et ce que veut la nation, &c. &c.

### LE MAJOR GÉNÉRAL AU ROI D'ESPAGNE.

Nantes, 11 Août, 1808.

*Section 5.*—Sire, le général Savary ni vos ministres Azanza et Urquijo ne sont arrivés: il paraît qu'il y a des rassemblemens à Bilbao d'après les nouvelles que nous recevons. S. M. pense qu'il est important d'y faire marcher le plutôt possible une colonne pour y rétablir l'ordre. *V. M. sait que la moitié de Saragosse était en notre pouvoir, et que sous peu on espérait avoir le reste de la ville. Lorsque le général Belliard a donné l'ordre de lever le siège, il eût été à désirer que cet ordre fût conditionnel, comme cela paraissait être l'intention de V. M., ainsi qu'on le voit dans sa correspondance; c'est à dire, que le siège ne fût levé que dans le cas où l'on n'aurait pas cru être maître de la ville avant cinq ou six jours. Cela aurait présenté des circonstances meilleures; car si le général Verdier évacuée en entier la Navarre et l'Arragon, il est à craindre que la Navarre ne s'insurge, et Pampelune ne tarderait pas à être cernée. J'ai mandé à V. M. que déjà des corps entiers de la grande armée sont en mouvement pour se rendre en poste en Espagne. Les dispositions les plus vigoureuses sont prises de tous côtés, et dans six semaines ou deux mois l'Espagne sera soumise. L'empereur, qui continue à jouir d'une bonne santé, quoiqu'il soit très occupé, part dans une heure pour continuer sa route sur Angers, Tours, et Paris. V. M. doit être persuadée que toutes nos pensées sont sur elle et sur l'armée qu'elle commande.*

### No. VIII.

#### LETTER FROM MR. DRUMMOND TO SIR ALEXANDER BALL.

Palermo, July 4th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,—His highness the duke of Orleans has applied to me to write to you on a subject about which he appears to be extremely interested. I take it for granted that you are acquainted with all the events which have lately happened in



Spain. The duke thinks that the appearance of a member of the house of Bourbon in that country might be acceptable to the Spaniards, and of great service to the common cause. In this I perfectly concur with his highness, and if you be of the same opinion you will probably have no objection to send a ship here to carry his highness to Gibraltar. He himself is exceedingly sanguine. We have letters from London down to the 5th of June. Portugal has followed the example of Spain, and Lisbon is probably now in other hands. An invitation has been sent to sir Charles Cotton.

(Signed)

WILLIAM DRUMMOND.

P.S. Weigh well what is said here, written at the side of the person.

MR. DRUMMOND TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Palermo, July 24th, 1808.*

DEAR SIR,—This letter will be delivered to you by his royal highness prince Leopold, second son of the king of the Two Sicilies. This prince goes immediately to Gibraltar to communicate immediately with the loyal Spaniards, and to notify to them that his father will accept the regency, if they desire it, until his nephew Ferdinand the Seventh be delivered from captivity. Don Leopold and his cousin the duke of Orleans will offer themselves as soldiers to the Spaniards, and will accept such situations as may be given to them suitable to their illustrious rank. If their visit should not be acceptable to the Spaniards, don Leopold will return to Sicily, and his serene highness the duke of Orleans will proceed to England. Being of opinion that the appearance of an infant of Spain may be of the greatest utility at the present crisis, and in all events can hardly be productive of harm, I have urged his Sicilian majesty to determine upon this measure, which I conceive to be required at his hands, in consequence of the manifesto of Palafox, which you have probably seen. At the distance of 1000 miles, however, we cannot be supposed to be accurately informed here of many circumstances with which you probably may be intimately acquainted; prince Leopold therefore will be directed to consult with you, and to follow your advice, which I have no doubt you will readily and cheerfully give him. I take the liberty at the same time of recommending him to your care and protection.

(Signed)

WM. DRUMMOND.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO  
LORD CASTLEREAGH.

*Gibraltar, August 10th, 1808.*

MY LORD,—Last night the Thunderer arrived here, having on board the duke of Orleans, the second prince of the Two Sicilies, and a considerable number of noblemen and others, the suite of the latter. As the ship came to anchor at a late hour, I had not the honour of seeing the duke of Orleans until near ten at night,

when he came accompanied by Captain Talbot. The duke first put into my hands a letter from Mr. Drummond, as captain Talbot did a despatch from sir Alexander Ball, copies of which I have the honour to enclose. As the latter seemed bulky, I did not immediately open it, and therefore did not immediately remark that sir Alexander Ball *did not seem aware* that the prince of the Two Sicilies was coming down, much less that he meditated establishing his residence at Gibraltar for the avowed purpose of negotiating for the regency of Spain. Of this object the duke of Orleans made no mystery, and proceeded to arrange the time and manner of the prince's reception in the morning, and the accommodation that should be prepared for him, suited to his rank, and capable of containing his attendants. I took early occasion first to remark the ill effect this measure might produce in Spain at the moment when the establishment of a central government had become obviously necessary, and would naturally lead to much intrigue and disunion, until the sentiments of the people and the armies (which would naturally assemble for the purpose of expelling the enemy from their territory) should be pronounced. . . . .

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM LORD CASTLEREAGH TO  
SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Downing Street, Nov. 4th, 1808.*

'I have great pleasure, however, in assuring you that the measures pursued by you on that delicate and important subject' (the unexpected arrival of prince Leopold and the duke of Orleans at Gibraltar) 'received his majesty's entire approbation.'  
(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

No. IX.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD.

*Head-quarters, at Livos, August 8th, 1808.*

SIR,—Having received instructions from the secretary of state that you were likely to arrive on the coast of Portugal with a corps of 10,000 men, lately employed in the north of Europe under the orders of sir John Moore, I now submit to you such information as I have received regarding the general state of the war in Portugal and Spain, and the plan of operations which I am about to carry into execution.

The enemy's force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, of which number there are about 500 in the fort of Almeida, about the same number in Elvos, about 6 or 800 in Peniché, and 16 or 1800 in the province of Alemtejo, at Setuval, &c.; and the remainder are disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. Julian and Caseaes, in the batteries along the coast as

far as the rock of Lisbon, and the old citadel at Lisbon, to which the enemy have lately added some works.

Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have lately detached a corps of about 2000, under general Thomieres, principally I believe to watch my movements, which corps is now at Alcobaca; and another corps of 4000 men, under general Loison, was sent across the Tagus into Alemtejo on the 26th of last month, the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter, to force the Spanish corps, consisting of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora from Estremadura, to retire, and then to be enabled to add to the force destined for the defence of Lisbon the corps of French troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of Alemtejo; at all events Loison's corps will return to Lisbon, and the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left in the garrisons and forts on the coast and in the river.

The French army under Dupont, in Andalusia, surrendered on the 20th of last month to the Spanish army under Castaños; so that there are now no French troops in the south of Spain. The Spanish army of Galicia and Castille, to the northward, received a check at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th of July, from a French corps supposed to be under the command of general Bessières, which had advanced from Burgos.

The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benevente, and I understand there has since been an affair between the advanced posts in that neighbourhood, but I am not certain of it; nor am I acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the French, since the 14th July. When you will have been a short time in this country, and will have observed the degree to which the deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate knowledge on these subjects.

It is, however, certain that nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since the 14th of July; and from this circumstance I conclude that the corps called Bessières' attacked the Spanish army at Rio Seco solely with a view to cover the march of king Joseph Buonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st July. Besides their defeat at Andalusia, the enemy, as you may probably have heard, have been beat off in an attack upon Zaragoza, in Aragon, in another upon the city of Valencia; (in both of which it is said that they have lost many men;) and it is reported that, in Catalonia, two of their detachments have been cut off, and that they have lost the fort of Figueras in the Pyrenees, and that Barcelona is blockaded. Of these last-mentioned actions and operations I have seen no official accounts, but the report of them is generally circulated and believed; and at all events, whether these reports are founded or otherwise, it is obvious that the insurrection against the French is general throughout Spain; that large parties of Spaniards are in arms; amongst others, in particular, an army of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry, at Almaraz on the Tagus, in



Estremadura, and that the French cannot carry on their operations by means of small corps, I should imagine, from their inactivity, and from the misfortunes they have suffered, that they have not the means of collecting a force sufficiently large to oppose the progress of the insurrection and the efforts of the insurgents, and to afford supplies to their different detached corps, or that they find that they cannot carry on their operations with armies so numerous as they must find it necessary to employ without magazines.

In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards, their troops have been completely dispersed, their officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy, and their revolt under the circumstances in which it had taken place is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation.

The Portuguese may have in the northern part of the kingdom about 10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me towards Lisbon. The remainder with a Spanish detachment of about 1500 men which came from Galicia, are employed in a distant blockade of Almeida, and in the protection of Oporto, which is now the seat of government.

The insurrection is general throughout Alentejo and Algarve to the southward, and Entre Minho e Duero and Tras os Montes and Beira to the northward; but for want of arms the people can do nothing against the enemy.

Having consulted sir C. Cotton, it appeared to him and to me that the attack proposed upon Cascaes-bay was impracticable, because the bay is well defended by the fort of Cascaes and the other works constructed for its defence, and the ships of war could not approach sufficiently near to silence them. The landing in the Passa d'Arcos in the Tagus could not be effected without silencing fort St. Julian, which appeared to be impracticable to those who were to carry that operation into execution.

There are small bays within, which might admit of landing troops, and others to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, but they are all defended by works which must have been silenced; they are of small extent, and but few men could have landed at the same time. There is always a surf on them which affects the facility of landing at different times so materially, as to render it very doubtful whether the troops first landed could be supported in sufficient time by others, and whether the horses for the artillery and cavalry, and the necessary stores and provisions could be landed at all. These inconveniencies attending a landing in any of the bays near the rock of Lisbon would have been aggravated by the neighbourhood of the enemy to the landing-place, and by the exhausted state of the country in which the troops would have been landed. It was obviously the best plan, therefore, to land in the northern parts of Portugal, and I fixed upon Mondego bay as the nearest place which afforded any facility for landing, ex-



cepting Peniché, the landing-place of which peninsula is defended by a fort occupied by the enemy, which it would be necessary to attack regularly, in order to place the ships in safety.

A landing to the northward was further recommended, as it would ensure the co-operation of the Portuguese troops in the expedition to Lisbon. The whole of the corps placed under my command, including those under the command of general Spencer, having landed, I propose to march on Wednesday, and I shall take the road by Alcobaça and Obidos, with a view to keep up my communication by the sea-coast, and to examine the situation of Peniché, and I shall proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Mafra, and by the hills to the northward of that city.

As I understand from the secretary of state that a body of troops under the command of brigadier-general Ackland may be expected on the coast of Portugal before you arrive, I have written to desire he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by the means of captain Bligh of the Alfred, who will attend the movements of the army with a few transports, having on board provisions and military stores. I intend to order brigadier-general Ackland to attack Peniché, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession of that place, and if not, I propose to order him to join the fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one of the bays near the rock of Lisbon, as soon as I shall approach sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation. If I imagined that general Ackland's corps was equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to move from the coast, I should have directed him to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which station he would have been at hand either to assist my operations, or to cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavour to make it either by the north of the Tagus and Almeida, or by the south of the Tagus and Elvas; but as I am convinced that general Ackland's corps is intended to form a part of some other corps which is provided with a commissariat, that he will have none with him, and consequently that his corps must depend upon the country: and as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, I have considered it best to direct the general's attention to the sea-coast; if, however, the command of the army remained in my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has lately been under the command of sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it upon Santarem. I have the honour to enclose a return of the troops, &c. &c. (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD.

*Camp at Lugar, 8 miles north of Lerya, August 10, 1808.*

SIR,—Since I wrote to you on the 8th inst., I have received letters from Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle at Coruña, of which I enclose copies. From them you will learn the state of the war in that part of Spain, and you will observe that Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle are of opinion that marshal Bessières will take advantage of the

inefficiency of the Gallician army under general Blake to detach a corps to Portugal to the assistance of general Junot; we have not heard yet of that detachment, and I am convinced it will not be made till king Joseph Buonaparte will either be reinforced to such a degree as to be in safety in Madrid, or till he shall have effected his retreat into France, with which view it is reported that he left Madrid on the 29th of last month.

I conceive, therefore, that I have time for the operations which I propose to carry on before a reinforcement can arrive from Leon, even supposing that no obstacles would be opposed to its march in Spain or Portugal; but it is not probable that it can arrive before the different reinforcements will arrive from England; and as marshal Bessières had not more than 20,000 men in the action at Rio Seco on the 14th July, I conceive that the British troops, which will be in Portugal, will be equal to contend with any part of that corps which he may detach.

The possibility that, in the present state of affairs, the French corps at present in Portugal may be reinforced, affords an additional reason for taking the position at Santarem, which I apprised you, in my letter of the 8th, I should occupy, if the command of the army remained in my hands after the reinforcements should arrive. If you should occupy it, you will not only be in the best situation to support my operations, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, but if any reinforcements of the French troops should enter Portugal, you will be in the best situation to collect your whole force to oppose him, &c. &c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## No. X.

### ARTICLES OF THE DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.

The generals commanding in chief, &c., &c., being determined to negotiate, &c., &c.

Article 1. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be given up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

Art. 2. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

Art. 3. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France, between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.

Art. 4. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging thereunto, and the

tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun: all other artillery arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.

Art. 5. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its accounts, as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

Art. 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

Art. 7. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the place, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

Art. 8. The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniché and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon. That of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

Art. 9. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are entrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which will take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

Art. 10. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which the stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given to them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

Art. 11. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon,

and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

Art. 12. The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio, and Cascaes, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as the lazaretta or Trafaria on one side, and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the 2nd division; as shall also the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniché, and Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the meantime, the general-in-chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.

Art. 13. Commissioners shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

Art. 14. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.

Art. 15. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, moveable or immovable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

Art. 16. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected; their property of every kind, moveable and immovable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only however in as far as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculations.

Art. 17. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property: it not having been at their



option to be obedient or not to the French government, they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.

Art. 18. The Spanish troops detained on board ship, in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without having been taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.

Art. 19. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.

Art. 20. Hostages of the rank of field officers shall be mutually furnished, on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

Art. 21. It shall be allowed to the general-in-chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bordeaux or Rochefort.

Art. 22. The British admiral will be invited to accommodate his excellency the commander-in-chief and the other principal officers of the French army on board ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general.

KELLERMAN, le général de division.

#### ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.

Art. 1. The individuals in the civil employment of the army made prisoners either by the British troops or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without exchange.

Art. 2. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation. The garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual forms to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods till their arrival in France, under the condition of being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army. The provisions on board the ships of war in the possession of the French army will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines of the fortresses.

Art. 3. The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general.

KELLERMAN, le général de division.

Ratified, &c. &c.

## No. XI.

### 1st. LETTER FROM BARON VON DECKEN TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY IN PORTUGAL.

*Oporto, August 18th, 1808.*

SIR,—The bishop of Oporto having expressed to me his wish to see me in private, in order to make me an important communication, which he desired to be kept secret, I went to his palace last night at a late hour. The bishop told me that he had taken the government of Portugal in his hands to satisfy the wish of the people, but with the intention to re-establish the government of his lawful sovereign; and he hoped that his majesty the King of Great Britain had no other point in view in sending troops to this country. After having given him all possible assurance on that head, the bishop continued that as the prince regent, in leaving Portugal, had established a regency for the government of this country during his absence, he considered it his duty to resign the government into the hands of that regency as soon as possible. My answer was, that I had no instruction from my government on that head, but that I begged him to consider whether the cause of his sovereign would not be hurt in resigning the government into the hands of a regency which, from its having acted under the influence of the French, had lost the confidence of the nation, and whether it would not be more advisable for him to keep the government until the pleasure of the prince regent was known. The bishop allowed that the regency appointed by the prince regent did not possess the confidence of the people, that several members of it had acted in such a manner as to show themselves as friends and partisans of the French, and that, at all events, all the members of the late regency could not be re-established in their former power; but he was afraid that the provinces of Estremadura, Alemtejo, and Algarvé, would not acknowledge his authority if the British government did not interfere. After a very long conversation, it was agreed that I should inform our ministers with what the bishop had communicated to me, and in order to lose no time in waiting for an answer, the bishop desired me to communicate the same to you, expressing a wish that you would be pleased to write to him an official letter, in order to express your desire that he might continue the government until the pleasure of his

sovereign was known, for the sake of the operations of the British and Portuguese troops under your command.

The secretary of the bishop, who acted as interpreter, told me afterwards in private, that the utmost confusion would arise from the bishop resigning the government at this moment, or associating with people who were neither liked nor esteemed by the nation.

I beg leave to add, that although the bishop expressed the contrary, yet it appeared to me that he was not averse to his keeping the government in his hands, if it could be done by the interference of our government. I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig.-gen.

2nd. DITTO TO DITTO.

*Oporto, August 22, 1808.*

SIR,—Your excellency will have received the secret letter which I had the honour to send you by brigadier-general Stuart, on the 18th, respecting the communication of his excellency the bishop of Oporto relative to his resignation of the government into the hands of the regency established by the prince regent. In addition to what I have had the honour to state upon that subject, I beg leave to add, that his excellency the bishop has this day desired me to make your excellency aware, in case it might be wished that he should keep the government in his hands until the pleasure of the prince regent may be known, that he could not leave Oporto; and the seat of government must in that case necessarily remain in this town. His excellency the bishop thinks it his duty to inform you of this circumstance as soon as possible, as he foresees that the city of Lisbon will be preferred for the seat of government, as soon as the British army have got possession of it. If the seat of the temporary government should remain at Oporto, the best method to adopt with respect to the other provinces of Portugal appears to be, to cause them to send deputies to that place for the purpose of transacting business relative to their own provinces; in the same manner as the provinces of Entre Douro y Minho and Tras os Montes now send their representatives. One of the principal reasons why his excellency the bishop can only accede to continue at the head of the government under the condition of remaining at Oporto is, because he is persuaded that the inhabitants of this town will not permit him to leave it, unless by order of the prince regent. It might also be advisable to keep the seat of government at Oporto, as it may be supposed that Lisbon will be in a state of great confusion for the first two months after the French have left it. I have the honour to be, sir, &c. &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig.-gen.

3rd.

*Oporto, August 28.*

SIR,—Your excellency will have received my secret letters of the 18th and 22nd instant relative to the temporary government

of this kingdom. His excellency the bishop of Oporto has received lately deputies from the province of Alemtejo and the kingdom of Algarve. Part of Estremadura, viz. the town of Leiria, has also submitted to his authority; and it may be therefore said that the whole kingdom of Portugal has acknowledged the authority of the temporary government, of which the bishop of Oporto is at the head, with the exception of Lisbon and the town of Setubal, (St. Ubes.) Although the reasons why these towns have not yet acknowledged the authority of the temporary government may be explained by their being in possession of the French; yet the bishop is convinced that the inhabitants of Lisbon will refuse to submit to the temporary government of Oporto, in which they will be strongly supported by the members of the former regency established by the prince regent, who of course will be very anxious to resume their former power. The bishop in assuming the temporary government complied only with the wishes of the people: he was sure that it was the only means of saving the country; but having had no interest of his own in view, he is willing to resign the authority, which he has accepted with reluctance, as soon as he is convinced that it can be done without hurting the cause of his sovereign, and throwing the country into confusion. There is every reason to apprehend that the inhabitants of the three northern provinces of Portugal will never permit the bishop to resign the government, and submit to the former regency. They feel extremely proud of having first taken to arms, and consider themselves as the deliverers and saviours of their country; and as the inhabitants of Lisbon will be as much disinclined to submit to the temporary government of Oporto, a division of the provinces, which will excite internal commotion, will naturally follow, if not supported by your excellency. It has appeared to me that the best way to reconcile these opposite parties would be in endeavouring to unite the present government at Oporto with such of the members of the former regency who have not forfeited by their conduct the confidence of the people; and having opened my idea to the bishop, his answer was, that he would not object to it if proposed by you. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting, that the difficulty above mentioned would be in a great measure removed if your excellency would be pleased to make it known after Lisbon has surrendered, that until the pleasure of the prince regent was known, you would consider the temporary government established at Oporto as the lawful government, with the addition of the four members of the late regency, who have been pointed out to me by the bishop as such who have behaved faithfully to their sovereign and country—viz. *don Francisco Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal Castro*. These members to be placed at the head of the different departments, and to consider the bishop as the president, whose directions they are to follow—a plan which will meet with the less difficulty, as the president of the former regency, named by the prince regent, has quitted Portugal, and



is now in France. The circumstance that Lisbon is now in a state of the greatest confusion will furnish a fair pretext for fixing the seat of the temporary government in the first instance at Oporto, to which place the gentlemen above-named would be ordered to repair without loss of time, and to report themselves to the bishop. Independent of the reasons which I had the honour of stating to your excellency in my letter of the 22nd instant, why it is impossible for the bishop to leave Oporto, I must beg leave to add, that, from what I understand, the greater part of the inhabitants of Lisbon are in the French interest, and that it will require a garrison of British troops to keep that city in order. The bishop of Oporto, although convinced of the necessity of considering Lisbon at present as a military station, and of placing a British commandant and a British garrison there, yet from a desire that the feelings of the inhabitants might be wounded as little as possible, wishes that you would be pleased to put also some Portuguese troops in garrison at Lisbon, together with a Portuguese commandant, who, though entirely under the orders of the British governor, might direct the police in that town, or at least be charged with putting into execution such orders as he may receive from the British governor under that head. If your excellency should be pleased to approve of this proposal, the bishop thinks brigadier Antonio Pinto Bacelar to be the properest officer of those who are now with the Portuguese army to be stationed at Lisbon, and who might also be directed to organize the military force of the province of Estremadura. The bishop is fully convinced that the temporary government of the country cannot exist without the support of British troops: he hopes that our government will leave a corps of 6000 men in Portugal after the French have been subdued, until the Portuguese troops may be sufficiently organised and disciplined to be able to protect their own government. I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

FREDERICK VON DECKEN, brig.-gen.

---

## No. XII.

[Translation.]

### LETTER FROM GENERAL LEITE TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR,—Strength is the result of union, and those who have reason to be grateful should be most urgent in their endeavours to promote it. I therefore feel it to be my duty to have recourse to your excellency to know how I should act without disturbing the union so advantageous to my country. The supreme junta of the Portuguese government established at Oporto, which I have hitherto obeyed as the representatives of my sovereign, have sent me

orders by an officer, dated the 1st instant, to take possession of the fortress of Elvas, as soon as it shall be evacuated. After having seen those same Spaniards who got possession of our strong places as friends, take so much upon themselves as even to prevent the march of the garrison which I had ordered to replace the losses sustained in the battle of Evora, which deprived me of the little obedience that was shown by the city of Beja, always favoured by the Spanish authorities; after having seen the Portuguese artillery which was saved after the said battle taken possession of by those same Spaniards, who had lost their own, without being willing even to lend me two three-pounders to enable me to join his excellency the Monteiro Mor; after having seen the arms which were saved from the destructive grasp of the common enemy made use of by those same Spaniards *who promised much and did nothing*; after having seen a Spanish brigadier dispute my authority at Campo Mayor, where I was president of the junta, and from whence his predecessor had taken away 60,000 crowns without rendering any account; in a word, after having seen the march of these Spaniards marked by the devastation of our fields, and the country deserted to avoid the plunder of their light troops, I cannot for a moment mistake the cause of the orders given by the supreme junta of Oporto. A corps of English troops having yesterday passed Estrémos, on their road to Elvas, knowing that in a combined army no officer should undertake any operation which may be intended for others, thereby counteracting each other, I consulted lieutenant-general Hierre (Hope), who has referred me to your excellency, to whom in consequence I send lieutenant-colonel the marquis of Terney, my quarter-master-general, that he may deliver you this letter, and explain verbally everything you may wish to know which relates to my sovereign and the good of my country, already so much indebted to the English nation.

God preserve your excellency many years.

(Signed) FRANCISCO DE PAULO LEITE, lieut.-general.

(Dated) *Estrémos*, 16th September, 1808.

To the most illustrious and most excellent  
sir Hew Dalrymple.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO  
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN HOPE.

*Head-quarters, Benefico, 25th Sept. 1808.*

SIR,—Impediments having arisen to the fulfilment of that article of the convention which relates to the cession of Elvas by the French to the British army, in consequence of the unexpected and unaccountable conduct of the commander-in-chief of the army of Estremadura, in bombarding that place and endeavouring to impose upon the French garrison terms of capitulation different from those which were agreed upon by the British and French generals in chief; and as the British corps sent to take possession of the above fortress, and to hold it in the name of

the prince regent until reinforced by a body of Portuguese troops is not of sufficient strength to preclude the possibility of insult should the general above-mentioned persevere in the contemptuous and hostile disposition he has hitherto shown; I have therefore thought it advisable to order the remainder of your division, and general Paget's advanced guard, to cross the Tagus, and to occupy cantonments as near as possible to the place above-mentioned. In the mean time colonel Graham is gone to Badajos to expostulate with general Galluzzo on the singular and very inexplicable line of conduct he has seen cause to adopt. . . .

## No. XIII.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE  
OF SIR JOHN MOORE AND OTHER PERSONS.

## SECTION I.—RELATING TO WANT OF MONEY.

*Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808.*

‘Sir David Baird has unfortunately been sent out without money. He has applied to me, and I have none to give him.’ . . . ‘I undertake my march in the hope that some will arrive; if it does not, it will add to the number of a great many distresses.’

*Sir John Moore to general Hope, October 22, 1808.*

‘Baird has sent his aide-de-camp Gordon to me: he is without money and his troops only paid to September. He can get none at Coruña.

*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird, October 22, 1808.*

‘We are in such want of money at this place, that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare 8000*l.*, which went to you in the Champion this day.

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 27.*

‘It is upon the general assurance of the Spanish government that I am leading the army into Spain without any established magazines. In this situation nothing is more essentially requisite than money, and unfortunately we have been able to procure very little here.’

*Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, November 10, 1808.*

‘I understand from sir David Baird that you were kind enough to lend him 40,000*l.* from the money you brought with you from England. We are in the greatest distress for money. I doubt if there is wherewithal after the 24th of this month to pay the troops their subsistence.’

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, November 24, 1808.*

‘I am without a shilling of money to pay, and I am in daily apprehension that from the want of it our supplies will be stopped. It is impossible to describe the embarrassments we are thrown into from the want of that essential article.’

*Admiral de Courcy to Mr. Stuart, Coruña, October 21, 1808.*

‘Mr. Frere will have told you that the Semiramis has brought a million of dollars, in order to be at his disposal, besides, 50,000*l.* in dollars, which are to be presented to the marquis of Romana’s army. In the meantime, the British troops remain in their transports at Coruña, uncertain whether they shall be invited to the war, and *without a shilling to pay their expenses.*’

## SECTION II.—RELATING TO ROADS.

*Sir John Moore to general Anstruther. at Almeida, dated Lisbon, October 12, 1808.*

‘A division under Beresford is marching upon Coimbra, and a part of it will proceed on to Oporto or not, as information is received from you that the road from thence to Almeida, is or is not practicable. Some officers of the Spanish engineers, employed in the quarter-master-general’s department, with commissaries, are sent from Madrid to obtain information on the subjects you will want with respect to roads, subsistence, &c. &c. from Almeida to Burgos.’

*Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808.*

‘Colonel Lopez has no personal knowledge of this part of Spain; but what he has told me accords with other information I had before received, that the great Madrid road was the only one by which artillery could travel; the French brought theirs from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, but by this *it was destroyed.*’  
 . . . . ‘The difficulty of obtaining correct information of roads, and the difficulties attending the subsistence of troops through Portugal, are greater than you can believe.’

*Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, November 20.*

‘I sent Wills of the engineers by Placentia to Salamanca, and before this time I suppose he may have made his report to you of the roads from the Tagus at Almarez and Puente de Cardinal to Salamanca.’ . . . . ‘Delancy is upon this road, and I have directed him to communicate with you at Salamanca, as soon as possible.’

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 27, 1808.*

‘I am under the necessity of sending lieutenant-general Hope, with the artillery, &c. by the great road leading from Badajos to Madrid, as *every* information agreed that no other was fit for the artillery.’



*Substance of a report from captain Carmichael Smyth, of the engineers, 26th December, 1808.*

‘The country round about Astorga is perfectly open, and affords no advantage whatsoever to a small corps to enable it to oppose a large force with any prospect of success. In retreating, however, towards Villa Franca, at the distance of about two leagues from Astorga, the hills approaching each other form some strong ground; and the high ground in particular in the rear of the village of Rodrigatos appears at first sight to offer a most advantageous position. One very serious objection presents itself nevertheless to our making a stand near Rodrigatos, or indeed at any position before we come to the village of Las Torres (about one league from Bembibre); as the talus or slope of the ground, from Manzanel (close to Rodrigatos) until Las Torres, would be in favour of an enemy, should we be forced at Rodrigatos, and we should be consequently obliged to retreat down hill for nearly two leagues, the enemy having every advantage that such a circumstance would naturally give them.

‘From Las Torres to Bembibre the ground becomes more open, but with the disadvantage, however, of the slope being still against us. From Bembibre to Villa Franca there is great variety of ground but no position that cannot easily be turned, excepting the ground in the rear of Calcavellos, and about one league in front of Villa Franca. This is by far the strongest position between Astorga and Villa Franca. It is also necessary to add, that the position at Rodrigatos can easily be turned by the Foncevadon Road (which, before the establishment of the Camina Real, was the high road towards Coruña). This is not the case with the position in front of Villa Franca, as the Foncevadon road joins the Camina Real to Calcavellos in front of the proposed position.’

*Major Fletcher, royal engineers, to sir John Moore, Betanzos, Jan. 5, 1809.*

‘I have the honour to report to your excellency that, in obedience to your orders, I have examined the neck of land between the harbour of Ferrol and the bridge of Puente de Humo. This ground does not appear to possess any position that has not several defects.’ . . . ‘I did not find any ground so decidedly advantageous and containing a small space, as to render it tenable for the vanguard of an army to cover the embarkation of the main body.’ . . . ‘I should have sent this report much sooner, but found it impossible to procure post-horses until my arrival at Lugo, and since that time I have had very bad ones.’

*Ditto to Ditto, Coruña, Jan. 6, 1809.*

‘I am therefore led to suggest, that as Coruña is fortified, reveted, and tolerably flanked (though the ground about it is certainly not favourable), as it could not be carried by a coup-

de-main if properly defended, as it contains a great quantity of cover for men, and as, even against artillery, it might make resistance of some days, it may be worth consideration whether, under present circumstances, it may not be desirable to occupy it in preference to the peninsula of Betanzos, should the army not turn off for Vigo.'

### SECTION III.—RELATING TO EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Oct. 9, 1808.*

'At this instant the army is without equipment of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or other appendages of an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes by which we are to march.'

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Oct. 18, 1808.*

'In none of the departments is there any want of zeal, but in some important ones there is much want of experience.' . . .  
'I have no hope of getting forward at present with more than the light baggage of the troops, the ammunition immediately necessary for the service of the artillery, and a very scanty supply of medicines.'

*Sir John Moore's Journal.*

'My anxiety is to get out of the ragged roads of Portugal before the rains.'

*Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, Oct. 22, 1808.*

'The season of the year admitting of no delay, there was a necessity for beginning the march, and trusting for information and supplies as we get on; unfortunately our commissariat is inexperienced, and a scoundrel of a contractor, Mr. Sattaro, has deceived us.'

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Oct. 29, 1808.*

'The want of provisions for the men and forage for the horses has been one of the most serious obstacles we have had to contend with. Nor do I at present feel at all easy upon that subject.' . . . 'The horses are suffering very severely, both for want of proper accommodations and food.' . . . 'From lord Castlereagh's letter, I was led to expect that every preparation for our equipment had been made previous to our leaving England; I need hardly say how difficult the case was, and how much I have been disappointed.'

*Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, November 17, 1808.*

'The continued slowness of the junta is the only explanation I can offer for the want of proper arrangements on the routes for the reception of the English troops.'

## SECTION IV.—RELATING TO THE WANT OF INFORMATION.

*Sir John Moore's Journal, November 28, 1808.*

'I am not in communication with any of the (Spanish) generals, and neither know their plans nor those of the government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what, as a stranger, I pick up.'

*Ditto, Salamanca.*

'It is singular that the French have penetrated so far (Valladolid), and yet no sensation has been made upon the people. They seem to remain quiet, and the information was not known through any other channel but that of a letter from the captain-general of the province to me.'

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Astorga, Nov. 19, 1808.*

'The local authorities have not only failed in affording us the least benefit in that respect (supplies), but have neglected to give us any kind of information as to the proceedings of the armies or the motions of the enemy.'

*Ditto, Astorga, 23rd November.*

'It is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been.' . . . 'It is very remarkable that I have not procured the least intelligence, or received any sort of communication from any of the official authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish generals.'

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Villafranca, Dec. 12, 1808.*

'I also enclose a letter from the marquis of Romana; you will be fully able to appreciate the degree of reliance that may be placed on the *verbal* communication made to him by the extraordinary courier from Madrid. It was from the same kind of authority that he derived the information he conveyed to me of a *supposed* brilliant affair at Somosierra, which turned out to be an inconsiderable skirmish altogether undeserving of notice.'

*Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.*

'The deputies sent over knew nothing but just concerning their own provinces, and *pour se faire valoir*, they exaggerated everything; for example, those of the Asturias talked louder than anybody, and Asturias as yet has never produced a man to the army; thus government, with all their wish to get information (which cannot be doubted), fail in the proper means.'

*Lord Wm. Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.*

'I must at the same time take the liberty of stating my belief, that reliance cannot be placed upon the correctness of informa-

tion, even if such information should not be kept back, which does not come through the channel of a British officer. It is the choice of officers rather than the system, that seems to have failed.'

*Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 19, 1808.*

'In your direct communications with Spanish generals, you must, however, be contented with their version of the state of affairs, which I do not think can always be relied on, because they only put matters in the view in which they wish you to see them.'

*Ditto, Nov. 29.*

'The calculation of force which the junta hope may be united in the army under your command will be as follows, if no impediment prevents the different corps. reaching the points selected for their junction.'

		Remarks by colonel Napier.
British . . . . .	25,000	They were only 23,500.
La Romana . . . . .	20,000	. . . only 5000 armed.
San Juan . . . . .	15,000	Totally dispersed.
Levies from the south, say	10,000	None ever arrived.
	80,000	Real total, 28,500.

*Lieut. Boothby, royal engineers, to sir John Moore, La Puebla, Jan. 1, 1809.*

'I shall consider of any means that may more completely ensure the earliest information of the enemy's movements towards this quarter; but the Spaniards are the most difficult people in the world to employ in this way, they are so slow, so talkative, and so credulous.'

#### SECTION V.—RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE LOCAL JUNTAS.

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Coruña, Oct. 24, 1808.*

'The answer of the supreme government to our application, as read by Mr. Frere last night in the presence of the junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing an anxiety to promote our views, and dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in the way of our measures by the Gallician government, it merely permits us to land here in the event of its being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero, and directs that, if our disembarkation takes place, it should be made in detachments of 2000 or 3000 men each! to be successively pushed on into Castille, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses.'

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Coruña, Nov. 7.*

'We have received no sort of assistance from the government.'



*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Astorga, Nov. 19.*

‘Had the Spanish government afforded us any active assistance, the state of our equipments would have been much more advanced.’

*Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.*

‘All this, instead of at once appointing the fittest men in the country to be ministers, looks much like private interest and patronage being the objects more than the public good.’

*Ditto, Tudela, Nov. 9, 1808.*

‘*It is hoped* that the Aragonese army will come over to fill it’ (the line) ‘up, but being an independent command, no order has yet been sent. An express went after Palafox, who will return here this morning, and *then it is hoped* that he will send an order to general O’Neil at Sangüessa to march instantly; and *further it is hoped* that general O’Neil will obey this order without waiting for one from his immediate chief, Palafox, the captain-general of Aragon, who is at Zaragoza; at all events, there is a loss of above twenty-four hours by the happy system of independent commands, which may make the difference of our having 18,000 men more or less in the battle that may be fought whenever the French are ready.’ . . . ‘Making me compliments of there being no secrets with their allies, they’ (the members of the council of war) ‘obliged me to sit down, which I did for a quarter of an hour, enough to be quite satisfied of the miserable system established by this junta.’ . . . ‘In short, I pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the greatest degree.’

*Colonel Graham to lord W. Bentinck, Centruenigo,  
Nov. 13, 1808.*

‘If anything can make the junta sensible of the absurdity of their conduct this will. It would indeed have been more felt if a great part of the division had been lost, as might well have happened. But the difficulty of passing so many men with artillery, and in small boats, and the time that would have been required so great, that I can hardly persuade myself these people can be so foolish as ever seriously to have entertained the idea. But with whatever intentions, whether merely as a pretence for assuming the command for the purpose of irritating Castaños; whether from the silly vanity of exercising power, and doing something which, if by great good luck it had succeeded, might have proved what might be done with a more active commander; or whether from a real conviction of the excellence of the scheme,—it must be equally evident to every military man, indeed to every man of common sense, that it is impossible things can succeed in this way; and then the junta itself interferes, and to worse purpose.’

*Castañón's Vindication.*

'The nation is deceived in a thousand ways; as an example, it is believed that our armies were greatly superior to those of the enemy, reckoning 80,000 men that of the centre, when your excellencies' (the junta) 'knew that it only amounted to 26,000 men.' . . . 'Madrid possessed money and riches; the nobles and loyal inhabitants of that capital wished to give both the one and the other; but whilst the armies were suffering the horrors of famine, naked, and miserable, the possessions and jewels of the good Spaniards remained quiet in Madrid, and they might be soon seized by the tyrant, as they were in the end.'

*Stuart's Despatch, August 7, 1808.*

'No province shares the succours granted by Great Britain, although they may not be actually useful to themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect Santander or the coast of Biscay; and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts of Gallicia. The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of general Blake. The money brought by the Pluto for Leon, which has not raised a man, remains in the port where it was landed.'

*Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 3, 1808.*

'I freely confess that I cannot help feeling some degree of apprehension that this great and glorious cause may be ruined by the baneful effects of jealousy and division.'

*Ditto, August 27.*

'The fact is, their' (the junta of Seville) 'attention has been for some time past so much occupied by vain and frivolous disputes, and by views of private interest and advantage, and they seem to have neglected entirely every concern of real importance, and almost to have lost sight of the general interests of the country.' . . . 'A million of dollars have, I understand, been sent out.' . . . 'It certainly would not be prudent to intrust so large a sum to the management of the temporary government of a particular province, without having a sufficient security for its proper application. My own opinion is, that the less money which is given to them the better, until the general government is formed. This junta have shown too evident signs of a wish to aggrandize themselves, and a disinclination to afford those aids to other provinces, which they had it in their power to grant, not to afford just grounds of suspicion, that their boasted loyalty and patriotism have at times been mixed with unworthy considerations of self-interest and personal advantage.'

*Ditto, Sept. 5.*

'By Mr. Duff's present instructions, he would have had no

option' (distributing the money), 'even though the *iniquitous project of partition*, which your excellency knows was once contemplated, were still in existence.'

*Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Sept. 7.*

'A dispute between the two juntas' (Seville and Grenada), 'which had nearly been productive of the most serious consequences, and would probably have ended in open hostility, had it not been prevented by the moderate, but decided, conduct of general Castaños.'

*Ditto, Seville, Sept. 10.*

'The supreme junta of Seville have latterly manifested very different views, and, I am sorry to say, they seem almost to have lost sight of the common cause, and to be wholly addicted to their particular interest. Instead of directing their efforts to the restoration of their legitimate sovereign and the established form of national government, they are seeking the means of fixing the permanency of their own, and endeavouring to separate its interests from those of the other parts of Spain. To what other purposes can be attributed the order given to general Castaños, not to march on any account beyond Madrid? To what the instructions given to their deputy, don Andrea Miniano, to uphold the authority and preserve the integrity of the junta of Seville; to distinguish the army to which he is attached by the name of the army of Andalusia; to preserve constantly the appellation, and not to receive any orders but what came directly from this government? And above all, what other motive could induce the strong and decided measure of enforcing obedience to those orders, by withholding from general Castaños the means of maintaining his troops, in case of his refusing to comply with them?' . . . 'What has been the late occupation of the junta of Seville? Setting aside the plans which were formed for augmenting the Spanish army in those provinces, and neglecting the consideration of those which have been proposed in their stead, their attention has been taken up in the appointment of secretaries to the different departments, in disposing of places of emolument, in making promotions in the army, appointing canons in the church, and instituting orders of knighthood. Such steps as these make their designs too evident.'

*Captain Carrol to sir David Baird, Llanes, Dec. 17, 1808.*

'This province' (Asturias), 'the first to declare war with France, has, during seven months, taken no steps that I can discover to make arrangements against the event of the enemy's entering the province.' . . . 'What has been done with the vast sums of money that came from England? you will naturally ask. Plundered and misapplied: every person who had or has anything to do with money concerns endeavouring to keep in hand all he can, and be ready, let affairs turn out as they may, to help himself.'

*General Broderick to Mr. Stuart, Reynosa, 11th Sept. 1808.*

‘The fact is, the junta of Galicia thinks that this army having marched to the assistance and protection of these countries, the latter ought to pay the expense, and therefore refuse the supplies, which Blake is unwilling to press.’

*Lord William Bentinck to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, Sept. 19, 1808.*

‘Notwithstanding the professions of the junta, their conduct has evidently fallen short of them, and I think it would be very desirable that more money should not fall into their hands.’

*Major Cox to sir H. Dalrymple, Seville, 10th and 27th July.*

‘The proclamation of Florida Blanca was received here some time ago, but was carefully suppressed by the government.’

‘Other publications, containing maxims similar to those inculcated by the proclamation of Florida Blanca, have appeared, but are suppressed here with equal care.’

#### SECTION VI.—CENTRAL JUNTA.

*Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning, Sept. 26, 1808.*

‘I have heard of several circumstances since my arrival at Aranjuez, which throw a light upon the conduct of general Cuesta, and, if well founded, go far to prove the existence of projects incompatible with the formation of any regular government in the country. I cannot say they are openly avowed by either party, although the measures of precaution, which the leading members of the junta have deemed expedient, go far to prove that the whispers which circulate are not altogether without foundation. It is said that the difficulty of forming a central junta induced Cuesta to propose to Castaños the establishment of a military power, alleging that, in the present situation of the corps under his command, he would take on himself to prevent the union of the central junta, and that his influence with the officers in other parts of Spain would enable him to crush all opposition, by the instant disorganization of the provisional government in the provinces of the kingdom. And I know, indeed, that the movement of Cuesta from Arevola to Segovia gave so much alarm at Madrid, and so fully convinced the public that he was going to carry this design into execution, that Castaños was formally requested to give orders for the approach of a division to Madrid, to be ready to oppose any act of violence calculated to bias the determination of the persons about to form the government.’

*Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning, Oct. 9, 1808.*

‘I have received the paper (of which I enclose a copy) from the supreme junta. Although somewhat startled at the exorbitancy of the demand, I was no less so at the language in which the



demand is conveyed, and the conversation I have subsequently had upon the subject. However willing I am to make every possible allowance for the embarrassments of this rising government, and the inexperience or intemperance of many among its members, I cannot but feel that the generosity of Great Britain not only called for some acknowledgment of what has been already done in favour of Spain, but that it likewise might have deserved a petition couched in terms less resembling a military requisition.' When it was observed to Mr. de Villar (the author of the note) that 'the demand for specie much exceeded the means of any country in the world, he said credit or specie was indifferent, provided they could obtain a part of what was requisite for present services. Mr. de Jovellaños was not so moderate, and *literally* proposed that I should draw bills at once on the treasury for the whole, or at least engage the faith of his majesty's government by such a promise as should enable them to raise money by anticipation, upon my signature, until the arrival of a British subsidy.' . . . 'It was seriously demanded also, that the English government should seize the sums which the Prince of Peace and other friends of the French interest *are supposed* to have in the English funds; nor could my explanation, citing several well-known instances to prove the impossibility of such a measure, and the determination to keep inviolable whatever was deposited under the guardianship of the public faith, prevent Mr. de Jovellaños and others from testifying some ill-humour and incredulity at my answer.'

*Lord William Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.*

'I am sorry to say that the new government do not seem to proceed with the despatch and energy which the critical situation of the country demands.'

*Ditto to sir H. Burrard, Madrid, Oct. 8.*

'In my last letter I adverted to the inactivity and apparent supineness which prevailed in the central council in regard to the military, as well as to the other business of the government.'

*Ditto to sir John Moore, Nov. 8.*

'But it is upon the spot where the exact state of the armies, and the extraordinary inefficiency of the government, whose past conduct promises so little for the future, are known, that the danger must be more justly appreciated.' . . . 'The most simple order, however urgent the case, cannot be obtained from the government without a difficulty, solicitation, and delay that is quite incredible.'

*Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.*

'It is perfectly evident that they' (the junta) 'are altogether without a plan as to their future military operations, either in the case of success or misfortune. Every branch is affected by the disjointed and inefficient construction of their government.'

*Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808.*

‘Lord William Bentinck, as well as myself, have made repeated representations, and I have given in paper after paper to obtain something like promptitude and vigour; but though loaded with fair promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits, and the wrangling which impedes even the simplest arrangements necessary for the interior government of a country.’  
 . . . ‘In short, we are doing what we can, not what we wish; and I assure you we have infamous tools to work with.’

*Ditto, Seville, Jan. 2, 1809.*

‘Morla’s treason is abused, but passed over; and the arrival of money from Mexico, which is really the arrival of spoil for the French, seems to have extinguished every sentiment the bad views and the desperate state of things ought to have created.’

*Ditto, Jan. 10, 1809.*

‘Castaños, Heredia, Castelar, and Galluzzo are all here. These unfortunate officers are either prisoners or culprits, waiting the decision of government on their conduct in the late transactions. If the state of affairs should allow the government to continue in existence, they will probably wait many months, for no determination is to be expected from people who have in no one instance punished guilt or rewarded merit since they ruled the country. The junta indeed, to say the truth, is at present absolutely null, and although they represent the sovereign authority, I have never witnessed the exercise of their power for the public good.’

*Mr. Frere to sir John Moore, Las Santos, Dec. 16, 1808.*

‘The subject of the ships in Cadiz had not escaped me, but I thought it so *very dangerous* to suggest to the junta any idea except that of living and dying on Spanish ground, that I avoided the mention of any subject that could seem to imply that I entertained any other prospects.’

#### SECTION VII.—RELATING TO THE PASSIVE STATE OF THE PEOPLE.

*Sir John Moore’s Journal, Dec. 9, 1808.*

‘In this part the people are passive. We find the greatest difficulty to get people to bring in information.’

*Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Sahagun, Dec. 23, 1808.*

‘If the Spaniards are enthusiastic, or much interested in this cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that was ever exhibited.’

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.*

‘I arrived here yesterday, where contrary to his promise, and to my expectation, I found the marquis la Romana, with a great part of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the inhabitants, his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm; and said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he would neither have accepted the command, nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army and of the country.’

*Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Nov. 17, 1808.*

‘The tranquillity of Madrid is truly wonderful.’

*Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Dec. 6.*

‘Destitute as we are of magazines, and without receiving even a show of assistance either from the government or inhabitants of the country, who, on the contrary, in many instances, even thwarted our plans and measures, we could not have advanced without exposing ourselves to almost certain destruction.’

*Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh, Astorga, Nov. 22, 1808.*

‘Major Stuart, of the 95th regiment, who was despatched in front of this place to obtain information, reports that the inhabitants appear perfectly depressed by their losses, and seem to abandon all hope of making a successful resistance.’

*Captain Carrol to sir John Moore, Dec. 17, 1808.*

‘On my arrival at Oviedo all was confusion and dismay; the confidence between the people, the army, and the junta destroyed.’  
 . . . ‘Is it to be expected that the peasantry can be as hearty in the cause of patriotism as if they were treated with justice?’

*Lieut. Boothby to sir J. Moore, La Puebla, Jan. 1, 1809.*

‘The Spanish soldiers now here (about 700) are merely on their way to the marquis de la Romana; and as to any neighbouring passes, there are no people whom I can call upon to occupy them, or should expect to defend them, however naturally strong they may be, for I see no people who are thinking of the enemy’s advance with any sentiments beyond passive dislike, and hopes of protection from God and the English army.’

*Extract from general Fane’s Journal, 1808-9.*

‘Five hundred and twenty-nine miles of our marches have been in Spain, and notwithstanding all we have read about Spanish patriotism, we have never been joined by *one man*, nor have we seen *one corps in arms*. The people have offered us *no assistance*; while not even a cart or a guide have been to be procured but by

force, and by that measure we have generally been obliged to obtain our quarters. How our ministers could have been so deceived as to the state of the country is inconceivable.'

*The prince of Neufchatel to the duke of Dalmatia, Dec. 10, 1808.*

'The city of Madrid is quite tranquil, the shops are all open, the public amusements are resumed.'

*General Thouvenot to the prince of Neufchatel, St. Sebastian, 29th Nov. 1808.*

'The successes obtained by the armies of the emperor, and those which are also foreseen, begin to make a sensible impression upon the authorities of the country, who become from day to day more affable towards the French, and more disposed to consider the king as their legitimate sovereign.'

*The commandant Meslin to the prince of Neufchatel, Vitoria, 29th Nov. 1808.*

'The public feeling is still bad, still incredulous of our successes.'  
 . . 'As to the tranquillity of the country, it appears certain.'

*Mr. Frere to sir John Moore, Merida, Dec. 14, 1808.*

'A thousand barriers would be interposed against that deluge of pain which sometimes overwhelms a whole nation, and of which at one time I was afraid I saw the beginning in this country.' . .  
 'The extinction of the popular enthusiasm in this country, and the means which exist for reviving it, would lead to a very long discussion.'

#### SECTION VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

*Lord Collingwood to sir H. Dalrymple, Ocean, Cadiz, June 23, 1808.*

'At Minorea and Majorea they describe themselves to be strong, and having nothing to apprehend. However, they made the proposal for entering into a convention with us for their defence, and in the course of it demanded money, arms, and the protection of the fleet. When, in return for them, it was required that their fleet should be given up to us, to be held for their king Ferdinand, or that a part of them should join our squadron against the enemy, they rejected all those proposals: so that whatever we did for them was to be solely for the honour of having their friendship.'

*Captain Whittingham to sir Hew Dalrymple, June 12, 1808.*

'12th June. I returned to Xeres at three o'clock, A.M. The general sent for me, and requested I would go without delay to Gibraltar, and inform lieut.-general sir Hew Dalrymple that he at present occupied Carmona with three thousand men (regulars) having his head-quarters at Utrera, where his regular force would amount to twelve thousand men; that it was not his intention to attempt to defend Seville; that the heavy train of artillery, con-



sisting of eighty pieces, was already embarked for Cadiz, under the pretext that they were wanting for the defence of its works; and that everything was prepared for burning the harness, timbers, &c. &c., of the field pieces; that he intended to fall gradually back upon Cadiz, if forced to retreat; and that he did not at present desire that any English troops should be landed till their numbers should amount to eight or ten thousand men, lest the ardour of the people should oblige him to commence an offensive system of warfare before the concentration of a considerable Spanish and English force should afford reasonable hopes of success.'

*Capt. Whittingham to sir H. Dalrymple, Utrera, June 29, 1808.*

'The president approves of the idea, condemned the policy which had led Spain to attempt to establish manufactures by force, and showed clearly that the result had been the loss of a considerable branch of the revenue, the increase of smuggling, and consequently an enormous expense, in the payment of nearly *one hundred thousand* custom or rather excise officers, distributed about the country, and the ruin of numberless families seduced by the prospect of immediate profit to engage in illicit traffic.'

*Lord William Bentinck to sir H. Dalrymple, Madrid, Oct. 2, 1808.*

'A passage of lord Castlereagh's letter, of which I received from you a copy, instructed you, if possible, to ascertain the intentions of the Spanish government after the expulsion of the French. Though not positively directed by you to ask this information, yet the occasion appeared to make the question so natural, and seemingly of course, and even necessary, that I availed myself of it, and gave to general Castaños, to be laid before count Florida Blanca, a memorandum of which I enclose a copy, marked A.'

*Extract from the copy marked A.*

'It seems probable, in such case, that no diversion could be more effectual or more formidable to Buonaparte than the march of a large combined British and Spanish army over the Pyrenees, into that part of France where there are no fortified places to resist their passage into the very heart of the country, and into that part where great disaffection is still believed to exist.'

---

#### No. XIV.

#### JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE'S CORRESPONDENCE.

*Sir J. Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, Nov. 27, 1808.*

'The movements of the French give us little time for discussion. As soon as the British army has formed a junction, I must, upon the supposition that Castaños is either beaten or retreated,

march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation, or I must fall back upon Portugal.' . . . 'The movement into Spain is one of greater hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain. I shall be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps this is worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain are thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats; and by collecting in the south be able, with the aid of the British army, to resist, and finally repel, the formidable attack which is prepared against them.'

*Sir John Moore's Journal, Salamanca, Nov. 30, 1808.*

'In the night of the 28th I received an express from Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, containing a letter from lieutenant-colonel Doyle, announcing the defeat of Castaños' army near Tudela. They seem to have made but little resistance, and are, like Blake's, flying; this renders my junction with Baird so extremely hazardous that I dare not attempt it: but even were it made, what chance has this army, now that all those of Spain are beaten, to stand against the force which must be brought against it? The French have eighty thousand in Spain, and thirty thousand were to arrive in twenty days from the 15th of this month. As long as Castaños' army remained there was a hope, but I now see none. I am therefore determined to withdraw the army.'

*Ditto, Dec. 9.*

'After Castaños' defeat, the French marched from Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms, barricaded their street, and swore to die rather than submit. This has arrested the progress of the French, and Madrid still holds out: this is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is a chance that the example may be followed, and the people be roused; in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and am taking measures to form our junction whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid. We are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or at any rate they may not be able to resist; in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever, unless the whole country is animated and flock to the aid of the capital, and in this part the people are passive.'

*Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808.*

'I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined spirit anywhere, unless it be at Zaragoza. There is, however, a chance, and whilst there is that I think myself bound to run all risks to support it. I am now differently situated from what I was when Castaños was defeated: I have been joined by general Hope, the artillery, and all the cavalry (Lord Paget, with three regiments, is at Toro); and my junction with Sir David Baird is secure, though I have not heard from him since I ordered him to return to Astorga.'

*Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Sahagun, Dec. 12.*

‘I shall threaten the French communications and create a diversion, if the Spaniards can avail themselves of it; but the French have in the north of Spain from eighty to ninety thousand men, and more are expected. Your lordship, may, therefore, judge what will be our situation if the Spaniards do not display a determination very different to any they have shown hitherto.’

*Sir John Moore’s Journal. Sahagun, Dec. 24, 1808.*

‘I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with the view of attracting the enemy’s attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, whilst it was still thought the British army was retreating into Portugal; for this I was aware I risked infinitely too much, but something I thought was to be risked for the honour of the service, and to make it apparent that we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up their cause as lost.’

*Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh, Coruña, Jan. 13, 1809.*

‘Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and from the character of the government, and the disposition of the inhabitants, I was satisfied that no efforts would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which they were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion it has succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made by any of what the Spaniards call armies to favour its retreat.

---

## No. XV.

THIS despatch from the count of Belvedere to the count of Florida Blanca, relative to the battle of Gamonal, is an example of the habitual exaggerations of the Spanish generals.

[Translation.]

Since my arrival at Burgos I have been attacked by the enemy; in two affairs I repulsed him; but to-day, after having sustained

his fire for thirteen hours, he charged me with double my force, besides cavalry, as I believe he had three thousand of the latter, and six thousand infantry at least, and I have suffered so much that I have retired on Lerma, and mean to assemble my army at Aranda de Duero. I have sustained a great loss in men, equipage, and artillery; some guns have been saved, but very few. Don Juan Henestrosa, who commanded in the action, distinguished himself, and made a most glorious retreat; but as soon as the cavalry attacked, all was confusion and disorder. I shall send your excellency the particulars by an officer when they can be procured. The volunteers of Zafra, of Sezena, of Valencia, and the first battalion of infantry of Truxillo, and the provincials of Badajos, had not arrived at Burgos, and consequently I shall be able to sustain myself at Aranda, but they are without cartridges and ammunition. I lament that the ammunition at Burgos could not be brought off. The enemy followed me in small numbers: I am now retiring (10 P.M.), fearing they may follow me in the morning. I yesterday heard from general Blake, that he feared the enemy would attack him to-day, but his dispositions frustrated the enemy's designs, beginning the action at eleven at night.

(Signed)

CONDE DE BELVEDERE.

## No. XVI.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF DALMATIA  
TO THE AUTHOR.

‘ Dans la même lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire, vous me priez aussi, Monsieur, de vous donner quelques lumières sur la poursuite de Mr. le général sir John Moore, quand il fit sa retraite sur la Corogne en 1809. Je ne pense pas que vous desiriez des détails sur cette opération, car ils doivent vous être parfaitement connus, mais je saisisrai avec empressement l’occasion que vous me procurez pour rendre à la mémoire de sir John Moore le témoignage que ses dispositions furent toujours les plus convenables aux circonstances, et qu’en profitant habilement des avantages que les localités pouvaient lui offrir pour seconder sa valeur, il m’opposa partout la résistance la plus énergique et la mieux calculée; c’est ainsi qu’il trouva une mort glorieuse devant la Corogne au milieu d’un combat qui doit honorer son souvenir.

‘ *Paris, ce 15 Novembre, 1824.* ’

## No. XVII.

## LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

*London, Dec. 10, 1808.*

SIR,—The messenger, Mills, arrived here yesterday with your despatches, No. 19 to 26 inclusive; and at the same time advices were received from lieutenant-general sir David Baird, dated on



the 29th ultimo at Astorga, which state that general to have received intelligence from sir John Moore of the complete defeat of general Castaños's army, and of the determination taken by sir John Moore, in consequence, to fall back upon Portugal, while sir David Baird is directed by sir John Moore to re-embark his troops, and to proceed to the Tagus. Thus at the same moment at which I receive from you the caution entertained in your No. 20, that a retreat into Portugal would be considered by the central junta as indicating an intention to abandon the cause of Spain, his majesty's government receive the information that this measure has actually been adopted, but under circumstances which, it is to be supposed, could not have been in the contemplation of the central junta. To obviate, however, the possibility of such an impression as you apprehend being produced upon the Spanish government by the retreat of the British armies, I lose no time in conveying to you his majesty's commands, that you should forthwith give the most positive assurance, that the object of this retreat is no other than that of effecting in Portugal the junction which the events of the war have unfortunately rendered impracticable in Spain, with the purpose of preparing the whole army to move forward again into Spain whenever and in whatever direction their services may be best employed in support of the common cause. In proof of this intention, you will inform the Spanish government, that an additional reinforcement of cavalry is at this moment sailing for Lisbon, and that the British army in Portugal will be still further augmented, if necessary, so as to make up a substantive and effective force, adequate to any operation for which an opportunity may be offered in the centre or south of Spain, according to the course which the war may take. But while you make this communication to the Spanish government, it is extremely necessary that you should accompany it with a distinct and pressing demand for the communication to you and to the British general of whatever be the plan of operations of the Spanish armies. Sir John Moore complains that he had not received the slightest intimation of any such plan at the date of his last despatch of the 20th ultimo; and I am afraid the appointment which you mention in your No. 20, of general Morla to discuss with the British commanders the mode of co-operation between the British and Spanish armies, will not have taken place till after the defeat of the Spanish armies will have entirely disposed of that question for the present. The language of sir David Baird, with respect to defect of information, is precisely the same as that of sir John Moore. Sir David Baird has indeed had the advantage of some intercourse with the marquis de la Romana; but the marquis de la Romana himself does not appear to have been in possession of any part of the views of his government, nor to have received any distinct account of the numbers, state, or destination even, of either of the armies which he was himself appointed to command. The British government has most cautiously and scrupulously

abstained from interfering in any of the councils of the junta, or presuming to suggest to them by what plan they should defend their country. But when the question is as to the co-operation of a British force, they have a right and it is their duty to require that some plan should have been formed, and being formed, should be communicated to the British commander, in order that he may judge of, and (if he shall approve) may be prepared to execute the share intended to be assigned to him. You will recollect, that the army which has been appropriated by his majesty to the defence of Spain and Portugal is not merely a considerable part of the disposable force of this country; it is, in fact, the British army. The country has no other force disposable. It may, by a great effort, reinforce the army for an adequate purpose; but another army it has not to send. The proposals, therefore, which are made, somewhat too lightly, for appending parts of this force, sometimes to one of the Spanish armies, sometimes to another, and the facility with which its services are called for, wherever the exigency of the moment happens to press, are by no means suited to the nature of the force itself, or consonant to the views with which his majesty has consented to employ it in Spain. You are already apprised by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of general Moore's instructions), that the British army must be kept together under its own commander, must act as one body for some distinct object, and on some settled plan.

It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger, when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled to see his way to some definite purpose. But, in order to this, it will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously arranged, and that the British army should not again be left, as that of sir John Moore and sir David Baird have recently been, in the heart of Spain, without one word of information, except such as they could pick up from common rumour, of the events passing around them. Previously, therefore, to general sir John Moore's again entering Spain, it will be expected that some clear exposition should be made to him of the system upon which the Spaniards intend to conduct the war; the points which they mean to contest with the advancing enemy, and those which, if pressed, by a series of reverse, they ultimately propose to defend.

The part assigned to the British army in the combined operation must be settled with sir John Moore, and he will be found not unambitious of that in which he may be opposed most directly to the enemy. The courage and constancy displayed by the junta, under the first reverses, are in the highest degree worthy of admiration.\* And if they shall persevere in the same spirit, and can rouse the country to adequate exertions, there is no reason to despair of the ultimate safety of Spain. But it is most earnestly to be hoped that the same confidence which they

---

\* The extract which follows this letter furnishes a curious comment on this passage.

appear to have placed in the ability of their armies, under Blake and Castaños, to resist the attacks of the enemy, will not be again adopted as their guide, again to deceive them in the ulterior operations of the war. It is to be hoped that they will weigh well their really existing means of defence against the means of attack on the part of the enemy, and that if they find them unequal to maintain a line of defence as extended as they have hitherto attempted to maintain, they will at once fall back to that point, wherever it may be, at which they can be sure that their stand will be permanent and their resistance effectual. It is obvious that unless they can resist effectually in the passes of the Guadarama, or in the Sierra Morena, the ultimate point of retreat, after a series of defeats more or less numerous and exhausting, according as they shall the sooner or the later make up their minds to retreat, is Cadiz. Supported by Cadiz on one side, and by the fortress of Gibraltar on the other, the remaining armies of Spain might unquestionably make such a stand, as no force which France could bring against them could overpower; and the assistance of the British army would be in this situation incalculably augmented by the communication with Gibraltar and the sea. I am aware of the jealousy with which the mention of a British force of any sort coupled with the name of Cadiz will be received. But the time seems to be arrived at which we must communicate with each other (the Spanish government and England) without jealousy or reserve. His majesty has abjured, in the face of the world, any motive of interested policy,—you are authorized to repeat in the most solemn manner, if necessary, that abjuration. But if in the midst of such sacrifices and such exertions as Great Britain is making for Spain; if after having foregone all objects of partial benefit, many of which the state of Spain (if we had been so ungenerous as to take that advantage of it) would have brought within our reach, the fair opinion of the British government cannot be received without suspicion; there is little hope of real cordiality continuing to subsist under reverses and misfortunes, such as Spain must but too surely expect, and such as are at all times the tests of sincerity and confidence. It is the opinion of the British government, that the last stand (if all else fail) must be made at Cadiz. It is the opinion of the British government, that this stand will be made in vain *only* if the necessity of resorting to it is too late acknowledged, and the means of making it effectually not providently prepared. It is the opinion of the British government that on no account should the naval means of Spain be suffered to fall into the hands of France, or those of France to be recovered by her. It is their opinion that this may be prevented; but to prevent it, the object must be fairly looked at beforehand; and it is hoped that a spirit of distrust unworthy both of those who entertain it, and of those with respect to whom it is entertained, will not be suffered to interfere between an object of so great importance and the means of ensuring its accomplishment. It is absolutely necessary to lose no time in bringing this subject fairly before the Spanish government; and if, in doing so, you should see either in M.



Cevallos or in count Florida Blanca marks of that distrust and suspicion which must fatally affect any measure of co-operation between the British and Spanish forces, it will be right that you should at once anticipate the subject, and you are at liberty to communicate this despatch *in extenso*, as the surest mode of proving the openness with which the British government is desirous of acting, and the disdain which it would feel of any imputation upon its disinterestedness and sincerity. But while this object is thus to be stated to the central government, it is not to this object alone that the services of the British army are to be appropriated. The commander-in-chief will have both the authority and the inclination to listen to any proposal for any other practical undertaking. And it is only in the event of no such object or undertaking being presented to him in Spain, that he is directed to confine himself to the defence of Portugal.

I am, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE  
OF THE SAME DATE AS THE ABOVE.

December 10, 1808.

‘The timely preparation of the fleets of France and Spain, now in the harbour of Cadiz, is also a point to be pressed by you with earnestness, but at the same time with all the delicacy which belongs to it. In the event of *an emigration to America*, it is obvious that this preparation should be made beforehand. And in the case of this project not being adopted, and of a resolution being taken to defend Cadiz to the utmost, it would still be desirable that the fleets should be prepared for removal to Minorca, in order to be out of the reach of any use which the disaffected in Cadiz (of whom general Morla is represented to have expressed considerable apprehensions) might be disposed to make of them for compromise with the enemy.’

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE.

December 11, 1808.

‘SIR,—Complaints have been justly made of the manner in which the British troops, particularly those under sir David Baird, have been received in Spain.

‘The long detention of sir David Baird’s corps on board the transports at Coruña may but too probably have contributed to render the difficulties of a junction between the two parts of the British army insurmountable, by giving the enemy time to advance between them. In addition to this it is stated, that there was a total want of preparation for supply of any sort, and the unwillingness with which those supplies appeared to have been administered, have undoubtedly occasioned as much disappointment as inconvenience to the British commanders. Unless some change is effected in these particulars when the army again moves into Spain, the advance of the British troops through that country will be attended with more difficulty than a march through a hostile country.’



## No. XVIII.

## ABSTRACT OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-general's returns.

Cavalry .....	30,000
Foot guards .....	6,000
Infantry of the line .....	170,000
Artillery .....	14,000

Total ..... 220,000

Of these between 50 and 60,000 were employed in the Colonies in India, the remainder were disposable, because from 80 to 100,000 militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add 30,000 marines, the military power of England must be considered prodigious.

RETURN OF BRITISH TROOPS EMBARKED FOR PORTUGAL  
AND SPAIN IN 1808.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	
357	349	8688	9394	Commanded by Sir A. Wellesley; embarked at Cork the 15th, 16th, and 17th June, 1808; sailed 12th July; landed at Mondego, August 1st.
379	...	4323	4702	Commanded by generals Acland and Anstruther; embarked at Harwich, July 18th and 19th; landed at Maceira, August 20th, 1808.
66	...	4647	4713	Commanded by general Spencer; embarked at Cadiz; landed at Mondego, August 3rd.
712	563	10,049	11,324	Commanded first by sir John Moore, secondly by sir Harry Burrard; embarked at Portsmouth, April, 1808; sailed to the Baltic; returned, and sailed to Portugal, July 31st; landed at Maceira, August 29th.
...	672	...	672	Landed at Lisbon, Dec. 31st, 1808.
186	...	943	1129	Embarked at Gibraltar, sailed Aug. 14; landed at the Tagus in September.
94	...	929	1023	Commanded by general Beresford; embarked at Madeira, sailed Aug. 17th; landed at the Tagus in September.
...	672	...	672	Commanded by general C. Stewart; embarked at Gravesend; landed at Lisbon, September 1st.
798	...	10,271	11,069	Commanded by sir D. Baird; embarked at Falmouth, sailed Oct. 9; arrived at Coruña 19th Oct., landed 29th do.
...	...	1622	1622	Two regiments sent round to Lisbon from sir D. Baird's force.
...	2021	...	2021	Commanded by lord Paget; embarked at Portsmouth; landed at Coruña, October 30th.
2592	4277	41,472	46,719	Add two regiments sent to Lisbon from Coruña. Grand total, of which 800 were artificers, waggon train, and commissariat.
			1622	
			48,341	

## No. XIX.

RETURNS OF KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, OF THE  
ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR A. WELLESLEY.

1808. August.	OFFICERS.			MEN.			TOTAL.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
15th—Brillos ...	1	1	0	1	5	21	29
17th—Rorica ...	4	19	4	66	316	70	479
21st—Vimiero .	4	35	2	131	499	49	720
Grand total for the campaign }	9	55	6	198	820	140	1228

## No. XX.

## BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. RORICA, 17th AUGUST, 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-general's states.

		Regiments.					
Right wing.	{	1st brigade, major-general Hill...	{	5th 9th 38th	{ 2780		
		3rd ditto, major-general Nightingale .....	{	29th 82nd	{ 1722		
		5th ditto, C. Crawford .....	{	45th 50th 91st	{ 2744		
		Left wing.	{	4th brigade, brigadier-general Bowes .....	{	6th 32nd	{ 1829
				2nd ditto, major-general Ferguson	{	36th 40th 71st	{ 2681
6th ditto (light) brigadier-general Fane.....	{			95th, 2nd bn. 60th, 5th bn.	{ 1336		
Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9lbs.....				660	660		
Cavalry ...				240	240		
Total British.....					13,992		
Portuguese, colonel Trant...	{	Infantry of the line... 1000	{	...	1,650		
		Light troops .....		400			
		Cavalry .....		250			
Grand total, British and Portuguese, including sick men, &c. &c.					15,642		

## No. XXI.

## BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. VIMIERO, 21st AUGUST, 1808.

Extracted from the Adjutant-general's states.

		Regiments.			
Right wing.	{ 1st brigade, general Hill .....	{ 5th 9th 38th	{	2780	2780
Centre.	{ 6 ditto, brigadier-general Fane .	{ 50th 60th 95th, 2nd bn.	{	2293	4953
	{ 7th ditto, brigadier-general Anstruther .....	{ 9th 43rd, 2nd bn. 52nd, 2nd bn. 97th	{	2660	
	{ 2nd brigade, major-general Ferguson .....	{ 36th 40th 71st	{	2681	
Left wing.	{ 3rd ditto, major-general Nightingale .....	{ 29th 82nd	{	1722	7612
	{ 4th ditto, brigadier-gen. Bowes	{ 6th 32nd	{	1829	
	{ 8th ditto, major-general Acland...	{ 2nd 20th	{	1380	
Reserve	5th brigade brig.-gen. C. Crawford	{ 45th 50th 91st	{	2744	2744
Artillery, 18 guns, 6 and 9 lbs. ....				660	660
Cavalry, 20th light dragoons .....				240	240

Total British..... 18,989

Portuguese, colonel Trant..... { Infantry, 1400 }  
 { Cavalry, 250 } ..... 1,650

Grand total, including sick, wounded, and missing ..... 20,639

## No. XXII.

## RETURN OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE'S ARMY, OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Bemfica.

	Fit for duty.	Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry .....	1,402	128	28	1,558
Artillery .....	2,091	146	6	2,243
Infantry .....	25,678	3196	454	29,328
Total.....	29,171	3470	488	

Grand total, including artificers, waggon train, &amp;c. &amp;c... 33,129

## No. XXIII.

EMBARKATION RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER  
GENERAL JUNOT.

	PRESENT UNDER ARMS.			DETACHED.			ABSENT WITHOUT PAY.				TOTAL.			CRIMI- NALS.
	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital Prisons				Officers.	Men.	Horses.	
							Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.				
Infantry ...	273	15,860	.....	52	2078	0	46	3281	17	895	...	22,635	...	13
Cavalry ...	48	1,722	1176	...	1	1	...	195	1	...	...	1,974	...	...
Artillery ...	21	1,015	472	...	6	...	...	...	3	...	...	1,121	...	...
Engineers .	14	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	...	...	...	17	...	...

Guns ..... 10' 8 lbs. }  
 Ditto ..... 16 4 lbs. } 30  
 Howitzers ..... 4 6 inch. }

Grand total, 25,747 men, 1655 horses, and 30 pieces of artillery.

Note.—On the staff of each division there are—

1 General of division.	1 Inspector of reviews.
2 Generals of brigade.	1 Commissary of engineers.
7 Aides-de-camp.	2 Officers of engineers.

Artillery .....	{ 1 General.	{ The remainder in the divisions.
	{ 4 Colonels.	
	{ 2 Chefs-de-bataillon.	
Engineers .....	{ 1 Colonel.	{ The remainder in the divisions.
	{ 2 Captains.	

## No. XXIV.

THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE MADE BY  
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK IN 1808

Proves that sixty thousand men could have been provided for  
the campaign of 1808-9 in *Spain*, without detriment to other  
services :

There are at present in Por- tugal .....	{ Cavalry ..... 1,640 }	{ 31,446
	{ Infantry, 34 battalions 29,806 }	
Under orders to embark .....	{ Cavalry ..... 3,410 }	{ 14,829
	{ Infantry..... 11,419 }	
Total .....	46,275	



'Of this force the 20th dragoons and eight battalions should remain in Portugal. The disposable force would then be—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
From Portugal.....	1,313	23,575
Under orders .....	3,200	11,419
Force to be drawn from Sicily .....		8,000
Total.....	4,513	42,994
'To this may be added, four regiments of cavalry } and the two brigades of guards .....	2,560	2,434
Grand total.....	7,073	45,428

'When to this you add four battalions of infantry, which may be spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of about sixty thousand rank and file.'

Note.—The details of names and strength of the regiments are omitted to save space.

## No. XXV.

### SIR J. MOORE'S ORDER OF BATTLE.

<i>Third Division.</i>	<i>Second Division.</i>	<i>First Division.</i>
Lt.-gen. M'Kenzie Fraser.	Lieut.-gen. sir John Hope.	Lt.-gen. sir David Baird.
73th, 38th, 3rd, 43rd, 23rd, 9th, 6th. Wilmot's brig. of artillery, 6 pieces.	76th, 59th, 51st, 92nd, 71st, 36th, 32nd, 14th, 5th, 2nd, Drummond's brig. of art. 6 pieces.	81st, 26th, 1st, 50th, 42nd, 4th, 1st, & 3rd bat. guards, Bean's brigade of artillery, 6 pieces.
<i>Second Flank Brigade.</i>	<i>Reserve.</i>	<i>First Flank Brigade.</i>
Brigadier-gen. C. Alten.	Major-general E. Paget.	Colonel R. Crawford.
1st battalion 2nd battalion K.G.L. K.G.L.	21st, 28th, 1st bat. 95th, 52nd, 20th. Carthew's brig. of artill- ery, 6 pieces.	2nd bat. 95th, 2nd bat. 52nd, 1st bat. 43rd.

### *Cavalry.*

Lieut.-general lord Paget.

3rd light dragoons K.G.L., 15th light dragoons, 10th, 18th, 7th hussars,  
Dowman's and Evelin's troops of horse artillery, 12 pieces.

### *Artillery Parc and Reserve.*

Colonel Harding.

5 brigades .....	30 pieces
6 ditto, attached to the divisions.....	36 „

66

RETURN OF SIR JOHN MOORE'S ARMY, DECEMBER 19, 1808.

Extracted from the adjutant-general's morning state of that day:

	Fit for Duty.	Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry .	2,278	182	794	3,254
Artillery	1,358	97	...	1,455
Infantry.	22,222	3,756	893	26,871
	25,858	4,035	1,687	31,580
Deduct...	2,275	{ Men composing four bat- talions, viz. .... }		
		{ 3d regt. left in Portugal. { 76th } Between Villa { 51st } Franca and Lago. { 59th }		
	23,583	Total number under arms.		

Note.—Of 66 guns, 42 were attached to the divisions, the remainder in reserve, with the exception of one brigade of 3lbs.

## No. XXVI.

THE following General Return, extracted from especial regimental reports, received at the Horse Guards, contains the whole number of non-commissioned officers and men, cavalry and infantry, lost during sir John Moore's campaign:—

Lost at or previous to the arrival of	{ Cavalry.....	95 }	Total.
the army at the position of Lugo	{ Infantry ...	1302 }	1397

Of this number 200 were left in the wine-vaults of Bembibre, and nearly 500 were stragglers from the troops that marched to Vigo.

Lost between the departure of the army from Lugo and the embarka- tion at Coruña .....	<table><tr><td>Cavalry...</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Infantry...</td><td>2627</td></tr></table>	Cavalry...	9	Infantry...	2627	} 2636
Cavalry...	9					
Infantry...	2627					

Grand total..... 4033

Of the whole number, above 800 contrived to escape to Portugal, and being united with the sick left by the regiments in that country, they formed a corps of 1876 men, which being re-embodied under the name of the battalions of detachments, did good service at Oporto and Talavera.

The pieces of artillery abandoned during the retreat were six 3-pounders.

These guns were landed at Coruña without the general's knowledge: they never went beyond Villa Franca, and, not being horsed, they were thrown down the rocks when the troops quitted that town.

The guns used in the battle of Coruña were spiked and thrown into the sea.

N.B. Some trifling errors may possibly have crept into the regimental states in consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total amount above fifty men more or less.

---

## No. XXVII.

THE following states of the Spanish armies are not strictly accurate, because the original reports from whence they have been drawn were generally very loose, often inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory: nevertheless, it is believed that the approximation is sufficiently close for any useful purpose.

### STATE I.

#### *Army of Andalusia.*

	Armed peasantry.	Regulars.
1808.		
19th July, Baylen .....	Unknown	29,000
1st Sept. { Madrid { La Mancha { Sierra Morena } .....	—	30,600

### STATE II.

Numbers of the Spanish armies in October, 1808, according to the reports transmitted to sir John Moore by the military agents.

	Regulars.	Armed peasantry incorporated with the regular troops.	
Troops upon the Ebro, and in Biscay	75,300	70,000	145,000
In Catalonia .....	20,000	...	20,000
In march from Aragon to Catalonia	10,000	...	10,000
Ditto new levies from Grenada .....	...	10,000	10,000
In the Asturias.....	18,000	...	18,000
Total.....	123,000	80,000	—
Grand total .....			203 000

## STATE III.

Real numbers of the Spanish armies in line of battle, in the months of October, November, and December, 1808.

*1st Line.*

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.	
Army of Palafox .....	550	17,500	20	} Defeated and dispersed at Tudela.
Army of Castaños .....	2200	24,500	48	
Army of Blake .....	100	30,000	26	} Ditto at the battles of Zornoza and Espinosa.
Army of Romana .....	1404	8,000	25	
Asturians.....	...	8,000	...	
Army of count Belvedere ...	1150	11,150	30	Ditto at Gamonal.
Total .....	5404	99,150	149	
Deduct Romana's cavalry and guns, which never came into the line of battle	1404	...	25	
Total, brought into first line of battle .....	4000	99,150	124	.....103,150

*2nd Line.*

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	
General St. Juan's division	12,000	...	} Were beaten at the Somosierra, 30th November; murdered their general at Talavera, December 7th, and dispersed.
Fugitives from Gamonal, commanded by general Heredia .....	4000	...	
Fugitives from Blake's army re-organized by Romana .	6000	1400	} Fled from Segovia and Sepulveda, Dec. 2nd, and dispersed at Talavera, 7th. Beaten at Mancilla, 20th Dec.; retired into Galicia. Infantry dispersed there.
Asturian levies under Balasteros .....	5000	...	
Fugitives assembled by Galuzzo behind the Tagus ...	6000	...	} Defeated and dispersed, 24th December, by the 4th corps, at Almaraz.
Total, brought into 2nd line	33,000	1400	

To cover Moore's advance there were on the Ebro, in Biscay, and in the Asturias, according to the Spanish and the military agents' reports ..... } 173,000

The real number brought into the field was ..... 103,150

Exaggeration ..... 69,850

Note.—The real amount includes the sick in the field hospitals.



## No. XXVIII.

## SECTION I.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, CALLED 'THE FIRST PART OF THE ARMY OF SPAIN,' DATED OCT. 1, 1808.

Head-quarters, Vitoria.

King Joseph, commander-in-chief.

General Jourdan, major-general. General Belliard, chief of the staff.

Recapitulation, extracted from the Imperial states, signed by the prince of Neufchatel.

Officers included, present under arms.

	Men.	Horses
Division imperial guard, commanded by gen. Dorsenne	2,423	786
Do. reserve cavalry, imperial gen- darmes, and other troops.....	gen. Saligny ... 5,417	944
Corps of marshal Bessières .....	15,595	2,923
Corps of marshal Ney .....	13,756	2,417
Corps of marshal Moncey 16,636 } Garrison of Pampeluna . 6,004 }	22,640	3,132
Garrisons of Vitoria, Bilbao, St Sebas- tian, Tolosa, Montdragon, Salinas, Bergara, Villa Real, Yrun, and other places of less note.....	gen. Lagrange . 8,479	1,458
Troops disposable at Bayonne and vicinity or in march upon that place .....	gen. Drouet, commanding 11th military division.....	20,005 5,196
Troops employed as moveable columns in the defence of the frontier from Bayonne to Belgarde.....	.....	6,042 261
In Catalonia, gen. Duhesme .....	10,142	1,638
Fort of Fernando, Figueras, gen. Reille .....	4,027	557
Division of gen. Chabot .....	1,434	...
Total .....	109,960	19,312

*Note.*—At this period the Spaniards and the military agents always asserted that the French had only from 35 to 45,000 men of all weapons.

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, CALLED THE 'SECOND  
PART OF THE ARMY OF SPAIN,' OCTOBER 1, 1808.

THIS army, composed of the troops coming from the grand army and from Italy, was by an imperial decree, dated 7th September, divided into six corps and a reserve.

Present under arms.

	Men.	Horses.
1st corps, marshal Victor, duke of Belluno . .	29,547	5,552
5th do. , , Mortier, duke of Treviso . .	24,405	3,495
6th do., destined for Ney, duke of Elchingen . .	22,694	3,945
Infantry of the viceroy of Spain's guards . .	1,213	...
Cavalry ditto . . . . .	456	551
1st division of dragoons . . . . .	3,695	3,994
2nd ditto . . . . .	2,940	3,069
3rd ditto . . . . .	2,020	2,238
4th ditto . . . . .	3,101	3,316
5th ditto . . . . .	2,903	3,068
Division of general Sebastiani . . . . .	5,808	185
5th regiment of dragoons . . . . .	556	531
German division . . . . .	6,067	381
Polish ditto . . . . .	6,818	...
Dutch brigade . . . . .	2,280	751
Westphalian light horse . . . . .	522	559
General Souham's division . . . . .	7,259	...
General Pino's ditto . . . . .	6,803	...
24th regiment of dragoons . . . . .	664	731
Regiment of royal Italian chasseurs . . . .	560	512
Regiment of Napoleon's dragoons . . . .	500	474
Artillery and engineers in march for Perpignan . . . . .	1,706	1,430
Total of second part . . . .	132,517	34,782
Total of first part . . . .	109,960	19,312
Grand total. . . . .	242,477	54,094

	PRESENT UNDER ARMS.			DETACHED.		HOSPITAL.	PRI-SONERS.	EFFECTIVE.		
	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav. Hrs.	Art. Hrs.
1st corps, duke of Belluno . . . . .	28,797	5,615		2,201	219	2,939	...	33,937	3,329	2,501
2nd ditto — Istria . . . . .	20,093	3,219		7,394	1,199	5,536	30	33,054	3,616	802
3rd ditto — Corneigliano . . . . .	18,867	3,186		11,082	2,472	7,522	219	37,690	4,537	821
4th ditto — Dantzic . . . . .	22,859	2,410		955	40	2,170	...	25,984	1,791	659
5th ditto — Treviso . . . . .	24,552	3,833		188	6	1,971	2	26,713	1,805	2,034
6th ditto — Elchingen . . . . .	29,568	4,304		3,381	257	5,051	33	38,033	2,465	2,096
7th ditto, general St. Cyr . . . . .	35,657	5,254		1,302	198	4,948	200	42,107	4,045	1,404
8th ditto, Duke of Abrantes . . . . .	19,059	2,247		2,137	1	3,528	1,006	25,730	1,776	472
Reserve . . . . .	34,924	23,604		3,538	733	3,553	392	42,382	21,225	3,112
1st hussars and 27th chasseurs . . . . .	1,424	1,463		256	208	74	...	1,754	1,675	...
Artillery and engineers in march, coming from Germany . . . . .	3,446	958		107	...	...	...	3,446	...	958
Moveable columns for defence of the frontiers of France . . . . .	8,588	477		107	...	146	19	8,860	268	209
Total . . . . .	247,834	56,670		32,643	5,333	37,438	1,901	319,690	46,822	15,068

	UNDER ARMS.			DETACHED.		HOSPITAL.	PRI-SONERS.	EFFECTIVE.		
	Artillery.		Cavalry.	Infantry.				Men.	Cav. Hrs.	Art. Hrs.
Of this number { French ... Auxiliaries	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	267,629	41,565	14,253
	17,868	15,107		29,647	5,052			52,061	5,263	815
	1,503	968	4,782	2,889	277	6,018	130			
Total . . . . .	19,371	16,075	38,954	32,536	5,329	37,419	1,901	319,690	46,828	15,068

Grand total.....319,690 men and 61,896 horses.

SECTION III.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN,  
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON COMMANDING IN  
PERSON, 25th OCTOBER, 1808.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Prisoners.</i>	<i>Total.</i>		
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Meo.	Cav. H.	Art. H.
249,046	55,759	33,438	4,943	34,558	1,892	318,934	45,242	15,498
Grand total.....318,934 men and 60,740 horses.								

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, THE EMPEROR  
NAPOLEON COMMANDING, 15th NOVEMBER, 1808.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Prisoners.</i>	<i>Total.</i>		
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav. H.	Art. H.
255,876	52,430	32,245	8,295	45,107	1,995	335,223	42,920	16,508
Grand total.....335,223 men and 60,728 horses.								

SECTION IV.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL,  
1st JANUARY, 1808.

[Extracted from the imperial returns.]

General Junot, commander-in-chief. General Thiebault, chief of the staff.

1st division, general De Laborde	} 26 battalions, 7 squadrons.
2nd „ „ Loison	
3rd „ „ Travot	
Cavalry „ Kellerman	
10 guns of 8lbs.	} 36 pieces.
22 „ 4lbs.	
4 6-inch howitzers	

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
At Salamanca, or in march to join	16,190	1,114	27,735	1,377
the army in Portugal .....	4,795	1,296	4,795	1,296
Total .....	20,985	2,310	29,530	2,673

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL,  
23rd MAY, 1808.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.	Art.
French.....	24,446	2,789	...	...	2,449	29,684	3,586	629
Spanish division of	} 9,281	101	1,087	...	651	11,019	...	...
gen. Quesnel ...								
Do., gen. Caraffa .	6,399	844	174	13	141	6,624	13	...
Portuguese troops	4,621	483	570	234	116	5,307	234	...
Total .....	44,657	4,217	1,831	247	3,357	52,634	3,833	629

Grand total.....52,634 men, 4454 horses, and 36 guns.



## SECTION V.—STATE OF 'THE SECOND ARMY OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE,' 1st FEB. 1808, SPAIN.

General Dupont, commanding.

20 battalions and 1 division of cavalry.

Head-quarters, Valladolid.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
20,729	2,884	1,303	334	2,277	24,309	3,218

Total.....24,309 men and 3,218 horses.

## SECTION VI.—STATE OF 'THE ARMY OF OBSERVATION DE COTE D'OCEAN,' 1st FEB. 1808, SPAIN.

Marshal Moncey, commanding.

Head-quarters, Vitoria.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detachment.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
21,878	2,547	2,144	...	4,464	28,486	2,547
Train of the guard .....					225	509

Grand total.....28,711 men and 3,391 horses.

## No. XXIX.

THE following letters from lord Collingwood did not come into my possession before the first edition of the present volume was in the press. It will be seen that they corroborate many of the opinions and some of the facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the attention due to the observations of such an honourable and able man.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with the army, and hope the first account will be of your success whenever you move. I have heard nothing lately of Junot at Cadiz; but there have been accounts, not very well authenticated, that Joseph Buonaparte, in his retiring to France, was stopped by the mass rising in Biscay, to the amount of fourteen thousand well-armed men, which obliged him to return to Burgos, where the body of the French army was stationed.

At Zaragoza, the French, in making their fourteenth attack upon the town, were defeated, repulsed with great loss, and had retired from it. There is a deputy here from that city with a commission from the marquis de Palafox to request supplies.

The first aid upon their list is for ten or fifteen thousand troops. The deputy states they have few regulars in the province, and the war has hitherto been carried on by all being armed. In this gentleman's conversation I observe, what I had before remarked in others, that he had no view of Spain beyond the kingdom of Aragon; and in reply to the observations I made on the necessity of a central government, he had little to say, as if that had not yet been a subject of much consideration. I have great hope that general Castaños, Cuesta, and those captains-general who will now meet at Madrid, will do something effectual in simplifying the government. In a conversation I had with Morla on the necessity of this, he seemed to think the juntas would make many difficulties, and retain their present power as long as they could.

I hope, my dear sir, you will give some directions about this puzzling island (*Perexil*), which it appears to me will not be of any future use; but the people who are on it will suffer much in the winter, without habitations, except tents; I conceive the purpose for which it was occupied is past, and will probably never return; whenever they quit it, they should bring the stores away as quietly as possible; for, if I am not mistaken, the emperor has an intention to keep them, and will remonstrate against their going. I hope you have received good accounts from lady Dalrymple, &c.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where everything indicates an intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million o. dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as major Cox has done; he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the proposal you made to him to go to Valencia.

I beg my kind regards, &c.

COLLINGWOOD.

P.S. Prince Leopold is still here, and I understand intends to stay until he hears from England. I have given passports for Dupont and a number of French officers to go to France on parole, ninety-three in number. General Morla was impatient to get them out of the country. The Spaniards were much irritated against them; they were not safe from their revenge, except in St. Sebastian's castle.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Ocean, off Toulon, October 18, 1808.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I have received the favour of your letters of the 27th August and 5th September, and beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on the success of the British army in Portugal, which I hope will have satisfied the French that they are not those invincible creatures which Buonaparte had endeavoured to persuade them they were.

It is a happy event to have rescued Portugal from the government of France; and their carrying off a little plunder is a matter of very secondary consideration; perhaps it may have the good effect of keeping up the animosity of the Portuguese who suffer, and incite them to more resistance in future.

The great business now is to endeavour to establish that sort of government, and organise that sort of military force, which may give security to the country; and the great difficulty in Portugal will be to find men who are of ability to place at the head of the several departments, who have patriotism to devote themselves to its service, and vigour to maintain its independence. In a country exhausted like Portugal, it will require much ingenious expedient to supply the want of wealth and of everything military. If it is not found in the breasts of those to whom the people look up, Portugal will remain in a hapless and uncertain state still.

I have not heard from sir Charles Cotton how he settled his terms with the Russian admiral; but as he has got possession of the ships to be sent to England, they cannot but be good. The hoisting the English flag on the fort which surrendered to our troops, I conclude, would be explained to the Portuguese as not to be understood as taking possession by England for other purpose than to be restored to its prince, as was done at Madeira; but in this instance it ought to have been thought necessary to deprive Siniavin of the argument he would have used of the neutrality of the Portuguese flag, with whom his nation was not at war.

I left Cadiz the moment everything in that quarter was pacific; and Mr. Duff arrived there with a million of dollars for their use; this money was sent to the junta of Seville, where I am afraid there are many members unworthy of the trust.

I have only heard once from Cox since I left that quarter. After getting the money, father Gil seemed to have dropt his communications with major C., and their discussions were not of a nature to excite much public interest; they consisted more in private bickering, than of grave consult for the public weal. Tilly seems to have been entirely disappointed in his project, both in respect to the annexation of southern Portugal to Andalusia and the pension of 12,000 dollars for his service in the supreme council: of those you will be informed by major Cox. I am afraid I related the proceedings to his majesty's ministers of events which were passing almost under my eye, and gave my opinion on them with too great freedom; I mean with a freedom that is not usual; but they were facts of which, without being possessed, his majesty's ministers could not have a knowledge of the real state of affairs in Spain; and the sentiments those facts inspired were necessary to explain my motives and the rule of conduct which I pursued. And still I consider the great and only danger to which Spain is now exposed is, the supposition that the whole nation is possessed of the same patriotism which, in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia, led to such glorious results.

It is far otherwise. There are not many Castañoses, nor Cuestas, nor Palafoxes; and take from Spain the influence of the clergy, and its best source of power would be lost: wherever this influence is least, the war is languid.

I wrote to you some time since to represent the state of Catalonia. Nothing can be more indifferent to the cause than they appear to be; yet the common peasantry have not less spirit nor less desire to repel their enemy. They have no leaders. Palacios the captain-general, stays at Villa Franca, west of Barcelona, talking of what he intends to do; and the people speak of him as either wanting zeal in their cause or ability to direct them; while the French from Barcelona and Figueras do just what they please. When the French attacked Gerona, he did nothing to succour it. The greatest discomfiture they suffered was from lord Cochrane, who, while they were employed at the siege, blew up the road, making deep trenches in a part where the fire of his ships could be brought upon; and when they came there he drove them from their guns, killed many, and took some cannon.

The French fleet is here quite ready for sea, and I am doing all that is in my power to meet them when they do come out. It is an arduous service: the last ten days we have had gales of wind incessantly; the difficulty of keeping a sufficient squadron is very great. I think the storms from those Alpine mountains are harder than in England, and of more duration.

I beg my best regards to captain Dalrymple, and my sincerest wishes for every success to attend you.

I am, my dear sir Hew,

Your obedient and most humble servant,

COLLINGWOOD.

P.S. In the letter which I wrote to you on the state of Catalonia I represented the necessity of sending a body of British troops to Catalonia. There is no other prospect of the French being kept in any bounds. The avenues to France are as open now as at any time they have been. I have kept a ship always at Rosas Bay; her marines have garrisoned the castle, and her company assisted in repairing the works. The French appear to have designs on that place. The presence of the English alone prevents them. If 18,000 men were here of our army, I think they would make Mr. Palacio come forward, and put the whole country into activity, which till then I don't think they ever will be.

COLLINGWOOD.

They want an English resident at Gerona, that they may have somebody to apply to for succour . . . .

[The rest torn off in the original.]

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

*Ocean, off Minorca, April 8, 1809.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I received the favour of your letter a few days ago, which gave me great pleasure, after all the trouble and vexations you have had to hear you were all well.



I was exceedingly sorry when I saw the angry mood in which the convention in Portugal was taken up, even before the circumstances which led to it were at all known. Before our army landed in Portugal, the French force was reported to be very small. I remember its being said that a body of 5000 troops was all that was necessary to dispossess Junot. I conclude the same sort of report went to England: and this, with the victory that was obtained, led people to expect the extermination of the few French which were supposed to be there; and when once the idea is entertained, people shut their eyes to difficulties.

I remember what you told me, the last time I saw you off Cadiz, of the communication which might be made to you by an officer who possessed the entire confidence of ministers. I thought then, that whatever ministers had to communicate to a commander-in-chief, could not be done better than by themselves; for intermediate communications are always in danger of being misunderstood, and never fail to cause doubts and disturb the judgment. I hope now it is all over, and your uneasiness on that subject at an end.

My labours I think will never cease. I am worn down by fatigue of my mind, with anxiety and sorrow; my health is very much impaired; and while our affairs require an increased energy, I find myself less able to conduct them from natural causes. I give all my thoughts and time, but have interruptions, from my weak state of body, which the service will scarcely admit of. I never felt the severity of winter more than this last. They were not gales of wind, but hurricanes; and the consequence is, that the fleet has suffered very much, and many of the ships very infirm. I would not have kept the sea so long, because I know the system of blockading must be ruinous to our fleet at last, and in no instance that I can recollect has prevented the enemy from sailing. In the spring we are found all rags, while they, nursed through the tempest are all trim. I would not have done it: but what would have become of me if, in my preserving the ships, the French had sailed, and effected anything in any quarter! The clamour would have been loud, and they would have sought only for the cause in my treachery or folly, for none can understand that there is any bad weather in the Mediterranean. The system of blockade is ruinous; but it has continued so long, and so much to the advantage of the mercantile part of the nation, that I fear no minister will be found bold enough to discontinue it. We undertake nothing against the enemy, but seem to think it enough to prevent him taking our brigs; his fleet is growing to a monstrous force, while ours every day gives more proof of its increasing decrepitude.

Of the Spaniards I would not say much; I was never sanguine in the prospect of success, and have no reason to change my opinion; the lower class of people, those who are under the influence of priests, would no anything were they under proper direction; but directors are difficult to be found. There is a canker in the state: none of the superior orders are serious in their

resistance to the French, and have only taken a part against them thus far from the apprehension of the resentment of the people. I believe the junta is not free from the taint of the infection, or would they have continued Don Miguel Vives, in high and important command after such evident proofs as he gave of want of loyalty? I do not know what is thought of Infantado in England; but in my mind, the man, the duke (for his rank has a great deal to do with it,) who would seat himself in Buonaparte's council at Bayonne, sign his decrees, which were distributed in Spain, and then say he was forced to do it, is not the man who will do much in maintaining the glory or the independence of any country; no such man should be trusted now. The French troops are mostly withdrawn from Spain, except such as are necessary to hold certain strong posts, and enable them to return without impediment. Figueras, Barcelona, and Rosas, are held here in Catalonia, and of course the country quite open to them. Will the Spaniards dispossess them? The junta does not seem to know anything of the provinces at a distance from them. At Taragona the troops are ill-clothed, and without pay; on one occasion they could not march against the enemy, having no shoes, and yet at Cadiz they have fifty-one millions of dollars. Cadiz seems to be a general dépôt of everything they can get from England. If they are not active the next two months, Spain is lost.

I hope lady Dalrymple, &c. &c.

I ever am, my dear sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,  
COLLINGWOOD.

## No. XXX.

### SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN,

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY  
THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL.

Commanded by the emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan. 1809.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Total.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
241,010	48,821	24,549	3,521	58,026	826	324,411	52,342

King Joseph, commanding—15th Feb. 1809.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Prisoners.	Total effective.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
193,446	33,203	36,326	9,523	56,404	1,843	238,019	42,726

*Note.*—The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the war in Austria, in all about 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls since the last returns.

1st July, 1809.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Prisoners and Stragglers.</i>	<i>Total effective.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
201,082	31,537	19,596	4,513	60,785	7,301	288,766	36,050
Deduct detached men comprised in governments						19,596	4,513
Real total.....						269,170	31,537

15th July, 1809.

196,144	31,131	19,122	4,608	58,230	8,089	281,585	35,739
Deduct detached in governments						19,122	4,608
Real total.....						262,463	31,131

15th August, 1809.

187,560	30,319	12,697	3,930	58,588	7,403	266,248	34,880
Deduct for governments.....						12,697	3,930
Real total.....						253,551	30,950

## SECTION II.—RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS.

Troops immediately under the king—1st June, 1809.

The king's guards, about 5000 men, of all arms, are never borne on the rolls.

First corps, marshal Victor, commanding.

Head-quarters, Torremocha.

		<i>Present under arms.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
		Men.	Men.
4 divisions of infantry	41 battalions	21,268	32,819
2 ditto cavalry	27 squadrons	5,232	7,344
Artillery and equipage	40 companies	2,984	3,610
Number of guns, 48			
Total present under arms.....		29,484	Grand total 43,773

First corps—21st June, 1809.

Head-quarters, Almaraz.

3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	18,367	25,633
2 ditto cavalry	20 squadrons	4,259	5,762
Artillery and equipage	„	2,535	2,860
Total present under arms.....		25,161	Grand total 34,255

First corps—15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Cazalegas.

3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	18,890	26,373
2 ditto cavalry	18 squadrons	3,781	5,080
Artillery and equipage	„	2,586	3,005
Total present under arms.....		25,257	Grand total 34,458

## First corps—1st August, 1809.

Head-quarters, Maqueda.

		Present under arms.	Total.
		Men.	Men.
3 divisions of infantry	33 battalions	15,066	25,068
2 ditto cavalry	18 squadrons	4,987	4,983
Artillery and equipage	„	2,862	2,873
Total present under arms.....		22,415	Grand total 32,924

## Fourth corps, general Sebastiani—10th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Alcala.

3 divisions of infantry	27 battalions	17,100	25,960
2 ditto cavalry	25 squadrons	3,670	5,859
Number of artillerymen omitted in the returns	„	„	„
30 guns			
Total present under arms.....		20,770	Grand total 31,819

15th August, 1809.

3 divisions of infantry	27 battalions	14,259	25,801
2 ditto cavalry	25 squadrons	3,420	5,801
Total present under arms.....		17,679	Grand total 31,602

## Division of Reserve, general Dessolles—15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Madrid.

		Present under arms.	Total.
		Men.	Men.
1 division of infantry	10 battalions	7,681	10,254
Number of guns unknown.			

## Kellerman's division—21st April, 1809.

Head-quarters, Astorga.

Total, composed of detachments	Men. 8,753	Horses. 805	Guns. 8
--------------------------------	---------------	----------------	------------

10th June, 1809.

Head-quarters, Oviedo.

		Under arms.	Total.	
		Men.	Horses.	Men. Horses.
Total, composed of detachments		7,423	2,549	7,681 2,690

15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Valladolid.

8 squadrons	2,291	2,360	2,469	2,393
6 guns				

## SECTION III.

1st February, 1809.

Under arms.

Division Lapisse	infantry	12 battalions	Men. 7,692	
Brigade Maupetit	cavalry	6 squadrons	910	
Total under general Lapisse at Salamanca			8,602	sabres and bayonets.
Number of guns and artillerymen unknown.				



SECTION IV.—RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE  
COMMAND OF MARSHAL SOULT.

Second corps, Soult—15th July, 1809.

Head-quarters, Toro.

		Present under arms.	Total.
		Men.	Men.
4 divisions of infantry	47 battalions	16,626	35,188
3 ditto cavalry	19 squadrons	2,883	4,540
Artillery	„	1,081	1,620
40 guns			
Total present under arms.....		20,590	Grand total 41,348

Fifth corps, Mortier.

Head-quarters, Valladolid.

2 divisions of infantry	24 battalions	15,036	19,541
1 brigade of cavalry	6 squadrons	896	1,491
Artillery	„	648	803
30 guns			
Total present under arms.....		16,580	Grand total 21,835

Sixth corps, Ney.

Head-quarters, Benevente.

2 divisions of infantry	24 battalions	13,700	17,587
1 ditto cavalry	10 squadrons	1,446	2,092
Artillery	„	1,113	1,293
37 guns			
Total present under arms.....		16,259	Grand total 20,972

General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809.

95 battalions—35 squadrons	53,529	84,155
107 guns		

SECTION V.—TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA,  
UNDER MARSHAL LASNES.

15th January, 1809.

	Present under arms.	Detached.	Hospital.	Total effective.
	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
Third corps	17,406	5,789	13,668	36,863
Fifth corps	18,284	„	4,189	22,473
Total.....	35,690	5,789	17,857	59,336

15th February, 1809.

Third corps	16,035	5,891	13,259	35,269
Fifth corps	17,933	1,735	3,859	23,626
Total.....	33,968	7,626	17,118	58,895

SECTION VI.—RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS,  
GENERAL ST. CYR.

15th January, 1809.

Present under arms.	Detached.	Hospital.	Prisoners.	Total.	
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Horses.
41,386	„	6,589	543	48,518	5,403

15th May, 1809.

42,246	2,341	10,243	435	55,265	5,537
--------	-------	--------	-----	--------	-------

15th June, 1809.

42,146	1,699	10,222	406	54,473	5,365
--------	-------	--------	-----	--------	-------

## No. XXXI.

## SECTION I.—STATE OF SPAIN.

*Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808.*

‘In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two more of note.’

*Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to Colonel Kemmis, Loboá, December 27.*

‘The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; and from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after we left it.’

*Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28.*

‘Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me, last night, by the governor, they want *arms, ammunition, and provisions*.’—‘The enemy marched into Truxillo, on the 26th, at half-past twelve o’clock in the day; but, at two, on the following morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four leagues.’

*Lieutenant Ellis to colonel Kemmis, December 28.*

‘I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy, six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz, and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.’

*Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809.*

‘The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the

bridge of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, on its way northward.'—'The extreme attention of Buonaparte being at this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be collected is opposed to you alone.'

## SECTION II.

*Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808.*

'You will receive together with this, several letters from Doyle, which describe events in Catalonia *no way differing from what we have witnessed in other parts of Spain!*'—'The junta have established themselves here, and, whatever may have been the expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr. Frere to form of their future proceedings, *a culpable relapse into their former apathy* seems susceptible of no other remedies but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to adopt.'—'Although Caro promised to write every particular of his conversation with you to the junta, I have hitherto been unable to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the whole to writing, and, *at the same time, to express my conviction both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of the army committed to your charge.* Though I doubt if this will stop the clamour which has been raised on the subject; and though events have probably since taken place, which may materially change the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. Frere *appears* to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so cautiously, and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual support from the Spaniards.'

*Ditto, Seville, January 2.*

'The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this event to make some change in their government.'—'I see, however, little but good disposition, and *am still to look for that energy in rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend matters.*'

*Ditto, Seville, January 10.*

'Reding is at *Taragona*, expecting to be attacked, and possessing a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation to face his opponents at any given point.'—'Whittingham arrived here yesterday, last from the duke of Infantado's head-quarters. He assures me the duke had already twenty thousand men when he left *Cuença*.'—'On the side of *Estremadura*, matters are not going on well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridgés, is here prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I cannot say, however, that I see much activity

since the change; parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz, while the corps of six thousand men, which had been pushed forward from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Plasencia, and probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of falling on the Salamanca country, and, if possible, cutting off your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.'

## SECTION III.

*Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8.*

'Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.'

*Ditto, Seville, July 10, 1809.*

'As the devastations which have been committed have, in many instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself.'

*Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.*

'I much fear that alarm and despondency have gained ground about Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such an united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails everywhere.'

*Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30.*

'He (lieutenant Ellis) has been living with general Cuesta for the last two days,'—'who has assured him that the Spanish troops in Madrid forced their way through the French army; and he expressed great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,' &c.—'that, such was the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos and Madrid, there did not remain a single man.'

*Colonel Kemmis to lieutenant-colonel Reynel, military secretary to sir John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809.*

'In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where Nature has done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the appearance of a soldier, viz. dismounted cavalry.'



*General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, 1809.*

‘The Spaniards here seemed lulled in the most fatal security. They are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the emperor of Austria’s having declared war, and Buonaparte’s return to France gain unlimited credit,’ — ‘The equipment of the fleet goes on very slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily made, but they will neither work themselves nor permit our people to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off the French prisoners go on equally ill.’

*Duc de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809.*

‘During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been lost; and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown away their arms, &c. the commissaries, abandoning more than fifteen hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, as we march as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery, which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more leagues.’

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809.*

‘I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do not consider military defence and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects.’

*Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809.*

‘While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future supply.’ — ‘The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under general Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the aid of a Portuguese army.’ — ‘In this

calamity, the people of Spain cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high and virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not true to herself.—‘Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain.’

END OF VOL. I.













## Date Due

DEC

1972

PRINTED IN U. S. A.



CAT. NO. 23233



TRENT UNIVERSITY



0 1164 0435912 1

ISSUED TO	DATE

0017

